United States of America v. Lonnie Dean

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LONNIE DEAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 21-2082
(D.C. No. 1:11-CR-01670-JCH-1)
(D. N.M.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Lonnie Dean appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 17, 2022
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by Section 603(b) of the First
Step Act, allows federal prisoners to move for compassionate release in the district
court after exhausting Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) administrative remedies. See
United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 830-31 (10th Cir. 2021). The court may
grant the motion only when the district court finds that
(1) extraordinary and compelling reasons justify release;
(2) release is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission; and
(3) release is warranted after considering the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors.
Id. at 831; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
In general, “district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any
of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at
831 n.4 (quotations omitted); see also United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1043
(10th Cir. 2021). But because the United States Sentencing Commission “has been
unable to comply with its statutory duty of promulgating a post-First Step Act policy
statement,” “the Sentencing Commission’s existing policy statement[s are] applicable
only to motions for sentence reductions filed by the Director of the BOP, and not to
motions filed directly by defendants.” Id. at 1050. Thus, current policy statements
“cannot constrain district courts’ discretion” in deciding a prisoner’s motion for
compassionate release. Id. (quotations omitted).
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In other words, until the Sentencing Commission promulgates new policy
statements, a district court may consider only the first and third prerequisites for
compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) because currently there are no
applicable policy statements under the second prerequisite.
B. Procedural History
In 2013, Mr. Dean pled guilty to (1) conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams
of methamphetamine; (2) possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute;
and (3) assaulting, resisting, or impeding a federal officer. He was sentenced to 240
months in prison. 1
In August 2020, Mr. Dean submitted a compassionate-release request to the
BOP under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As justification, he cited (1) his medical
conditions, including obesity, diabetes, and hypertension; and (2) the spread of
COVID-19. After the BOP denied his request, Mr. Dean filed a motion for
compassionate release in the district court.
The district court agreed that Mr. Dean’s medical conditions constituted
extraordinary and compelling circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 2 It then
1 A state court also sentenced Mr. Dean to 10 years in prison for vehicular
homicide after he killed an innocent bystander while attempting to escape federal
officers. Suppl. ROA at 3, 87, 98. The federal and state sentences were set to run
concurrently.
2 The court disagreed with Mr. Dean’s contention that the COVID-19
pandemic supported a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances, noting
the BOP’s adequate response to the pandemic and Mr. Dean’s vaccination status.
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weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and concluded that
modifying Mr. Dean’s sentence was not warranted. The court acknowledged Mr.
Dean had a clean record in prison.
In considering the § 3553(a) factors, the district court
(1) described Mr. Dean’s extensive criminal history, which
“included five felony drug convictions, carrying a
concealed weapon, possession of stolen property, an arrest
for battery against a household member and an arrest for
burglary”;
(2) noted the seriousness of his offenses of conviction, during
which “he fled from federal agents by ramming a vehicle,
fleeing and then causing a crash that killed a person”; and
(3) found “after review of the section []3553 factors and the
facts set forth above, the defendant is a danger to the safety
of another person or to the community.”
ROA at 133. The court determined the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release and
denied Mr. Dean’s motion.
Mr. Dean timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s ruling on a First Step Act motion for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1147-48, 1154-55 (10th Cir.
2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect
conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Piper, 839
F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted).
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Mr. Dean argues the district court erred because it relied on a policy statement
in the Sentencing Guidelines, § 1B1.13(2), to deny the motion. 3 We disagree. The
court said Mr. Dean satisfied the first prerequisite of § 3582(c)(1)(A)—extraordinary
and compelling reasons—but denied the motion based on the third prerequisite—
evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors. It did not rely on the second prerequisite. Mr.
Dean’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.
First, he argues the district court failed to acknowledge that no applicable
Sentencing Commission policy statements exist. But Mr. Dean points to no authority
providing that the district court was obligated to state that no policy statement
applied. The Government alerted the court to our holding in McGee that the
Sentencing Commission has not yet promulgated an applicable policy statement,
Suppl. ROA at 7, and the court cited McGee in its order denying compassionate
release, ROA at 129.
3 United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13(2) states:
Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a
term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of
supervised release with or without conditions that does not
exceed the unserved portion of the original term of
imprisonment) if, after considering the factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are
applicable, the court determines that
. . .
(2) [t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety of any
other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g).
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Second, he says the district court’s order summarized the Government’s
argument that Mr. Dean cannot satisfy Sentencing Commission Policy Statement
§ 1B1.13(2). But the court’s description of the Government’s argument citing to
§ 1B1.13(2) does not show the court denied relief based on that provision. A court’s
restatement of a party’s argument does not mean the court has adopted it. And “it
would hardly be an abuse of discretion for a district court to look to the present
policy statement for guidance” as long as it did not feel bound by the policy
statement. United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 938 n.4 (10th Cir. 2021).
Third, he contends the district court’s statement that he “is a danger to the
safety of another person or to the community” “tracks” the language found in
§ 1B1.13(2). Aplt. Br. at 14 (quoting United States v. Carralero-Escobar, 860 F.
App’x 143, 146 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished)). But the court used this language
only after it considered the § 3553(a) factors. This in no way shows it denied the
motion based on § 1B1.13(2). The court instead tied the language from the policy
statement to its assessment of the § 3553(a) factors.
Even assuming the district court relied on § 1B1.13(2), any error would have
been harmless. In its order, the court listed the § 3553(a) factors. It then determined
that the defendant’s criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the
offense—i.e., the facts it previously laid out—militated against sentence
modification. Because “district courts may deny compassionate-release motions
when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking,” Maumau,
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993 F.3d at 831 n.4 (quotations omitted), any error by the district court in its
treatment of § 1B1.13(2) would have been harmless.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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