USA v. Tia Deyon Pugh

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13136
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TIA DEYON PUGH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00073-TFM-B-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
Before L AGOA and B RASHER , Circuit Judges, and B OULEE ,∗ District
Judge.
BRASHER , Circuit Judge:
This appeal raises questions of first impression about the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3), which prohibits impeding
law enforcement officers during a civil disorder affecting interstate
commerce. During a riotous protest in Mobile, Alabama, Tia Pugh
shattered the window of a police car that was blocking protestors
from walking onto the interstate. After the government charged
Pugh with impeding law enforcement during a civil disorder, she
moved to dismiss the indictment. She argued that Section 231(a)(3)
is facially unconstitutional because it: (1) exceeds Congress’s power
to legislate under the Commerce Clause, (2) is a substantially over-
broad regulation of activities protected by the First Amendment,
(3) is a content-based restriction of expressive activities in violation
of the First Amendment, and (4) is vague in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court rejected
these arguments, Pugh’s case went to trial, and a jury found her
guilty. Pugh argues that the district court erred in rejecting her four
challenges to the constitutionality of Section 231(a)(3). We disa-
gree and affirm Pugh’s conviction.
∗ Honorable J. P. Boulee, United States District Judge for the Northern District
of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 3
I.
In May 2020, protesters planned to march through the
streets of downtown Mobile, Alabama, to protest police brutality
after the death of George Floyd. Mobile police officers developed
an operational plan to protect the protestors and the public. As part
of that plan, the police placed traffic units in the area to redirect
protesters away from Interstate 10, which was near the protest
route.
On the day of the protest, Tia Pugh and a group of protes-
tors deviated from the planned protest route and approached a
ramp to Interstate 10. The ramp they approached was near
Exit 26B of Interstate 10, an exit used by commercial vehicles car-
rying hazardous materials across state lines. In response, the police
attempted to block access to the ramp by forming a barricade. The
police, in coordination with the Alabama Department of Transpor-
tation, shut down traffic along the ramp and closed the exit. The
Alabama Department of Transportation also rerouted vehicles on
the interstate, which slowed traffic and forced commercial vehicles
carrying hazardous materials to take a longer route.
The protest eventually devolved into a riot. Police officers
used tear gas to disperse people from the highway. Around that
time, Pugh smashed a police car window with a baseball bat before
running away. Pugh’s attack immobilized the vehicle, and police
officers had to be “pulled off of the barricade line to guard the ve-
hicle” and the equipment inside.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
A grand jury indicted Pugh on one count of impeding law
enforcement during a civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 231(a)(3). Pugh moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that Section 231(a)(3) is unconstitutional. As relevant here, Pugh
argued that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it:
(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause;
(2) too broadly regulates speech and expressive conduct protected
by the First Amendment; (3) constitutes a content-based restriction
of expressive activities protected by the First Amendment; and
(4) fails to provide fair notice and encourages arbitrary and discrim-
inatory enforcement, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. After a grand jury issued a superseding indictment,
Pugh renewed her motion to dismiss and reasserted her argu-
ments.
The district court denied Pugh’s motion and rejected each
of her arguments. The case went to trial, and the government pre-
sented evidence and testimony about the protest, its impact on in-
terstate commerce, and Pugh’s conduct. The district court in-
structed the jury that Pugh could be found guilty of violating Sec-
tion 231(a)(3) only if the government established beyond a reason-
able doubt that: (1) Pugh “knowingly committed an act or at-
tempted to commit an act with the intended purpose of obstruct-
ing, impeding, or interfering with one or more law enforcement
officers”; (2) at the time of the act or attempted act, the “officer or
officers were engaged in the lawful performance of their official du-
ties incident to and during a civil disorder”; and (3) “the civil disor-
der obstructed, delayed, or adversely affected interstate commerce
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 5
or the movement of any article or commodity in interstate com-
merce in any way or to any degree.”
The jury found Pugh guilty of violating Section 231(a)(3).
The district court sentenced Pugh to time served and imposed
monetary penalties and restitution. Pugh timely appealed.
II.
We generally review a district court’s order denying a mo-
tion to dismiss an indictment for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269, 1285 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Di Pietro, 615 F.3d 1369, 1370 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010)). But
“[w]e review a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de
novo.” United States v. Knight, 490 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218,
1225 (11th Cir. 2005)); accord Focia, 869 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Di
Pietro, 615 F.3d at 1370 n.1).
III.
Section 231(a)(3) punishes “[w]hoever commits or attempts
to commit any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with any fire-
man or law enforcement officer” who is “lawfully engaged in the
lawful performance of his official duties incident to and during the
commission of a civil disorder.” 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). The civil dis-
order must be one “which in any way or degree obstructs, delays,
or adversely affects commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce or the conduct or performance of any
federally protected function.” Id. A related provision defines “civil
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
disorder” and “commerce” for Section 231(a)(3). See id. § 232(1)–
(2). A “civil disorder” is “any public disturbance involving acts of
violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which causes an
immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the property
or person of any other individual.” Id. § 232(1). And “commerce” is
defined as “commerce (A) between any State or the District of Co-
lumbia and any place outside thereof; (B) between points within
any State or the District of Columbia, but through any place out-
side thereof; or (C) wholly within the District of Columbia.” Id.
§ 232(2).
Pugh argues that Section 231(a)(3) is unconstitutional be-
cause it (1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause, (2) is a substantially overbroad regulation that criminalizes
activities protected by the First Amendment, (3) is a content-based
restriction of expressive activities in violation of the First Amend-
ment, and (4) is vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.
These four arguments are all facial challenges to the consti-
tutionality of Section 231(a)(3). “A facial challenge, as distinguished
from an as-applied challenge, seeks to invalidate a statute or regu-
lation itself.” Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235
(11th Cir. 2000)). Generally, “a plaintiff bringing a facial challenge
must ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
[law] would be valid’ or show that the law lacks ‘a plainly legitimate
sweep.’” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 7
(2021) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); and then quoting Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449
(2008)).
In determining whether a statute meets this standard, we
“consider[] only applications of the statute in which it actually au-
thorizes or prohibits conduct.” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S.
409, 418 (2015). Although “the underlying facts” of the case “are
largely irrelevant” in a facial challenge, Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC
v. City of Atlanta, 15 F.4th 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Patel,
576 U.S. at 415; Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d
666, 674 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984)), the facts may establish that circum-
stances exist under which the statute is valid, see United States v.
Paige, 604 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting facial challenge
under the Commerce Clause because the law “was constitutionally
applied to [the defendant’s] conduct” (citing Horton, 272 F.3d at
1329)). And for all arguments but First Amendment ones, the “fact
that [a statute] might operate unconstitutionally under some con-
ceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly in-
valid” because federal courts “have not recognized an ‘over-
breadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amend-
ment.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
269 n.18 (1984)).
With these principles in mind, we next consider Pugh’s four
facial challenges to the constitutionality of Section 231(a)(3).
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
A.
We will start with Pugh’s argument that Section 231(a)(3) is
facially unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power un-
der the Commerce Clause. Pugh’s argument turns on whether the
jurisdictional element of the statute—the requirement that the civil
disorder “in any way or degree obstruct[], delay[], or adversely af-
fect[] commerce”—is enough to limit the statute’s scope to consti-
tutional applications. 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). We believe that it is.
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to
regulate interstate commerce. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The
Supreme Court has “identified three broad categories of [interstate]
activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.”
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citing Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclama-
tion Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1981)). The three categories
are: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” id. (citing
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)); (2) “the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce,” id. (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); S.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911); Perez, 402 U.S. at 150);
and (3) “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce,” id. at 558–59 (citations omitted).
Under our precedents, if a criminal statute contains a juris-
dictional element that limits the statute to constitutional
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 9
applications, that jurisdictional element “immunizes [the statute]
from . . . [a] facial constitutional attack.” United States v. Scott, 263
F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. McAllister, 77
F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000). The reason is that “[w]hen a statute ex-
pressly requires that the proscribed conduct have an appropriate
nexus with interstate commerce, courts can ‘ensure, through case-
by-case inquiry,’ that each application of the statute is constitu-
tional, and thus the statute should not be struck down as being fa-
cially unconstitutional.” Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1228 n.5 (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Pugh argues that the jurisdictional element in Sec-
tion 231(a)(3) is not enough to limit its scope to constitutional ap-
plications. Under the relevant part of the statute, a jury must find
that a defendant committed an “act to obstruct, impede, or inter-
fere with” a law enforcement officer while that officer was per-
forming “his official duties incident to and during the commission
of a civil disorder which in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
adversely affects commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). The statute’s ju-
risdictional element criminalizes acts during civil disorders that “af-
fect[] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce.” Id. (emphases added). “The ‘in commerce’ language de-
notes the first two Lopez categories—regulation of the channels and
of the instrumentalities of commerce.” Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1231.
And “[t]he ‘affecting commerce’ language invokes the third Lopez
category—regulation of intrastate activities that substantially affect
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
commerce.” Id. Congress, therefore, invoked the full scope of its
commerce power in Section 231(a)(3).
Pugh says this element fails because its broadest reach—any
act to obstruct an officer during a civil disorder that “adversely af-
fects commerce”—is beyond Congress’s power to regulate. She
points to three parts of this phrase that, she says, make it overinclu-
sive. First, she says this language does not limit the statute’s reach
to intrastate “activities that ‘substantially affect’ interstate com-
merce” because the element is directed to acts that merely “affect”
commerce. Second, she says that the jurisdictional element is too
removed from her actions. That is, the jury was not required to
find that her “act” affected interstate commerce—the jury needed
to find only that the “civil disorder” in which her act occurred af-
fected interstate commerce. Third, she argues that the use of the
phrase “incident to” further attenuates the link between the crimi-
nal act and the civil disorder that must affect commerce.
Pugh’s first argument is foreclosed by our precedent, which
approves of the “affect” language. In United States v. Castleberry, 116
F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1997), we upheld the Hobbs Act against a com-
merce clause challenge. See id. at 1387. That “Act prohibits extor-
tion or robbery that ‘in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or af-
fects commerce or the movements of any article or commodity in
commerce.’” Id. at 1386 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994); and
citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960)). The defend-
ant in Castleberry argued that the jurisdictional element of the
Hobbs Act did not require a sufficient connection between the
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 11
criminal act of robbery and interstate commerce. See id. at 1387.
But we disagreed. We instead held that, because the statute “con-
tains a jurisdictional requirement that the [criminal act] be con-
nected in any way to interstate commerce,” the statute survived a
facial challenge. Id. The jurisdictional element here is the same as
the one in Castleberry in using “affect” instead of “substantially af-
fect.”
Pugh’s second argument—that the criminal act is too re-
moved from any connection to commerce—is not so easily re-
solved. Unlike the Hobbs Act, Section 231(a)(3) does not require
that the criminal act itself be linked to commerce—it requires only
that the civil disorder “incident to and during” which the criminal
act occurred be linked to commerce. Does this more removed con-
nection make a difference in the result?
We believe the answer is “no.” Although the Supreme Court
has not approved this precise language, the Court has concluded
that a similarly removed jurisdictional element satisfies the Com-
merce Clause. In Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the
arson of “any building . . . used . . . in any activity affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce.” Id. at 859 (alterations in original)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)). There, the statute did not link the
criminal act of arson itself to interstate commerce but rather the
destroyed property. Still, the Court held that the government could
convict a Chicago arsonist who set fire to a Chicago property as
long as the property sat in the broader commercial market. Id. at
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
860. There was no need for a jury finding that the arson itself af-
fected interstate commerce.
It seems clear from Russell that the jurisdictional element of
interstate commerce need not link directly to the criminalized act
itself as long as the object of the criminal act is sufficiently con-
nected to interstate commerce. In Russell, the Court upheld the
statute because commercial buildings were “used in an activity af-
fecting [interstate] commerce,” and thus criminals who burned
those buildings down necessarily affected interstate commerce. Id.
at 862. There was a logical connection between the criminal act
and commerce, even though the act’s effect on commerce was me-
diated through the victim of the crime. Likewise, Section 231(a)(3)
makes it illegal to “impede . . . any fireman or law enforcement of-
ficer” who is trying to quell a civil disorder that “in any way or de-
gree . . . adversely affects commerce.” Just as Congress had the
power to outlaw the burning of commercial buildings in Russell be-
cause of the buildings’ effect on interstate commerce, Congress has
the power to outlaw interference with police as they try to elimi-
nate civil disorders that affect interstate commerce.
Pugh’s contrary view would anomalously allow Congress to
criminalize creating a civil disorder that affected interstate com-
merce but not a person’s interference with an officer’s efforts to
stop that disorder. Such an irrational line is inconsistent with the
scope of Congress’s authority. Congress has the “authority to
‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States,’” even by regulating
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 13
conduct that is not itself interstate commerce. See Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8). We therefore
reject Pugh’s argument that the jurisdictional element of Sec-
tion 231(a)(3) is too attenuated.
Having resolved Pugh’s second argument, we turn to
Pugh’s third and final point. She notes that the language of the stat-
ute criminalizes impeding an officer engaged in “his official duties
incident to and during commission of a civil disorder” affecting in-
terstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (emphasis added). She
complains that “incident to” further removes the impeding act
from the jurisdictional element. We disagree.
Pugh rightly defines the adjectival form of incident as
“[d]ependent on, subordinate to, arising out of, or otherwise con-
nected with (something else, usu. of greater importance).” Incident,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). But Pugh erroneously argues
that this language means that the statute requires that the officer’s
duties be only incidentally related to a civil disorder affecting inter-
state commerce. Pugh misunderstands how the phrase “incident
to” is used in legal parlance. Consider “search incident to arrest.”
This doctrine does not allow an officer to search anything inci-
dentally related to an arrest, however removed. Instead, it requires
the search to connect to or arise out of arrest, limiting the search
to the person of the arrestee or an area they control. See Birchfield
v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 460 (2016) (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)). That same reasoning applies to
this statute.
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
Lastly, we think that the conduct Pugh was convicted for
strongly suggests that the jurisdictional element is constitutional.
See Paige, 604 F.3d at 1274. Pugh interfered with a police officer’s
ability to open an interstate highway by disabling a police car near
an exit ramp. Her criminal act required commercial vehicles to be
rerouted as they transported hazardous material. Her conduct is
perhaps a quintessential example of the nexus between a criminal
act and interstate commerce.
Pugh’s facial challenge therefore fails under the Commerce
Clause.
B.
Next, Pugh asserts that Section 231(a)(3) violates the First
Amendment because it broadly prohibits protected speech and ex-
pressive conduct. The First Amendment provides that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.
Const. amend. I. Under that provision, “a law may be invalidated
as [facially] overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legiti-
mate sweep.” Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010)). While “‘[s]ubstan-
tial overbreadth’ is not a precisely defined term[,] . . . we know it
requires ‘a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties
not before the Court.’” Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1232
(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984)).
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 15
Pugh must carry a heavy burden to establish unconstitu-
tional overbreadth. To prevail on this claim, Pugh must establish
“from the text of the [challenged provisions] and from actual fact
that a substantial number of instances exist in which [the provi-
sions] cannot be applied constitutionally.” Cheshire Bridge Holdings,
15 F.4th at 1370–71 (alterations in original) (quoting N.Y. State Club
Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)). Courts have “vigor-
ously enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be sub-
stantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the stat-
ute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S.
285, 292 (2008) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 485 (1989); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973)). “Rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to
speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as
picketing or demonstrating).” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124
(2003).
Our “first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the chal-
lenged statute.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 293. Then we consider
whether Pugh has established that “the statute, as we have con-
strued it, criminalizes a substantial amount of protected expressive
activity.” Id. at 297.
According to Pugh, Section 231(a)(3) applies to a range of
speech and expressive conduct, including “yell[ing] at police to de-
sist from an arrest, . . . flip[ping] off officers to distract or to encour-
age resistance, or . . . record[ing] police activity with a cell phone.”
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
But we cannot say Section 231(a)(3) affects much speech at all.
“The ‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible ap-
plications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an
overbreadth challenge.’” Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (quoting Taxpay-
ers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800).
The government must prove four elements under Sec-
tion 231(a)(3). First, the government must establish that the de-
fendant committed (or tried to commit) “any act to obstruct, im-
pede, or interfere with any fireman or law enforcement officer.” 18
U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). Second, the fireman or law enforcement officer
must have been “lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his
official duties.” Id. Third, the fireman or law enforcement officer
must have been performing those official duties “incident to and
during the commission of a civil disorder.” Id. Fourth, the civil dis-
order must have “in any way or degree obstruct[ed], delay[ed], or
adversely affect[ed] commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce or the conduct or performance of any
federally protected function.” Id.
Pugh argues that the first element regulates speech, focusing
particularly on the word “interfere.” Section 231(a)(3)’s first ele-
ment requires that the defendant “commit[] or attempt[] to com-
mit any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with any fireman or
law enforcement officer.” Id. The words “commit any act to ob-
struct, impede, or interfere” are not statutorily defined. We may
therefore look to “dictionaries in existence around the time of en-
actment”—around 1968—to interpret the “plain and ordinary
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 17
meaning” of these words. United States v. Chinchilla, 987 F.3d 1303,
1308 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852
F.3d 1018, 1026 (11th Cir. 2016)).
It is hard to see how either “obstruct” or “impede” apply to
speech or expressive conduct, except at the margins. In ordinary
language around the time of Section 231(a)(3)’s enactment, “ob-
struct” meant “to block or close up by an obstacle.” Webster’s Sev-
enth New Collegiate Dictionary 583 (7th ed. 1969) (defining “obstruct
further to mean “to hinder from passage, action, or operation: im-
pede” and “to cut off from sight”); accord The Random House College
Dictionary 918 (1973). And, in the specific context of “obstructing
an officer,” it “implie[d] forcible resistance.” Obstructing an officer,
Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Likewise, around that
time, “impede” meant “to interfere with the progress of” and to
“block.” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 418 (7th ed.
1969); accord Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “im-
pede” as “[t]o obstruct[,] hinder[,] check[, or] delay”); The Random
House College Dictionary 666 (1973) (defining “impede” as “to retard
in movement or progress by means of obstacles or hinderances”
and to “ostruct” or “hinder”). Therefore, around the time Sec-
tion 231(a)(3) was enacted, the terms to “obstruct” and to “impede”
were similar and meant to block through an obstacle, forcible re-
sistance, or by other means. One cannot block a fireman or law
enforcement officer with speech alone.
The term “interfere” carries a slightly broader meaning. To
“interfere” meant “to come in collision or be in opposition” and to
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
“clash” as well as “to enter into or take a part in the concerns of
others.” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 441 (7th ed.
1969); accord The Random House College Dictionary 694 (1973) (defin-
ing “interfere” as “to come into opposition, as one thing with an-
other, esp[ecially] with the effect of hampering action or proce-
dure,” as well as “to take part in the affairs of others” and “med-
dle”). In legal contexts, “interfere” meant “to check; hamper; hin-
der; disturb; intervene; intermeddle; interpose; to enter into, or to
take part in, the concerns of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th
ed. 1968). But in the context of Section 231(a)(3) the term “inter-
fere” is “narrowed by the [] canon of noscitur a sociis—which coun-
sels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring
words with which it is associated.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 294 (citing
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961); 2A Norman J.
Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Con-
struction § 47:16 (7th ed. 2007)). That is, the surrounding words—
“obstruct” and “impede”—cabin the scope of “interfere.” Cf.
Paresky v. United States, 995 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2021) (ex-
plaining that because the word “‘sum’ [in a statute] finds itself trav-
eling with ‘tax’ and ‘penalty,’ [] we therefore use [] noscitur a sociis
. . . to understand [its] meaning”). Although “interfere,” by itself,
could include speech, it is best read in Section 231(a)(3) alongside
“obstruct” and “impede” as prohibiting someone from hindering a
law enforcement officer or fireman with more than mere words.
Having interpreted Section 231(a)(3) as focused on obstruc-
tive conduct, we turn to Pugh’s facial overbreadth challenge and
whether she has established that the statute “criminalizes a
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 19
substantial amount of protected expressive activity.” United States
v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200, 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams, 553
U.S. at 297). It is obvious that the statute does not. We need not
decide today whether the statute might prohibit certain kinds of
expressive activities that have the effect of blocking police officers
from quieting a riot—such as directing others to riot. It is sufficient
to say that Pugh cannot identify from the text of Section 231(a)(3)
or from any actual prosecutions that “a substantial number of in-
stances exist in which [the provisions] cannot be applied constitu-
tionally.” Cheshire Bridge Holdings, 15 F.4th at 1370–71 (alteration in
original) (quoting N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 14).
One last point: Pugh says that we must declare this statute
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987). We disagree. In Hill, the Su-
preme Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance that made it
“unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or
her duties.” Id. at 453. But there are two crucial differences between
Section 231(a)(3) and the municipal ordinance in that case.
First, the municipal ordinance in Hill prohibited only verbal
interference with law enforcement. See id. at 460–61. As the Court
explained, state law preempted the municipal ordinance insofar as
it prohibited any physical assault on a police officer. See id. at 460.
So the only field of operation for the ordinance was to “prohibit[]
verbal interruptions of police officers.” Id. at 461. Unlike that mu-
nicipal ordinance, Section 231(a)(3) is directed at conduct, not
speech.
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
Second, in Hill, there was real-world evidence that the mu-
nicipality was enforcing its ordinance to prohibit speech. The target
of the statute’s enforcement in Hill was arrested for shouting at of-
ficers, “[w]hy don’t you pick on somebody your own size?” Id. at
454. He had been arrested three other times for similar speech. See
id. at 455 n.4. And he introduced evidence that others had been
charged for similar speech crimes, including “several reporters.” Id.
at 455. Here, on the other hand, it is merely hypothetical that Sec-
tion 231(a)(3) could be enforced against speech. And “[t]he ‘mere
fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a
statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth
challenge.’” Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. at 800). Unlike the arrestee in Hill, Pugh cannot establish
that Section 231(a)(3) prohibits a substantial amount of protected
conduct as required to succeed on her facial overbreadth challenge.
C.
Having dealt with Pugh’s overbreadth argument, we turn to
Pugh’s other First Amendment claim. Pugh asserts that, on its face,
Section 231(a)(3) is a content-based restriction of activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment. “Government regulation of speech
is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the
topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564
U.S. 552, 563–66 (2011); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980);
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). “In other words,
a regulation is content-based if it ‘suppress[es], disadvantage[s], or
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 21
impose[s] differential burdens upon speech because of its content,’
. . . i.e., if it draws ‘facial distinctions . . . defining regulated speech
by particular subject matter.’” Speech First, Inc. v. Cartwright, 32
F.4th 1110, 1126 (11th Cir. 2022) (some alterations in original) (ci-
tation omitted) (first quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC., 512
U.S. 622, 642 (1994); and then quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 163–64).
To determine whether a regulation is a content-based re-
striction of speech, we first consider whether the regulation, “‘on
its face[,]’ draws distinctions based on the message a speaker con-
veys.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163 (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566). If the
law is facially content neutral, we then consider whether the regu-
lation “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech[]’ or [] [was] adopted by the government ‘because
of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.’” Id. at 164
(fourth alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
Section 231(a)(3) is not a content-based regulation of speech.
If it affects speech at all, Section 231(a)(3) is content-neutral. It ap-
plies to “any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with any fireman
or law enforcement officer” performing official duties “incident to
and during the commission of a civil disorder” affecting commerce
or a federally protected function. 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (emphasis
added). In criminalizing “any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere,”
id., the statute does not “draw[] distinctions based on the message”
conveyed by the relevant act, Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. Instead, Sec-
tion 231(a)(3) applies as long as the act is “to obstruct, impede or
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13136
interfere with any fireman or law enforcement officer” performing
official duties.
Still, Pugh asserts that Section 231(a)(3) “singles out forms of
expression that . . . criticize, challenge, insult, or object to the ac-
tions of law enforcement officers.” But the statute does not distin-
guish between acts that are critical of law enforcement and acts that
are neutral toward, or favor, law enforcement. Cf. McCullen v. Coak-
ley, 573 U.S. 464, 479 (2014) (holding that a statute was not a con-
tent-based restriction because “[w]hether petitioners violate[d] the
[a]ct ‘depend[ed]’ not ‘on what they say,’ . . . but simply on where
they say it” (citation omitted) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian L.
Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 (2010))).
Moreover, Pugh has not successfully established that Sec-
tion 231(a)(3) was enacted to suppress expressive content. Because
the broad language of the statute “help[s] confirm that it was not
enacted to burden a narrower category of disfavored speech” but
is instead content-neutral and because there is no evidence to the
contrary, we hold that § 231(a)(3) is not a content-based regulation
of speech. Id. at 481 (citing Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Pur-
pose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63
U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 451–52 (1996)).
D.
Finally, Pugh asserts that Section 231(a)(3) violates the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it is vague on its face.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
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21-13136 Opinion of the Court 23
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he [g]overnment
violates this guarantee by taking away someone’s life, liberty, or
property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary
people fair notice of the conduct it punishes[] or so standardless
that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 576
U.S. 591, 595 (2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58
(1983)).
“[A] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others.” Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. at 20
(quoting Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 495 (1982)). Accordingly, we have held that “a facial vagueness
challenge” cannot be maintained “by one to whom a statute may
be constitutionally applied.” Di Pietro, 615 F.3d at 1373 (citing Hu-
manitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. at 17–20).
Here, Section 231(a)(3) constitutionally applies to Pugh’s
conduct. Her act of disabling a police car on an interstate ramp dur-
ing a civil disorder undoubtedly obstructed the law enforcement
response to the riot in which she was participating. Accordingly,
Pugh “may not challenge the statute on vagueness grounds based
on its application to others.” Id.
IV.
The district court’s order denying Pugh’s motion to dismiss,
Pugh’s conviction, and her sentence are AFFIRMED.
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