USA v. Joseph Sanfilippo

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
_________________
No. 22-11175
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH A. SANFILIPPO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60006-RKA-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 1 of 13

-- 1 of 13 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-11175
Before J ORDAN, L AGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
L AGOA , Circuit Judge:
Joseph Sanfilippo appeals his conviction for wire fraud pur-
suant to a guilty plea and contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment against him because
it was issued after the expiration of the federal statute of limitations
under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Sanfilippo argues that the district court
misinterpreted § 3282(a), and thus incorrectly concluded that the
government indicted him within the statute of limitations. We
conclude, however, after careful review and with the benefit of oral
argument, that we cannot resolve this issue, as Sanfilippo entered
an unconditional guilty plea to one of eight counts in the indict-
ment and, under our precedent, waived his ability to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Be-
cause Sanfilippo waived any challenge to the timeliness of his in-
dictment by entering a knowing, voluntary, and unconditional
plea, we dismiss Sanfilippo’s appeal.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Sanfilippo met the victim, a wealthy widow, in 2008 or 2009,
and the pair had a long-distance relationship that lasted for a few
years. In 2013, Sanfilippo informed the victim that he was moving
to South Florida, and the couple’s relationship rekindled once he
did. In 2015, Sanfilippo convinced the victim that she should invest
1 Sanfilippo stipulated to the following facts in the factual proffer submitted
with his plea agreement.
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 2 of 13

-- 2 of 13 --

22-11175 Opinion of the Court 3
in Cayman Shipping and Distribution, LLC (“Cayman Shipping”),
which allegedly bought excess inventory from companies like
Walgreens and CVS and shipped it to South America for resale.
Sanfilippo told the victim that he knew the president of Cayman
Shipping, who would only accept investment money directly from
him. So, in late October and early November 2015, the victim
wrote four checks, payable to Sanfilippo, for a total of $100,000. In
return for her investments, Sanfilippo gave the victim a fraudulent
promissory note. Sanfilippo deposited these checks into one of two
personal bank accounts, and almost immediately thereafter with-
drew the money in increments of less than $10,000. In April 2017,
the victim hired an attorney, who unsuccessfully tried to contact
Cayman Shipping seeking return of the victim’s investment.
Agents later learned that Cayman Shipping did not exist, nor did
the person Sanfilippo said was the president.
For a large part of 2020, grand jury sessions were suspended
in the Southern District of Florida due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
See S.D. Fla. Admin. Order 2020-22 (suspending all grand jury ses-
sions as of March 26, 2020); S.D. Fla. Admin. Order 2020-76 (provid-
ing that two grand jury sessions per week were to resume on No-
vember 16, 2020). As a result, by late 2020, the government still
had not brought its case. Under federal law, however, “[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prose-
cuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the in-
dictment is found or the information is instituted within five years
next after such offense shall have been committed.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282(a).
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 3 of 13

-- 3 of 13 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-11175
Unable to bring an indictment, the government instead filed
an eight-count information in the Southern District on October 23,
2020. Because the government alleged that Sanfilippo committed
four acts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 between Oc-
tober 28, 2015, and November 2, 2015, and four acts of structuring
in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 between October 29, 2015, and No-
vember 4, 2015, the information was filed within the five-year pe-
riod provided by § 3282(a). The parties agree that Sanfilippo could
be prosecuted by information only if he waived prosecution by in-
dictment “in open court and after being advised of the nature of the
charge and of [his] rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b); see U.S. Const.
amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or oth-
erwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury. . . .”). But Sanfilippo did not provide such a waiver.
After grand jury sessions resumed, the government indicted
Sanfilippo on the same eight counts on January 14, 2021. The gov-
ernment then moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
48(a) to dismiss the information without prejudice, which the dis-
trict court granted on February 26, 2021. Sanfilippo then moved to
dismiss the indictment, arguing that it was “filed after the Statute
of Limitations had expired” for all eight counts.
The district court denied Sanfilippo’s motion. The district
court first concluded that an information is “instituted” when it is
filed, and thus the government acted timely under § 3282(a), even
though Sanfilippo had not waived his right to prosecution by in-
dictment. The district court then turned to 18 U.S.C. § 3288.
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 4 of 13

-- 4 of 13 --

22-11175 Opinion of the Court 5
When an information charging a felony is dismissed after the stat-
ute of limitations expires, § 3288 provides, with some exceptions, a
six-month window in which the government can indict the defend-
ant. See § 3288. While the government cannot invoke this provi-
sion when the reason for the dismissal “was the failure to file the
indictment or information within the period prescribed by the ap-
plicable statute of limitations, or some other reason that would bar
a new prosecution,” id., Sanfilippo did not argue that either applied
in his case. Even if he had, the district court concluded that “any
reliance on these exceptions would have been futile.” Therefore,
the district court concluded that the indictment was timely, and,
after rejecting other arguments not relevant to this appeal, denied
Sanfilippo’s motion to dismiss.
Sanfilippo later agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire
fraud. The written plea agreement does not contain a reservation
of the right to appeal the district court’s denial of Sanfilippo’s mo-
tion to dismiss. At the plea colloquy, Sanfilippo stated that he had
discussed the plea agreement with his counsel and fully understood
its terms, including the fact that the plea agreement “fully re-
flect[ed] [his] agreement with the United States.” The district court
summarized the terms of the plea agreement and alerted Sanfilippo
to the last paragraph, which stipulated “that this plea agreement
represents the entire agreement and understanding between you
and the United States, and that there are no other secret or myste-
rious agreements, promises, or guarantees that have been made to
you in order to induce you to plead guilty in this case.” Sanfilippo
confirmed that the plea agreement represented his entire
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 5 of 13

-- 5 of 13 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-11175
understanding with the government and that he understood he
was waiving certain rights by pleading guilty. Sanfilippo’s counsel
indicated that Sanfilippo understood the rights that he was waiving
in signing the agreement. Sanfilippo then pleaded guilty to Count
Four, and the district court accepted his plea, adjudging him guilty.
After Sanfilippo’s guilty plea was entered and the district
court sought to end the hearing, the government interjected,
“there is one other issue.” The government noted that United States
v. B.G.G., another case that raised similar statute of limitations
questions, was on appeal to this Court. If it turned out, based on
this Court’s decision in B.G.G., that the government was “in error
by filing an information within the statute of limitations,” the gov-
ernment said that “Sanfilippo would be exonerated at that point,
just as a matter of fundamental fairness.” In such a case, “what [the
government] would probably do is allow [Sanfilippo] to withdraw
his guilty plea, and then [the government] would have to dismiss
the charges, because the statute of limitations had run.” Sanfilippo
would be able to “file a motion to dismiss based on the statute of
limitations again, in which case it would be granted at that point.”
Both the district court and Sanfilippo agreed to this potential path.
The district court subsequently sentenced Sanfilippo to 24
months’ imprisonment with three years of supervised release and
restitution in the amount of $300,000.2 This appeal follows.
2 The district court has since moved Sanfilippo’s self-surrender date to May
2024.
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 6 of 13

-- 6 of 13 --

22-11175 Opinion of the Court 7
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a defendant waived the right to appeal a district
court’s decision on a pretrial motion by entering a guilty plea is a
question of law this Court reviews de novo. See United States v.
Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2003).
III. ANALYSIS
We have long held that a “defendant’s [unconditional] plea
of guilty, made knowingly, voluntarily, and with the benefit of
competent counsel, waives all non-jurisdictional defects in that de-
fendant’s court proceedings.” United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153,
1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795,
796 (11th Cir. 1984)); see, e.g., Patti, 337 F.3d at 1320 (same). And
we have held that a statute of limitations defense is one of those
non-jurisdictional defects. In United States v. Najjar, we rejected the
argument that “in a criminal case, the statute of limitations is a ju-
risdictional bar that cannot be waived in a plea agreement.” 283
F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). Instead, we recognized that, “pur-
suant to binding precedent, the statute of limitations is a matter of
defense that must be asserted at trial by the defendant.” Id. (citing
Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1933)). And in Musac-
chio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 248 (2016), the Supreme Court
held in a case involving § 3282(a)—the statute of limitations at issue
here—that “[i]n keeping with § 3282(a)’s text, context, and history,
we conclude that § 3282(a) provides a non-jurisdictional defense,
not a jurisdictional limit.”
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 7 of 13

-- 7 of 13 --

8 Opinion of the Court 22-11175
Thus, if Sanfilippo wished to preserve appellate review of
the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment
while pleading guilty, he could “do so only by entering a ‘condi-
tional plea’ in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).” Pierre,
120 F.3d at 1155.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) provides that
“[w]ith the consent of the court and the government, a defendant
may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving
in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse
determination of a specified pretrial motion.” Thus, a “conditional
plea must be in writing and must be consented to by the court and
by the government.” Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155. As for consent under
the Rule, it “means express approval: direct assent requiring no in-
ference or implication.” Id. at 1156. “[S]ilence or inaction by the
government” will not cut it. Id.
Sanfilippo’s plea fails to qualify as a conditional plea on both
fronts. First, Sanfilippo’s plea agreement—the only written agree-
ment we have in the record—does not show that Sanfilippo re-
served his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss. Further, the written plea agreement confirms that “[t]his
is the entire agreement and understanding between this Office and
the defendant,” and that “[t]here are no other agreements, prom-
ises, representations or understandings.” And during his plea col-
loquy Sanfilippo said that this written agreement fully reflected his
agreement with the government.
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 8 of 13

-- 8 of 13 --

22-11175 Opinion of the Court 9
Second, there is no record evidence indicating that the dis-
trict court and the government consented to Sanfilippo reserving
his ability to appeal the district court’s motion to dismiss. Sanfil-
ippo points us to the agreement reached at the end of his plea col-
loquy. As we discussed above, the government said that if it turned
out, based on this Court’s then-forthcoming decision in United
States v. B.G.G., that it was “in error by filing an information within
the statute of limitations,” then the government believed that “San-
filippo would be exonerated at that point, just as a matter of funda-
mental fairness.” Procedurally, the government said that “what [it]
would probably do is allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, and
then [the government] would have to dismiss the charges, because
the statute of limitations had run.” Sanfilippo would be able to, in
the government’s words, “file a motion to dismiss based on the
statute of limitations again, in which case it would be granted at
that point.” Sanfilippo agreed to this plan, as did the district court.
We do not find evidence in this conversation of “direct as-
sent” to a conditional plea from either the district court or the gov-
ernment to permit Sanfilippo to appeal the district court’s denial of
his motion to dismiss. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1156. Instead, we inter-
pret this discussion as an agreement that Sanfilippo’s plea would be
withdrawn and the charges dismissed if this Court, in B.G.G.,
agreed with Sanfilippo’s statute of limitations argument. For simi-
lar reasons, the fact that the government agreed to stay Sanfilippo’s
sentencing and then to stay Sanfilippo’s appeal while B.G.G. was
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 9 of 13

-- 9 of 13 --

10 Opinion of the Court 22-11175
pending in front of this Court is also not sufficient evidence of ex-
press consent for Rule 11(a)(2) purposes.3
For these reasons, we conclude that Sanfilippo’s plea was
not conditional under Rule 11(a)(2), and consequently, he waived
his ability to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dis-
miss. The district court’s decision is therefore “not reviewable,”
and we “offer no opinion about the merits” of it. Patti, 337 F.3d at
1323.
3 In United States v. B.G.G., we did “not reach the issue of whether filing an
information without a waiver of indictment institutes the prosecution, and
tolls the statute of limitations, under sections 3282(a) and 3288.” 53 F.4th 1353,
1361 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022). Instead, we concluded that the district court erred
when it dismissed the information with prejudice but noted that if a “grand
jury later indicts [the defendant], he can still raise a statute of limitations de-
fense.” Id. at 1370. After remand, a grand jury indicted the defendant, and the
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds.
The district court in that case determined that the filing of an information,
without a corresponding waiver of an indictment, within the five-year limita-
tions period did not satisfy § 3282(a). See United States v. Gatz, No. 20-CR-
80063, 2023 WL 8355363, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2023). The district court also
concluded that the dismissal of a waiver-less information after the statute of
limitations had expired did not entitle the government to a new six-month
window under § 3288 in which it could indict the defendant. Id. at *8–*9. The
district court therefore granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indict-
ment. Id. at *13. If the government once again decides to appeal the district
court’s order in B.G.G., and this Court agrees with the district court’s interpre-
tation of §§ 3282(a) and 3288, then, under the terms of the government’s
agreement with Sanfilippo before the district court, Sanfilippo would be enti-
tled to withdraw his plea.
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 10 of 13

-- 10 of 13 --

22-11175 Opinion of the Court 11
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we conclude that Sanfilippo entered
an unconditional guilty plea to one of eight counts in the indict-
ment and thus waived his ability to appeal the district court’s denial
of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Because Sanfilippo waived
any challenge to the timeliness of his indictment by entering a
knowing, voluntary, and unconditional plea, we dismiss Sanfil-
ippo’s appeal.4
APPEAL DISMISSED.
4 While in past cases we have afforded relief to defendants if they entered a
guilty plea “only on the reasonable (but mistaken) belief” that they had pre-
served the ability to challenge on appeal a district court’s pretrial decision,
Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1156, here Sanfilippo did not argue that his plea was un-
knowing and involuntary until oral argument. Under our precedent, his fail-
ure to make this argument in his briefs precludes us from considering it. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 15 F.4th 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that we “do not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral
argument”); Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting
a party’s “last-minute attempt to raise [an] alternative argument” at “oral ar-
gument”); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he law is by now well settled in this Circuit that a legal claim or
argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and
its merits will not be addressed.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 11 of 13

-- 11 of 13 --

22-11175 J ORDAN, J., Concurring 1
J ORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring.
I join Judge Lagoa’s opinion for the court in full. I write sep-
arately to alert the parties that their agreement to allow Mr. Sanfil-
ippo to withdraw his guilty plea if the Eleventh Circuit ultimately
rules against the government on the statute of limitations issue—
something the district court seemed to countenance—will require
traversing some tricky jurisdictional terrain.
A district court has limited jurisdiction under the U.S. Code
(e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)) and the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure (e.g., Rule 35) to set aside or modify a federal defendant’s con-
viction or sentence, and it does not possess inherent authority to
take such action. See generally United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d
1310, 1315-198 (11th Cir. 2002). I am therefore not sure how it is
that the parties believe that they will be able, months or years from
now, to go back to the district court and request that Mr. Sanfilippo
be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in a closed case.
There is, of course, the possibility of Mr. Sanfilippo seeking
collateral relief from his conviction, but a motion to vacate has a
one-year limitations period that runs from a number of possible
trigger dates. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f ). Once this direct appeal is
dismissed, Mr. Sanfilippo’s conviction will become final when the
time for seeking certiorari expires or when the Supreme Court de-
nies certiorari. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 524-25 (2003);
Drury v. United States, 507 F.3d 1225, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007). If Mr.
Sanfilippo files a § 2255 motion after the one-year limitations period
has expired, the government, in order to follow through on its
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 12 of 13

-- 12 of 13 --

2 J ORDAN, J., Concurring 22-11175
agreement with him, will have to expressly disclaim or waive any
statute of limitations argument in its response.
USCA11 Case: 22-11175 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024 Page: 13 of 13

-- 13 of 13 --