USA v. Carlos Alberto Morilla

FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10610
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS ALBERTO MORILLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20153-KMM-4
____________________
Before NEWSOM , L AGOA , and K IDD, Circuit Judges.
L AGOA , Circuit Judge:
Carlos Alberto Morilla pleaded guilty to conspiracy to com-
mit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and was
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals his sen-
tence, raising three issues. First, Morilla argues that the district
court improperly applied a “sophisticated laundering” sentencing
enhancement. Second, Morilla contends that the district court
erred in denying a minor-role adjustment. Lastly, Morilla argues
that under the circumstances here, the district court’s finding under
United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006), cannot shield
its Guideline errors from appellate review.
Upon careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
we conclude that the district court correctly denied Morilla’s re-
quest for a minor-role adjustment but erred in applying the sophis-
ticated-laundering enhancement. The district court’s purported
Keene statement—made before hearing arguments from the parties
regarding factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and before hearing from
Morilla himself—does not render that Guidelines error harmless.
We therefore affirm in part, vacate Morilla’s sentence, and remand
for resentencing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Morilla was charged in a superseding indictment with one
count of conspiracy to engage in money laundering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and three counts of money laundering, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B). The superseding indictment also
charged Morilla’s co-conspirators—Jesus Javier Diaz, Yunier Car-
denas Calero, and Othoniel Gomez—with conspiracy to engage in
money laundering and money laundering.
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 3
Morilla agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy charge in
exchange for the dismissal of the three money laundering charges.
Morilla and the government submitted a factual proffer stip-
ulating to the following facts. Morilla and his co-conspirators par-
ticipated in a money laundering conspiracy that began around
March 1, 2022, and ended on May 23, 2023. Morilla and his co-
conspirators knew the money being laundered came from the ille-
gal drug trade. Morilla joined the conspiracy on March 14, 2023,
when he met with an undercover agent who gave him $200,000 in
cash. The next day, Morilla took a six percent laundering fee and
wired $188,000 from his personal bank account to the undercover
agent’s account. On March 24, 2023, the undercover agent gave
Morilla $150,000 in cash, and Morilla wired $135,000 back to the
undercover agent a few days later. Finally, on April 20, 2023, the
undercover agent wired Morilla $200,000 and Morilla wired back
$188,000 on April 28, 2023.
The district court accepted Morilla’s guilty plea and adjudi-
cated him guilty of conspiracy to engage in money laundering.
The probation officer then prepared a presentence investi-
gation report (“PSI”). The report found Morilla responsible for
laundering $550,000 of the total $1,365,000 involved in the conspir-
acy. The probation officer did not recommend any aggravating or
mitigating role for Morilla.
In calculating the applicable guideline range, the PSI recom-
mended a two-level enhancement under the United States Sentenc-
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
ing Guidelines § 2S1.1(b)(3) “[b]ecause the offense involved sophis-
ticated laundering.” After applying the sophisticated-laundering
enhancement, the probation officer found that Morilla’s total of-
fense level was twenty-five and his criminal history category was
one. The probation officer recommended an advisory Guideline
range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment.
Morilla filed an objection to the PSI, arguing that he should
receive a two-level downward adjustment under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2(b) because he was a minor participant in the conspiracy.
The probation officer responded that the minor-role adjustment
should not apply because Morilla “had a vested interest in the laun-
dering” by accepting a six percent fee and laundered a total of
$550,000 over three transactions.
Morilla also objected to the application of the two-level so-
phisticated-laundering enhancement. Morilla argued that the en-
hancement should not apply because he did not use “off-shor[e] ac-
counts, fictitious companies, or multi-level [layers] of laundering”
and he only “took a single step in moving money for the purpose
of laundering.” The probation officer responded to the objection
by noting that the enhancement should apply because “the conspir-
acy involved hiding assets, transactions, and the use of covert com-
panies.” The government did not file a written response.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court addressed Mo-
rilla’s two objections to the PSI. With regard to the first objection,
Morilla argued that the district court should apply a minor role ad-
justment because Morilla joined the conspiracy nearly a year after
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 5
it began, only participated in the conspiracy for one month, did not
recruit anyone, only engaged in three transactions, and took a six
percent laundering fee. Morilla asserted that this conduct was less
culpable than that of his co-conspirators.
The government disagreed, arguing that each co-conspira-
tor “played somewhat of a comparable role” and that “there wasn’t
really a leader” of the conspiracy. Although Morilla was the last
person to join the conspiracy, he was responsible for laundering
$550,000 over a short period of time. Morilla also knew that the
money was coming from the illegal drug trade.
As to the second objection, Morilla argued that the district
court should not apply a two-level sophisticated-laundering en-
hancement because he only participated in “one-step laundering”
that did not involve any off-shore accounts or shell companies. He
was also the owner of the bank account he used for the transac-
tions, so there “wasn’t an extra layer of hiding anything.” The gov-
ernment agreed that the sophisticated-laundering enhancement
should not apply as Morilla’s conduct did not amount to sophisti-
cated laundering based on the factors outlined in the Guidelines.
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court over-
ruled both of Morilla’s objections and adopted the probation of-
ficer’s recommendations “based on the offense conduct” and the
evidence that was presented at co-conspirator Gomez’s trial. After
overruling the objections, the district court stated:
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
And, I will also note that in the event that there is any
appeal on either of those objections, that I would im-
pose a sentence independent of the guidelines as a
reasonable sentence under post-[Booker1
] that would
be equivalent to the sentence that I would impose un-
der the guideline provision, as well. Okay. So, you
have that alternative sentence.
Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 11:22–12:2, Dkt. No. 226. The district court
then calculated a Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. After stating
that it would have imposed the alternative sentence “independent
of the guidelines,” the district court asked Morilla if he had any-
thing to say, but Morilla deferred to his attorney.
After pronouncing its sentence, the district court turned to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Morilla asked the district
court to consider that: (1) he accepted responsibility early on by
pleading guilty; (2) he was a zero-point offender; (3) he had family
and community support, which was shown by their presence in the
courtroom; and (4) his family would be negatively affected by the
lack of his financial support during his incarceration.
The government agreed that a sentence at the low end of
the guideline range would be appropriate because of Morilla’s lack
of criminal history. But the government reiterated that Morilla’s
conduct was serious, because it involved multiple transactions, a
1
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 7
significant amount of money, and proceeds he believed were de-
rived from drug-related activity.
The district court concluded that it had “considered the
3553(a) factors” such as Morilla’s criminal history, his acceptance
of responsibility, the substantial amount of money involved, the
“sophisticated means” used to conceal the transaction, and the con-
nection of the money laundering conspiracy to the distribution of
narcotics. The district court again announced that Morilla would
serve a sentence of 57 months.2
The district court entered a final judgment against Morilla,
and this timely appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and
application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Dupree, 57
F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). We accept a district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United
States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2009). When “a de-
cision either way will not affect the outcome of” a sentencing, it is
unnecessary for us to decide it. Keene, 470 F.3d at 1348. Under
Keene, “we need not review an issue when (1) the district court
states it would have imposed the same sentence, even absent an
2 If the district court had sustained Morilla’s objections to both the sophisti-
cated-laundering enhancement and the denial of the minor-role reduction, the
resulting total offense level would have yielded an advisory Guidelines range
of 37 to 46 months.
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
alleged error, and (2) the sentence is substantively reasonable.”
United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2020).
III. ANALYSIS
Morilla raises three issues. First, he argues that the district
court erred in applying the two-level “sophisticated laundering” en-
hancement. Second, he contends the district court erred in deny-
ing him a minor-role reduction. Morilla also argues that the district
court’s alternative-sentence statement under Keene does not render
any Guidelines error harmless. We address each argument in turn.
A. The “Sophisticated-Laundering” Enhancement.
Section 2S1.1(b)(3) provides a two-level increase if a defend-
ant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 commits an offense that in-
volved “sophisticated laundering.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3). The
commentary to the Guidelines explains that “sophisticated laun-
dering” refers to “complex or intricate offense conduct pertaining
to the execution or concealment” of the laundering offense. Id.
§ 2S1.1, cmt. n.5(A). And while the commentary does not make
any single feature dispositive, it identifies the kinds of conduct that
typically qualify: the use of “fictitious entities” or “shell corpora-
tions”; “two or more levels (i.e., layering) of transactions” designed
to make criminal proceeds appear legitimate; or “offshore financial
accounts.” Id. In other words, the enhancement is aimed at laun-
dering conduct that is materially more elaborate, either in how it is
carried out (execution) or in how it is masked (concealment), than
routine laundering transactions.
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 9
Measured against that definition, the sentencing record does
not support applying § 2S1.1(b)(3) to Morilla. The parties agree
that Morilla’s laundering activity consisted of “one layer, which was
the one transfer, one transaction from his account into the under-
cover’s account.” And during the sentencing hearing, the govern-
ment acknowledged that the only potential “factor” from the
Guidelines commentary that might be implicated in this case was
“layering.” Id. But a single transfer is not “two or more levels” of
transactions. Id. Nor does the record show that Morilla engaged
in the “typical” hallmarks of sophisticated laundering: no offshore
accounts, no shell corporations, and no fictitious entities. Id.
The district court nevertheless applied the enhancement,
not by identifying sophisticated features of Morilla’s own launder-
ing conduct, but by adopting a generalized view of “offense con-
duct” proven at a co-defendant’s trial. The district court stated, in
substance, that if the offense conduct of the conspiracy as a whole
was sophisticated, then “you don’t have to differentiate between in-
dividual defendants.” The district court overruled Morilla’s objec-
tion “based on the evidence that I heard at trial,” and adopted the
probation officer’s response.
This was error, as the evidence adduced at trial pertained to
the actions of co-defendant Gomez, not Morilla. “The rule is that
a sentencing judge must make individualized findings.” United
States v. Barry, 163 F.4th 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2026). Section
2S1.1(b)(3) does not ask whether someone in the conspiracy laun-
dered money in a sophisticated way in the abstract; it asks whether
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
the offense “involved” sophisticated laundering, as determined
through the defendant’s relevant conduct under § 1B1.3. The com-
mentary to § 1B1.3 states that “the accountability of the defendant
for the acts of others is limited by the scope of his or her agreement
to jointly undertake the particular criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3, cmt. n.3(B).
This Court has held that “to determine a defendant's liability
for the acts of others, the district court must first make individual-
ized findings concerning the scope of criminal activity undertaken
by a particular defendant.” United States v. Hunter, 323 F.3d 1314,
1319 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498,
1499 (11th Cir. 1993)). This is required in cases of criminal conspir-
acies because “without individualized findings concerning the
scope of [the defendant’s] involvement with the conspiracy, it can-
not be determined that [he] should be liable for some quantity less
than all.” Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. As such, in Hunter, this Court
held that the district court committed reversible error when it
failed to make “particularized findings as to the scope of each Ap-
pellants’ agreement in the larger” criminal scheme. 323 F.3d at
1320.
This is especially true where, as here, a defendant joins a con-
spiracy that was formed long before his participation. See id. (“In
the first place, the record reflects that [the defendant] did not join
the conspiracy until 2000. He therefore cannot be held accountable
for conduct that occurred prior to his entry into the joint criminal
undertaking.”); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.3(B) (“A defendant’s
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 11
relevant conduct does not include the conduct of members of a
conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy, even if the
defendant knows of that conduct[.]”). Morilla joined the conspir-
acy in March 2023, a year after his co-defendants formed it.
Even if the district court had made individualized findings
as to Morilla, nothing in the record identifies (1) what specific so-
phisticated-laundering conduct the district court believed existed,
(2) whether that conduct occurred during Morilla’s limited period
of participation, or (3) whether Morilla agreed to jointly undertake
the conduct that allegedly made the laundering “complex or intri-
cate” within the meaning of § 2S1.1’s commentary. U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1,
cmt. n.5(A). Indeed, the parties agreed that the government’s own
articulation of the only potentially applicable hallmark, layering,
does not match a record of one-step transfers using accounts Mo-
rilla owned.
Because the district court imposed the sophisticated-laun-
dering enhancement based on a generalized assessment of the con-
spiracy rather than based on individualized findings concerning the
scope of Morilla’s involvement with the conspiracy, its Guidelines
calculation was erroneous. We turn next to the district court’s rul-
ing on Morilla’s request for a minor-role reduction.
B. The Minor-Role Reduction.
Morilla next argues that the district court erred in denying
him a minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. That provision
authorizes a two-level decrease for a defendant who was a “[m]inor
[p]articipant” in the criminal activity, meaning one “less culpable
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
than most other participants,” though not minimal. U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2, cmt. n.5. The determination must be based on the “total-
ity of the circumstances” and is “heavily dependent upon the facts
of the particular case.” Id. cmt. n.3(C).
The commentary to the Guidelines identifies a non-exhaus-
tive set of factors that courts must consider, to the extent applica-
ble: (i) the defendant’s understanding of “the scope and structure
of the criminal activity”; (ii) the degree to which he “participated
in planning or organizing it”; (iii) whether he “exercised decision-
making authority”; (iv) “the nature and extent of [his] participa-
tion,” including his responsibility and discretion; and (v) the degree
to which he “stood to benefit.” Id. cmt. n.3(C)(i)–(v). Although no
single factor is dispositive, a sentencing court “must consider all of
these factors to the extent applicable, and it commits ‘legal error in
making a minor role decision based solely on one factor.’” United
States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 732 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting United
States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1249 (11th Cir. 2018)).
To guide a court in this fact-intensive inquiry, we have ex-
plained that two principles should govern. First, “the district court
must measure the defendant’s role against [his] relevant conduct,
that is, the conduct for which [he] has been held accountable under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.” United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930,
934 (11th Cir. 1999). Second, “where the record evidence is suffi-
cient, the district court may also measure the defendant’s conduct
against that of other participants in the criminal scheme attributed
to the defendant.” Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3).
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 13
Because De Varon’s framework turns on “relevant conduct,”
the sentencing court must first determine the scope of the criminal
activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). A defendant’s accountability “for the acts of oth-
ers is limited by the scope” of that agreement, and the court must
identify that scope before attributing additional conduct. Id. §
1B1.3, cmt. n.3(B). Moreover, relevant conduct “does not include
the conduct of members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant
joining the conspiracy, even if the defendant knows of that con-
duct.” Id.
Here, the record supports the district court’s denial of a mi-
nor-role reduction. The stipulated facts establish that Morilla laun-
dered approximately $550,000 in drug proceeds over the course of
roughly one month through three separate wire transfers to an un-
dercover agent. Morilla knew the funds were proceeds of illegal
drug trafficking and he received a six-percent fee for each transac-
tion, earning approximately $39,000. Although Morilla’s participa-
tion in the conspiracy was relatively brief, the record reflects that
he personally laundered nearly half of the total funds involved in
the scheme. On this record, the district court could reasonably con-
clude that Morilla was not “substantially less culpable than the av-
erage participant” in the conduct for which he was held accounta-
ble. De Varon, 175 F.3d at 943.
Morilla argues that the district court failed to make specific
findings regarding the scope of his criminal activity. But as we ex-
plained in De Varon, “[i]n making the ultimate determination of the
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
defendant’s role in the offense, the sentencing judge has no duty to
make any specific subsidiary factual findings. . . . So long as the dis-
trict court’s decision is supported by the record . . . , a simple state-
ment of the district court’s conclusion is sufficient.” Id. at 939.
Because the record supports the district court’s conclusion
that Morilla was not entitled to a minor-role adjustment, we con-
clude that the district court did not clearly err in denying the reduc-
tion and we affirm as to this issue. We now turn to the Keene issue.
C. The District Court’s Keene Statement is Ineffective.
Because the district court committed a Guidelines error in
applying the sophisticated-laundering enhancement, we must de-
cide whether that error was harmless under the alternative-sen-
tence doctrine of United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir.
2006).3 We conclude that it was not because the district court’s
purported Keene statement was made at a procedurally premature
point in the sentencing sequence and therefore cannot insulate the
sentence from appellate review.
Under Keene, an error in calculating the advisory range may
be deemed harmless only when two requirements are satisfied:
“(1) the district court states it would have imposed the same sen-
tence, even absent an alleged error, and (2) the sentence is substan-
tively reasonable.” United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1221
3 As the government conceded during oral argument before this Court, if the
district court’s Keene finding is invalid, then an erroneous application of the
sophisticated-laundering enhancement is not harmless.
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 15
(11th Cir. 2020). Keene described this as “an assumed error harm-
lessness inquiry,” where we assume the Guidelines issue should
have been resolved in the defendant’s favor and then ask whether
“the final sentence resulting from consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors would still be reasonable.” 470 F.3d at 1349.
In Keene, we explained that we could avoid “pointless rever-
sals and unnecessary do-overs of sentence proceedings” if the dis-
trict court faced with disputed Guidelines issues stated that a “de-
cision of those issues does not matter to the sentence imposed after
the § 3553(a) factors are considered.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J., concurring)).
In such a case, the Guidelines error in the imposed sentence would
be harmless because it did not affect the outcome. Id. So “when a
district court states that the sentence it has imposed would not have
changed even with a different guideline calculation,” “we assume
there was an error, reduce the guideline range according to the way
the defendant argued, and analyze whether the sentence would be
substantively reasonable under that guideline range.” United States
v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 18 (11th Cir. 20122) (citing Keene, 470 F.3d at
1349–50).
The question here, however, is not whether the district court
made a Keene statement (it did), but whether the Keene statement
made by the district court renders the error harmless. The answer
to that question turns on when the district court made the Keene
statement.
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Although Keene did not expressly address when an alterna-
tive-sentence statement must be made, its reasoning makes clear
that it should occur after both sides are heard and all relevant fac-
tors are considered. In Keene, the Guidelines error was harmless
because it had no effect on “the sentence imposed after the § 3553(a)
factors [were] considered.” 470 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis added). The
focus was on the sentence ultimately imposed following the court’s
full § 3553(a) analysis, not on a preliminary declaration made at the
Guidelines stage.
That framework makes the timing of an alternative-sen-
tence statement consequential. Federal sentencing is not complete
when the court announces its Guidelines rulings. The district court
must still hear the parties’ arguments on the § 3553(a) factors and
provide the defendant with an opportunity to allocute, procedural
safeguards that help ensure an individualized, legitimate sentenc-
ing decision. See United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254
(11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir.
2002). Consistent with that structure, we have observed that “the
better practice” is for the district court to make clear, “at the time
of pronouncing the sentence,” that it would impose the same sen-
tence regardless of the Guidelines range. United States v. Delgado,
981 F.3d 889, 900 n.8 (11th Cir. 2020).
The record here reflects the opposite sequence. After over-
ruling Morilla’s two Guidelines objections, the district court imme-
diately announced—before any § 3553(a) argument and before al-
locution—that “I would impose a sentence independent of the
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 17
guidelines as a reasonable sentence under post-[Booker],” equiva-
lent to the sentence it would impose under the Guidelines. Sen-
tencing Hr’g Tr. at 11:22–12:2, Dkt. No. 226. Only after that decla-
ration did the district court ask Morilla whether he wished to speak
and then hear counsel’s § 3553(a) presentation.
The district court’s sequencing turns Keene’s harmlessness
inquiry on its head. Keene’s assumed error harmlessness inquiry
turns on whether the court can say, with confidence, that it would
impose the same sentence after meaningful consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors. See Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349–50. A statement made
before the court hears the parties’ § 3553(a) arguments, and before
the defendant has had the opportunity to allocute, cannot do that
work, because it precedes the very adversarial presentation and al-
locution that federal sentencing procedure makes consequential.
See Prouty, 303 F.3d at 1253. Put differently, a pre-argument Keene
statement either (1) reflects that the sentencing decision was effec-
tively fixed before the required § 3553(a) presentation and the de-
fendant’s allocution, or (2) reflects that the court had not yet com-
pleted the holistic § 3553(a) analysis that Keene presupposes. Either
way, such a statement does not reliably demonstrate what Keene re-
quires, namely, that the same sentence would be imposed after
meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
Morilla’s later opportunity to speak does not cure the prob-
lem. Morilla declined allocution only after the court had already
announced that, if its Guidelines rulings were reversed, it would
impose the same sentence anyway. But allocution is not a hollow
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-10610
ritual; it is a procedural safeguard designed to matter to the sen-
tencing outcome. Id. When the district court has already declared,
before allocution, that the outcome will be the same regardless, the
record no longer permits confidence that the defendant’s oppor-
tunity to be heard had any realistic potential to affect the sentence.
The government’s suggestion that any defect is harmless be-
cause defense counsel’s § 3553(a) arguments largely tracked infor-
mation already contained in the PSI fares no better. The point of
Keene is not whether the judge had access to information in writing;
it is whether the district court can confidently say the same sen-
tence would be imposed after the adversarial § 3553(a) presentation
and the defendant’s allocution—procedural steps that are designed
to shape the court’s individualized judgment. To accept the gov-
ernment’s position would invert the sentencing sequence Keene
presupposes and treat the § 3553(a) hearing as a formality rather
than a required, consequential step.
When there is a Guidelines error and the district court issues
a Keene statement before hearing the parties’ arguments, applying
the § 3553(a) factors, and allowing the defendant to allocute, we
cannot say that the error was harmless. A premature Keene state-
ment renders those procedural safeguards meaningless.4 We thus
4 Because we find that the district court committed a procedural error in cal-
culating the Guidelines range and the government has failed to prove that such
an error was harmless, we need not engage with the second step in Keene to
determine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable. See Goldman,
953 F.3d at 1221.
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24-10610 Opinion of the Court 19
conclude that because the district court’s purported Keene state-
ment was made at a procedurally premature point in the sentenc-
ing sequence, the Keene statement cannot insulate the sentence
from appellate review.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s denial
of Morilla’s request for a minor-role adjustment, but we vacate the
district court’s sophisticated-laundering sentencing enhancement.
We thus affirm in part and vacate Morilla’s sentence. We remand
to the district court for resentencing consistent with this Opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED.
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