USA v. Walter L. Williams

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 27, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-12139
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cr-00013-MMH-MCR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WALTER L. WILLIAMS,
lllllllllllllllllll lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 27, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Walter Williams was convicted at a bench trial on two counts for
distribution of heroin, one count for possession of heroin with intent to distribute,

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and one count for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, all in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count for felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).1 Williams appeals his convictions,
raising one issue: whether the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence the police found in a search of his vehicle following his arrest, to-wit: a
Smith & Wesson .45 caliber pistol, heroin, and cocaine. The search was conducted
without a warrant, and Williams contends that none of the exceptions for
warrantless searches applied.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress under two
standards. We examine the court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its
application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d
1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). The district court referred Williams’s motion to
suppress to a magistrate judge. He held an evidentiary hearing and recommended
that the district court deny the motion. Williams objected to the recommendation,
but only as to the magistrate judge’s legal conclusions. The district court overruled
his objections and denied his motion. Since Williams did not object to the
magistrate judge’s fact findings, our review is limited to the district court’s
application of Fourth Amendment law. We find no error in the application and
1 The court conducted the bench trial on facts the parties presented via stipulation.
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therefore affirm.
Here are the facts on which the district court based its ruling. On August 24,
2009, an undercover narcotics detective in the Jacksonville, Florida Sheriff’s office
bought heroin from Williams, which Williams obtained from his pick-up truck.
The detective bought heroin from Williams again, three days later on August 27;
this sale took place inside Williams’s pick-up truck. On September 14, 2009,
narcotics officers in the Sheriff’s office, aware of the August 14 and 27 heroin
sales, spotted Williams near his truck. He saw them approaching and attempted to
get into his truck. But they seized him and placed him under arrest, in handcuffs.
As they were doing so, one of the officers noticed a gun in the pocket of the door
on the driver’s side of the truck.
The officers placed Williams in a police car, and then seized the truck, for
they had reason to believe that it contained contraband and thus was subject to
forfeiture. They drove the truck to the police station, where, pursuant to the
Sheriff’s office’s standard procedures, they searched it. The search uncovered the
suspected contraband: heroin and cocaine, located in the truck’s ash tray, and the
gun that had been seen in the pocket of the driver’s-side door.
The district court’s conclusion that the foregoing facts gave the officers
probable cause to arrest Williams for the drug offenses for which he was convicted
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is unassailable. Also unassailable is the court’s conclusion that, given the totality
of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe that the truck
contained evidence of Williams’s heroin trafficking. Accordingly, the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement authorized the
warrantless search. See United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11 th Cir.
2006). The exception applied even though the officers searched the truck after
taking Williams into custody and securing the vehicle. United States v. Birdsong,
982 F.2d 481, 483 (11 th Cir. 1993). The court concluded, alternatively, that the
officers’ inventory search was proper. We agree. See South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 376, 99 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1976).
AFFIRMED.
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