Kenneth Grimshaw v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, et al

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 10, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-13796
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-14165-DLG
KENNETH GRIMSHAW,
Pro Se "ex rel",
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
METLIFE, INC.,
C. ROBERT HENRIKSON,
CURTIS H. BARNETTE,
SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 10, 2012)

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Before HULL, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Grimshaw appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his complaint
that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and its employees violated the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.,
the insurance laws of the State of New York, and the laws of Florida. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Grimshaw alleged that Metropolitan Life and its employees used mail
and wire transmissions to “defraud[] [Grimshaw] and hundreds of other
beneficiary and/or policyholders nationwide out of millions” of dollars by
diminishing beneficiary payments for life insurance policies issued before 1965
that had face values below $1,000. The district court ruled that Grimshaw failed
to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. We affirm.
Grimshaw argues that the district court erred by dismissing his complaint
based on the insufficient pleading of his claim of racketeering, but we disagree.
Grimshaw asks that we remand so he can file an amended complaint, but a remand
would be futile because even a “‘more carefully drafted complaint [could not] state
a claim.’” Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bank
v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991)). Grimshaw’s complaint asserted
that Metropolitan Life engaged in racketeering, but the facts alleged in his
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complaint cannot support a claim of racketeering.
Grimshaw also argues that the supplemental jurisdiction of the district court
evaporated upon dismissal of the racketeering claim, but a district court has the
discretion to “exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim
over which it had original jurisdiction.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556
U.S. 635, 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1866 (2009). Grimshaw fails to challenge the ruling
that his complaint also failed to state a claim for relief under state law.
The dismissal of Grimshaw’s complaint with prejudice is AFFIRMED.
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