USA v. Luis Linares

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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Nos. 13-12325, 15-10559, 15-11708
______________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 1:88-cr-00750-KLR-2, 1:90-cr-00075-JAG-1,
1:89-cr-00240-JAG-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LUIS LINARES,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
____________________
(March 10, 2016)
Before WILSON and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HALL,* District
Judge.
* Honorable J. Randal Hall, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia,
sitting by designation.
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PER CURIAM:
In three criminal cases, Linares pled guilty to conspiring to import cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. As a result, the district court, in accordance with 21
U.S.C. § 960, imposed three concurrent sentences of eighty-one years of
incarceration, subject to parole eligibility after twenty-seven years. Then, more
than twenty-two years later, Linares filed three pro se motions to correct an illegal
sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). Below, the district
court denied these motions, and subsequently Linares filed the instant appeal.
For cases 1:88-cr-750-KLR-2 and 1:90-cr-75-JAG-1, Linares argues that the
parole terms within his sentences were erroneous based on the non-parole
provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“ADAA”). Conversely, the
Government contends that Linares’ sentences were proper because the non-parole
provisions were not applicable to conspiracy drug offenses until 1988. Having
received these arguments, we now review de novo. See United States v. Giltner,
972 F.2d 1563, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1992).
Enacted on October 27, 1986, the ADAA amended 21 U.S.C. § 960 by
eliminating parole as a sentencing term for federal drug offenses and replacing it
with a system of supervised release. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1302, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986). Yet, unlike other provisions within the ADAA, section 1302 – the section
amending 21 U.S.C. § 960 – did not contain an express effective date. Id.
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However, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gozlon-Peretz v. United
States, 498 U.S. 395, 406 (1991), we held in Giltner, 972 F.2d at 1565, that this
section became effective upon the ADAA’s enactment. Moreover, we also held in
Giltner that the non-parole provisions in section 1302 became effective as to both
substantive and conspiracy drug offenses upon the ADAA’s enactment. Id. at
1563, 1565; see also United States v. Young, 975 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, because his conspiracy offenses occurred from August 1987 to on or
about October 27, 1987, and on or about August 27, 1987, respectively, we hold
that the parole terms within Linares’ sentences were improper.
As for case 1:89-cr-240-JAG-1, Linares asserts that his eighty-one-year
sentence pursuant to the ADAA1 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution.2 In support of his argument, Linares contends that his role in the
conspiracy ended in early 1983 and did not extend beyond, or “straddle,” the
October 27, 1986 effective date of the ADAA. In opposition, the Government
argues that, because Linares is responsible for the reasonably foreseeable conduct
1 For this case, both parties cite the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (“CCCA”) as the
act at issue. However, the CCCA only increased the maximum term of imprisonment under 21
U.S.C. § 960 from fifteen to twenty years. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 504, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
Consequently, because the district court sentenced Linares to eighty-one years of imprisonment,
the district court did not sentence him pursuant to the CCCA. Instead, the district court
sentenced Linares pursuant to the ADAA, which increased the maximum term of imprisonment
to life. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1302, 100 Stat. 3207 (1984). Therefore, we construe the parties’
CCCA-based arguments as ADAA-based.
2 “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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of his coconspirators, his role in the conspiracy continued beyond this date. We
review such alleged violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause de novo. See United
States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir. 2000).
To run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause, a criminal law must meet two
criteria: (1) “it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring
before its enactment,” and (2) “it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.”
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). Here, because the maximum sentence
under 21 U.S.C. § 960 in 1983 was fifteen years of imprisonment, it is clear that
the eighty-one-year sentence Linares received pursuant to the ADAA was
disadvantageous. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1302, 100 Stat. 3207 (1984). Thus, only
the element of retrospectivity is at issue in this case.
In United States v. Peeples, 23 F.3d 370, 373 (11th Cir. 1994), we stated that
a conspirator is responsible for
the conspiracy’s activities in which he is involved, and for drugs
involved in those activities, and for subsequent acts and conduct of
conspirators, and drugs involved in those acts or conduct carried on in
furtherance of the conspiracy which is reasonably foreseeable to him.
Importantly, we have also noted that “‘the ending date of an indictment does not
govern whether an offense should be classified as a straddle crime.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir. 1991)). Rather, the scope of
the conspiracy “‘must be determined individually from what was proved as to [the
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defendant].’” Id. (quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 385 (2d Cir.
1964)).
Based on these principles, the fact that the indictment against Linares
identifies the conspiracy as ending in 1988 is immaterial. On the other hand, what
is material is Linares’ alleged admission, noted within his pre-sentence
investigation (“PSI”) report. Specifically, the report reveals that Linares indicated
that “from 1982 to 1988 he and his codefendant conspired to import cocaine into
the United States.” However, the reliability of this statement is belied by other
parts of the PSI report that suggest Linares’ participation in the conspiracy was
more limited in duration: (1) the probation officer’s statement that this case
“occurred before the November of 1987” and (2) the probation officer’s repeated
assertion that Linares’ sentencing should not be governed by the Sentencing
Guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 1987.
Excluding this putative admission in light of the inconsistencies in the PSI
report, we are left without any evidence suggesting that the post-1983 conduct of
Linares’ coconspirators was reasonably foreseeable to him. While the Government
argues that coconspirator Indalecio Iglesias’ use of cocaine proceeds to purchase
and improve real estate was reasonably foreseeable, it points only to allegations in
the indictment for substantiation of these acts. Without more, we cannot conclude
that Iglesias took these actions, much less that they were reasonably foreseeable to
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Linares. As a result, we must hold that the ADAA’s application in this case was
retrospective in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
For the reasons above, we hold that Linares was improperly sentenced in
each of the aforementioned cases. Accordingly, we vacate Linares’ sentences and
remand these cases to the district court for resentencing.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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