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15-12590•Linda Camberdella, et al v. William Goldstein
15-12590Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitAug 3, 2016
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-12590
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cv-81258-DMM
LINDA CAMBERDELLA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael
Camberdella, IRVING CAMBERDELLA, as Guardians and Natural Parents of
N.C., a minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
WILLIAM GOLDSTEIN, in his individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 3, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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This is an interlocutory appeal by Deputy William Goldstein of the Palm
Beach County Sheriff’s Office. Appellees Linda Camberdella, as personal
representative of the estate of Michael Camberdella, and Linda and Irving
Camberdella, as guardians and natural parents of N.C., a minor, claim that Deputy
Goldstein deprived 18-year-old Michael Camberdella (Michael) of his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights when Deputy Goldstein shot and killed Michael
while responding to a 911 call. Deputy Goldstein argues that the district court
erred when it denied his motion for summary judgement on the basis that Deputy
Goldstein was not entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After
review, we affirm.1
The district court held that Deputy Goldstein is not entitled to summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds because a reasonable jury could find that
Deputy Goldstein violated a clearly established constitutional right when he shot
and killed Michael. See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.
2016) (“[T]he [plaintiff] must establish that [the defendant] is not entitled to
qualified immunity by showing that the facts alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right and that the constitutional right was clearly established at the
time of [the defendant’s] conduct.). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiffs, see id. at 1217 (“At [summary judgment], we view all evidence and
1 Appellant William Goldstein’s Amended Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Reply Brief Based On Appellee’s Filing of an Amended Answer Brief is GRANTED.
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factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . .”), the
district court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Deputy
Goldstein shot Michael when Michael was neither resisting nor fleeing and no
longer posed a risk of harm to Deputy Goldstein or the public, see Morton v.
Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that deadly force is
reasonable when an officer “has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm” and “reasonably believes that the use of deadly
force was necessary to prevent escape” (quotation marks omitted)). The district
court also found sufficient evidence that Deputy Goldstein used lethal force
without first warning Michael or attempt to subdue him using nonlethal means.
See id. (explaining that peace officers should “give[] some warning about the
possible use of deadly force, if feasible”). The district court therefore concluded
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the use of lethal force
was “objectively reasonable” under the circumstances. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 397(1989) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use
of deadly force when the use of deadly force is not “objectively reasonable” under
the circumstances).
Deputy Goldstein argues that the district court erred in finding sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that Deputy Goldstein shot Michael when
Michael was neither resisting nor fleeing and no longer posed a risk of harm. He
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contends that we are required to reweigh the facts of this case under Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), and that when we do we will conclude that Michael
resisted arrest and posed a “threat of serious physical harm” to Deputy Goldstein
and the public. See Morton, 707 F.3d at 1281. But this is not a case in which the
facts found by the district court are “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe [them].”2 Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. To the extent that
we might otherwise have discretion to reweigh the facts of this case, we decline to
do so. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1486 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e have
discretion to accept the district court’s findings, if they are adequate. . . . But we
are not required to accept them.”). Deputy Goldstein has waived all other
arguments that he is entitled to immunity, including any arguments that he is
entitled to immunity under the facts as found by the district court. We therefore
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
2 The district court relied primarily on testimony by Linda Camberdella, who was outside
the Camberdella house and witnessed the shooting. As the court observed, however, there were
at least four different accounts of the events at issue: Two by Deputy Goldstein, one by a
neighbor who witnessed the shooting, one by the Sheriff’s department at a press conference, and
another by the Camberdella family.
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