Beverly Jo Jones v. State of Alabama, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-13573
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00059-WS-C
BEVERLY JO JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF ALABAMA,
GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(March 2, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Beverly Jo Jones, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming a
violation of the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the appeal for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 Jones raises
one issue on appeal, arguing generally that a state court no-contact order violated
her civil rights. After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2013).
Although we construe pro se pleadings liberally, we will not “rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1169 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts “from
exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Nicholson v.
Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). The doctrine is
confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. (quotation
omitted). It applies when the issues presented to the district court are “inextricably
intertwined with the state court judgment.” Alvarez v. Att’y Gen., 679 F.3d 1257,
1 See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
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1262 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). An issue is “inextricably intertwined”
when “(1) the success of the federal claim would effectively nullify the state court
judgment” or “(2) the federal claim would succeed only to the extent that the state
court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. at 1262–63 (quotations omitted). However,
the doctrine does not bar federal review unless the plaintiff had a reasonable
opportunity to raise the federal claim in an earlier state proceeding. Casale v.
Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
To obtain a reversal of the district court, “an appellant must convince us that
every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.” Sapuppo v.
Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). If the appellant
does not address one of the grounds, she “is deemed to have abandoned any
challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”
Id.
First, Jones does not address the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in her brief and
has therefore abandoned the issue on appeal. But even if she had not abandoned
the issue, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars her claim. Jones seeks to have the
federal district court directly overrule the Alabama state courts by removing the
no-contact order. As such, she is complaining of injuries caused by a state court
judgment after losing in state court. See Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1268. And the
success of her federal claim “would effectively nullify the state court judgment.”
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Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1263 (quotation omitted). Jones makes no argument, nor does
the record reflect, that she had no reasonable opportunity to raise her constitutional
claims in an earlier state proceeding. See Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260. We affirm the
district court’s conclusion that the claim was barred due to lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We also deny Jones’s pending
motion to reconsider remand.
AFFIRMED.
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