Maryann Brothers v. Commissioner of Social Security

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-14668
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00108-CAR-MSH
MARYANN BROTHERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(April 26, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Maryann Brothers appeals the judgment that affirmed the denial of her
application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income from
the Social Security Administration. 41 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Brothers
argues that the administrative law judge failed to account for her limitations in
timely completing tasks and responding appropriately to supervisors in the
hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert and in the assessment of
Brothers’s residual functional capacity. We affirm.
The administrative law judge accounted for Brothers’s limitations. The
administrative law judge gave “great weight” to the findings of Dr. David S.
Bailey, a psychologist, that Brothers could understand and complete basic
instructions and had extreme limitations in interacting with the public, coworkers,
and supervisors. And the administrative law judge gave great weight to the
findings of Dr. Clifford Guarnaccia, a state psychologist, that Brothers had “some
limitation in understanding and remembering detailed instructions, [yet could]
sustain attention for two-hour periods” to “complete tasks” with occasional
reminders by a supervisor with whom Brothers might “develop interpersonal
problems” but could “maintain basic social interactions.” See Sharfarz v. Bowen,
825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). Based on this evidence, the administrative law
judge found that Brothers could “work only where no production rate or pace is
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required[,] can perform only simple routine tasks, and can work where only
occasional interaction with the public and co-workers is required.”
The administrative law judge also included those limitations in the
hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. See Winschel v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011). The administrative law judge was
not required to refer to supervisors when the residual functional capacity
assessment and the hypothetical question included a restriction on Brothers’s social
interaction in the workplace. And the administrative law judge was not required to
“specifically refer to every piece of evidence . . . [when his] decision [reveals]. . .
that [he] considered [Brothers’s] medical condition as a whole.” Dyer v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
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