Louis Navellier, et al. v. State of Florida, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-11994
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:15-cv-81428-WPD
LOUIS NAVELLIER,
WENDY NAVELLIER,
individuals,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA,
TOWN OF MANALAPAN,
a Florida township,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 1, 2016)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Louis and Wendy Navellier appeal the district court’s dismissal of their
complaint challenging the constitutionality, on equal protection grounds, of the
homestead exemption provision of the Florida Constitution, Fla. Const., art. X,
§4(a)(1), which limits Florida’s municipal homestead exemption to “one-half acre
of contiguous land.”1 The district court found that the Navelliers lacked standing
and dismissed the claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The court alternatively found that the
complaint was subject to dismissal on the merits for failure to state a claim, under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Navelliers challenge both the district
court’s standing and merits determinations.2 After careful review, we agree that
1 The provision states, in relevant part:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the
payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for
house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property
owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one
hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon,
which shall not be reduced without the owner’s consent by reason
of subsequent inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a
municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land,
upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the
owner or the owner’s family[.]
Fla. Const. Art. X, § 4(a)(1).
2 The Navelliers’ brief notes that, after filing their notice of appeal, they concluded that
this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear their appeal because the district court dismissed their
complaint without prejudice. However, a dismissal without prejudice is appealable if “it is clear
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the Navelliers lacked standing to pursue their claims against the State of Florida
(the “State”) and their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against both
defendants, the State and the Town of Manalapan (the “Town”), and we affirm the
district court’s dismissal without prejudice of those claims. We conclude,
however, that the Navelliers had standing to pursue their claim for damages against
the Town, though we agree that the complaint failed to state a claim on the merits.
Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal without prejudice of the Navelliers’ damages
claim and remand for the district court to dismiss that claim with prejudice.
We review jurisdictional issues, including questions of standing, de novo,
see Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346
(11th Cir. 1999), with the burden of establishing jurisdiction resting on the party
bringing the claim, Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242,
1247 (11th Cir. 2005). We also review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations
in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).
that the order was nevertheless ‘final.’” Samco Global Arms, Inc. v. Arita, 395 F.3d 1212, 1213
n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, the dismissal was involuntary and closed the case. Further, the
standing defect identified by the district court could not have been cured by amendment. Thus,
the district court’s dismissal order was final and appealable, and we have appellate jurisdiction.
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The relevant background is this. According to the complaint, the dispute
arose when the Town obtained a $232,000 judgment against the Navelliers and
threatened to enforce the judgment against their home, which was located on a
1.2-acre parcel of land in Manalapan and had been claimed by the Navelliers as a
homestead. The Navelliers argued that Florida’s homestead exemption prevented
the Town from enforcing the judgment against their property, but the Town
disagreed on the ground that the Navelliers home was located on a parcel larger
than a half-acre. The Navelliers ultimately paid the Town $232,000 under protest,
to satisfy the judgment and avoid losing their home. They then filed the instant
civil-rights suit in federal district court, against the State and the Town, seeking a
refund of the $232,000 they paid, a declaratory judgment that Florida’s homestead
exemption is unconstitutional because it treats municipal homeowners who claim
homestead protection for homes located on parcels of land larger than a half-acre
unequally, and to prospectively enjoin the defendants from enforcing judgments
against the homestead property of such municipal homeowners. The plaintiffs
styled their suit as a class action, brought on behalf of all similarly-situated Florida
municipal homeowners who have claimed a homestead exemption on properties
larger than a half-acre, and they sought to be certified as the lead plaintiffs.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to actual cases and controversies. Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of
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Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1203 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2). The
standing doctrine is part of the case or controversy requirement. Id. “In essence
the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (quotation omitted). Generally, standing
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) that he has suffered an injury-in-fact -- that
is, an injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and (3) a likelihood
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See DiMaio v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008). When a plaintiff
seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief, he must establish that: (1) he is likely to
suffer a future injury; (2) he is likely to suffer the injury at the hands of the
defendant; and (3) the relief he seeks will likely prevent the injury from occurring.
Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1203-04 (11th Cir. 1991); see
also Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 883 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Where the
plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief . . . [he must] allege facts from which
it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.
This is because injunctions regulate future conduct only; they do not provide relief
for past injuries already incurred and over with.” (quotation and citation omitted)).
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Individual standing requirements must be met by anyone attempting to
represent his own interests or those of a class. Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452,
1456 (11th Cir. 1984). If the named plaintiff seeking to represent a class fails to
establish the requisite case or controversy, he may not seek relief on his behalf or
on that of the class. Id.
The Navelliers appeal the district court’s standing determination, claiming
they have standing in light of the live dispute between them and the defendants as
to the constitutionality of Florida’s homestead exemption. The Navelliers also
point to their allegation that the Town used the homestead exemption against them
to coerce them to pay the $232,000 judgment under threat of losing their home
through a forced sale. We agree with the Navelliers that they have standing to
pursue a damages claim against the Town. The complaint alleged that: (1) the
Navelliers suffered a monetary injury in the amount of $232,000; (2) which they
paid under the Town’s threat to enforce the $232,000 judgment against their
claimed homestead property; and (3) a judicial decision that the Navelliers were
denied equal protection and ordering the Town to pay $232,000 in damages would
redress that injury. Based on these allegations, the Navelliers plainly established
the injury-in-fact, causation and redressability requirements of the standing
doctrine. See DiMaio, 520 F.3d at 1302. Accordingly, the district court erred in
dismissing the Navelliers’ claim for damages against the Town without prejudice
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on jurisdictional standing grounds. See id. at 1303 (noting that dismissal without
prejudice is required if the dismissal is on standing grounds and not on the merits).
As for the Navelliers’ damages claim against the State, the complaint alleged
only that the State, “in enacting and enforcing and threatening to enforce and
allowing Article X, §4 of the Florida Constitution to be used as a basis for
judgment creditors to enforce money judgments against homeowners whose homes
are on greater than one-half acre parcels, has treated municipal homeowners whose
homes are on a half-acre of land or greater unequally in violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution right to equal protection
of the law.” In contrast to the damages claim the Navelliers alleged against the
Town based on their $232,000 payment, this damages claim does not demonstrate
a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury that they suffered at the
hands of the State. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s determination that the
Navelliers lacked standing to pursue a damages claim against the State.
We also affirm the district court’s determination that the Navelliers lacked
standing to pursue their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. As the district
court correctly found, the allegations in the complaint did not establish a likelihood
of future injury. The complaint does not even so much as suggest that either the
Town or the State is likely to unconstitutionally apply the Florida homestead
exemption against the Navelliers in the future. See Cone, 921 F.2d at 1203-04;
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Alexander, 772 F.3d at 883. Indeed, there is no allegation that either defendant
has, or may acquire, an unpaid judgment against the Navelliers, or that either
defendant might seek to enforce such a judgment against the Navelliers’ property.
The Navelliers’ reliance on MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118 (2007), is misplaced. MedImmune involved a patent licensee, whose licensing
agreement required it to pay royalties to the patent owner unless and until the
patent was ruled invalid by a competent court. 549 U.S. at 121. The Supreme
Court held that the licensee had standing to seek a declaratory judgment
establishing the validity and scope of the underlying patent, even though the
licensee continued to pay royalty fees under protest to avoid the prospect of being
sued for infringement and facing liability for treble damages. Id. at 122, 126-37.
While the Navelliers and the MedImmune plaintiff both made a payment under
protest, the similarities end there. In MedImmune, the plaintiff faced a recurring
obligation for royalties: thus, there was a concrete likelihood that the defendant
would demand payment from the plaintiff in the future. Here, in contrast, there is
nothing in the complaint or elsewhere in the record indicating that either the Town
or the State will seek to enforce another judgment against the Navelliers’ property.
In short, the Navelliers have standing to pursue a claim for damages related
to their $232,000 payment to the Town, which they allege was unconstitutionally
coerced. But they lack standing to seek a judicial declaration that Florida’s
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homestead exemption is unconstitutional or an injunction preventing the
defendants from enforcing judgments against homestead property in excess of a
half-acre in the future. Moreover, because the Navelliers, themselves, lack
standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief, they also lack standing to serve
as representatives of their proposed class. See Lynch, 744 F.2d at 1456. Further,
because the Navelliers lacked standing to pursue their claim for damages against
the State and their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against both
defendants, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of
those claims, and we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits on appeal.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998).
We are left, then, with the Navelliers’ claim for damages against the Town
of Manalapan, which asserted that the Town’s threat to enforce the $232,000
judgment against their property, pursuant to the half-acre municipal limitation in
Florida’s homestead exemption, violated their equal-protection rights. The district
court determined that, even if the Navelliers had standing, the complaint failed to
state an equal-protection claim because it failed to allege that the Navelliers’
property could not be subdivided so as to create a half-acre section that would be
protected from forced sale under the homestead exemption. See In re Englander,
95 F.3d 1028, 1031 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Smith v. Guckenheimer, 27 So. 900,
915-16 (Fla. 1900)) (recognizing this option under Florida law). Moreover, the
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district court reasoned, the Navelliers failed to show that the half-acre limit for
municipal homesteads lacked a rational basis. We agree.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
states to treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner. See Leib v.
Hillsborough Cty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (11th Cir.
2009). When a statute or constitutional provision classifies persons in such a way
that they receive different treatment under the law, the degree of scrutiny a
reviewing court applies depends on the basis for the classification. Id. at 1306. If
the provision treats individuals differently on the basis of race or another suspect
classification, or if the law impinges on a fundamental right, it is subject to strict
scrutiny. Id. Otherwise, the law need only have a rational basis. Id. The
Navelliers do not dispute that rational-basis review applies in this case.
Rational-basis review is a highly deferential standard that proscribes only
the very outer limits of a legislature’s power. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944,
948 (11th Cir. 2001). “A statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so
long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the statute.” Id. (quotation omitted). What’s more, “[a] state is
under no obligation to produce evidence supporting the rationality of the
legislation and, indeed, the legislature need not even have actually been motivated
by the rational reason presented to the court when it enacted the challenged law.”
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Blue Martini Kendall, LLC v. Miami-Dade Cty., 816 F.3d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir.
2016). “Rather, the challenger bears the burden to negative every conceivable
basis which might support the law.” Id. (quotation omitted, alteration adopted).
On appeal, the Navelliers dispute the district court’s conclusion that
Florida’s homestead exemption provides at least a half-acre of homestead
protection to homeowners. They point out that, where a property cannot be
subdivided, the property is subject to a forced sale and the homeowners receive the
sale proceeds allocable to a half-acre. They assert that this does not further the
purposes of the homestead exemption, which is to shield the home from a forced
sale and provide security to families. See Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850,
853-54 (Fla. 2007) (“The public policy furthered by a homestead exemption is to
promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a
home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of
financial misfortune and the demands of creditors who have given credit under
such law.” (quotations omitted)). However, as the district court pointed out, the
complaint did not allege that the Navelliers’ property could not be partitioned in a
way that would enable them to maintain their home and enable the Town to
enforce the $232,000 judgment against the remainder of the property.
Moreover, Florida’s decision to limit the homestead exemption to a half-acre
survives rational-basis review. The allegations in the complaint certainly do not
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“negative every conceivable basis which might support” the State of Florida’s
decision to limit its municipal homestead exemption to a half-acre. See Blue
Martini, 816 F.3d at 1351. For example, the decision to limit homestead protection
to a half-acre for municipal homeowners represents a rational way to balance the
competing legitimate interests of providing security and stability for homeowners
who fall upon financial hardship and ensuring that creditors can satisfy valid
claims against debtors.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of the
Navelliers’ claim for damages against the State of Florida and their claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief, vacate the dismissal without prejudice of their
claim for damages against the Town of Manalapan, and remand the case for entry
of a dismissal with prejudice of that claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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