Celestine G. Thompson v. Secretary of Homeland Security

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-10860
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cv-60652-JIC
CELESTINE G. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
John F. Kelly,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(January 31, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Celestine Thompson, a pro se litigant, appeals the district court’s dismissal
of her action alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; bribery of public officials under 18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(A); the making of false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001; and
judicial bias under 28 U.S.C. § 144. The district court dismissed Thompson’s
second amended complaint on alternative grounds. First, the district court
determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Thompson’s claims because
she failed to identify any applicable waiver of federal sovereign immunity.
Second, the district court held that Thompson failed to adequately plead facts
suggesting a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, Thompson contends she has, in
fact, suffered racial discrimination, harassment, and intimidation at the hands of
various agents of the Department of Homeland Security. After review,1 we affirm.
Although we liberally construe pro se briefs, arguments not raised on appeal,
even by pro se litigants, are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8) (requiring appellants
to argue “contentions and the reason for them, with citations to the authorities and
parts of the record on which the appellant relies”). Thompson’s brief, even
1 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Thacker v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 868 F.3d 979, 981 (11th Cir. 2017). Likewise, we review de novo a district court’s grant
of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and considering them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th
Cir. 2011).
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construed liberally, presents no arguments concerning the primary basis for the
district court’s dismissal—sovereign immunity. In fact, Thompson’s brief fails to
even mention sovereign immunity. Likewise, Thompson makes no arguments
concerning the district court’s dismissal of her claims for bribery, false statements,
and judicial bias. Thompson has therefore abandoned any arguments on those
issues. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
But even if we were to assume Thompson did not abandon her arguments on
sovereign immunity, and even if we were to ignore the fact that Thompson’s
operative second amended complaint made no factual allegations concerning racial
discrimination,2 her appeal would fail. Despite receiving multiple opportunities to
amend her complaint, as well as instruction from the district court as to her
complaints’ legal deficiencies, Thompson failed to plead facts plausibly elevating
her claims above the speculative level. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555–56 (2007).
AFFIRMED.
2 Thompson’s allegations of racial discrimination were made in prior complaints that
were dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim. See Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V
Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (“An amended pleading supersedes the
former pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of
the pleader’s averments against his adversary.” (quotation omitted)). It appears Thompson
intended her second amended complaint as a supplement to her previously dismissed complaints.
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