Ronald Siliakus v. Carnival Corporation

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-10755
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-25137-UU
RONALD SILIAKUS,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines,

Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 4, 2020)
Before WILSON, LAGOA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Ronald Siliakus slipped and fell on wet stairs while on board a cruise
ship, suffering a severe injury. He sued Carnival Corporation (“Carnival”) in both
state and federal court, bringing a common law claim of negligence under Florida
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law. However, in his federal complaint, Siliakus affirmatively requested that his
case be dismissed, arguing that the district court lacked admiralty jurisdiction. In so
doing, Siliakus hoped to avoid the forum-selection clause that he agreed to in his
contract with Carnival, which mandates that suits are to be litigated in federal court
unless there is a want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court agreed it
lacked admiralty jurisdiction, could not locate any other source of federal subject-
matter jurisdiction, and dismissed the case without prejudice. But since the district
court issued its decision, our Court squarely ruled out this method of forum shopping
in a case nearly identical to this one. See DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302
(11th Cir. 2020). Thus, after thorough review, we reverse the district court’s
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings.
“We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. In reviewing a facial challenge to a complaint, we consider only the
allegations in the complaint, accepting them as true for this purpose.” Id. at 1309
(citations omitted). In evaluating subject-matter jurisdiction, “it is the facts and
substance of the claims alleged, not the jurisdictional labels attached, that ultimately
determine whether a court can hear a claim.” Id. at 1311. Under our prior panel
precedent rule, we are bound by earlier panel holdings unless and until they are
overruled by this Court en banc or by the Supreme Court. See United States v.
Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Main Drug, Inc.
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v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2007) (“If
jurisdictional holdings are explicit they must be followed.”) .
The relevant facts are these. Siliakus embarked on a multi-day Carnival cruise
in November 2017. On November 5, 2017, Siliakus slipped on wet steps on board
the vessel, falling and severely injuring himself in the process. Siliakus argued that
Carnival was negligent in allowing this condition to exist on its ship; that is, he
claimed that Carnival knew or should have known of the dangerous condition of the
stairs, that Carnival owed him a duty of reasonable care, and that Carnival breached
that duty. However, pursuant to the contract that Siliakus signed with Carnival when
he purchased his ticket, claims against the cruise liner must be “litigated, if at all,
before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami
or as to those lawsuits to which the Federal Courts of the United States lack subject
matter jurisdiction, before a court located in Miami-Dade County, Florida.”
Siliakus, apparently preferring to resolve his claim in state court, zeroed in on
the language in the clause that allowed a state court to hear his claim if a federal
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to do so. To that end, Siliakus filed two
complaints: one in Florida state court, and one with the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida. His federal claim, however, affirmatively
argued that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, because he brought
his action “at law for damages,” suing Carnival “in personam for its negligence.”
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Thus, he claimed that there was no federal admiralty jurisdiction, nor any other
source of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The crux of Siliakus’ argument comes
down to statutory language within 28 U.S.C. §1333, which grants federal courts
original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (emphases added). “Other remedies,” the argument goes, would
include the right to bring a common law claim for damages at law in state court.
The district court agreed with Siliakus, relying heavily on a similar, recently
decided district court case, DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:18-CV-20653-UU, 2018
WL 2316643 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2018) (citation omitted), rev’d, 963 F.3d 1302.
There, the district court had held that the saving-to-suitors clause in §1333 “permits
a plaintiff to proceed ‘at law,’ (for example, in tort or contract) rather than in
admiralty,” and bringing the case at law “exempts state common law remedies from
exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction.” 2018 WL 2316643, at *4. Similarly here,
because Siliakus raised a state common law claim of negligence, and because he
affirmatively chose to bring this claim at law and in personam, the district court
concluded there was no admiralty jurisdiction. Finding no other source of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, it dismissed Siliakus’ action.
However, as we’ve noted, the district court’s decision in DeRoy was
subsequently reversed and remanded by a panel of this Court. 963 F.3d 1302. In
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DeRoy, we declined to accept the jurisdictional label used by the plaintiff in her
pleading. Rather, we held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h) provides that a claim cognizable
“only in the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction is an admiralty or maritime claim for
those purposes, whether or not so designated.” Id. at 1312 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(h)(1)). Noting that DeRoy “voluntarily filed in federal court and alleged sufficient
facts to satisfy admiralty jurisdiction,” we clarified that under Rule 9(h), there was
no need to defer to DeRoy’s own categorization of her claim. Id. at 1314 (emphasis
added). T he plain text of Rule 9 made it is irrelevant that DeRoy formally designated
her claim as being at law; rather, because she filed in federal court, and because the
facts alleged within her complaint established admiralty jurisdiction, the district
court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Id. As we explained:
Although Rule 9(h) allows a plaintiff in a maritime case to choose
whether to proceed at law or in admiralty, that choice is available only
if there is a choice to be made -- that is, if the plaintiff has a separate
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction other than admiralty. But when
admiralty is the only basis for jurisdiction, then admiralty jurisdiction
applies, regardless of how the plaintiff designates her case.

Id. at 1312.

So too here. Just like in DeRoy, it makes no difference that Siliakus classified
his claims as being brought at law and in personam. By filing in federal court, and
by alleging facts that establish admiralty jurisdiction, Siliakus triggered that type of
jurisdiction -- regardless of whatever jurisdictional labels he chose to use. And since
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no other avenue for federal jurisdiction exists, “admiralty jurisdiction applies,
regardless of how the plaintiff designates [his] case.” Id.
Indeed, in the district court’s own words, this case is “virtually identical” to
DeRoy. Nor can we identify any ground on which to distinguish the two cases. The
facts are substantially similar; there, DeRoy tripped on an uneven carpet; here,
Siliakus slipped and fell on wet stairs. Slipping on wet stairs while on board a vessel
is just as “connected with maritime activity” and is sufficient to allow for admiralty
jurisdiction. See id. (citing Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1365
(11th Cir. 2018) (“Tort claims are within admiralty jurisdiction if (1) the incident
occurred on navigable water, or the injury was caused by a vessel on navigable
water, and (2) the incident is connected with maritime activity.”)). Moreover, the
legal issue is identical in the two cases -- both plaintiffs used the same language in
their attempt to avoid admiralty jurisdiction. And the district courts applied the same
legal analysis -- now disapproved of by our Court -- to evaluate each claim. Thus,
under our decision in DeRoy, the district court has admiralty jurisdiction over
Siliakus’ claim, regardless of how he classified it.
Because the argument relied upon by the district court in this case is squarely
foreclosed by our intervening decision in DeRoy, we reverse the order of dismissal
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for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. See Smith, 122 F.3d at 1359; Main Drug, Inc., 475 F.3d at 1231.
1

REVERSED and REMANDED.

1
Siliakus’ alternative arguments are similarly unpersuasive and foreclosed by DeRoy. He says
that the forum-selection clause does not mandate a federal forum in this case, because “[t]he claims
made in Siliakus’ lawsuit do not invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction.” But as our Court
explained in DeRoy, these claims do in fact invoke admiralty jurisdiction, and, thus, federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. 963 F.3d at 1314. As for his saving-to-suitors arguments, “the saving-
to-suitors clause is not even arguably relevant to the analysis, since [Siliakus] filed in federal court
and Carnival has agreed to a jury trial.” Id.
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