Eric Watkins v. Alain Dubreuil, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________

No. 19-15131
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-62260-WPD

ERIC WATKINS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ALAIN DUBREUIL,
WARREN JEVAE WRIGHT,
WALMART STORES, INC.,
MICHAEL J. SATZ,
TAYLOR MCGAATH, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.
________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________

(July 17, 2020)

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Eric Watkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and the sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
lawsuit. Watkins complained that, following an altercation at a Walmart, he was
falsely arrested, maliciously prosecuted for disorderly conduct and trespass, and
falsely imprisoned, all in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district
court denied Watkins leave to proceed IFP, dismissed the case, denied leave to
amend as futile, and sanctioned him as a vexatious litigant.
On appeal, Watkins contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint without leave to amend because he either stated or could state plausible
claims to relief. He further argues that the district court abused its discretion when,
without holding an evidentiary hearing, it sanctioned him as a vexatious litigant and
prevented him from filing any new lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida
without prior court approval. We address each argument in turn.
I.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, accepting the
allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016).
“Claims of absolute immunity present questions of law that we review de novo.”
Mikko v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 857 F.3d 1136, 1142 (11th Cir. 2017). Likewise, the
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denial of leave to amend based on futility is reviewed de novo. SFM Holdings, Ltd.
v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint
“must include
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hunt, 814 F.3d
at 1221 (quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible when “the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Pro
se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than those
drafted by lawyers but still must suggest some factual basis for a claim. Jones v.
Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
In his complaint, Watkins alleged that he was standing in line at a Walmart
store singing an “anti-gay” song
1
when a manager was called to help a cashier with
a problem at the register. After fixing the register, the manager approached Watkins
and asked him to stop singing. Watkins refused and continued singing. The manager
then called the police, and a deputy sheriff arrived soon after. Watkins heard the

1
This same song features in many of Watkins’s lawsuits. See, e.g., Watkins v. Cent.
Broward Reg’l Park, 799 F. App’x 659, 662 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Watkins’s claims arise from two
incidents where he was removed and subsequently banned from a park after loudly and repeatedly
singing a song with lyrics advocating violence against gay people.”); Watkins v. Bigwood, 797 F.
App’x 438, 440 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Plaintiff says he was singing a published and recorded song,
‘Boom Bye,’ by reggae artist Buju Banton, the lyrics of which include the terms ‘faggot’ and ‘batty
boy.’ The song’s lyrics also include references to shooting homosexuals and setting them on
fire.”); Watkins v. U.S. Postal Emp., 611 F. App’x 549, 550 (11th Cir. 2015) (“While waiting in
line, Watkins was singing what he describes as ‘an antigay song by superstar Reggea [sic] artist
Buju Banton.’”).
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manager tell the deputy that Watkins had previously received a trespass warning and
that he wanted Watkins arrested. Watkins objected that this was a “lie” and that “no
one had ordered [him] to leave Walmart” either then or in the past. Despite these
claims, the deputy arrested Watkins for trespass, and state prosecutors later charged
him with trespass and disorderly conduct. At trial, the state declined to prosecute
the disorderly conduct charge, and the judge dismissed it. The jury acquitted
Watkins of the trespass offense. Watkins was detained for 128 days pretrial, which
was eight days longer than the combined maximum punishment for the two offenses.
The district court did not err in dismissing Watkins’s complaint for failure to
state a plausible claim to relief or in denying leave to amend as futile.
First, Watkins’s claims against Walmart and the manager are not viable
because these defendants were not acting under color of state law. To establish a
§ 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a federal right
(2) by a “state actor.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992); see
also Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013). “Only in rare
circumstances can a private party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for section 1983
purposes.” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130. To be considered a state actor under § 1983,
a private party must have exercised a traditionally exclusive public function, acted
in concert with public officials, or engaged in conduct compelled by the state. See
id. at 1130–31; see Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990).
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Here, Walmart and the manager are private parties which cannot plausibly be
viewed as state actors. Watkins contends that Walmart and the manager acted in
concert with the deputy to carry out his arrest. But the mere fact that the manager
may have provided false information to the deputy does not show that they acted in
concert. Nothing in the complaint plausibly suggests that the deputy was aware the
manager’s statements were false or that the deputy and the manager had reached an
understanding to deprive Watkins of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Lowe v.
Aldridge, 958 F.2d 1565, 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) (to show that a private party “acted
in concert” with state officials, “a plaintiff must show that the parties reached an
understanding to deny the plaintiff his or her rights”). Nor has Watkins shown that
he could demonstrate such an understanding through further amendment. So the
court properly dismissed this claim and denied leave to amend.
Second, the false arrest and malicious-prosecution claims against the deputy
fail because the deputy had probable cause to arrest for trespass. The existence of
probable cause to support an arrest defeats claims for both false arrest and malicious
prosecution based on that arrest. Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724,
734 (11th Cir. 2010) (false arrest); Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240,
1256 (11th Cir. 2010) (malicious prosecution). Probable cause exists where
reasonably trustworthy information known by the officer would cause a person of
reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense has been committed. Brown,
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608 F.3d at 734. Under Florida law, a person commits the offense of trespass in a
structure or conveyance when he “willfully enters or remains in any structure or
conveyance” without having been “authorized, licensed, or invited,” or refuses to
leave after having been asked to do so by “a person authorized by the owner or
lessee.” Fla. Stat. § 810.08(1).
Here, the deputy had probable cause to arrest for trespass because he received
apparently reliable information from the Walmart manager that Watkins had
previously been warned that he was not welcome in the Walmart. In other words, a
person with apparent knowledge and authority told the deputy that Watkins had
“willfully enter[ed] or remain[ed]” in the Walmart without having been “authorized,
licensed, or invited.” See id.
Watkins claims that the deputy failed to conduct a reasonable investigation by
checking whether there was a prior trespass warning on file at Walmart or with the
Sheriff’s Office. But nothing in the trespass statute requires a prior, written warning.
See id. And “a police officer is not required to explore and eliminate every
theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest,” Kingsland v.
City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted), or
to “sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility,
so long as the
totality of the circumstances present a sufficient basis for believing that an offense
has been committed,”
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002). On this
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record, the deputy was entitled to rely on the manager’s statement to conclude that
the offense of trespass had been committed.
Watkins also responds that, under state law, the deputy was not authorized to
conduct a warrantless arrest because he did not see Watkins commit all elements of
the misdemeanor offense in his presence. See Fla. Stat. § 901.15(1). But “[t]here is
no federal right not to be arrested in violation of state law.” Knight v. Jacobson, 300
F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). An arrest supported by probable cause does not
violate the Fourth Amendment even if it violates state law. Id.; see United States v.
Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the district court
properly dismissed this claim and denied leave to amend.
Third, the prosecutors who charged Watkins are entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity against his claim of malicious prosecution. “A prosecutor
is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions he takes while performing his
functions as an advocate for the government” in the judicial phase of the criminal
process, including the “initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution,” Rivera v.
Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004), such as the filing of charges, Hart v.
Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009). Put simply, “[a] prosecutor is
immune for malicious prosecution.” Id. While immunity does not apply when a
prosecutor acts as an investigator or complaining witness, there are no allegations in
this case of conduct other than initiating and pursuing a baseless prosecution. See
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Rivera, 359 F.3d at 1353. Because the prosecutors are immune for this conduct, this
claim was properly dismissed, and amendment would be futile.
Fourth, the district court did not err in dismissing Watkins’s claim of false
imprisonment. Watkins claims that the Broward County Sheriff’s Office, a state
prosecutor, and the current and former sheriffs of Broward County are liable for
keeping him in pretrial detention eight days longer than the maximum possible
penalties (120 days) for his two charged offenses of trespass after warning and
disorderly conduct.
Here, Watkins’s complaint and other filings fail to show that any of the
defendants, individually, had anything to with the jail keeping him in pretrial
detention for 128 days. In his complaint, Watkins indicated that his alleged
overdetention resulted from jail personnel’s erroneous entering into the jail’s system
that he had been charged with trespass under Fla. Stat. § 810.08(1)(2)(b), which
carried a maximum sentence of one year, instead of Fla. Stat. § 810.08(1)(2)(a),
which was the correct charge and carried a maximum sentence of 60 days. There
are no factual allegations that the sheriffs or the prosecutor were responsible for this
error, however, or otherwise for keeping Watkins in jail longer than authorized.
While Watkins suggests that the sheriffs are liable because they are broadly
responsible for jail functions, including the release of detainees, supervisory officials
like the sheriffs are not liable for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates
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unless they personally participated in, directed, or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct. See Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th
Cir. 2010). Because Watkins has not alleged any conduct by the sheriffs or the
prosecutor that led to the allegedly excessive pretrial detention, we dismiss his
individual-capacity claims of false imprisonment.
Nor do Watkins’s complaint and related filings provide a basis for a
municipal-liability claim against the Sheriff’s Office under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2
To impose municipal liability under § 1983,
the plaintiff must establish that a custom or policy of the municipal entity caused a
violation of his constitutional rights. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2004). Alone, “the fact that a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal
rights at the hands of a municipal employee” is not enough. Id. Here, Watkins has
not identified any policy or custom of the jail or the Sheriff’s Office that caused his
injury. See id. Nor can we infer such a custom or policy “based upon an isolated
incident,” which is all that we have here. Id. Accordingly, the complaint failed to
allege any basis for municipal liability.

2
It appears that Watkins intended to assert official-capacity claims against the sheriffs, but
an official-capacity claim “is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation
marks omitted). Therefore, we construe any official-capacity claims against the sheriffs as simply
claims against the Broward County Sheriff’s Office.
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For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Watkins’s complaint and the
denial of leave to amend.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to impose a
filing injunction. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008). Likewise,
we review for abuse of discretion the denial of an evidentiary hearing. Menchise v.
Akerman Senterfitt, 532 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 2008). An abuse of discretion
occurs if the court bases its decision on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous or
“commits a clear error of judgment.” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 613 F.3d
1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2010).
“Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation
to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out
Article III functions.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir 1986).
In particular, “[t]he court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from
unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others.” Id. at 1074.
To that end, the court may severely restrict a litigant’s filings, but it cannot
completely foreclose a litigant from any access to the courts. Id.
A.
Watkins first argues that no sanction was appropriate because the district court
failed to show, beyond conclusory claims, that any of his prior lawsuits were filed
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in bad faith or were frivolous, repetitive, or vexatious. He maintains that
litigiousness alone, without a finding that prior cases were vexatious or frivolous, is
not sufficient to impose sanctions.

In concluding that sanctions were appropriate, the district judge reviewed in
detail Watkins’s litigation history, which at that time included thirty-six civil
lawsuits, arising from twenty-four separate incidents, filed in the Southern District
of Florida since September 2012, in addition to nearly forty-five additional cases
filed in other federal courts since 2008. The judge also considered his conduct in
litigating these cases, many of which, including two trials, were before the judge.
Based on this review, the judge found that Watkins had a “history of vexatious,
harassing and duplicative lawsuits,” and that his pattern of conduct “severely tax[ed]
this [c]ourt’s resources” and warranted the imposition of sanctions.
The district judge did not abuse his discretion by imposing sanctions. As the
judge found, much of Watkins’s prior litigation has been without merit. Of the
thirty-six cases filed in the Southern District, twenty-two were dismissed for failure
to state a claim
3
or as frivolous.
4
While a few have reached summary judgment
5
or

3
S.D. Fla. Case nos. 13-cv-61641, 13-cv-62448, 14-cv-60257, 14-cv-60354, 14-cv-60380,
14-cv-60941, 14-cv-61205, 14-cv-61856, 14-cv-62095, 15-cv-61592, 15-cv-62515, 16-cv-60030,
16-cv-60437, 17-cv-62547, 18-cv-61055, 18-cv-61131, 18-cv-61330, 18-cv-61843, 18-cv-62335,
18-cv-63165, 19-cv-62260.
4
S.D. Fla. Case no. 18-cv-62009.
5
S.D. Fla. Case nos. 17-cv-60009, 13-cv-60564, 18-cv-60980.
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trial,
6
Watkins has not prevailed in any of these cases.
7
Moreover, with one
exception, where we vacated and remanded for further proceedings,
8
his appeals
from these cases—roughly thirty-five in total—have fared no better. Six appeals
were dismissed for want of prosecution (two such dismissals came after IFP was
denied because the appeal was frivolous)
9
, seven were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction
10
, and sixteen resulted in affirmance of the judgment.
11
So despite prior
courts’ rare invocation of “frivolity,” we agree with the district judge’s assessment
that Watkins has not only been hyperlitigious but his lawsuits have been largely,
though not entirely, meritless.
Additionally, many of Watkins’s lawsuits have been repetitive, if not
duplicative. As the district judge observed, “Watkins has a pattern of disobeying
requests from authority figures because he perceives them to be unlawful” and then
“uses these incidents of non-compliance as a basis for numerous federal lawsuits,
often against anyone, even peripherally involved.” For example, approximately ten

6
S.D. Fla. Case nos. 16-cv-60436, 16-cv-63017.
7
Of the remaining cases, six were dismissed for reasons such as failure to prosecute, failure
to perfect service, or law of the case (S.D. Fla. Case nos. 12-cv-61886, 13-cv-62302, 14-cv-61144,
15-cv-60514, 15-cv-61556, 18-cv-60110), and three are still pending in the district court (S.D. Fla.
Case nos. 18-cv-63035, 19-cv-60810, 19-cv-61972).
8
In Appeal no. 19-10456, we concluded that Watkins stated plausible claims to relief, and
so we vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
9
Appeal nos. 14-11794, 14-12257, 15-10458, 15-13096, 15-15373, 17-13938.
10
Appeal nos. 15-10904, 15-13878, 16-11826, 17-11835, 17-14501, 17-15443, 18-10413.
11
Appeal nos. 14-12158, 14-14608, 16-11411, 16-11826, 16-12932, 16-15081, 16-16049,
17-14871, 18-10773, 18-12855, 18-13184, 18-13938, 18-14165, 18-14626, 19-10654, 19-12851.
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lawsuits arose out of six incidents where Watkins was simply ordered to leave
private property and threatened with arrest for trespass. Both the district court and
this Court have repeatedly rejected Watkins’s claims that such orders violated his
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Watkins v. Elmore, 589 F. App’x 524, 524–25 (11th
Cir. 2015); Watkins v. Miller, 782 F. App’x 770, 773–74 (11th Cir. 2019); Watkins
v. Joy, 782 F. App’x 892, 894–95 (11th Cir. 2019).
Moreover, the district judge, who had previously handled many of Watkins’s
cases, was in the best position to assess Watkins’s activities and their effect on the
Southern District of Florida’s resources. The judge observed, and we agree based
on a review of the underlying cases, that “Watkins does not take ‘no’ for an answer”
and “multiplies the litigation by filing frivolous motions for reconsideration and
frivolous interlocutory appeals.” The judge also noted that, in the view of a
psychiatrist who testified at one of Watkins’s trials, Watkins was seemingly
impressed by the fact that he had filed 400 complaints during his federal prison
incarceration. Cf. Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir.
1991) (upholding a filing injunction against a litigant who “proudly boasted that he
was the ‘most litigious inmate in the system’”).
In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we consider whether the judge based
his decision on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous or “commit[ed] a clear
error of judgment” by arriving at a decision outside the range of reasonable
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outcomes. Gray, 613 F.3d at 1039. Although Watkins objected to many of the facts
cited by the district judge, the judge explained that, even if Watkins’s objections
were valid, his overall impression of Watkins’s litigation history and his reasons for
imposing sanctions would remain unchanged. And based on our review of
Watkins’s litigation history, and for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that
the district judge did not commit a clear error of judgment in finding that Watkins
had a history of filing meritless and vexatious lawsuits that warranted the imposition
of sanctions.
B.
Nor did the district court’s choice of sanction amount to an abuse of discretion.
The court entered an order enjoining Watkins from filing any new lawsuits in the
Southern District of Florida without prior court approval. Watkins would be
required to file a motion for leave to file, attaching a copy of his proposed lawsuit
and a reference to the sanctions order, at which point the court would review the
lawsuit and decide whether it should be accepted by the clerk and filed. Unaccepted
cases would be kept by the clerk for possible review on appeal. If Watkins failed to
submit a motion for leave to file, “the Clerk of Court would be directed to close the
case upon filing,” and the defendants would not be required to make any response.
We have upheld injunctions with pre-filing screening restrictions on vexatious
plaintiffs. Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993); Cofield,
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936 F.2d at 518. In Martin-Trigona, for example, we upheld as reasonable a broad
filing injunction that prohibited the plaintiff “from filing or attempting to initiate any
new lawsuit in any federal court in the United States . . . without first obtaining leave
of that federal court.” 986 F.3d at 1387. Likewise, in Cofield, we upheld an
injunction requiring the plaintiff “to send all pleadings to a judge for prefiling
approval” because the plaintiff would still be able to have colorable claims filed in
federal court. 936 F.2d at 518.
The pre-approval filing injunction in this case is comparable to the filing
injunctions in both Martin-Trigona and Cofield. Like the injunctions in those cases,
the injunction here does not completely foreclose Watkins’s access to the courts, see
Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073, so long as the court merely “screen[s] out the frivolous
and malicious claims and allow[s] the arguable claims to go forward.” Cofield, 936
F.2d at 518. Watkins will be in a position not significantly “different from other in
forma pauperis litigants.” Id. “Should [Watkins] have a colorable claim he will be
able to file his claim in federal court.” Id. With this understanding, we conclude
that the district court imposed a reasonable injunction that does not impermissibly
foreclose Watkins’s access to federal court. See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074.
C.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hold an
evidentiary hearing before imposing sanctions. Watkins was given notice and an
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opportunity to contest the court’s rationale for imposing sanctions, and the decision
did not depend on the resolution of material factual disputes or credibility
determinations. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1312–13 (11th
Cir. 1998) (explaining when evidentiary hearings are appropriate). The decision was
based primarily on prior court records, which are not reasonably subject to dispute
and which are available for our review. And Watkins primarily challenges the
inferences the court drew from those records. See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 43
(indicating that his request was for a hearing “for the court to produce evidence to
support its claims” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the court indicated that its
decision would remain the same “even if all of Watkins’ objections were valid,”
which suggests that any factual disputes were not material. In these circumstances,
no evidentiary hearing was required before sanctions were imposed.
III.
In sum, we affirm the dismissal of Watkins’s complaint and the denial of his
motion for leave to proceed IFP. We also affirm the district court’s order enjoining
Watkins from filing new cases in the Southern District of Florida without prior court
approval.
AFFIRMED.
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