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20-12909•Vaughn Johnson v. Acting United States Attorney General, et al
20-12909Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitMay 3, 2021
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-12909
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-02114-RDP-JHE
VAUGHN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
MARC J. MOORE,
Field Operations Director,
JONATHAN HORTON,
Sheriff of Etowah County,
DAVID RIVERA,
Field Operations Director, New Orleans, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(May 3, 2021)
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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Vaughn Johnson appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his pro se
complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, he argues that the district court
erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case. After
thorough review, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s determination about whether it has
subject-matter jurisdiction over a complaint. Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d 1062,
1064-65 (11th Cir. 2013).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) deprives the district courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over specific types of immigration actions. In relevant
part, § 1252(g) provides that:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The statute further says that “a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial
review of an order of removal.” Id. § 1252(a)(5).
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We’ve explained that § 1252(g) is “unambiguous” in that it bars federal
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction “over any claim for which the ‘decision or action’
of the Attorney General [] to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders is the basis of the claim.” Gupta, 709 F.3d at 1065. In Gupta, a
removable alien brought a Bivens action, arguing that federal agents illegally created
an arrest warrant, illegally arrested him, and illegally detained him. Id. at 1064. We
squarely held that § 1252(g) barred the court from reaching the merits of those
claims. Id. at 1065-66.
Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Johnson’s case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint alleges that Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) lacked probable cause to issue a detainer or a warrant for
Johnson’s arrest, and because of this illegal seizure, his notice to appear, his
detention and the subsequent final order of his removal are unconstitutional. Based
on Johnson’s allegations, it is clear that the commencement of removal proceedings,
the detention order, and the removal order form the basis of his Bivens claim. Thus,
like the appellant in Gupta, Johnson is attempting to challenge his underlying
immigration orders and to obtain declaratory relief from the district court that his
ICE detainers, notice to appear, detention order, and removal order are
unconstitutional. As we held in Gupta, however, this kind of challenge
“unambiguous[ly]” is included within the exclusionary language of § 1252(g). Id.
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Accordingly, just as we held in Gupta, the district court was barred from
reaching the merits of Johnson’s claims because § 1252(g) stripped jurisdiction of
those matters from the district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); see also Gupta, 709 F.3d
at 1065-66. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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