USA v. Hugo Valencia Mendoza

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-10342
Non-Argument Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HUGO VALENCIA MENDOZA,
a.k.a. Uriel Valencia Mendoza,
a.k.a. Yiyo,
Defendant-Appellant.
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10342
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00278-LMM-JSA-1
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Before W ILSON, ROSENBAUM , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hugo Valencia Mendoza appeals his sentence of imprison-
ment for 210 months following his guilty plea for conspiring to pos-
sess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, and aiding and abetting the
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mendoza
contends the district court erred by applying a two-level enhance-
ment under U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b)(5) for his offense involving the im-
portation of methamphetamine. He argues that the word “in-
volved” in § 2D.1.1(b)(5) is unconstitutionally vague. After careful
review, we affirm.
The district court committed no error.1 Mendoza’s argu-
ment is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Beckles v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). In
Beckles, the Supreme Court
1 We review constitutional challenges to a district judge’s use of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th
Cir. 2015).
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21-10342 Opinion of the Court 3
held that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines cannot be challenged
as unconstitutionally vague. 137 S. Ct. at 892. The Supreme Court
explained that the “void for vagueness” doctrine has been applied
to two kinds of criminal laws: “laws that
define criminal offenses
and laws that
fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.”
Id. Because the Guidelines do neither, but rather serve as a non-
binding guide to aid judges in their sentencing, the vagueness doc-
trine does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines.
Id. Further, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the Guidelines do not interfere with
the two policies that the void for vagueness doctrine protects—pro-
vision of notice and the avoidance of arbitrary enforcement.
Id. at
894.
Mendoza’s attempt to distinguish
Beckles fails. He contends
that because of the vagueness of the word “involved” under
U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b)(5),2 district court judges across the country
could apply the enhancement to anyone no matter how far down
the chain of distribution. But in this specific case, it makes no dif-
ference how the district court applied the enhancement provision
because Mendoza challenges only the vagueness of § 2D.1.1(b)(5),
and the Supreme Court held that the advisory guidelines—
2 We previously declined to interpret the word “involved” narrowly and de-
termined the language used by the Sentencing Guidelines supports a broader
reading of the word “involved.”
See United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d
779, 784 (11th Cir. 2007).
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10342
including § 2D.1.1(b)(5)—cannot be unconstitutionally vague in
any case as a matter of law.
See Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894–95.
AFFIRMED.
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