Ishanna Ible v. Wells Fargo, National Association, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11777
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ISHANNA IBLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-OPT1, Asset Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-OPT1,
WAKULLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
STATE OF FLORIDA,
BRENT X. THURMOND,
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11777
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00025-MW-MAF
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ishanna Ible appeals
pro se from the district court’s order
granting Wells Fargo Bank, National Association’s (“Wells Fargo”)
motion to dismiss her
pro se complaint alleging Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) violations, Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) violations, mortgage
fraud, and criminal law violations. On appeal, she argues that
Wells Fargo, the Wakulla County Circuit Court, and the State of
Florida (collectively, the “Defendants”) violated RICO, violated the
FDCPA, deprived her of her civil rights, obstructed justice, and
committed aggravated identify theft.
When appropriate, we review
de novo a district court’s de-
termination that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Behr v. Camp-
bell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2021). We also review
de novo
the dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint because it should have been
presented as a compulsory counterclaim.
See Montgomery Ward
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21-11777 Opinion of the Court 3
Dev. Corp. v. Juster, 932 F.2d 1378, 1379 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that we review whether the district court erred as a matter of law
when it dismissed a complaint because it should have been pre-
sented as a compulsory counterclaim in a previous action);
Johan-
sen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999)
(stating that we review questions of law
de novo). We review a
district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
de novo, “accept-
ing the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Hill v. White, 321 F.3d
1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). We review the dismissal of a shotgun
pleading under Rule 8 for abuse of discretion.
Vibe Micro, Inc. v.
Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018).
A document filed
pro se must be liberally construed and held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by law-
yers.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, “is-
sues not briefed on appeal by a
pro se litigant are deemed aban-
doned.”
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
An appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when she does not
“plainly and prominently raise it.”
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omit-
ted). An appellant abandons a claim when she “either makes only
passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without
supporting arguments and authority.”
Id. “To obtain reversal of a
district court judgment that is based on multiple, independent
grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground
for the judgment against [her] is incorrect.”
Id. at 680. “When an
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11777
appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds
on which the district court based its judgment, [s]he is deemed to
have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that
the judgment is due to be affirmed.”
Id.;
United States v. Campbell,
26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (
en banc) (holding that issues not
raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited and will not be ad-
dressed absent extraordinary circumstances),
petition for cert. filed,
No. 21-1468 (U.S. May 23, 2022).
“Within fourteen days after being served with a copy [of the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (“R&R”)], any
party may serve, and file written objections to such proposed find-
ings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party who fails to object to a magistrate
judge’s findings or recommendations contained in an R&R “in ac-
cordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the
right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on un-
objected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed
of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal
for failing to object.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. “In the absence of a proper
objection, however, the [C]ourt may review on appeal for plain er-
ror if necessary in the interests of justice.”
Id.
Here, as to the motion to dismiss,1 Ible has waived review
of the magistrate judge’s R&R because she did not properly object.
1 On appeal, the Wakulla County Clerk of Court and Comptroller’s
(“County Clerk”), Brent X. Thurmond, asserts that the orders to quash the
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21-11777 Opinion of the Court 5
Although she filed objections, her objections were not specific, pro-
vided no bases for the objections, and did not identify any error
committed by the magistrate judge. Prior to the district court’s de-
cision, Ible was given notice that she had 14 days to object to the
R&R and that failure to file specific objections would waive her
right to appeal. Because she received proper notice and failed to
sufficiently object, her arguments challenging the magistrate
judge’s R&R on appeal are waived.
Additionally, Ible has abandoned any argument that the dis-
trict court erred when it dismissed her complaint on the grounds
that (1) it was a shotgun pleading, (2) it was barred by the
Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine, (3) it was barred under Florida’s com-
pulsory counterclaim rule and
res judicata, and (4) it did not state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and she lacked standing to liti-
gate her criminal allegations. While she does mention the FDCPA,
she makes no challenge to the district court’s determination that
the foreclosure action was not a debt collection activity. Although
Ible’s brief, liberally construed, arguably challenged the district
court’s determination that she had failed to state a RICO claim, she
challenged none of the district court’s other, independent, grounds
service of process on him were proper because he was not a party to the law-
suit. However, Ible has abandoned any challenge to the magistrate judge’s
orders granting the County Clerk’s motions to quash the summonses by not
raising the issue on appeal, so we need not address it.
2
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
Dist. of Col. Ct. of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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for dismissing her complaint (e.g. the
Rooker-Feldman bar and/or
the compulsory counterclaim bar).
AFFIRMED.
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