Roger Halstead v. Fidel Espinoza, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13356
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ROGER HALSTEAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FIDEL ESPINOZA,
in his individual capacity, & official capacity
as a Lieutenant for The City of Dunwoody Police Dept ,
BILLY GROGAN,
in his individual capacity, & official capacity
as Chief of City of Dunwoody Police Department,
OLIVER FLADRICH,
in his individual capacity, & official capacity
as an Officer of The City of Dunwoody Police Department,
THE CITY OF DUNWOODY,
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13356
Under color of State Law,
LYNN DEUTSCH,
in her individual capacity & official capacity
as Mayor of The City of Dunwoody, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03474-SCJ
____________________
Before BRANCH , LAGOA , and BRASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Roger Halstead appeals the district court’s order dismissing
his amended complaint with prejudice and denying his motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint. The district court dis-
missed the amended complaint, which alleged a litany of claims
stemming from Halstead’s employment as a police officer in the
City of Dunwoody, as a shotgun pleading. And the court denied
Halstead’s motion to amend because the proposed second
amended complaint, rather than curing the pleading deficiencies,
exacerbated them. On appeal, Halstead makes three arguments.
First, he contends that because his original complaint complied
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21-13356 Opinion of the Court 3
with Georgia’s state-court pleading requirements, dismissal was
improper. Second, he argues that the district court should have
granted his motion for leave to amend or, at a minimum, dismissed
the complaint without prejudice. Third, he contends that the dis-
trict court erred by dismissing the case after it learned of an open
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigation. How-
ever, Halstead has abandoned all relevant issues and, regardless, his
arguments lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint as a
“shotgun” pleading for abuse of discretion.
Weiland v. Palm Beach
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). “Shotgun
pleadings are those that incorporate every antecedent allegation by
reference into each subsequent claim for relief . . . .”
Wagner v.
First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006).
“The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, each one
incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, lead-
ing to a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first)
contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.”
Strate-
gic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d
1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002).
On appeal, Halstead abandons any challenge to the district
court’s dismissal of the amended complaint because he does not
challenge the substance of the district court’s determination that
the amended complaint was a shotgun pleading. He argues only
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13356
that his original complaint, which was not the operative complaint,
complied with Georgia state-law pleading requirements. An appel-
lant abandons an issue by failing to sufficiently argue the merits of
the issue.
Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316,
1318-19 (11th Cir. 2012),
overruled in part by United States v.
Durham, 795 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015). Accordingly,
Halstead abandons any challenge to the district court’s dismissal
because he does not argue that the operative complaint was not a
shotgun pleading.
In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing the amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. For start-
ers, both Halstead’s complaints are quintessential shotgun plead-
ings because they “contain[] several counts, each one incorporating
by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situa-
tion where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrele-
vant factual allegations and legal conclusions.”
Strategic Income
Fund, 305 F.3d at 1295. Even more, the district court told Halstead
how to cure his defective complaint, but Halstead failed to comply.
Finally, Halstead’s argument that his original complaint complied
with state-law pleading requirements has no bearing on the propri-
ety of the district court’s dismissal. Accordingly, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the amended complaint
as a shotgun pleading.
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21-13356 Opinion of the Court 5
II.
We also review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint
for abuse of discretion.
Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008,
1012 (11th Cir. 2005). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(2), courts should freely grant leave to amend a complaint
“when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). District courts
must give a litigant at least one chance to remedy any pleading de-
ficiencies before dismissing a complaint on shotgun pleading
grounds.
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2018).
Once a district court gives a plaintiff fair notice of the specific
defects in the complaint and a meaningful chance to fix them, dis-
missal with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds is proper if a
plaintiff files an amended complaint afflicted with the same defects.
Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358-59 (11th Cir.
2018). It is futile to grant leave to amend once again “if an amended
complaint would still fail at the motion-to-dismiss or summary-
judgment stage.”
L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323,
1332 (11th Cir. 2020).
Halstead abandons any challenge to the district court’s de-
nial of his motion for leave to further amend his complaint and the
prejudicial effect of the dismissal. On appeal, he does not address
the district court’s determination that it would be futile to grant
leave to amend. Instead, Halstead limits his argument to providing
examples of cases in which district courts allowed plaintiffs to
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amend their complaints multiple times. Halstead’s failure to specif-
ically explain why the district court abused its discretion in this case
is fatal to his appeal of that issue.
Moreover, the district court acted within its discretion by
dismissing with prejudice rather than allowing leave to amend.
The court permitted Halstead to amend his complaint and pro-
vided explicit instructions on how to correct the pleading deficien-
cies. The court also denied Halstead’s motion only after determin-
ing that the proposed second amended complaint would not cure
the pleading deficiencies. Accordingly, dismissing the action with
prejudice and denying Halstead’s motion to amend was not error.
See L.S. ex rel. Hernandez, 982 F.3d at 1332.
III.
Finally, Halstead argues that the district court erred by dis-
missing his complaint despite the existence of a pending EEOC in-
vestigation. The pending EEOC investigation is irrelevant to our
consideration of whether dismissal was proper and whether the dis-
trict court erred by denying Halstead’s motion to amend. Our prec-
edents do not preclude a district court from dismissing a deficient
complaint because of a pending EEOC investigation, and Halstead
makes no argument otherwise.
IV.
Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.
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