Robert Earl Gorham v. Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13645
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ROBERT EARL GORHAM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-14241-KAM
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13645
Before N EWSOM , G RANT, and B LACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Earl Gorham, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We granted a certif-
icate of appealability on the following issue:
Whether the district court erred in concluding that 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) barred habeas corpus relief on
Gorham’s claim that his trial counsel’s failure to con-
vey to him the State’s pretrial plea offer of a five-year
term of imprisonment was ineffective assistance of
counsel?
After review,1 we affirm the district court.
1 We review
de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition.
McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). That is, we review
de novo “the district court’s decision about whether the state court acted con-
trary to clearly established federal law, unreasonably applied federal law, or
made an unreasonable determination of fact.”
Reed v. Sec’y,
Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). In re-
viewing the district court’s holdings, we are mindful that, in essence, we are
reviewing the state court’s conclusions.
Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208,
1224 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, although a district court’s decision is reviewed
de
novo, we must apply deference to the final judgment of a state court.
Reed,
593 F.3d at 1239.
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21-13645 Opinion of the Court 3
I. BACKGROUND
A jury convicted Gorham of two counts of burglary of a con-
veyance with an assault or battery, one count of aggravated assault,
and one count of attempted aggravated battery. According to
Gorham, while awaiting sentencing, he requested a copy of his at-
torneys’ case files and discovered the five-year plea offer for the first
time. Prior to sentencing, Gorham filed a
pro se motion for a new
trial based on the fact he had only recently learned of the five-year
plea offer. At a hearing, the state trial court heard arguments and
evidence regarding the failure to convey the five-year plea deal.
Gorham’s first attorney, Mary Celidonio, testified that, alt-
hough she could not specifically remember extending the offer to
Gorham, it would have been her normal practice to do so. How-
ever, she stated the meeting where she believed she conveyed the
plea offer “didn’t go well” because Gorham fired her during it.
During cross-examination, Celidonio acknowledged that soon af-
ter the jail visit where Gorham fired her, she received a letter from
Gorham asking her to explore the possibility of a plea offer.
Gorham introduced communications between himself and Celi-
donio into evidence, none of which mentioned the five-year offer,
which he argued indicated that she never conveyed it to him.
Gorham’s second attorney, Rebecca Hamilton, testified that
Gorham never wavered from the idea of wanting a jury trial.
Gorham testified that, had he received notice of the five-year
plea offer at the time the prosecution extended it, he would have
accepted it “[w]ithout a doubt. Absolutely.”
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13645
The state trial court found that all the documentation be-
tween Gorham and his attorneys demonstrated his desire for a
speedy jury trial and concluded that, even if Gorham had received
the five-year offer, he would not have taken it. The court further
emphasized that Gorham would not have taken the deal because it
required him to plead guilty to an aggravated assault charge, and
Gorham had previously expressed his belief he was only guilty of
two batteries. When asked why he rejected a later-offered ten-year
plea deal, Gorham stated he wanted to go to trial because attorney
Hamilton had convinced him that his case was triable. The state
court denied the motion for new trial, stating “the record . . . does
not clearly indicate that the offer was necessarily extended, but re-
gardless of whether it was extended or not, . . . the record I think is
very clear that Mister Gorham would have rejected that offer as he
did the ten-year offer.”
On appeal, the state appellate court concluded that defense
counsel’s failure to inform Gorham the State had offered him a five-
year plea offer did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,
stating the record of the hearing held by the trial court supported
its finding Gorham would not have taken the offer if conveyed.
Gorham v. State, 968 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
In the present § 2254 petition, in relevant part, Gorham
raised a ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, contending his
counsel did not convey the five-year written plea offer to him be-
fore he proceeded to trial, which constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel.
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21-13645 Opinion of the Court 5
The district court ultimately denied Gorham’s § 2254 peti-
tion. The district court noted the state trial court’s factual findings
were entitled to strong deference, and its decision would be
deemed “reasonable so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree
on [its] correctness,” which it found applied here. Accordingly, the
district court denied the petition.
II. DISCUSSION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) provides that, after a state court has adjudicated a claim
on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the
state court’s decision was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearly established federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court, or (2) based on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision can be
“contrary to” established law in two ways: (1) if the state arrives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by the U.S. Supreme Court
on a question of law; or (2) if a state court confronts facts that are
“materially indistinguishable” from relevant Supreme Court prec-
edent but arrives at an opposite result from that arrived at by the
Supreme Court.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
The United States Constitution provides “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The
right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To make a showing
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13645
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a prisoner must prove two
things: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense.
Id. at 687. To establish
prejudice from his trial counsel’s failure to communicate a plea of-
fer, the defendant must allege and prove a reasonable probability
that (1) he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised the
defendant correctly, (2) the prosecutor would not have withdrawn
the offer, (3) the court would have accepted the offer, and (4) the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would
have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that
in fact were imposed.
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012).
The district court did not err in denying Gorham’s § 2254
petition. First, Gorham’s contention the state courts erred when
they declined to consider whether counsel’s failure to convey the
plea offer constituted deficient performance fails. A court need not
address both prongs of the
Strickland analysis if a prisoner makes
an insufficient showing as to one.
Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d
1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating there is no reason for a court
deciding an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to approach the
inquiry in the same order, or even to address both components of
the inquiry if the prisoner makes an insufficient showing on one).
Second, the state court determined Gorham had not satis-
fied the prejudice prong of
Strickland because it found, based on
his previous statements, that he would not have accepted the plea
offer had counsel advised him of it. We reject Gorham’s argument
that the Florida court held Gorham to a higher standard than
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21-13645 Opinion of the Court 7
required, as the Florida court’s finding he would not have accepted
the plea necessarily finds that Gorham did not allege and prove a
“reasonable probability” that he would have accepted the plea of-
fer.
See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164. As Gorham did not allege and prove
a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer,
he could not establish prejudice.
See id. Under § 2254(d), this
Court need not determine whether the state court’s conclusion
that he would not have accepted the plea was incorrect, only
whether it was unreasonable.
See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 123 (2009) (stating under § 2254(d), “[t]he question is not
whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination un-
der the
Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that deter-
mination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold”
(quotation marks omitted)). The state court’s conclusion was not
unreasonable. Moreover, Gorham does not argue that the state
trial court would have accepted the five-year plea, which is also re-
quired by
Lafler.
III. CONCLUSION
Even if Gorham’s attorney failed to communicate a plea of-
fer to him, the state court reasonably determined that Gorham did
not satisfy the prejudice prong of
Strickland, because Gorham did
not allege and prove a reasonable probability that he would have
accepted the plea deal and he did not argue the state trial court
would have accepted such a plea. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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