Sean P. Reilly v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13668
____________________
SEAN P. REILLY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00118-MW-MJF
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13668
Before J ORDAN, L AGOA , Circuit Judges, and C ANNON,* District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
In 2021, Sean Reilly—a Florida prisoner—submitted a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging
a 2009 conviction and a subsequent 2015 judgment for revocation
of probation. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that it was an unauthorized second or suc-
cessive habeas corpus application.
Mr. Reilly appeals the district court’s dismissal of his peti-
tion. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
I
We begin with an overview of the sentences and convictions
relevant to Mr. Reilly’s § 2254 petition from 2021. The procedural
history is complicated, but necessary to understanding what the
2021 petition related to.
A
The September 2009 Judgment. On September 22, 2009, in
Case No. 2008-CF-4221, Mr. Reilly was convicted of two counts
(Counts One and Five) of criminal use of personal identification
information in Leon County Circuit Court. As to Count One, Mr.
Reilly was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days of imprisonment,
* The Honorable Aileen M. Cannon, United States District Judge for the South-
ern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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21-13668 Opinion of the Court 3
followed by two years of community control and two years of pro-
bation. As to Count Five, he was sentenced to “two years of com-
munity control followed by two years of probation, to run consec-
utive to the incarcerative portion of the sentence on Count [One]
but concurrent with the supervisory portions of the sentence on
Count [One] (the community control and probation).” D.E. 19 at
3.
The 2010 Violation of Supervision Judgment. In September
of 2010, while Mr. Reilly was serving the supervisory portion of
the 2009 sentence in Case No. 2008-CF-4221—and of another sen-
tence unrelated to this appeal in Case No. 2008-CF-781—he was
charged with violations of his supervision. On December 6, 2010,
the state court found that he had violated the conditions of super-
vision and revoked his term of supervision. As to Count One of
the 2009 judgment, Mr. Reilly was sentenced to 60 months of im-
prisonment. As to Count Five, he received a split sentence of two
years of community control followed by two years of probation,
to run consecutive to the incarcerative sentence on Count One.
The 2015 Violation of Probation Judgment. In December of
2013, while Mr. Reilly was serving the supervisory portion of his
sentence from the 2010 violation of supervision judgment, he was
charged with aggravated stalking in Leon County Circuit Court
and with violation of his probation in Case No. 2008-CF-4221. In
April of 2015, “following a combined nonjury trial on the [aggra-
vated stalking] charge . . . and a [violation of probation] hearing in
Case No. 2008-CF-4221, the state court found [Mr.] Reilly guilty of
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13668
[a]ggravated [s]talking . . . and guilty of violating his supervision in
Case No. 2008-CF-4221 (imposed by the 2010 [violation of proba-
tion] Judgment).” Id. at 4–5. On June 18, 2015, Mr. Reilly was sen-
tenced to a term of five years of imprisonment for the aggravated
stalking conviction, and five years of imprisonment for the viola-
tion of probation, with the latter to run consecutively to the for-
mer.
B
Over the last five years, Mr. Reilly has filed various § 2254
petitions. We discuss certain petitions—those relevant to this ap-
peal—below.
The 2018 Petition. In 2018, Mr. Reilly filed a § 2254 petition
in the Northern District of Florida, challenging the sentence im-
posed in 2010. He amended that petition in 2019 and identified the
date of the judgment and sentence he was challenging as Decem-
ber 6, 2010. This was the sentence resulting from the 2010 viola-
tion of supervision judgment discussed above. Mr. Reilly raised
various ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the district
court denied the petition on the merits.
The 2020 Petition. In 2020, Mr. Reilly filed another § 2254
petition in the Northern District of Florida, this time challenging
the sentence imposed in 2009. In this petition, he identified the
date of the judgment of conviction that he was challenging as July
24, 2009, and the date of the sentence as September 22, 2009. This
was the sentence resulting from the original “September 2009 judg-
ment” discussed above for the two counts of criminal use of
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21-13668 Opinion of the Court 5
personal identification information. Mr. Reilly raised several inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims, as well as a claim that the cu-
mulative impact of his counsel’s ineffectiveness deprived him of a
fair and impartial trial. The district court dismissed the petition on
jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the merits of the claims
asserted. Specifically, the district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, which recommended that the
petition be dismissed for being an unauthorized second or succes-
sive petition. Mr. Reilly appealed the dismissal of his § 2254 peti-
tion and, as of the time of this decision, that appeal is still pending
before this Court in Case No. 21-11565.
The 2021 Petition. In 2021, Mr. Reilly filed the § 2254 petition
at issue in this appeal. This petition raised two claims—one chal-
lenging the original 2009 conviction and one challenging the 2015
violation of probation judgment. As to the 2009 conviction, Mr.
Reilly alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a
plea offer of deferred prosecution. See D.E. 1 at 3. And as to the
2015 violation of probation judgment, he asserted that his counsel
was ineffective for advising him to “waive his right to a jury trial on
the aggravated stalking offense and proceed to a joint hearing in-
volving both the new law violation of aggravated stalking and the
[violation of probation.]” Id. at 5.
The Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections
moved to dismiss the petition as second or successive, arguing that
the petition was Mr. Reilly’s “fifth habeas action in [the Northern
District of Florida] and his second attempt to file an unapproved
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13668
successive petition challenging his 2009 conviction[.]” D.E. 13 at 1–
2. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Mr. Reilly’s
petition for lack of jurisdiction based on its conclusion that the pe-
tition was an unauthorized second or successive habeas corpus ap-
plication. This is Mr. Reilly’s appeal from that ruling.1
II
“We review de novo whether a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is second or successive” under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
III
“After a state prisoner has had a trial, a direct appeal, and an
opportunity for collateral review in the state courts, he typically
gets one, and only one, chance to collaterally attack his conviction
in federal court.” Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1324. Subject to certain
exceptions not relevant here, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) requires district
courts to dismiss “[a] claim presented in a second or successive ha-
beas corpus application under [§] 2254 that was presented in a prior
application[.]”
Though AEDPA does not define “second or successive,” we
are not without guidance in assessing this “term of art.” See Mag-
wood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332 (2010) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000)). The Supreme Court explained in
1 For ease of reference, Appendix I demonstrates the habeas petitions filed by
Mr. Reilly and their corresponding challenged judgments.
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21-13668 Opinion of the Court 7
Magwood that “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be inter-
preted with respect to the judgment challenged.” Id. at 333. The
Supreme Court also made clear “that the phrase . . . applies to ha-
beas petitions, not to the claims they raise.” Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in orig-
inal). In other words, under § 2244(b), there are no second or suc-
cessive claims. Rather, “the phrase ‘second or successive’ applies to
an application as a whole[.]” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Mag-
wood, 561 U.S. at 334–35). And “where . . . there is a new judgment
intervening between the two habeas petitions, an application chal-
lenging the resulting new judgment is not second or successive.”
Id. (quoting Magwood, 561 U.S. at 341–42).
With this backdrop, we have “conclude[d] that when a ha-
beas petition is the first to challenge a new judgment, it is not ‘sec-
ond or successive,’ regardless of whether its claims challenge the
sentence or the underlying conviction.” Id. at 1281. To determine
whether the 2021 habeas petition challenges a new judgment, we
look to the judgment “that places [Mr. Reilly] in custody.” Ferreira
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
judgment that forms the basis of the habeas petition is the one that
places the petitioner in custody.”). Here, that judgment is the 2015
violation of probation judgment. Though that 2015 judgment
stems in part from the 2009 judgment, the sentence that author-
ized Mr. Reilly’s current detention is the sentence imposed in 2015
for his violation of probation. See Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1325 (“The
judgment that matters for purposes of [§] 2244 is the judgment au-
thorizing the prisoner’s confinement.”) (internal quotation marks
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13668
omitted). Thus, because “the judgment to which AEDPA refers is
the underlying conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes
the petitioner’s current detention,” we conclude that the 2015 judg-
ment is the dispositive judgment. See Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1292.
Given that Mr. Reilly has not challenged that judgment be-
fore, his 2021 petition is not “second or successive.” That is, “[s]ince
there was a new judgment”—i.e., the sentence imposed in 2015
when Mr. Reilly violated his probation—there is “no reason to dif-
ferentiate between [his] claim[s] challenging” the 2009 conviction
in his 2021 habeas petition and those “challenging the [2015] sen-
tence.” Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1281. Put simply, “when a habeas
petition is the first to challenge a new judgment, it is not ‘second
or successive,’ regardless of whether its claims challenge the sen-
tence or the underlying conviction.” Id.
Mr. Reilly’s 2021 habeas petition is his first to challenge the
2015 violation of probation judgment. Thus, even though it in-
cludes claims challenging the underlying 2009 conviction, it is not
a “second or successive” application. See id. at 1279 (“Since his pe-
tition was his ‘[first] application challenging [an] intervening judg-
ment,’ it was not ‘second or successive,’ regardless of whether he
had raised the claims before.”) (quoting Magwood, 561 U.S. at 338).
IV
For purposes of this appeal, we decide only whether the
2021 habeas petition was second or successive. We conclude that
it was not, and therefore the district court had (and has) jurisdiction
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21-13668 Opinion of the Court 9
to consider the petition. We reverse the district court’s dismissal
and remand for proceedings consistent with our opinion.2
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
2 Of course, “AEDPA’s other limitations still apply” and may otherwise pre-
clude Mr. Reilly from relief. See Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1281 n.9.
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13668
Appendix I
September 2009 Conviction 2020 Habeas Petition
Claims made against the
September 2009 Judgment
2010 Violation of 2018 Habeas Petition
Supervision Judgment Claims made against the
2010 Violation of Super-
vision Judgment
2015 Violation of 2021 Habeas Petition
Probation Judgment Claims made against the
September 2009 Convic-
tion and the 2015 Second
Violation of Probation
Judgment
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