USA v. Roderick Chester

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10409
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RODERICK CHESTER,
a.k.a. C-Rod,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cr-00020-MTT-CHW-2
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10409
____________________
Before WILSON, G RANT, and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Roderick Chester appeals his convictions for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, and distribution of
methamphetamine. We denied his appointed counsel’s Anders
motion and ordered briefing on two issues: (1) whether the
evidence was sufficient to support Chester’s conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and (2) whether the
district court abused its discretion by denying Chester’s motion for
a mistrial based on a witness’s statement that Chester had a
pending murder charge in state court. We now address the merits
of his appeal and, finding no error, affirm Chester’s convictions.
I.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government. United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d
1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2015). We will affirm a conviction “unless
there is no reasonable construction of the evidence from which the
jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted).
To prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must
show that (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or
ammunition, (2) the defendant was a felon, (3) the defendant knew
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22-10409 Opinion of the Court 3
that he was a felon, and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or
affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846,
852 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309, 1345 (11th
Cir. 2021). On appeal, Chester challenges only the first element—
knowing possession.
Possession of a firearm can be either actual or constructive.
United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576 (11th Cir. 2011). The
government proves constructive possession by showing “that the
defendant (1) was aware or knew of the firearm’s presence and
(2) had the ability and intent to later exercise dominion and control
over that firearm.” Id. Constructive possession can be proved
through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.
After a lawful traffic stop and search, police discovered a
handgun and some loose marijuana on the front bench seat of
Chester’s truck, under a folded-down center armrest. Chester was
driving the truck at the time, with his wife in the front passenger
seat. Chester argues that the government introduced no evidence
at trial showing either that he knew of the firearm’s presence or
that he intended to exercise control over it.
These arguments are unsuccessful. Constructive possession
of a firearm can be proved through circumstantial evidence. We
have repeatedly held that a defendant’s ownership of or control
over a vehicle is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to infer both
a defendant’s knowledge of a firearm found within the vehicle and
his intent to exercise control over it. See, e.g., United States v.
Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wright,
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10409
392 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gunn, 369
F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). The jury was permitted to make
the same inferences here—Chester was driving the vehicle when
the police found the handgun next to the driver’s seat. And the fact
that Chester’s wife was also present does not change our calculus—
a defendant’s possession can be either exclusive or “in association
with others.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 596
(11th Cir. 2020).
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial
for abuse of discretion. Wright, 392 F.3d at 1274. “It has long been
the settled rule in this Circuit that error in the admission of
evidence under most circumstances may be cured by withdrawing
the evidence from the jury’s consideration and instructing the jury
to disregard it.” United States v. Troise, 483 F.2d 615, 618 (5th Cir.
1973); see also United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir.
2020) (“When the district court gives a curative instruction, we
presume that the jury followed it.”). Therefore, if the district court
gives a curative instruction in response to a prejudicial statement
made to the jury, we will reverse “only if the evidence is so highly
prejudicial as to be incurable by the trial court’s admonition.”
United States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quotation omitted). This requires “a reasonable probability that,
but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been
different.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir.
2007).
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22-10409 Opinion of the Court 5
At Chester’s trial, in response to an unrelated question from
the prosecution, one of the government’s witnesses mentioned
that she saw online that Chester “was booked for murder in Bibb
County.” After a brief sidebar, both parties and the district court
agreed that “instead of dwelling on” the statement then, they
would move on to avoid drawing further attention to it by the jury.
Then, after the close of evidence, the district court gave the jury a
curative instruction, telling them that the witness was “mistaken,”
that there was “no evidence or contention here that Mr. Chester
was involved in anything like that,” and that they “must
completely disregard” the statement.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Chester’s motion for a mistrial. United States v. Newsome is
instructive. There, the government itself told the jury in its
opening statement that the defendant—charged only with
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon—had allegedly shot his
wife. 475 F.3d at 1223. The district court instructed the jury that
the lawyer’s statement was not evidence and denied the
defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Id. This Court affirmed,
reasoning that after the curative instruction, “the prosecutor’s
single statement did not inflict the kind of prejudice necessary to
warrant a mistrial” and that the defendant could not “show a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different
absent the prosecutor’s statement.” Id. at 1227; see also United States
v. Smith, 517 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming denial of a
mistrial after the district court instructed the jury to ignore a
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witness’s hearsay statement that the defendant’s co-conspirator
“had shot a man”).
Here, the offending statement was made a single time in
passing and, when the record is viewed as a whole, was clearly not
a significant or material part of the overall trial. There was also
significant independent evidence supporting Chester’s three
convictions. Therefore, after the district court properly instructed
the jury to disregard the witness’s statement, we are confident that
it did not carry a substantial prejudicial effect and that Chester
cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been any different even if it had not been made.
* * *
AFFIRMED.
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