USA v. Jarvis Lockett

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10528
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JARVIS LOCKETT,
a.k.a. J-Rock,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00003-TES-CHW-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10528
____________________
Before J ORDAN, G RANT, and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jarvis Lockett pleaded guilty after being caught dealing
cocaine and participating in a dog fighting ring. His sentence was
enhanced because a firearm was found at the home where he dealt
the drugs, and the district court varied upward based on its
conclusion that the applicable Guidelines range did not adequately
reflect the seriousness of Lockett’s misconduct. Because the
district court did not err in either of those determinations, we
affirm Lockett’s sentence.
I.
Lockett was indicted along with ten co-defendants for his
participation in a criminal organization based out of Roberta,
Georgia that was involved in both cocaine distribution and dog
fighting. He pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine
and one count of conspiracy to participate in an animal fighting
venture. In exchange, the remaining counts against him were
dismissed. The plea agreement also included a stipulation of facts
that Lockett agreed the government could prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.1
1 Our statement of the facts derives primarily from this stipulation, as well as
the parts of the presentence investigation report to which Lockett did not
object. See United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It is the
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The evidence showed that Lockett purchased some
$250,000 worth of cocaine and cocaine base (also known as crack
cocaine) from his co-conspirators for the purpose of distribution.
Operating out of his mother’s house, Lockett sold both forms of
the drug to a confidential informant. Lockett’s cell phone records
revealed that he texted several of his co-conspirators that his
customers were upset by the low quality of the cocaine that he was
selling them. He also said, referring to the possibility of being
arrested on drug charges: “Man feds can kiss my a**, I kill the feds
before them b****es lock me up for something talking about
talking to a b****. Hell yea they gotta die boy, imma kill me some
b****es.” When law enforcement executed a search warrant at
Lockett’s mother’s house, they found over $2,500 in cash and
plastic bags containing cocaine and cocaine base in a bedroom.
They found several more bags of narcotics outside the residence.
Agents also found two guns belonging to Lockett’s stepfather and
one unclaimed handgun in another bedroom. In total, Lockett is
accountable for over 900 grams of cocaine and cocaine base.
Lockett also played a leadership role in the gang’s
dogfighting operations. He organized and attended several dog
fights, brought his own dogs to fight, acted as a referee for at least
two dog fights, and discussed killing several dogs. This dog fighting
ring involved over 150 animals. When law enforcement searched
Lockett’s mother’s house, they found fourteen dogs that had
law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a PSI admits
those facts for sentencing purposes.”).
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scarring consistent with dog fighting, as well as break sticks, photos
of dogs fighting, blood-stained carpet and walls, and a dog fighting
pit. When law enforcement searched Lockett’s home, they found
a pit bull with extreme injuries that had been crudely stapled shut
rather than stitched. The dog died two days later. Agents also
found still more evidence of dog fighting, such as medicine, a scale,
veterinary paperwork, breeding certificates, and several bags of
cash.
The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation
Report (PSI) to aid the district court in sentencing. For the drug
distribution offense, the PSI calculated a base offense level of 24
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(a)(5) (Nov. 2021). It
increased this base offense by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level increase if a firearm
was possessed. This left an adjusted offense level of 26. For the
dog fighting, the base offense level is 16 under U.S.S.G.
§ 2E3.1(a)(1). Because Lockett was an organizer or leader of this
exceptionally large animal-fighting ring, the PSI applied a four-level
increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). So his adjusted offense
level for conspiracy to participate in an animal fighting venture was
20.
Next, the PSI applied the grouping rules for multiple
offenses and calculated a combined adjusted offense level of 27.
U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1(a), 3D1.4. The PSI then reduced that by two
levels because Lockett had accepted responsibility, and by one
more level because of Lockett’s guilty plea. U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a),
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22-10528 Opinion of the Court 5
(b). His total final offense level was thus 24. This, combined with
a criminal history category of III, resulted in a Guideline
imprisonment range of 63 to 78 months. The statutory maximum
for the drug charge is 240 months, and the maximum for the dog
fighting is 60 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 49.
Lockett objected to the application of the two-level enhancement
for possessing a firearm in connection with the offense.
At sentencing, the district court overruled Lockett’s
objection, finding that it was not “clearly improbable” that the
unclaimed gun found at Lockett’s mother’s house was connected
to the drug distribution Lockett was conducting there. The court
then used its discretion to vary upward from the Guideline range
of 63 to 78 months and instead sentenced Lockett to 120 months
on count two and 60 months on count nine, to be served
concurrently. The district court explained its reasons: (1) that
Lockett was the “mastermind” of the dog fighting, which was
“heinous” and “awful”; (2) that he was “very involved in the
distribution of drugs,” and that this was bad for the community; (3)
that Lockett used his mother’s house for the drug distribution; (4)
that Lockett said he was going to kill the federal agents before being
caught; (5) the “extent of the $250,000 of drugs”; and (6) the
sentences given to co-defendants and ensuring that “there is no
disparity” between them.
Lockett appealed, arguing first that the application of the
two-level enhancement was in error, and second that his above-
Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable.
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II.
“We review the district court’s findings of fact under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear error, and the application of the
Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo.” United States v. Gallo,
195 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999). “We review the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.” United States
v. Hayes, 762 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). In conducting this
review, “we will reverse a sentence as substantively unreasonable
only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
District Court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
factors by arriving at a sentence outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Alberts,
859 F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).
III.
A.
The district court did not procedurally err when it imposed
an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for
a two-level increase in a defendant’s base offense level if he
possessed a dangerous weapon. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). This
enhancement “reflects the increased danger of violence when drug
traffickers possess weapons.” Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A). The
commentary to the Guidelines explains that the enhancement
should be applied “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id.
Our cases have held that the enhancement should apply so
long as the government can “establish by a preponderance of the
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evidence that the firearm was present at the site of the charged
conduct.” United States v. Carrasquillo, 4 F.4th 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.
2021) (quotation omitted). In short, the mere presence of a firearm
at the location of the alleged crime is all that is required for the
government to meet its initial burden. Id. After that, the burden
shifts to the defendant to show that “a connection between the
weapon and the offense was clearly improbable.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
The government met that initial burden, and Lockett failed
to rebut it. The district court concluded that it was more likely
than not that two of the three guns at Lockett’s mother’s house
belonged to Lockett’s stepfather, but that the third gun was
unclaimed. So there was at least one unclaimed firearm present at
the home where it is undisputed that Lockett repeatedly sold drugs.
On the basis of those facts, we agree with the district court that it
is not clearly improbable that this gun was possessed in connection
with the drug offense.
B.
Lockett’s sentence of 120 months imprisonment is not
substantively unreasonable. Lockett bears the burden of
demonstrating that this sentence is unreasonable “in light of the
record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Gonzales, 550 F.3d
1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). Section 3553(a) sets out factors that a
sentencing court must consider, including (but not limited to): “the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant”; the need for the sentence “to
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reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; the need for
the sentence to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the
public from further crimes; the kinds of sentences available and the
sentencing range; and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants” charged with similar conduct. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). A sentence that is “well below the statutory
maximum” is an indicator that the sentence is reasonable. United
States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2021).
Lockett argues that the district court abused its discretion
because it gave significant weight to an improper factor.
Specifically, he contends that the district court based the upward
variance primarily on the dog fighting charges, which carry a
statutory maximum of 60 months. But a closer look at the record
reveals that this premise is faulty.
The district court explained that “this is one of those times”
where the Guideline range “substantially understates the
seriousness of the offense.” True, “one of the things” that the
district court considered was Lockett’s “mastermind” role in the
dog fighting, which the court described as “heinous” and “awful.”
But the court also took into account many other factors relating to
the drug charges. The court considered (1) that Lockett was “very
involved in the distribution of drugs,” which is harmful to the
community; (2) that Lockett used his mother’s house to distribute
drugs; (3) that Lockett said he would “kill the feds” before he would
go to prison; (4) the magnitude of the drugs Lockett distributed;
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and (5) the need to ensure that Lockett’s sentence was consistent
with the sentences imposed on his co-defendants. Taking all of
those factors together, the court used its discretion to vary upward
and sentence Lockett to 120 months imprisonment, which is still
well below the statutory maximum for the drug charge.
On this record, Lockett’s contention that the court “said
little about the drug charges in imposing the sentence,” is simply
implausible. Five of the six reasons given for the upward variance
were unrelated to the dog fighting charge. We are not convinced
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
imposing this sentence, nor that the sentence is outside the range
of reasonableness dictated by the facts of the case. See Alberts, 859
F.3d at 985.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
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