USA v. Steven Wesley Grandison

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11572
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN WESLEY GRANDISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00071-KD-C-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11572
____________________
No. 22-13653
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN WESLEY GRANDISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00037-KD-B-1
____________________
Before W ILSON, BRANCH , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this consolidated appeal, Steven Grandison challenges his
concurrent sentences of 36 months’ imprisonment following the
revocation of his supervised release in two cases (Case No.
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22-11572 Opinion of the Court 3
1:07-cr-00037 and Case No. 1:10-cr-00071).1 He argues that the
above-guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable because
the district court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors and focused exclusively on Grandison’s
recidivism risk. After review, we affirm.
1 The government argues that we should dismiss Grandison’s appeal with
respect to the judgment in Case No. 1:07-cr-00037 because Grandison failed to
timely file a notice of appeal in that case, and the notice of appeal that he filed
in Case No. 1:10-cr-00071 does not evince a clear intent to also appeal the
judgment in Case No. 1:07-cr-00037. We disagree. Even though the district
court entered a separate judgment in both cases, we cannot ignore that it
addressed both cases in a single revocation hearing and made no distinction
between the cases, except to say that the sentences in each case were to run
concurrently. And the identical judgments in both cases were entered on the
same day. Although Grandison’s notice of appeal only listed Case No. 1:10-cr-
00071, it also stated that he was appealing “from the Judgment entered
revoking the Defendant’s [s]upervised release on April 26, 2022.” When
viewed as a whole and in light of the totality of the circumstances, there is no
genuine doubt as to the judgments being appealed, and dismissal is not
warranted. See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 (2001) (“Imperfections
in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about
who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court.”); United
States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1151 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding under nearly
identical circumstances that a notice to appeal that referenced only one case
number evinced an intent to appeal in both cases because it referenced the
single judgment entered following a consolidated hearing); see also Hill v.
Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
we “embrace[] ‘a policy of liberal construction of notices of appeal’ when
(1) unnoticed claims or issues are inextricably intertwined with noticed ones
and (2) the adverse party is not prejudiced” (quotation omitted)).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11572
I. Background
In 2007, Grandison pleaded guilty to bank fraud in the
Southern District of Alabama, and the district court sentenced him
to 30 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of
supervised release. His supervision commenced in April 2009. In
January 2010, the district court revoked his supervised release upon
finding that Grandison violated its terms by (1) failing to follow his
probation officer’s instructions not to engage in the purchase and
resale of automobiles, (2) committing a new crime (bank fraud), (3)
failing to attend drug treatment and counseling, and (4) failing to
make required restitution payments. The district court sentenced
him to 24 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 36 months’
supervised release.
In a separate proceeding later in 2010, Grandison pleaded
guilty to a new count of bank fraud and was sentenced to 33
months’ imprisonment to be followed by five years’ supervised
release, which was set to run consecutively to the revocation
sentence in his 2007 case.
Thereafter, in 2015, in both cases, Grandison admitted to,
among other violations, committing a new criminal offense in
violation of the terms of his supervised release, and the district
court revoked his supervised release. He was sentenced to
concurrent terms of 24 months’ imprisonment to be followed by
36 months’ supervised release in both cases.
Grandison’s supervised release term commenced in March
2017. In November 2018, Grandison’s probation officer petitioned
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22-11572 Opinion of the Court 5
the court for revocation of Grandison’s supervised release,
asserting that Grandison violated the conditions of his supervised
release, which required him to (1) provide the probation officer
with access to requested financial information, (2) not open any
new lines of credit, (3) make timely restitution payments, and
(4) not commit another crime. In 2022, Grandison’s probation
officer amended the petition, alleging that Grandison also violated
the conditions of his supervised release which prohibited him from
leaving the judicial district without the permission of the court or
his probation officer and required him to notify the probation
officer of changes in his residence within a specified period of
time.2 Grandison denied the violations.
At the revocation hearing, Grandison’s probation officer
testified that, in 2018, she discovered that Grandison had opened
two new lines of credit and purchased two vehicles without prior
approval. At that time, he was behind significantly on his monthly
restitution payments. Upon questioning by the probation officer,
Grandison admitted to purchasing the vehicles, but he stated that
“he was tricked into signing the loan papers.” When the probation
officer visited Grandison’s home, she observed a brand new 55-inch
television still in the box, and Grandison said his girlfriend had
purchased it, but at that time she was unemployed. The probation
officer also observed paperwork for a third vehicle, which
2 Grandison absconded from supervision in 2018, and he remained at large for
three years.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11572
Grandison stated was his daughter’s and that he “helped [her] with
a car loan.”
The probation officer instructed Grandison to report to her
office and bring various financial records. He brought some, but
not all, of the requested information, and he did the same thing
again at a follow-up meeting a few days later. Grandison failed to
show up for a reporting appointment in mid-November 2018, and
he stopped responding to the officer’s calls.
Meanwhile, the probation officer received phone calls from
various individuals who stated that they had purchased vehicles
from Grandison, but they did not receive the vehicles. Grandison’s
employer also reported that Grandison was “scamming individuals
who he worked with out of money.” And a check company
reported that Grandison was cashing personal checks with
insufficient funds.
Additional evidence presented at the hearing established
that, in 2018, a woman gave money to Grandison as payment for a
car that he was supposed to procure for her at an auction, but she
did not receive the vehicle as promised and Grandison stopped
responding to her inquiries. Similarly, another individual sent
Grandison money for the purchase of a vehicle, and Grandison
gave him a vehicle for the weekend, but then took it back to have
body work done on it. Grandison never picked up the car from the
repair shop or paid the repair bill and the car was repossessed by a
finance company. The body shop received multiple calls from
multiple individuals who appeared to believe the car belonged to
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22-11572 Opinion of the Court 7
them asking about the status of the vehicle. Furthermore, an
elderly couple in Florida gave Grandison money for him to procure
a tractor for them, but they never received the tractor.
Moreover, in 2019, Grandison purchased two trucks and
received a loaner vehicle from a dealership in Georgia, but the
checks he used to purchase the vehicles bounced. When contacted
about the checks, Grandison stated he would return the vehicles,
but he did not do so—instead, the cars were later found in various
locations after Grandison “sold” the cars to other individuals.
Finally, in April 2021, Grandison was pulled over in Georgia.
Grandison told the officer that his name was “Steven Watson,” and
denied having a driver’s license. The officer was unable to verify
Grandison’s identify with the name and birthdate he provided, and
the officer arrested Grandison for driving without a license. Later,
officers determined Grandison’s correct identity and discovered
that he had multiple outstanding warrants.
Based on the evidence presented during the revocation
hearing, the district court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Grandison violated the terms of his supervised
release by incurring new debt without prior approval, failing to pay
restitution, committing new criminal conduct, and traveling
outside the Southern District of Alabama without permission.3
3 The district court found Grandison not guilty of violating the condition that
required him to notify his probation officer of changes in his residency within
a specified period of time.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11572
Grandison’s probation officer recommended the district court
impose concurrent terms of the statutory maximum term of 36
months’ imprisonment with no supervision to follow.4 In support
of the requested sentence, the government emphasized
Grandison’s criminal history, pattern of fraud, and prior
revocations based on similar conduct. Grandison’s counsel
requested that the district court “consider a sentence within the
guidelines.”
The district court sentenced Grandison to concurrent terms
of 36 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release. The
district court noted that it had considered the guidelines, but found
a guideline sentence inappropriate. The district court reasoned as
follows:
Well, Mr. Grandison, I’ve been doing this a long time,
and I have never ever encountered anybody that
committed as much fraud as you did over your
lifetime. Your priors include at least four or five, six
fraud cases, theft of property, at least four of those,
lots of worthless checks, false statements.
And this case involves I don’t know how many people
you swindled or made false statements to. And I
wrote a note to myself before that you are highly
4 Grandison’s advisory guidelines range was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment.
He faced a statutory maximum of 36 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’
supervised release.
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22-11572 Opinion of the Court 9
likely of recidivism, but, because you pled guilty, I
gave you guideline sentences each time.
This time, I’m giving you the maximum of 36 months
with no supervised release to follow. I feel that you
are a danger to the community, and I don’t know
what’s ever going to stop you or if you ever will.
Grandison objected, arguing that “the sentence is substantively and
figuratively unreasonable” and asked the district court to consider
a guideline sentence. The district court overruled the objection
without explanation. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Grandison argues that the 36-month revocation sentence in
each of his respective cases is substantively unreasonable because
the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors and relied
exclusively on his potential for recidivism.5
We review the “district’s court’s revocation of supervised
release for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Cunningham, 607
F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). We will “vacate the sentence if,
but only if, we ‘are left with the definite and firm conviction that
5 The government argues that we should review Grandison’s claim for plain
error because he failed to argue below that the district court did not consider
the § 3553(a) factors or that it erroneously relied solely on Grandison’s risk of
recidivism, and his general challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence was insufficient to preserve those issues. We need not decide
whether plain error review applies because Grandison’s claim fails even under
the lesser abuse of discretion standard.
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11572
the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).
The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of
showing that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
The district court may, after considering certain factors in
§ 3553(a), revoke a defendant’s supervised release if the court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
condition of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The
factors the court must consider in sentencing a defendant after a
revocation of supervised release include: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history and
characteristics; (2) the need for the sentence to deter criminal
conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes,
and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (3) the
sentencing guidelines range; (4) any pertinent policy statement;
(5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
similarly situated defendants; and (6) the need to provide
restitution to victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (cross-
referencing § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7)). The weight
given to any § 3553(a) factor “is a matter committed to the
discretion of the district court.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d
1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
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“If, after correctly calculating the guidelines range, a district
court decides that a sentence outside that range is appropriate, it
must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the
justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the
variance.” Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378 (quotations omitted). “[T]he
district court [is] free to consider any information relevant to a
defendant’s background, character, and conduct in imposing an
upward variance.” Id. at 1379 (quotation omitted). Although
“[s]entences outside the guidelines are not presumed to be
unreasonable, . . . we may take the extent of any variance into our
calculus.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir.
2009). “However, we must give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, [as] a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378.
Here, Grandison failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion. Although the district court did not mention
expressly the relevant § 3553(a) factors, the district court’s
explanation when imposing the upward variance sentence
establishes that it considered multiple § 3553(a) factors, including
the applicable guidelines and sentences available, the nature and
circumstances of the offense, Grandison’s history and
characteristics, and the need for the sentence to deter criminal
conduct and to protect the public from Grandison’s further crimes.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e). And the district court supported
the upward variance with significant justifications, including
Grandison’s prior criminal history and prior revocations for similar
conduct.
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To the extent Grandison quarrels with the weight and focus
that the district court placed on his criminal history and recidivism,
the weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to
the sound discretion of the district court. Williams, 526 F.3d at
1322; see also United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th
Cir. 2015) (explaining that the district court “is permitted to attach
great weight to one factor over others” (quotations omitted)).
Given the broad sentencing discretion that district courts have and
the totality of the circumstances in this case, we are not “left with
the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
clear error of judgment” in imposing an upward variance sentence
of 36 months’ imprisonment. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. Accordingly,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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