Edward Staley v. Sheriff, Fulton County Georgia

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11813
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
EDWARD STALEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION REVEW BOARD, et al.,
Defendants,
SHERIFF, FULTON COUNTY GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11813
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-05606-VMC
____________________
Before J ILL PRYOR , L UCK , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Georgia’s Sexual Offender Registration Review Board (the
“Board”) determined that Edward Staley, a convicted sexual of-
fender, qualified as a sexually dangerous predator under Georgia
law. As a result, Staley was required to comply with the restrictions
that Georgia law imposes on sexually dangerous predators.
In this lawsuit, Staley sued the Board and others under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging his classification as a sexually danger-
ous predator. The district court dismissed Staley’s claims as time-
barred. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
Under Georgia law, individuals who have been convicted of
listed sexual offenses are designated as “sexual offender[s]” and
generally must register with law enforcement each year and com-
ply with other restrictions, including geographic limitations on
where they may live, work, or volunteer.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 42-1-
12(a)(20), (f); 42-1-15(b), (c). Georgia imposes a more stringent set
of restrictions on those sexual offenders who are designated as “sex-
ually dangerous predator[s].”
See generally id. § 42-1-14. The Board
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22-11813 Opinion of the Court 3
designates a sexual offender as a sexually dangerous predator if it
finds that he is “at risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual
offense.”
Id. § 42-1-12(a)(21)(B).1 An individual designated as a sex-
ually dangerous predator must wear an “electronic monitoring sys-
tem” while on probation or parole.
See id. § 42-1-14(e);
Park v.
State, 825 S.E. 147, 158 (Ga. 2019).2 He must report in person to
law enforcement at least twice per year, which is more frequent
than the reporting requirement for other sexual offenders, who
generally must report only once per year.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 42-1-
12(f)(4); 42-1-14(f). In addition, an individual designated as a sex-
ually dangerous predator cannot work or volunteer within 1,000
feet of any area in which minors congregate, a geographic re-
striction that does not apply to other sexual offenders.
See id. § 42-
1-15(c)(2).
1 Georgia law sets forth a list of crimes that qualify as “dangerous sexual of-
fenses.”
See O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(10). For purposes of this appeal, the list of
qualifying crimes included aggravated assault, rape, aggravated sodomy, ag-
gravated child molestation, and aggravated sexual battery, as well the attempt
to commit these offenses.
Id. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(A).
2 Section 42-1-14(e) states that a sexually dangerous predator is subject to elec-
tronic monitoring for life. But the Georgia Supreme Court has held that the
statute is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires electronic monitoring
for individuals “who are no longer serving any part of their sentences.”
Park,
825 S.E.2d at 157–58. We thus understand that individuals designated as sex-
ually dangerous predators are required to wear electronic monitoring systems
only while on probation or parole.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11813
Under Georgia law, when the Board determines that a per-
son qualifies as a sexually dangerous predator, it must notify the
person of its decision.
Id. § 42-1-14(a). The person then has 30 days
to submit to the Board a petition for reevaluation and 60 days to
present additional information to support his petition.
Id. § 42-1-
14(b). If an individual designated as a sexually dangerous predator
fails to submit a petition for reevaluation or supporting documents
within these time periods, the Board’s classification decision be-
comes final.
Id.
After the Board’s decision becomes final, an individual clas-
sified as a sexually dangerous predator may file a petition in supe-
rior court seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision.
Id. § 42-
1-14(c). This petition must be filed within 30 days of the Board no-
tifying him of its final decision.
Id. In reviewing the petition, the
court considers the Board’s classification decision.
Id. The court
also may consider other evidence submitted by the parties and hold
a hearing.
Id. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the individual was not appropriately classified as a sexually
dangerous predator, it may reclassify him.
Id.
The Board classified Staley as a sexually dangerous predator.
He previously had been convicted of multiple counts of child mo-
lestation and spent several decades in prison in Georgia. In January
2015, Staley was released from prison and began to serve a term of
probation. Shortly after his release, Staley was arrested for violating
the terms of his probation. While Staley was incarcerated for the
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22-11813 Opinion of the Court 5
probation violation, the Board initiated a review to determine
whether he qualified as a sexually dangerous predator.
A licensed counselor working as a clinical evaluator for the
Board assessed Staley’s risk of reoffending. After reviewing records
from various law enforcement agencies about Staley, but without
interviewing him, she concluded that he had a high risk of reoffend-
ing and recommended that the Board classify him as a sexually dan-
gerous predator. The Board accepted the counselor’s recommen-
dation and classified Staley as a sexually dangerous predator.
In May 2015, the Board notified Staley of its decision to clas-
sify him as a sexually dangerous predator. When the Board notified
Staley of its classification decision, it informed him of the deadlines
to petition the Board for revaluation of its decision and to submit
additional information to support his petition.
Staley timely petitioned the Board for a reevaluation. He
also asked that the Board extend the 60-day deadline for him to
submit additional information regarding his classification and re-
quested a hearing before the Board. The Board rejected Staley’s re-
quest to extend the deadline for submitting additional information
and denied his request for a hearing. When it denied these requests,
it warned him that if he failed to submit additional documents in
support of his request for reevaluation by the 60-day deadline, the
Board’s decision would become final. After Staley failed to submit
additional documentation by the deadline, the Board’s decision
classifying Staley as a sexually dangerous predator became final.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11813
In August 2015, Staley filed a petition in Fulton County Su-
perior Court seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision to clas-
sify him as a sexually dangerous predator.
See id. § 42-1-14(c). On
February 3, 2016, the court dismissed Staley’s petition. The court
concluded that the petition was untimely because Staley filed it
more than 30 days after the Board notified him that its classification
decision had become final. The court also ruled, in the alternative,
that even if Staley’s petition had been timely, he was not entitled
to relief because the Board’s classification of him as a sexually dan-
gerous predator was “amply supported.” Doc. 9-1 at 12.3
In November 2019, Staley was released from incarceration.
Due to his status as a sexually dangerous predator, he was required
to submit to electronic monitoring. Because he resided in Fulton
County, the Fulton County sheriff was responsible for overseeing
the monitoring.
In December 2019, Staley filed this lawsuit. In the operative
complaint, he named as defendants the Board; Jenitha Gouch, the
Board’s chairperson; and Theodore Jackson, the Fulton County
sheriff. He brought claims against these defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. He alleged that the determination that he was a sexually
dangerous predator was “arbitrar[y]” and that the Board had im-
properly denied his request for a hearing. Doc. 43 at ¶ 16. He
sought injunctive relief to stop the defendants from continuing to
designate him as a sexually dangerous predator and from requiring
3 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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22-11813 Opinion of the Court 7
him to comply with the sexually-dangerous-predator restrictions.
He also sought related declaratory relief.
The Board and Gouch filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
Staley’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Jackson
initially filed an answer and then moved for judgment on the plead-
ings, raising the same timeliness argument as the other defendants.
The district court granted the defendants’ motions. Accord-
ing to the district court, Staley claimed he had been “improperly
classified without a due process hearing.” Doc. 60 at 12. The court
explained that, “[a]t the very latest,” Staley was aware of the facts
giving rise to his claims as of February 3, 2016, when the state court
dismissed his petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision.
Id.
Because Staley waited more than two years from the date of the
state court decision to file suit, the district court concluded, his
claims were untimely.
This is Staley’s appeal.
II.
We review
de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, accept-
ing the complaint’s factual allegations as true and construing them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See Glover v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). Similarly, we re-
view
de novo the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
“accept[ing] as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving
party’s pleading” and “view[ing] those facts in the light most favor-
able to the non-moving party.”
Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11813
1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). A district court’s application of statutes
of limitations is likewise subject to
de novo review.
Ctr. for Biolog-
ical Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006).
III.
The question in this appeal is whether the district court
erred in granting the motions to dismiss and for judgment on the
pleadings based on its determination that the statute of limitations
barred Staley’s claims. In analyzing this issue, we must keep in
mind that this case is at the pleadings stage. “A statute of limitations
bar is an affirmative defense,” and a plaintiff is “not required to ne-
gate an affirmative defense in [its] complaint.”
La Grasta v. First
Union Secs., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Still, a dismissal based on the statute of lim-
itations is appropriate at the motion-to-dismiss or motion-for-judg-
ment-on-the-pleadings stage when “it is apparent from the face of
the complaint that the claim is time-barred.”
Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).4
4 In reviewing the statute-of-limitations issue, we have considered the facts as
set forth in Staley’s second amended complaint, which is the operative com-
plaint. We also have reviewed the state court’s order dismissing Staley’s peti-
tion for review of the Board’s decision. Although the state court’s order was
not attached to the operative complaint, we may consider this document be-
cause it was “referred to in the [operative] complaint, central to [Staley’s]
claim[s], and of undisputed authenticity.”
Luke v. Gulley, 975 F.3d 1140, 1144
(11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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22-11813 Opinion of the Court 9
Here, the parties agree that a two-year statute of limitations
applied to Staley’s § 1983 claims. But they disagree about when
Staley’s claims accrued and the limitations period began to run.
To determine when Staley’s § 1983 claims accrued, we look
to federal law.
See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996).
“The general federal rule is that the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of action
are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably
prudent regard for his rights.”
Id. at 561-62 (alteration adopted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
Staley argues that the continuing violation doctrine applies
to his claims. “The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff
to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional viola-
tions of the law occur within the statutory period.”
Ctr. for Biolog-
ical Diversity, 453 F.3d at 1334. “The critical distinction in the con-
tinuing violation analysis is whether the plaintiff complains of the
present consequence of a one time violation, which does not ex-
tend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation
into the present, which does.”
Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183
In addition, we note that the district court considered the state court order
when granting the motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Be-
cause Staley has not argued on appeal that it was improper for the district
court to have considered the state court order at this stage, he has forfeited
this issue.
See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en
banc).
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11813
(11th Cir. 2003) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Our recent decision in
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Swearingen,
51 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2022), leads us to conclude that Staley’s
claims here are time-barred. In
Doe, individuals required to register
as sex offenders in Florida brought constitutional claims challeng-
ing “their very classification as sex offenders.”
Id. at 1310. The
plaintiffs alleged that they were injured when Florida failed to af-
ford them with sufficient procedures to challenge sex-offender clas-
sifications at the time the classifications were made.
Id. We con-
cluded that any cause of action based on these injuries accrued
when “the plaintiffs were designated as sex offenders and initially
required to register.”
Id. Even though the plaintiffs continued to
face “lingering effects” as a result of being classified as sex offend-
ers, we held that the plaintiffs’ claims accrued at the time of classi-
fication.
Id.
Like Staley, the plaintiffs in
Doe argued that their claims
challenging their classification as sex offenders under Florida law
were timely under the continuing violation doctrine.
See id. But
we rejected this argument, concluding that the “continuing viola-
tion doctrine does not save this kind of claim.”
Id.
Consistent with
Doe, we conclude that Staley’s alleged inju-
ries in this case accrued at the time he was classified as a sexually
dangerous predator. Looking to the operative complaint, Staley al-
leged that he was injured due to his classification as a sexually dan-
gerous predator. This injury occurred, at the latest, on February 3,
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22-11813 Opinion of the Court 11
2016. By this date, the Board’s decision classifying him as a sexually
dangerous predator was final and the state court had denied his pe-
tition seeking review of that decision. Even though Staley contin-
ues to face collateral effects of the classification decision, his claims
challenging his classification accrued no later than when the state
court dismissed his petition seeking judicial review of the classifica-
tion decision. Because it is apparent from the face of the operative
complaint that Staley waited more than two years after learning of
the state court’s decision to file this lawsuit, we conclude that the
statute of limitations barred his claims.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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