Waseem Daker v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12369
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
JACK KOONS,
Facilities Director,
ROBERT TOOLE,
Field Operations Director,
AHMAD HOLT,
Deputy Field Operations Director,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12369
ADRIAN NELSON,
Statewide Tier Coordinator, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00003-JRH-CLR
____________________
____________________
No. 23-11445
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TIMOTHY WARD,
Commissioner,
JACK KOON,
Facilities Director,
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22-12369 Opinion of the Court 3
ROBERT TOOLE,
Field Operations Director,
AHMAD HOLT,
Deputy Field Operations Director,
ADRIAN NELSON,
Statewide Tier Coordinator, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00003-JRH-CLR
____________________
Before J ORDAN , NEWSOM, and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Waseem Daker, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
peals (a) the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his first amended
complaint raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and (b)
the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motions pursuant to
Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With
respect to the dismissal order, he argues that the district court
abused its discretion by sua sponte dismissing his first amended
complaint for failure to comply with a court order. With respect
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12369
to the denial of his post-trial motions, he argues that the district
court abused its discretion by not letting him file a post-judgment
second amended complaint and by not vacating its previous order
denying his motion for a preliminary injunction.
Following a review of the record and Mr. Daker’s brief, we
affirm.
I
We review for abuse of discretion the dismissal of an action
for failure to comply with the rules or orders of the district court.
See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th
Cir. 2005). “Discretion means the district court has a ‘range of
choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays
within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” Id.
(citation omitted).
A
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the Rules
of Civil Procedure] or a court order, a defendant may move to dis-
miss the action or any claim against it.” A district court may sua
sponte dismiss a case under the authority of either (1) Rule 41(b), or
(2) its “inherent power to manage its docket.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd.,
432 F.3d at 1337.
Unless the district court specifies otherwise, a Rule 41(b) dis-
missal acts as an adjudication upon the merits: “Unless the dismis-
sal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and
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22-12369 Opinion of the Court 5
any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates
as an adjudication on the merits.” An adjudication on the merits
is, in turn, presumed to operate as a dismissal with prejudice unless
the district court specifies otherwise. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (“an ‘adjudication upon the
merits’ is the opposite of a ‘dismissal without prejudice’”).
We have held that “[t]he severe sanction of dismissal with
prejudice . . . can be imposed only in the face of a clear record of
delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Morewitz v. W. of
Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass’n (Luxembourg), 62
F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “Dismissal with
prejudice is a sanction of last resort that is to be utilized only in
extreme situations.” Id. “While dismissal is an extraordinary rem-
edy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the liti-
gant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.”
Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). This is so even
when “less drastic sanctions are available.” Phillips v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 633 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1981).
B
In August of 2020, the district court for the Northern District
of Georgia entered a permanent injunction against Mr. Daker after
finding that his extensive, abusive, and vexatious litigation history
had improperly burdened the court. Among other things, the per-
manent injunction required that Mr. Daker file a copy of the in-
junction order with every lawsuit that he filed in any federal court,
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12369
along with a list of every case he had filed in federal court and its
disposition. The injunction also warned Mr. Daker that if he did
not comply with its terms, his complaint could be “summarily dis-
missed.” Mr. Daker appealed the permanent injunction, but we
affirmed. See Daker v. Governor, No. 20-13602, 2022 WL 1102015, at
*1-*2 (11th Cir. April 13, 2022).
When he filed his 86-page initial complaint in this case, in
the Southern District of Georgia, Mr. Daker sought a preliminary
injunction compelling the defendants to provide him with access
to photocopies for his litigation. He said that he needed to copy
documents he was going to file with the court or serve on opposing
counsel so that he could keep a copy for himself. But he never as-
serted that he needed to make copies of the permanent injunction
that had been entered against him in the Northern District of Geor-
gia. See generally D.E. 3 at 1-14; D.E. 4 at 1-17.
The magistrate judge issued a report recommending denial
of Mr. Daker’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See D.E. 7.
Over Mr. Daker’s objection, the district court adopted the report
and denied the motion. See D.E. 15.
Then the magistrate judge issued another report recom-
mending that Mr. Daker’s complaint be dismissed without preju-
dice in its entirety. See D.E. 24. Mr. Daker objected to the report,
see D.E. 28, but also filed a 100-page first amended complaint.
Though he listed his litigation history in the first amended com-
plaint, he did not attach a copy of the permanent injunction from
the Northern District of Georgia. See D.E. 30.
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22-12369 Opinion of the Court 7
The district court concluded that the first amended com-
plaint superseded the initial complaint and rendered the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation moot. See D.E. 38. The dis-
trict court ruled that the allegations in the first amended complaint
against the Georgia Department of Corrections defendants were
malicious, duplicative, and precluded by his prior lawsuits, and as
a result dismissed the claims against those defendants with preju-
dice. See id. at 4-17, 24. As for the allegations against the Smith
State Prison defendants, the district court concluded that they con-
stituted a shotgun pleading and dismissed the claims against those
defendants without prejudice. See id. at 17-24.
Alternatively, the district court concluded that the case
should be dismissed because Mr. Daker had failed to comply with
a court order, i.e., he had not attached a copy of the permanent
injunction order from the Northern District of Georgia to the first
amended complaint. See id. at 23-24. The district court did not
specify whether the dismissal for this failure to comply was with or
without prejudice, but as noted it acted as an adjudication on the
merits pursuant to the text of Rule 41(b).
Contrary to Mr. Daker’s argument, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by sua sponte dismissing his first amended com-
plaint for failure to comply with a court order. The permanent in-
junction issued by the district court for the Northern District of
Georgia warned Mr. Daker that his complaint would be “summar-
ily dismissed” if he did not comply with its terms. And it is clear,
from Mr. Daker’s appeal of that permanent injunction, that he was
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12369
aware of its existence and its terms. Under the circumstances, in-
cluding Mr. Daker’s abusive litigation history, see Daker, 2022 WL
1102015, at *1-*2, we cannot say that the district court committed
a clear error of judgment in concluding that his contumacious be-
havior warranted the severe penalty of dismissal with prejudice.
See Betty K Agencies, Ltd., 432 F.3d at 1337; Moon, 863 F.2d at 837.
II
We review “the denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of dis-
cretion.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). “A
motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28
days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “The
only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered
evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343
(citation omitted and alterations adopted). “A Rule 59(e) motion
cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judg-
ment.” Id. And such a motion cannot be used to ask the court to
reexamine an unfavorable ruling in the absence of a manifest error
of law or fact. See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intl., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327,
1344 (11th Cir. 2010). Generally speaking, if the district court did
not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, “it necessarily fol-
lows that it did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 59(e) relief.”
Id
Here the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
ing the Rule 59(e) motion because Mr. Daker did not point to
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22-12369 Opinion of the Court 9
newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. See
Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343.
III
We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
for an abuse of discretion. See Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1341-42
(11th Cir. 2006). “An appeal of a ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion . . .
is narrow in scope, addressing only the propriety of the denial or
grant of relief and does not raise issues in the underlying judgment
for review.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 198 F.3d
1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
A
“On motion and just terms, the district court may relieve a
party from an order for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evi-
dence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discov-
ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud,
whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or apply-
ing it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason
that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The moving party must
show extraordinary circumstances so compelling that the court
needed to vacate its order, and “[e]ven then, whether to grant the
requested relief is . . . a matter for the district court’s sound discre-
tion.” Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342 (citation omitted).
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12369
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
Rule 60(b) motion because Mr. Daker generally reiterated his argu-
ments as to the merits of his motion for a preliminary injunction
and did not point to any of the enumerated circumstances under
Rule 60(b) that would grant him relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b);
Cano, 435 F.3d at 1341-42; Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 198 F.3d at 1338.
B
“Post-judgment, the plaintiff may seek leave to amend if he
is granted relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(6).” United States ex
rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1361 n.22 (11th Cir. 2006). Be-
cause the district court did not err in denying Mr. Daker’s Rule
59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions, it did not err by declining to allow
the filing of a post-judgment second amended complaint.
That leaves Daker’s challenge to the denial of his motion for
a preliminary injunction. Given that we have affirmed the dismis-
sal of Mr. Daker’s first amended complaint, the appeal from the
denial of preliminary injunctive relief is moot.
IV
The district court’s orders are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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