USA v. Michael Jackson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12471
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20587-DLG-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12471
Before NEWSOM, G RANT , and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Jackson appeals his 144-month sentence for carjack-
ing on substantive unreasonableness grounds. Jackson argues that
the district court improperly balanced the 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a)
sentencing factors by failing to adequately weigh his longstanding
struggles with substance addiction and mental illness. After careful
review, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2022, Jackson pleaded guilty to carjacking. At his
sentencing hearing, the district court adopted Jackson’s presen-
tence investigation report, which—based on a total offense level of
26 and a criminal history category of VI—calculated a sentencing
guideline range of 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment.
The presentence investigation report, which Jackson did not
object to, detailed his decades-long criminal history. Jackson had
been convicted of multiple vehicle thefts, multiple burglaries, drug
possession, strongarm robbery, aggravated battery with a firearm,
and aggravated battery causing great bodily harm. The report also
noted Jackson’s longstanding struggles with bipolar disorder, schiz-
ophrenia, suicidal ideation, alcohol addiction, and substance abuse.
The district court heard both parties’ arguments “regarding
an appropriate sentence.” Jackson requested a 120-month sentence
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3 Opinion of the Court 22-12471
at the bottom of the guideline range, while the government argued
for a 150-month sentence at the top of the range. In responding to
the government’s argument, the district court noted the challenge
of balancing public safety with Jackson’s mental health struggles:
It’s an awful dilemma because I have the public to be
concerned about and looking at [Jackson’s] record,
I’m very concerned about the safety of the public. It
just appears that [Jackson] cannot conduct himself in
accordance with the law, and so I understand [the gov-
ernment’s] argument for a sentence at the top end of
the guidelines. Absent these mental health issues, I
would have no hesitation in imposing such a sen-
tence. I do have a little hesitation because it’s obvious
that some of these issues are related to mental prob-
lems.
The district court ultimately imposed a 144-month sentence, fol-
lowed by three years’ supervised release. It noted that it had con-
templated the section 3553(a) factors, the parties’ statements, and
the presentence investigation report and found that “a sentence
within the guideline range [wa]s sufficient punishment and deter-
rence.” See § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C). This is Jackson’s appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We consider the totality of the
circumstances and whether the sentence achieves the purposes of
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12471
sentencing stated in 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a). See United States v.
Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). “[T]he party chal-
lenging the sentence bears the burden to show that it is unreason-
able in light of the record and the [section] 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omit-
ted). We will disturb a sentence only if “we are left with the defi-
nite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the [section] 3553(a) factors by ar-
riving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sen-
tences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Section 3553(a) requires a sentencing court to consider “the
nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant,” “the kinds of sentences available,” the
guideline range, policy statements of the United States Sentencing
Commission, “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dispari-
ties,” and “the need to provide restitution to any victims.”
§ 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). A sentence must also comport with the statu-
tory purposes of sentencing, which include promoting respect for
the law, providing just punishment, deterring criminal conduct,
protecting the public from further crimes, and providing the de-
fendant with needed correctional treatment. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–
(D).
Jackson raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends
that the district court “gave insufficient weight to the [section]
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5 Opinion of the Court 22-12471
3553(a) sentencing factors justifying a lower sentence,” specifically
his “severe substance abuse and mental health issues.” Jackson
claims that these factors warranted a sentence near the low end of
the guideline range. Second, he argues that the district court
abused its discretion by considering his criminal history, career of-
fender status, and the seriousness of his conduct under section
3553(a), because those factors were already taken into account as
part of his criminal history score and guideline range.
Neither argument is persuasive. First, the district court ad-
equately weighed his mental health issues when considering the
section 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court specifically
stated that, due to Jackson’s criminal history, it would’ve sentenced
him at the top of the guideline range “absent [his] mental health
issues.” It then imposed a sentence below the top of the range.
And the district court recommended that Jackson be incarcerated
in a facility that “can treat persons with moderate to severe mental
illness.”
Jackson’s second argument—that the district court abused
its discretion by considering his criminal history, career offender
status, and the seriousness of his conduct under section 3553(a),
when his criminal history score and guideline range already ac-
counted for those factors—also fails. District courts’ “discretion in
weighing sentencing factors is particularly pronounced when it
comes to weighing criminal history,” and we have held that “[p]lac-
ing substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely
consistent with [section] 3553(a) . . . .” United States v. Riley, 995
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F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Here, the district court weighed the factors, balanced
Jackson’s personal characteristics with his criminal history, and im-
posed a sentence that was below the top end of the sentencing
guideline range. The record leaves us with no “definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judg-
ment.” See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
Because the district court abused no discretion in imposing
Jackson’s sentence, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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