Larry Cotton v. Sgt. Cooper, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12927
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
LARRY COTTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SGT. COOPER,
SGT KNIGHT,
LT. WALKER,
SGT. JORDAN,
P. MYERS,
Captain, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12927
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00359-MHT-CSC
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, G RANT, and A NDERSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Cotton, an Alabama state prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendants—current and former Alabama Department
of Corrections officials—on his Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference and First Amendment access-to-courts claims. We
affirm in part and vacate and remand in part. Cotton has
abandoned his access-to-courts claim on appeal, so we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim. But
because the magistrate judge applied the wrong legal standard in
evaluating the merits of Cotton’s deliberate indifference claim, we
partially vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
remand for the court to consider Cotton’s evidence under the
correct legal standard.
I.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in their
favor. Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 64 F.4th 1166, 1168 (11th
Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
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22-12927 Opinion of the Court 3
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).1
Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). But “this leniency
does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party,
or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.” Id. at 1168–69 (quotation omitted).
II.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel
and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend VIII. Under the
Eighth Amendment, prison custodians are not the “guarantor[s] of
a prisoner’s safety.” Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., 400
F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). The Eighth
Amendment does, however, require that “inmates be furnished
with the basic human needs, one of which is reasonable safety.”
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (quotation omitted).
Subjecting prisoners to “life-threatening condition[s]” while
incarcerated is an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain that
constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. Thus, the Eighth
Amendment provides an inmate with the right to be reasonably
1 To the extent that Cotton argues on appeal that the district court’s grant of
summary judgment violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, this
argument is foreclosed by longstanding precedent. “The Supreme Court
made clear long ago that summary judgment does not violate the Seventh
Amendment.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 919 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quotation omitted).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12927
protected from an “excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.”
Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320. To sufficiently allege a deliberate
indifference claim, a plaintiff must state facts showing “(1) a
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate
indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty.,
50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).
The first element requires a showing of incarceration under
conditions that objectively pose a “substantial risk of serious
harm.” Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 2021)
(quotation omitted). To satisfy this element under a generalized
risk of violence theory, a plaintiff must show that the conditions of
confinement at the time of the officials’ conduct “were extreme
and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health
or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019)
(quotation omitted). “While occasional, isolated attacks by one
prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, confinement in a prison where violence and terror
reign is actionable.” Id. at 1234 (alteration adopted and quotation
omitted). To establish this showing, the plaintiff must show that
“serious inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something
close to it.” Id. at 1234 (quotation omitted).
For the second element, “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and also draw the inference.” Id. at 1233
(alteration adopted and quotation omitted). “Whether a prison
official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
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22-12927 Opinion of the Court 5
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,
including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Hale, 50 F.3d at
1583 (quotation omitted). Thus, a court “may conclude that a
prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
risk was obvious.” Id. (quotation omitted). In the context of claims
regarding an excessive risk of inmate assaults, the plaintiff need not
show that he notified an official that he feared an attack. Id. The
plaintiff must also produce evidence that, with knowledge of the
substantial risk of serious harm, the government official
“knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. (alteration adopted and
quotation omitted).
Finally, the plaintiff must show proof of “an affirmative
causal connection between the actions taken by a particular
person . . . and the constitutional deprivation.” LaMarca v. Turner,
995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).
Cotton’s Eighth Amendment claim asserts that, while
incarcerated at Ventress Correctional Facility, he was subjected to
an excessive risk of prisoner-on-prisoner violence. His complaint
alleges that he witnessed multiple incidents of beatings, stabbings,
and rape, some occurring less than four feet away from him. He
describes a prison environment where the strong preyed on the
weak with impunity, leaving him “in fear of [his] life every day.”
He alleges that, as a result, he suffered significant mental and
emotional injury and had to seek medical treatment.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12927
Cotton further alleges that these violent and unsafe
conditions were perpetuated by understaffing and overcrowding,
and that defendants were aware of the violent conditions in the
prison but failed to make any changes. He specifically alleges that
the wardens allowed the officers to lock the dorms and leave the
prisoners unsupervised without separating the violent prisoners
from the weak and nonviolent prisoners.
In support of these contentions, Cotton submitted sworn
affidavits from himself and several other prisoners at Ventress.
These affidavits generally describe an atmosphere of regular
prisoner-on-prisoner violence, and also detail specific assaults.
David Harmon’s affidavit, for example, states that in the previous
two months, he had been “extorted on several occasions,”
“assaulted by numerous inmates, along with gangs,” “hit with a
whip and lock,” and had “a knife and two (2) ice picks put in [his]
face.” Donald Knight’s affidavit describes another inmate stabbing
him twice, which pierced his spine and severely injured him. And
Josh Roberts’s affidavit states that he was cut by a fellow prisoner
eight times over an outstanding debt; when he was moved to a
different lock-up, another prisoner attempted to stab him in the
face through his cell window with a long, sharp rod.
Several of these affidavits also assert that correctional
officials at Ventress, including some of the named defendants,
either personally witnessed incidents of prisoner violence or were
informed of them by the affiants; either way, they did nothing in
response. Some specific assaults were recorded by the inmates and
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22-12927 Opinion of the Court 7
posted on the video-sharing platform WorldStarHipHop, where
they went “viral.”
The magistrate judge concluded that Cotton could not
succeed on his deliberate indifference claim because he never
personally “allege[d] that he ha[d] been the victim of any violent
attack by a fellow prisoner or guard,” or “allege[d] that any
Defendant knew a risk of serious harm existed to him and
disregarded the risk.” The magistrate judge also apparently
disregarded the affidavits submitted by other inmates at Ventress
as impermissible attempts to raise third-party claims on those
inmates’ behalf. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation.
But to succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, a prison
inmate need not show that he was personally subject to a previous
attack because “the Eighth Amendment protects against future
harm to inmates.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. “[C]onfinement in a
prison where violence and terror reign” is itself actionable—a
plaintiff “need not await a tragic event” before bringing suit.
Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1234; Helling, 509 U.S. at 33.
Nor must Cotton show that the prison officials knew of a
specific risk to him. While “relevant, a claimant’s failure to give
advance notice of an attack is not dispositive” and “an official may
not escape liability merely by showing that he did not know the
claimant was likely to be assaulted.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583
(alteration adopted and quotation omitted). Cotton need show not
that the defendants “knew precisely who would attack whom,” but
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12927
rather that they “had subjective knowledge of a generalized,
substantial risk of serious harm from inmate violence” and that
they “knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to
take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. (alteration adopted and
quotation omitted).
The affidavits from Cotton’s fellow inmates may be relevant
in this regard—not as attempts to raise third-party claims on other
prisoners’ behalf, but as evidence that there existed extreme
conditions at the jail posing “an unreasonable risk of serious injury
to [Cotton’s] future health or safety.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233
(quotation omitted). Likewise, the affidavits may also be relevant
evidence on the question of whether the defendants subjectively
knew about the generalized risk from inmate-on-inmate violence
but failed to take action to abate it. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to the
defendants on Cotton’s Eighth Amendment claim and remand for
consideration of Cotton’s evidence in the first instance under the
correct legal standards.
Finally, the district court also granted summary judgment to
the defendants on Cotton’s First Amendment access-to-courts
claim. While he mentioned this claim in his notice of appeal, he
did not address it in his brief. Although pro se pleadings are held
to a less stringent standard, any issues not briefed on appeal by a
pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
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22-12927 Opinion of the Court 9
grant of summary judgment on this count. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2014).
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN
PART.
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