USA v. Charles Coleman

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13095
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20135-DPG-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13095
Before R OSENBAUM , NEWSOM , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Coleman was indicted on one count of possession
of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), after a gun was found in the center console of his car
during a traffic stop. Coleman moved to suppress the evidence, ar-
guing that neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion sup-
ported the warrantless search of his car. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress, and a jury
later found Coleman guilty at trial. Coleman appeals the denial of
his motion to suppress. He also raises, for the first time on appeal,
arguments that the indictment was defective and that § 922(g)(1) is
unconstitutional as applied to convicted felons. After careful re-
view, we affirm.
I.
At around 4:00 a.m. on November 30, 2020, two City of Mi-
ami Police Department Officers on patrol together in separate ve-
hicles saw a black Chevrolet Impala that Coleman was driving, run
a red light in the Little Havana neighborhood. The officers, Pedro
Moreno and David Torres, activated their overhead lights and
pulled the car over.
When the Impala came to a stop, both officers observed
Coleman turning his upper body to the right and moving his arms
and shoulders, as if he was “fiddling” or “fidgeting” with the center
console. Officer Moreno approached the driver’s side door with his
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22-13095 Opinion of the Court 3
gun drawn and ordered Coleman to put his hands up and step out
of the car. Coleman complied, and Officer Torres detained him at
the rear of the Impala.
While Officer Moreno was standing near the driver’s side
door, he observed with the aid of a flashlight that the center con-
sole was “partially open” and was being prevented from closing by
“what appeared to be the back strap of a firearm.” Moreno reached
inside the car and retrieved a firearm from the console. Coleman
was not in handcuffs at this time. The officers secured the firearm
and after making additional inquiries, learned that Coleman was a
convicted felon, at which point they placed him under arrest.
II.
In March 2021, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
charging Coleman with one count of possession of a firearm and
ammunition after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment alleged that, on November
30, 2020, Coleman “knowingly possessed a firearm and ammuni-
tion . . . , knowing that he had previously been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
Coleman filed a motion to suppress the evidence, and the
district court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2022. After hear-
ing the officers’ testimony and viewing body-worn camera video
of the incident, the court denied the motion to suppress. The court
found that the officers testified credibly and consistently with each
other and the body-worn camera video. And the court concluded
that probable cause existed for the traffic stop and that reasonable
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13095
suspicion supported conducting a protective search of the center
console for weapons.
Coleman proceeded to a jury trial in June 2022. Among
other evidence presented, the parties stipulated that Coleman
“knew that prior to November 30, 2020, he had been convicted of
a felony offen[s]e, which is a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.” The court also instructed the jury that one
of the elements they must find beyond a reasonable doubt was that
“at the time the defendant possessed the firearm or ammunition,
the defendant knew he had previously been convicted of a felony.”
The jury returned a guilty verdict.1 Coleman appeals.
III.
We start with the denial of the motion to suppress. We re-
view the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its appli-
cation of law to the facts de novo. United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d
991, 997 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). “We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, as the party that prevailed
in the district court.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “[w]hen an officer rea-
sonably believes that a suspect threatens his safety or the safety of
others, he may search the suspect and seize concealed objects that
he reasonably believes may be weapons or other instruments of as-
sault.” Johnson, 921 F.3d at 997. The “sole justification” for such a
1 Based on a jury note during deliberations, Coleman filed a motion to recon-
sider the denial of his motion to suppress, which the district court denied.
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22-13095 Opinion of the Court 5
search “is the protection of the police officer and others nearby,” so
it must “be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed
to discover” weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), “the Supreme Court
held that a protective Terry search can extend to the passenger com-
partment of an automobile in the absence of probable cause to ar-
rest.” United States v. Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368, 372 (11th Cir. 1983).
The Court reasoned “that roadside encounters between police and
suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from
the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a sus-
pect.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. These interests, according to the
Court, compelled the conclusion that officers may search a vehi-
cle’s passenger compartment for weapons, so long as they have rea-
sonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and might access
the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons. Id. at 1048–51;
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346 (2009) (“[Long] permits an of-
ficer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has rea-
sonable suspicion than an individual . . . is dangerous and might
access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons.”).
This case is controlled by Long, though any reference to that
case is conspicuously absent from Coleman’s briefing.2 Coleman
2 Coleman’s briefing instead concerns the “protective sweep” doctrine, a re-
lated but distinct doctrine extending Terry to permit a cursory inspection of a
residence upon reasonable suspicion “that the area to be swept harbors an in-
dividual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Maryland v. Buie, 494
U.S. 325, 333–35 (1990). Of course, as Coleman notes, “It is highly unlikely
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13095
does not dispute that the traffic stop was supported by probable
cause. And the circumstances facing the officers provided reason-
able suspicion that Coleman was armed and dangerous.
As the district court found, both officers credibly testified
that they could see into Coleman’s vehicle when it came to a stop,
and that they saw him “fidgeting in the vehicle” and “mov[ing] his
torso toward the center console.” Based on their training and ex-
perience, as well as common sense, the officers could reasonably
believe that Coleman was attempting to conceal or retrieve some-
thing from the center console. Consistent with that suspicion,
when Officer Moreno reached the driver’s side door and ordered
Coleman out of the vehicle, he could see the center console
propped open by a black object, which he suspected to be a firearm.
Moreno then lifted the lid to the console—an area where a weapon
could be placed or hidden and easily accessed by the driver—and
recovered a firearm from inside. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049–50.
Given the “especially hazardous” nature of roadside encoun-
ters between police and suspects, the officers’ observations at the
scene were sufficient to justify an “articulable and objectively rea-
sonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.” Long, 463
U.S. at 1051. That Coleman may have been effectively under the
officers’ control during the stop—detained by Officer Torres near
the rear of the vehicle, but not in handcuffs or under arrest—does
not eliminate the danger to officer safety. See id. at 1051–52.
that another individual would be found hiding in the vehicle’s console.” But
that’s not the inquiry here, as Long makes clear.
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22-13095 Opinion of the Court 7
Rejecting this same argument, the Supreme Court in Long ex-
plained that a Terry suspect may “break away from police control
and retrieve a weapon from his automobile,” or he may regain “ac-
cess to weapons” if permitted to return to his vehicle when the stop
ends. Id. at 1052; see Johnson, 921 F.3d at 1001 (“[S]uspects have been
known to reach for weapons even when handcuffed.”). So the Su-
preme Court has “not required that officers adopt alternate means
to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a
Terry encounter.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1052. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
IV.
Next, Coleman contends for the first time on appeal that his
indictment was jurisdictionally defective and failed to provide fair
notice because it did not allege that he knew his status as a felon,
also known as the “knowledge-of-status” element. See Rehaif v.
United States, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019) (“To convict
a defendant, the [g]overnment . . . must show that the defendant
knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the rel-
evant status [as a felon] when he possessed it.”).
For starters, as Coleman acknowledges, our precedent fore-
closes his jurisdictional argument. United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d
1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that the omission of the
knowledge-of-status element in an indictment “does not deprive
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction”). That’s so even
though the indictment failed to reference § 924(a)(2), which sets
out the penalties for a § 922(g) violation. United States v. Leonard, 4
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13095
F.4th 1134, 1143 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating that, “because the text of
§ 922(g) implies a knowledge-of-status element, an indictment that
alleges violations of § 922(g) confers subject matter jurisdiction,”
notwithstanding the failure to reference § 924(a)(2)).
More fundamentally, Coleman’s challenge fails because the
indictment included Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status element. The in-
dictment expressly alleged that Coleman knowingly possessed the
firearm “knowing that he had previously been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” He
later stipulated to that same fact at trial, and the jury was charged
on the knowledge-of-status element. In other words, the indict-
ment alleged, and the jury found, that Coleman knew he was a
felon when he possessed the gun.
Coleman responds that, in his view, the government was re-
quired to go further and both allege and prove he knew that his
felon status prohibited him from lawfully possessing a gun. But
Rehaif itself does not support that claim. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at
2198 (explaining that a defendant’s ignorance of “the existence of
a statute proscribing his conduct” is no excuse). Nor is it consistent
with our precedent applying Rehaif. See, e.g., United States v. Coats,
8 F.4th 1228, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he knowledge-of-status
element requires proof that at the time he possessed the firearm he
was aware he had a prior conviction for a crime punishable by im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year.”) (quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir.
2020) (“The Supreme Court clarified in Rehaif v. United States that
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22-13095 Opinion of the Court 9
a defendant must know both that he possesses a firearm and that
he has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than a year to violate section 922(g)(1).”); see also United States
v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that a defendant
convicted of possessing a firearm as a domestic misdemeanant
needed to know only that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor
and he must have known the facts that made the crime qualify as a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, not that he needed to
know that his status as a domestic misdemeanant precluded him
from possessing a firearm).
In sum, either prior precedent forecloses or the record con-
tradicts Coleman’s Rehaif arguments. See United States v. Vega-Cas-
tillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are bound to follow
a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this
court en banc or by the Supreme Court.”) (quotation marks omit-
ted). We affirm.
V.
Finally, Coleman contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitu-
tional as applied to convicted felons, in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association,
Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
We review this argument for plain error because Coleman
raised it for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Vereen, 920
F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Objections not raised in the dis-
trict court are reviewed only for plain error.”). “When neither this
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13095
Court nor the Supreme Court have resolved an issue, there can be
no plain error in regard to that issue.” Id.
Here, Coleman cannot establish any error, plain or other-
wise. In United States v. Rozier, we held that felons as a class of per-
sons were not qualified to possess a handgun under the Second
Amendment. 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Dist. of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)). Notwithstanding Rozier, Cole-
man maintains Bruen changed the relevant inquiry and that
§ 922(g)(1) fails Bruen’s historical-tradition test. But we recently
held that Bruen did not overrule or abrogate Rozier, which remains
binding under the prior precedent rule. United States v. Dubois, __
F.3d __, No. 22-10829, manuscript op. at 13–14 (11th Cir. Mar. 5,
2024); see Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236. Accordingly, we reject
Coleman’s challenge based on the Second Amendment.
VI.
In sum, the district court properly denied Coleman’s motion
to suppress, Coleman’s challenges to the indictment are contra-
dicted by the record or prior precedent, and § 922(g)(1) is constitu-
tional under our precedent notwithstanding Bruen. We therefore
affirm Coleman’s convictions and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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