Joseph Majdalani v. William Hardgrave, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13192
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JOSEPH C. MAJDALANI,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM C. HARDGRAVE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00894-JTA
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13192
Before NEWSOM , L AGOA , and B RASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellee, Joseph Majdalani, a tenured professor at
Auburn University, filed a complaint against several Auburn ad-
ministrators alleging, in relevant part, various First Amendment
claims. In their motion to dismiss Majdalani’s claims, Defendants-
Appellants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court concluded that because Defendants-Appellants
were not acting within the scope of their discretionary authority,
they are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants-Appellants, all Auburn University administra-
tors at the relevant time,1 ask us to reverse the magistrate judge’s
denial of their motion to dismiss on grounds that they are entitled
to qualified immunity.2 After careful review of the parties’ argu-
ments, we vacate the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
and remand.3
1 Defendants-Appellants are William C. Hardgrave, former Provost for Aca-
demic Affairs; Timothy Boosinger, former Provost of Auburn; John E. Winn,
tenured professor and former Associate Provost for Faulty Affairs; Christopher
Roberts, President of Auburn and former Dean of the College of Engineering;
and Brian Thurow, Chair of Aerospace Engineering.
2 The magistrate judge was presiding with the parties’ consent.
3 We review de novo the denial of an immunity defense. McCullough v. Finley,
907 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018). While a district court’s denial of a motion
to dismiss is not ordinarily a final decision, the denial of qualified immunity at
the motion to dismiss stage is a final decision as the defense entitles the holder
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22-13192 Opinion of the Court 3
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to invoke the defense of qualified immunity, a govern-
ment official must have been acting within the scope of his discre-
tionary authority at the time the allegedly wrongful conduct oc-
curred. Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 n.19 (11th Cir.
2010). If the official establishes that he was acting within the scope
of his discretionary authority, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the official’s conduct (1) violated federal law (2) that was
clearly established at the relevant time.” Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th
1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021).
For a defendant to prove that he was acting within the scope
of his discretionary authority, he must show that his challenged ac-
tions were “(1) undertaken pursuant to the performance of his du-
ties, and (2) within the scope of his authority.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v.
James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998). When conducting this
analysis, a court must “strip out the allegedly illegal conduct.”
Spencer, 5 F.4th at 1231. In other words, “[t]he inquiry is not
whether it was within the defendant’s authority to commit the al-
legedly illegal act” because if “[f]ramed that way, the inquiry is no
more than an ‘untenable’ tautology.” Harbert Int’l, 157 F.3d at 1282;
to immunity from not just liability, but from the lawsuit. Id.; Patel v. City of
Madison, 959 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13192
see also Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir. 2019) (“A
plaintiff cannot plead around qualified immunity simply by saying
that the official was animated by an unlawful purpose. The excep-
tion would swallow the rule.”).
Here, the magistrate judge failed to “strip out” the allegedly
illegal conduct. The judge found that “discrimination, harassment,
mockery, invasion of privacy, and defamation” were not within the
scope of the Defendants-Appellants official duties. The judge
should have, however, “look[ed] to the general nature of [Defend-
ants-Appellants] action[s],” and evaluated the actions at “the mini-
mum level of generality necessary to remove the constitutional
taint.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266
(11th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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