USA v. Edwin Sylvain

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13225
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDWIN SYLVAIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cr-60313-DPG-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13225 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2023 Page: 1 of 7

-- 1 of 7 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-13225
Before N EWSOM , GRANT, and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER C URIAM :
Edwin Sylvain appeals the district court’s denial of his mo-
tion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2).
The government has moved for summary affirmance because
there is no substantial question as to the outcome of Sylvain’s ap-
peal. We agree, grant the summary affirmance motion, and affirm
the district court’s order.
I.
Sylvain pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit Hobbs Act
robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of vi-
olence, kidnapping, and carjacking. In 2015, the district court sen-
tenced Sylvain to 408 months’ imprisonment.
Between May 2021 and September 2022, Sylvain moved
more than a dozen times to reduce his sentence. Relevant here:
• In May 2021, he moved for compassionate release under
section 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the Covid-19 pandemic.
• In June 2022, he moved for reduction of his sentence un-
der section 3582(c)(2), arguing plain error under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and misapplication of
guideline section 2K2.4 and guideline amendments 599
and 600.
• In July 2022, he moved for compassionate release under
section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he saved the life of a
USCA11 Case: 22-13225 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2023 Page: 2 of 7

-- 2 of 7 --

22-13225 Opinion of the Court 3
corrections officer in medical distress by providing im-
mediate assistance and calling other officers for help.
On August 16, 2022, the district court denied Sylvain’s sec-
tion 3582(c)(2) motion for reduced sentence because he failed to
show “how the guidelines were misapplied to him,” noting that he
and the government jointly recommended a sentence of thirty-
four years’ imprisonment. That same day, the district court denied
Sylvain’s May 2021 and July 2022 section 3582(c)(1)(A) compassion-
ate release motions because the section 3553(a) factors didn’t sup-
port his release, he failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and
compelling reason for his early release, and he remained a danger
to the safety of the community.
On September 13, 2022, Sylvain moved to reduce his sen-
tence under section 3582(c)(2), reiterating his arguments from his
June 2022 and July 2022 motions. The next day, the district court
described the motion as “another collateral attack on his convic-
tions and sentence” and denied it “for the reasons already stated
. . . in its previous [o]rders.”
Sylvain timely appealed, and the government has moved for
summary affirmance and a stay of the briefing schedule.
II.
Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of
one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can
be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” Groen-
dyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). We
USCA11 Case: 22-13225 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2023 Page: 3 of 7

-- 3 of 7 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-13225
review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions about the scope
of its authority under section 3582(c)(2). United States v. Lawson,
686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012). If section 3582(c)(2) applies,
we review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a sentence
reduction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Caraballo-Mar-
tinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). “While we read briefs
filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro
se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
III.
Section 3582(c)(2) allows a district court to modify a defend-
ant’s term of imprisonment if the defendant was sentenced based
on a sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A district court
considering a motion under this section must determine (1) what
sentence it would’ve imposed based on the subsequently lowered
sentencing range, and (2) whether, in its discretion, it should re-
duce the defendant’s sentence accordingly considering the section
3553(a) factors and whether the defendant poses a threat to the
safety of the community. United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254,
1256 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780–81
(11th Cir. 2000); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(B)(ii)–(iii).
In his notice of appeal, Sylvain specified that “[t]his notice is
for my 3582(c)(2) that was denied 9/14/2022.” No other orders or
motions were mentioned.
USCA11 Case: 22-13225 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2023 Page: 4 of 7

-- 4 of 7 --

22-13225 Opinion of the Court 5
But, in his brief, Sylvain doesn’t mention section 3582(c)(2).
He doesn’t address whether the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his section 3582(c)(2) motion. And he identifies no
amendment to the guidelines that was made after he was sentenced
and that would have subsequently lowered his guideline range.
Sylvain has therefore abandoned these arguments.
What Sylvain does mention is his July 2022 motion for com-
passionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), which he calls the
“instant motion on appeal.” But where an appellant makes an ex-
press statement limiting the scope of the appeal, we have jurisdic-
tion to review only the judgments or orders that are specified in
the notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(6); Osterneck v. E.T. Bar-
wick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The general
rule in this circuit is that an appellate court has jurisdiction to re-
view only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which are
specified in an appellant’s notice of appeal.”), aff’d sub nom. Oster-
neck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). We liberally construe
this requirement. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (“When
papers are technically at variance with the letter of [Rule 3], a court
may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if
the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the rule re-
quires.” (quotation omitted)). But even under the most liberal con-
struction possible, Sylvain’s notice shows no overriding intent to
appeal anything other than the September 14 ruling. See Nichols v.
Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2016) (“ We liberally con-
strue the requirements of Rule 3, however, and an appeal is not lost
if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed from
USCA11 Case: 22-13225 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2023 Page: 5 of 7

-- 5 of 7 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-13225
where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively to ap-
peal.” (quotation omitted)). We therefore lack jurisdiction to con-
sider his arguments related to his earlier motions. See Fed. R. App.
P. 3(c)(6); Osterneck, 825 F.3d at 1528.1
The government argues that Sylvain has abandoned his
challenge to the denial of his section 3582(c)(2) motion by not brief-
ing it on appeal. Because the government is clearly correct as a
matter of law, it is entitled to summary affirmance. See Groendyke
Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162.
But even if it weren’t, the outcome would be the same. Syl-
vain’s section 3582(c)(2) motion didn’t rely on any amendment to
the guidelines that retroactively reduced his guideline range. Ra-
ther, he relied on amendments 599 and 600, which went into effect
November 1, 2000, well before the district court sentenced him.
The other grounds he cited in support of his motion—saving the
life of the corrections officer, the district court’s alleged “misappli-
cation” of section 924(c), and the “ambiguity” of that statute—
1
Even if we could review the district court’s order denying compassionate
release, we would still grant the government’s summary affirmance motion.
“[T]he only circumstances that can rise to the level of extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons for compassionate release are limited to those extraordinary
and compelling reasons as described by [s]ection 1B1.13.” United States v. Gi-
ron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021). But the reasons Sylvain gave for com-
passionate release were not described in section 1B1.13. So there was no basis
for the district court to grant relief.
USCA11 Case: 22-13225 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2023 Page: 6 of 7

-- 6 of 7 --

22-13225 Opinion of the Court 7
aren’t reasons for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2).
The district court therefore could not have abused its discretion.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE GRANTED;
AFFIRMED.2
2 The government’s motion to stay the briefing schedule is DENIED AS
MOOT.
USCA11 Case: 22-13225 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2023 Page: 7 of 7

-- 7 of 7 --