Multimedia Technologies, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, Georgia

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13625
____________________
MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
GEOFFREY ANDERSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
versus
CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01280-VMC
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13625
____________________
Before WILSON, J ILL PRYOR , and B RASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case concerns two signs that Multimedia Technologies
owns. One sign hangs on the side of a building owned by Peach
Hospitality of Georgia, LLC; the second sits on top of the building.
The City of Atlanta permitted both signs in 1993. But after a sign
code change, state-court litigation, and some time passed, Atlanta
demanded that Multimedia remove its signs. When Multimedia re-
fused, Atlanta issued arrest citations to Multimedia’s president and
Peach’s registered agent.
Multimedia, its president, and Peach sued Atlanta, claiming
that it sought to unconstitutionally apply the sign code to Multime-
dia’s signs. Because Multimedia had lost the state-court litigation,
the district court requested briefing on whether Rooker-Feldman, a
doctrine precluding a party who lost in state court from trying to
remedy that loss in federal district court, barred Multimedia’s
claims.
Convinced that Rooker-Feldman applied, the district court
dismissed Multimedia, stayed the remaining claims in the lawsuit,
and certified its order for appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 54(b). On appeal, Multimedia and Atlanta urge us to decide
whether the district court properly applied Rooker-Feldman. To do
so, we must have jurisdiction under Rule 54(b). But jurisdiction un-
der Rule 54(b) requires that a case present unique or unusual
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22-13625 Opinion of the Court 3
circumstances. This case lacks those circumstances; we thus lack
jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Multimedia owns two signs that Atlanta permitted in 1993,
under the 1982 sign code. Atlanta amended the code in 2015 but
allowed nonconforming signs to stay up if they were lawfully
erected under the 1982 sign code and properly maintained by their
owner.
A few years after Atlanta enacted the 2015 sign code, Multi-
media sought permits to convert its signs to LED faces. Atlanta
granted the conversion permits, but three parties appealed that de-
cision to the Board of Zoning Adjustment. After the Board denied
the appeal, two parties challenged the Board’s decision before the
Superior Court of Fulton County. The superior court reversed the
Board’s decision and set aside the conversion permits, determining
that the signs were illegal under the 2015 sign code and were not
legally nonconforming because the original permits were improp-
erly issued.
Almost a year after the superior court’s decision, Atlanta de-
manded that Multimedia remove its signs. When Multimedia re-
fused, Atlanta issued arrest citations to Multimedia’s president and
Peach’s registered agent commanding them to appear in municipal
court. Multimedia, its president, and Peach sued in federal district
court, claiming that Atlanta violated the First, Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendments when it tried to enforce the 1982 sign code
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13625
against Multimedia’s signs. After this action was filed, Atlanta
agreed to stay the pending actions in municipal court.
The parties completed discovery. Multimedia, its president,
and Peach together moved for summary judgment.
After the briefing on summary judgment was complete, the
district court asked the parties for supplemental briefing on Rooker-
Feldman, a doctrine that precludes “state-court losers” from “com-
plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and “inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mo-
bil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).1 After
receiving briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to
Atlanta and against Multimedia, determining that Rooker-Feldman
barred Multimedia’s claims. In its order, the district court left un-
addressed whether Multimedia’s president and Peach were entitled
to summary judgment. The court instead stayed the case as to the
two other plaintiffs and certified a Rule 54(b) appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
“We have a threshold obligation to” address any jurisdic-
tional questions before discussing an appeal’s merits. Peden v. Ste-
phens, 50 F.4th 972, 977 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted). That obligation remains even though Multimedia and At-
lanta each urge appellate review. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville
1 Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine derived from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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22-13625 Opinion of the Court 5
Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997). The jurisdictional
question before us is whether the district court properly certified
its order under Rule 54(b). See id. (“Rule 54(b) certifica-
tion[s] . . . implicate the scope of our appellate jurisdiction.”). Be-
cause we conclude that the district court improperly certified this
appeal under Rule 54(b), we lack appellate jurisdiction.
We ordinarily have jurisdiction to review only “decisions of
the district courts” that are “final.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision
exists when “the rights and liabilities of all the parties to the action
have been adjudicated.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 165.
But Rule 54(b) provides “a limited exception” that permits
us to “entertain an appeal of an order that does not dispose of all
claims against all parties if the district court properly certifies such
an order as ‘final.’” Scott v. Advanced Pharm. Consultants, Inc.,
84 F.4th 952, 959 (11th Cir. 2023). Rule 54(b) “codif[ied] the historic
practice of prohibiting piecemeal disposition of litigation and per-
mitting appeals only from” final decisions of the district court, “ex-
cept in the infrequent harsh case in which the district court
properly makes the determinations contemplated by the rule.” In
re Se. Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995) (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To properly make the determinations Rule 54(b) contem-
plates, district courts must follow a two-step analysis: the district
court first determines whether the order is a “final judgment” and
then decides whether there is “no just reason for delay.” Lloyd
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Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court’s order satisfies the first step. We review
de novo whether the district court’s order constitutes a final judg-
ment. Id. at 778 & n.5. During that review, we must “decide
whether the district court completely disposed of one or more
claims.” In re Se. Banking Corp., 69 F.3d at 1546. Because the district
court’s order “dismisse[d] a party entirely,” id. at 1547, it qualifies
as a final judgment under Rule 54(b).
At the second step, we are unconvinced that there is no just
reason to delay this appeal. We usually review the second step for
an abuse of discretion. Lloyd Noland Found., 483 F.3d at 778 n.5.
“Deference to the district court’s determination, however, depends
upon our ability to discern the reasoning that motivated the
Rule 54(b) certification.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 166. The district
court here never explained itself. Although it concluded that “there
is no just reason for delay for the reasons given above,” Doc. 48 at
23,2 the reasons it gave above did not implicate sound judicial ad-
ministration and efficiency, the cornerstones of Rule 54(b)’s analy-
sis, see Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 167. We therefore analyze de novo
whether there is any just reason to delay this appeal.
We have stressed that the no-just-reason-to-delay require-
ment contemplates special circumstances beyond the delay inher-
ent in ordinary appeals. That is because “[t]he federal concept of
2 “Doc.” refers to the district court’s docket entries.
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22-13625 Opinion of the Court 7
sound judicial administration and efficiency will not normally be
furthered by having piecemeal appeals,” which “require two (or
more) three-judge panels to familiarize themselves with a given
case.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Judicial administration and efficiency instead favor “having the trial
judge, who sits alone and is intimately familiar with the whole case,
revisit a portion of the case if he or she has erred in part and that
portion is overturned following the adjudication of the whole
case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “[a]bsent
special circumstances,” pretrial appellate review should be denied.
Id. at 168.
We noted some special circumstances in Doe #1 v. Red Roof
Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021). There, multiple sex traffick-
ing victims sued several individuals and hotels, alleging violations
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act and
Georgia state law. Id. at 721. The district court dismissed the com-
plaints against three hotels, concluding that they failed to state
claims. Id. It also certified its orders under Rule 54(b) and “stayed
discovery pending the anticipated appeals.” Id. Each of the four
Does appealed, and we consolidated the four appeals.
We then determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it certified its orders under Rule 54(b). We con-
cluded that the certification was proper for four reasons. First, ad-
dressing the appeal enhanced the litigation’s efficiency because the
four consolidated cases were related. Id. at 723. Second, the litiga-
tion remained in early stages, with all four cases at the motion-to-
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13625
dismiss stage. Id. Third, the litigation involved multiple defendants.
Id. And fourth, the parties had yet to engage in discovery. Id.
“Those special circumstances are absent here.” Peden,
50 F.4th at 979. There are no consolidated appeals. The litigation is
no longer in its early stages, having progressed all the way to the
summary judgment stage. This litigation involves only one defend-
ant. And the parties have already finished discovery.
Of course, the exact special circumstances found in Red Roof
Inns are unnecessary for Rule 54(b) jurisdiction. Multimedia and
Atlanta argue that their case involves special circumstances for
three reasons. But we find their arguments unconvincing.
First, Multimedia argues that permitting the appeal will fur-
ther judicial economy because the district court stayed the other
plaintiffs’ claims. But our past cases have given no weight to stays
when considering whether special circumstances existed to justify
Rule 54(b) certification. In Red Roof Inns, for example, we noted that
the district court stayed discovery pending the appeal but never
mentioned it as a reason to support jurisdiction. 21 F.4th at 721.
That makes sense. District courts “possess[] inherent pow-
ers . . . to manage their own affairs.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40,
45 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 They therefore have
3 A district court’s power to manage its own docket allows it to avoid issuing
piecemeal orders, which can lead to piecemeal appeals. For example, the dis-
trict court may resolve all pending motions in omnibus orders. Or it may re-
solve legal issues that affect only a single party or claim posttrial, rather than
pretrial.
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22-13625 Opinion of the Court 9
discretion to stay proceedings whenever they certify Rule 54(b) ap-
peals. If staying proceedings “alone justified an immediate appeal,
Rule 54(b) certifications would cease to be reserved for the unusual
case.” Peden, 50 F.4th at 979 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 54(b) is a narrow exception to our general prohibition against
piecemeal appeals. In this case, we decline to broaden that narrow
exception by giving weight to whether the district court stayed the
underlying proceedings.
Second, Multimedia argues that permitting the appeal will
not cause piecemeal appeals or require us to relearn facts because
we will need to hear the Rooker-Feldman issue only once. That is
true. But the “relevant equitable concerns” go beyond avoiding
piecemeal appeals and include “limit[ing] Rule 54(b) certification to
instances in which immediate appeal would alleviate some danger
of hardship or injustice associated with delay.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d
at 166. No danger of hardship or injustice exists here because the
arrest citations “have been stayed[] pending the outcome of” this
litigation. Doc. 6 ¶ 37.
And third, Multimedia and Atlanta argue that judicial econ-
omy will suffer if we delay this appeal, noting that the district court
will need to duplicate its efforts if the case proceeds without Multi-
media, only for us to reverse its dismissal on direct appeal. But the
possibility of reversal pervades every case and provides no special
circumstance for Rule 54(b) certification. See Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at
167. Atlanta, which failed to respond to our jurisdictional question,
stated at oral argument that judicial economy will suffer if the
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13625
district court ends up conducting two nearly identical trials. This
case, however, is before us on a summary judgment motion. It is
by no means clear that this case will involve one trial, let alone two.
Put simply, “there is no indication that the delays here
would cause anything other than inconvenience.” Peden, 50 F.4th
at 979. We have cautioned against Rule 54(b)’s “liberal construc-
tion,” stressing that it should be “reserved for the unusual case.”
Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 166–67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This is not the unusual case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, we dismiss this appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED.
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