Barbara Buckhanon v. Opelika Housing Authority

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13689
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
BARBARA BUCKHANON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OPELIKA HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellee,
MATTHEW MCCLAMMEY,
Defendant.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13689
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00893-ECM-KFP
____________________
Before J ORDAN , G RANT, and L AGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Barbara Buckhanon brought suit against her former
employer, Opelika Housing Authority, alleging color-based
discrimination in violation of Title VII. The district court granted
summary judgment on Buckhanon’s claim in favor of Opelika. We
affirm.
I.
Barbara Buckhanon, a dark-skinned black woman, worked
for Opelika Housing Authority as a Housing Quality Specialist until
she was fired. As an HQS inspector, Buckhanon was responsible
for inspecting properties, recording failed inspections, and
scheduling reinspection. While employed, Buckhanon was
supervised by Julia Dowell, a light-skinned black woman. Dowell
in turn reported directly to Matthew McClammey, a light-skinned
black man.
While she received positive reviews at first, Buckhanon’s
work later declined. Buckhanon was repeatedly late on completing
inspections and reinspections. In Buckhanon’s view, McClammey
and Dowell failed to provide proper instruction on how to use the
new inspection software system. When she requested additional
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22-13689 Opinion of the Court 3
training on the program, Dowell provided her with an online
option. But Buckhanon still struggled to use the new program and
continued her poor record on completing inspections and
reinspections in a timely manner. In response, McClammey
decided that Buckhanon could no longer perform inspections.
Buckhanon filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against
Opelika. She alleged in that Charge that she was being excessively
criticized and set up to fail at work, in part because of her skin color.
EEOC later closed this Charge and sent her a Notice of Right to
Sue letter. Two months later, McClammey fired Buckhanon.
Buckhanon brought a color-based discrimination suit,
alleging that Opelika discriminated against her based on the color
of her skin. After discovery, Opelika moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion for summary
judgment. Buckhanon appeals.1
II.
“We review the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment de novo.” Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276
F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). Summary
1 Buckhanon also brought retaliation, failure to train, and due process claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an unpaid overtime claim under the Fair Labor
Standards Act against Opelika, as well as a separate retaliation claim against
McClammey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These claims were all either dismissed
or resolved by the parties. So the only claim resolved at summary judgment,
and thus the only claim before this Court today, is Buckhanon’s Title VII
discrimination claim against Opelika.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13689
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
issue of material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced
evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in
its favor.” Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279.
III.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
for an employer to intentionally discriminate against an employee
with respect to her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973). Title
VII discrimination claims can be categorized as either mixed
motive or single motive. Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d
1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016). For a single-motive theory, a plaintiff
must show that discrimination was the but-for cause of the adverse
employment action. Id. But under a mixed-motive theory, a
plaintiff need only show that her gender was a “motivating factor”
in the employer’s decision to take adverse employment action. Id.
(quotation omitted). At summary judgment, the ultimate question
for all Title VII intentional discrimination claims is the normal
standard: whether a reasonable jury could infer that the reason for
the adverse employment action was illegal discrimination. Tynes v.
Florida Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2023).
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22-13689 Opinion of the Court 5
The district court analyzed Buckhanon’s claims under a
single-motive theory, finding that she failed to sufficiently plead or
provide sufficient evidence to support a mixed-motive theory. It is
true that Buckhanon’s complaint only generally states that her
“color was a motivating factor, moving force, and/or otherwise
influenced” her ultimate termination. But it is still an “open
question in this Circuit” whether a plaintiff must actually plead a
mixed-motive theory in her complaint. Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health
Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1337 n.2 (11th Cir. 2023). We need not resolve
that question today, though, because regardless of the theory
applied, Buckhanon’s claims fail.
A.
We start with the single-motive theory. “There is more than
one way to show discriminatory intent using indirect or
circumstantial evidence.” Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc.,
680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012). One is via the “burden-shifting
framework set out in McDonnell Douglas.” Id. This is an evidentiary
tool used to “establish an order of proof and production.” St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993). It involves a
three-step process for a plaintiff to show intentional discrimination.
First, a plaintiff must establish a “legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption” of intentional discrimination by showing that she (1)
belongs to a protected class, (2) suffered an adverse employment
action, (3) was qualified for the job in question, and (4) was treated
less favorably by her employer compared to another employee
who was similarly situated in all material respects. Texas Dep’t of
Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981); Tynes, 88 F.4th
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13689
at 944 . The burden then shifts to the defendant, who has a chance
to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir.
2019) (en banc). Once the defendant has done so, the plaintiff can
rebut the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by showing that it is
pretextual. Id.
Of course, a plaintiff is not limited to McDonnell Douglas
because the ultimate question is the normal summary judgment
standard. Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946–47. We thus review all relevant
direct and circumstantial evidence to determine if a convincing
mosaic of evidence has been presented such that a reasonable juror
could find intentional discrimination. Id. at 946; Hamilton, 680 F.3d
at 1320. Probative evidence may include, “among other things, (1)
suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or other information
from which discriminatory intent may be inferred, (2)
systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees,
and (3) pretext.” Tynes, F.4th at 946 n.2 (quotation omitted).
Applying this approach to Buckhanon’s claim, we ask
whether there is enough evidence such that a reasonable juror
could infer intentional discrimination. Buckhanon presents the
following evidence to support her Title VII discrimination claims:
that she was fired two months after her EEOC Charge was closed,
that her superiors began “secretly monitoring and taking notes” on
her, and that similarly situated light-skinned employees received
better treatment.
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22-13689 Opinion of the Court 7
Taken as a whole, Buckhanon’s evidence is insufficient to
show discriminatory intent. Of all three of the employees she
references, none had the same job title or job responsibilities (like
performing inspections and reinspections), none had the same
supervisor, and none committed the same misconduct as she did.
As for her supervisors monitoring her and taking notes, Buckhanon
never explains why a supervisor monitoring her, as supervisors
often do, shows racial discrimination, particularly given that she
had received poor reviews regarding her work. And with respect
to her being fired two months after her EEOC charge, Buckhanon
fails to show how being fired for filing an EEOC charge shows
discrimination on the basis of race.2
So none of the evidence Buckhanon provides suggests that
her skin color was the reason she was transferred or fired. See
Ossmann v. Meredith Corp., 82 F.4th 1007, 1019–20 (11th Cir. 2023).
She also does not dispute that she received warnings about her
work product prior to her transfer and firing, and that she had failed
to complete inspections and reinspections in a timely manner. The
district court thus correctly concluded that a reasonable juror could
not find that discrimination was the but-for cause of the adverse
employment action.
2 To be sure, filing an EEOC complaint is protected conduct, so an adverse
employment action two months after an EEOC filing could be evidence of
retaliation. See Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1135
(11th Cir. 2020). But there is no retaliation claim here, and Buckhanon fails to
provide an explanation connecting her claims regarding the EEOC charge to
her claims of racial discrimination.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13689
B.
We now move to the mixed-motive analysis. Here, “a
plaintiff need only show that a protected consideration contributed
in some way to the outcome—even if it ultimately changed
nothing.” Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1339. An employee can succeed under
a mixed-motive theory by presenting evidence showing that
discriminatory input factored into the decisional process that
resulted in the adverse employment action. Quigg, 814 F.3d at
1241. This can include evidence such as discriminatory statements
by those involved in the decisional process. Id.
Buckhanon seems to confuse the mixed-motive and
convincing mosaic analyses. We thus rely on the same evidence
analyzed for Buckhanon’s convincing mosaic argument to assess
her claims under a mixed-motive theory. Buckhanon presents the
following evidence: her superiors monitored her and took notes,
she was fired two months after her EEOC Charge closed, and light-
skinned employees received better treatment in comparison.
This evidence is not enough to show discrimination under a
mixed-motive theory. Buckhanon fails to show how any of the
evidence provided suggests discriminatory input into the decision
to fire her. Her claim that light-skinned employees received better
treatment is unconvincing given that none of the employees she
points to held the same position, were subject to the same
supervisors, or committed the same misconduct. And she fails to
adequately explain how her allegations of monitoring and
notetaking and evidence that she was fired two months after the
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22-13689 Opinion of the Court 9
EEOC Charge are connected to discrimination based on her skin
color. Because none of the evidence she provides suggests
discriminatory input into the decision-making process,
Buckhanon’s claims fail under a mixed-motive analysis. See id.
* * *
Under both the single-motive and mixed-motive analyses,
Buckhanon failed to provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory
intent. We AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment order.
AFFIRMED.
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