Christopher Chandler v. Sheriff, Walton County

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13698
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CHRISTOPHER CHANDLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF, WALTON COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00507-MCR-ZCB
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Chandler appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Chandler’s employer, Michael Ad-
kinson, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Walton County.
First, he claims that Adkinson interfered with his rights under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) by ordering a coworker
to stop by his house while he was on leave for an injury, as well as
by not informing him that he could take additional leave for his
mental health, and retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave by
punitively reassigning him to an undesirable fire station after he re-
turned from leave, demoting him, and ultimately terminating him.
Second, he claims that he suffered discrimination under the Florida
Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) due to his disabilities—i.e. depression
and post-traumatic stress disorder—in the form of his reassign-
ment, demotion, and termination. Finally, he claims that these
same adverse events were retaliation under the FCRA for him re-
porting his own experiences with disability discrimination, as well
as sex discrimination that he witnessed targeting another em-
ployee.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, apply-
ing the same legal standards as the district court. Alvarez v. Royal
Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary
judgment is proper if the evidence shows “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 3
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dis-
pute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The mere existence of a scin-
tilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insuffi-
cient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.
We write only for the parties who are already familiar with
the facts. Accordingly, we include only such facts as are necessary
to understand our opinion.
I. Chandler’s FMLA Claims
Under the FMLA, eligible employees are entitled to take up
to 12 weeks of “leave during any 12 month period . . . [b]ecause of
a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to per-
form the functions of the position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
“The FMLA prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining,
retaliating against, or denying ‘the exercise of or the attempt to ex-
ercise’ any rights guaranteed under the Act.” Matamoros v. Broward
Sheriff’s Off., 2 F.4th 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)). The FMLA creates two types of claims—interference
claims and retaliation claims. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2); O’Connor
v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2000).
To establish a prima facie FMLA interference claim, a plain-
tiff must show that he was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA
and his employer denied him that benefit. White v. Beltram Edge
Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015). “When an
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
employee requests FMLA leave, or when the employer acquires
knowledge that an employee’s leave may be for an
FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer must notify the employee
of the employee’s eligibility to take FMLA leave . . . .” 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.300(b)(1). However, the FMLA requires that the employee
“actually seek leave–of some sort–to trigger an employer’s obliga-
tion to give eligibility and rights-and-responsibilities notice.”
Graves v. Brandstar, Inc., 67 F.4th 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2023).
To establish a prima facie FMLA retaliation claim, the em-
ployee must show that “(1) she engaged in statutorily protected
conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(3) there is a causal connection between the two.” Munoz v. Selig
Enterprises, Inc., 981 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020). An adverse
employment action is an action that “might have dissuaded a rea-
sonable worker” from engaging in protected activity. Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quota-
tion marks omitted). This includes “conduct that alters the em-
ployee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or ad-
versely affects his or her status as an employee.” Cotton v. Cracker
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks omitted).
Generally, close temporal proximity between an employee’s
protected conduct under the FMLA and an adverse employment
action is sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the events are causally related.
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 5
Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th
Cir. 2006). However, the proximity must be close, and a gap of
three months between the protected activity and the adverse em-
ployment action is not proximate enough, in the absence of other
evidence, to create a triable issue as to causation. See Drago v. Jenne,
453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that three months is
insufficiently proximate to show a relationship between the plain-
tiff’s complaint under the FMLA and a demotion).
Employers are liable under the FMLA for the actions of su-
pervisory employees. See, e.g., Drago, 453 F.3d at 1303-05 (evaluat-
ing an employee’s claims for FMLA interference and retaliation
premised on the actions of supervisory employees despite the de-
fendant-employer’s lack of personal knowledge); Spakes v. Broward
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 631 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) (same).
Unlike with claims of FMLA interference, to claim FMLA
retaliation the employee must additionally show that the em-
ployer’s actions were motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or
discriminatory animus. Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1275. After the em-
ployee makes a prima facie showing of FMLA retaliation, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse action. Id. The burden then shifts back to the em-
ployee to produce evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason is
pretextual. Id. “To show pretext, an employee must introduce
evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons
for the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 1277 (quotation
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
marks omitted). The employee may point to “weaknesses, implau-
sibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons” to demonstrate that they
are pretextual. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Adkinson with respect to Chandler’s FMLA claims. As
it correctly determined, Chandler was not prevented from taking
leave, intimidated into cutting his leave short, or prevented from
learning of his FMLA rights but was, in fact, promoted. Further-
more, the district court correctly determined that, although Chan-
dler argues that his reassignment, demotion, and termination were
retaliatory, the evidence showed that the reassignment was
planned prior to his leave and his placement at Station 4 was not
objectively adverse; and the demotion and termination were not
causally related to his using leave but were precipitated by legiti-
mate reasons that were not pretextual.
A. Chandler’s FMLA interference claims
As to Chandler’s prima facie claim of FMLA interference,
the evidence showed Chandler was not denied leave by his then-
supervisors Turner, McMillian, Beaty, and Finley. See White, 789
F.3d at 1191. Doctor Contini estimated Chandler would need three
months to recover from the injury to his hip and back, and Chan-
dler was granted that full amount, not returning to work until after
Contini fully cleared him to fulfill his duties without restriction, at
which point he reported to Hatfield, Turner, and Newsome. Chan-
dler was even promoted during his time on leave, rather than
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 7
punished, and then reported to Hatfield and Brown. While Chan-
dler accused Blevins of visiting his house during his leave in his
complaint, he later clarified in his deposition that Blevins did not
visit until after he had already returned from leave and submitted
a note describing Blevins visiting in October 2018. Chandler’s note
was similar to Vause’s and Blevins’s accounts of Blevins volunteer-
ing to visit Chandler “to see if he was okay” after Chandler refused
contact following his demotion. Moreover, although Chandler ar-
gues that Vause, Hatfield, and McMillian interfered with his FMLA
rights by not informing him that he could take leave under the
FMLA for his mental health after he expressed his struggles with
depression and PTSD, he had not requested leave or another ac-
commodation and therefore did not trigger his employer’s affirm-
ative duty to notify him of his rights under the FMLA. See Graves,
67 F.4th at 1122. Accordingly, the district court did not err in grant-
ing Adkinson summary judgment as to Chandler’s FMLA interfer-
ence claim because it correctly determined that Chandler was not
denied leave, pressured to return early, or purposefully made una-
ware of the possibility that he could take leave for his mental health
issues.
B. Chandler’s FMLA retaliation claims
As to Chandler’s FMLA retaliation claim, he failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case with respect to his transfer to Station 4, his
demotion, or his termination. As the district court explained,
Chandler did not show that his reassignment to Station 4 was ad-
verse, nor that any of these outcomes were causally connected to
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
his use of leave, and did not show that the reasons offered for each
outcome were pretextual. See Cotton, 434 F.3d at 1233; See Burling-
ton, 548 U.S. at 68; Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1275.
First, Chandler cannot show that the initial decision to reas-
sign him was causally related to his FMLA leave because it was
scheduled prior to his electing to use leave. See Munoz, 981 F.3d at
1275. However, even assuming that Newsome and Hatfield told
Chandler he was placed at Station 4 due to his leave and assuming
that his eventual placement at Station 4 was causally connected to
taking leave because it did not become official until after he re-
turned, Chandler did not show that the placement was adverse. See
Cotton, 434 F.3d at 1233. While Chandler argues that his reassign-
ment was adverse because it substantially increased his call volume
and effectively removed him from firefighting duties, he admitted
that his pay and benefits did not change. See Cotton, 434 F.3d at
1233. And employee depositions showed that there was no objec-
tive consensus among employees that Station 4 was a punitive
placement. Howard stated that some people disliked Station 4 be-
cause it is busy, and Halderson felt the assignment was punitive.
However, Cooper and McElyea expressed that it was routine for
all employees to rotate through Station 4 and Carter stated that he
enjoyed working there, referring to it as an “enhancement” station
to get employees back from leave up to speed. In addition, Chan-
dler himself stated that he “fully accept[ed] the LT position any-
where seen fit,” including Station 4, noting “I’ve been here for years
and been assigned to almost every station in the county including
4,” supporting McElyea’s assertion that even seasoned paramedics
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 9
are routinely transferred to Station 4 multiple times in their careers.
Thus, as the district court correctly concluded, Chandler failed to
carry his burden to show, as an element of the prima facie case, that
his assignment to Station 4 was an objectively adverse employment
action that would dissuade a “reasonable worker” from using
FMLA benefits. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68; Munoz, 981 F.3d at
1275.
Furthermore, Adkinson offered the legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory explanation that placing Chandler at Station 4 was intended
to sharpen his skills after three months on leave, and Chandler did
not show this reason was pretext for discrimination. See Munoz,
981 F.3d at 1275. While Chandler claims he did not need to sharpen
his skills at Station 4 because he was experienced, had sufficient pa-
tient contacts, and did not need additional training, it is undisputed
that he had recently taken three months off from using his perish-
able skills as an EMT and, in August 2018, Earley advised him that
his patient contact reports contained errors and were insufficiently
thorough. As the district court concluded, the evidence, as a
whole, showed that Chandler’s reassignment was not related to his
leave, was not materially adverse, and served the legitimate pur-
pose of restoring his skills after leave and is not sufficient to permit
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the
employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment
decision. See Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1277.
Second, while Chandler’s demotion and termination were
clearly adverse employment actions, Chandler did not show a
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
causal connection between his FMLA leave and these outcomes ei-
ther. Chandler was demoted, then terminated, by two new super-
visors who did not oversee him prior to or during his period of
leave. And Chandler was demoted and terminated about six
months after his return to work, which is not sufficiently proximate
to give rise to a presumption of causality. See Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at
1298; Drago, 453 F.3d at 1308. Finally, Chandler did not point to
any other evidence causally connecting his use of leave to the deci-
sion to demote and terminate him.
Accordingly, because Chandler did not show that his reas-
signment, demotion, or termination were both adverse and caus-
ally related to his FMLA leave, this is an independent ground to
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect
to Chandler’s FMLA retaliation claim.
Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, Adkinson had
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for both demoting Chan-
dler and terminating him. With respect to the demotion, Chandler
had been insubordinate to his supervisor and had failed to show up
for an August 2018 overtime shift. With respect to the termination,
after his demotion, Chandler refused to return to work. These le-
gitimate reasons—which Chandler did not show were pretextual—
constitute separate and independent grounds to affirm the district
court’s summary judgment with respect to Chandler’s FMLA retal-
iation claims.
II. Chandler’s FCRA Discrimination Claims
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 11
The FCRA forbids employers from “discriminat[ing] against
any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . handicap.” Fla.
Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). “Florida courts construe the Florida Civil
Rights Act in conformity with the federal Americans with Disabili-
ties Act [(“ADA”)].” Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc., 4 F.4th 1149,
1155 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and brackets omitted); see
also Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination due to her heart
condition under Fla. Stat. § 760.10(a) was analogous to a claim un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). This includes situations where the lan-
guage is similar but not identical. Ring, 4 F.4th at 1156. Chandler
argues that he is disabled due to his depression and post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”), that his employer had notice thereof, and
that he was discriminated against in the form of his reassignment
to Station 4 and his demotion and termination.
It is unclear when a county agency, as an employer, may be
held vicariously liable under Title II of the ADA for the discrimina-
tory actions of one employee against another in the absence of that
employer’s actual knowledge. See, e.g., Silberman v. Miami Dade
Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 n.6 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he availability
of respondeat superior for Title II . . . remains an open question.”).
However, we recently held, in the context of a claim for compen-
satory damages, that the plaintiff must establish that the employer
had “actual knowledge” of discrimination and failed to respond ad-
equately. See Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1257-58 (11th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 142 S. Ct. 2855 (2022).
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
Under the antidiscrimination provision in the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), an employer may not “discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to .
. . the . . . discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish
a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, the plaintiff must show
that he (1) has a disability, (2) is otherwise qualified to perform the
job, and (3) was discriminated against on the basis of his disability.
Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th
Cir. 2004). The plaintiff may show that the employer treated simi-
larly situated individuals outside his protected class more favora-
bly. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220-21 (11th Cir.
2019) (en banc) (Lewis I). The plaintiff may set forth a comparator
that is outside the protected class but “similarly situated in all ma-
terial respects,” including factors such as similar conduct, similar
office policies or guidelines, the same supervisor, and similar work
and disciplinary history, to demonstrate differential treatment. Id.
at 1226-29, 1231. The plaintiff may also rely on evidence of a “pat-
tern or practice” of treating people within the protected class dif-
ferently if it is so widespread that “discrimination is the company’s
standard operating procedure.” E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220
F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
We generally analyze ADA discrimination claims under the
McDonnell Douglas1 burden shifting framework. Cleveland, 369 F.3d
1 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 13
at 1193. Once a plaintiff meets his prima facie burden under the
ADA, the defendant must present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. Id. The employee must then demonstrate
that the reason given was a pretext for discrimination. Id. To show
pretext in an employment discrimination claim, including under
the ADA, a plaintiff must show both that an employer’s reasons are
false “and that discrimination was the real reason.” Ring, 4 F.4th at
1163 (quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the employee must
produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the employer’s reason was not the real reason for the
adverse employment action, which can include implausible or in-
coherent details that cast doubt on the employer’s account. Furcron
v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016).
“Provided that the proffered reason is one that might moti-
vate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason
head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply
quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman v. AI Transp.,
229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff cannot merely
make conclusory allegations and assertions but must present con-
crete evidence in the form of specific facts showing that the em-
ployer’s reason for the materially adverse action was merely pre-
textual. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009). The
inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the em-
ployee’s beliefs or “reality as it exists outside of the decision
maker’s head.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266. Accordingly, when as-
sessing whether an employer has properly imposed an adverse ac-
tion on an employee based on that employee’s conduct, the
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
question is not whether the employee actually engaged in the con-
duct, but instead whether the employer in good faith believed that
the employee had done so. Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967
F.3d 1121, 1148 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). “A plaintiff’s failure to
rebut even one nondiscriminatory reason is sufficient to warrant
summary judgment.” Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163 (quotation marks and
brackets omitted).
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is not the
sole method for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment in an em-
ployment discrimination claim. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644
F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a plaintiff survives
summary judgment if the plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence
that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discrimina-
tory intent by introducing evidence sufficient to show, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a “convincing
mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer
intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker. Id. A plaintiff
may establish a “convincing mosaic” by pointing to evidence that
demonstrates, among other things, (1) suspicious timing, ambigu-
ous statements, or other information from which discriminatory
intent may be inferred, (2) superior treatment of similarly situated
workers, and (3) pretext. Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2022).
An employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a disa-
bled individual is itself discrimination. Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC,
492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, an employer’s
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 15
duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is not triggered un-
less a specific demand for an accommodation has been
made. Id. To “trigger an employer’s accommodation duties, a dis-
abled employee need only identify a statutory disability and explain
generally how a particular accommodation would assist
[him].” Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th
1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2022). The employee has the burden of iden-
tifying an accommodation and demonstrating that it is reasona-
ble. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016). “An
‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’—and, therefore, required under
the ADA—only if it enables the employee to perform the essential
functions of the job.” LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d
832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (defin-
ing a reasonable accommodation partly as an action that “enable[s]
an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the es-
sential functions of that position”). An employee is not necessarily
entitled to the accommodation of his choice, but rather is entitled
only to a reasonable accommodation. Stewart v. Happy Herman’s
Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997).
Generally, “the mere failure to raise an issue in an initial
brief on direct appeal should be treated as a forfeiture of the issue.”
United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022). We
have affirmed, in the context of an employment discrimination
suit, “the importance of giving the nonmovant a meaningful op-
portunity to respond” to all arguments at the summary judgment
stage. Burns v. Gadsden State Cmty. Coll., 908 F.2d 1512, 1516-17
(11th Cir. 1990).
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
As initial matters,2 first, Chandler forfeited any argument
based on his statement in his second affidavit that he merely re-
quested to reschedule his meetings with Hatfield and Vause follow-
ing his demotion due to being “emotionally devastated” because
he did not present this evidence in his response to Adkinson’s mo-
tion, but submitted it only in conjunction with his sur-reply to
which Adkinson had no “meaningful opportunity to respond.” See
Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873; Burns, 908 F.2d at 1516-17. Second, to the
extent that Chandler stated in the same affidavit that he requested
reevaluation of his demotion as an accommodation of his disabil-
ity, this is not a reasonable accommodation request in any event
because it is not an intervention designed to help Chandler fulfill
the requirements of his position but effectively a request to nullify
a disciplinary procedure that already took into account his mental
health conditions. See LaChance, 146 F.3d at 852; Stewart, 117 F.3d
at 1286.
Here, the district court did not err in determining that Ad-
kinson was entitled to summary judgment with regard to Chan-
dler’s FCRA claim of disability discrimination. At this stage of the
litigation, neither party disputes that Chandler was disabled, nor
2 As noted above, we held in Ingram that an ADA plaintiff claiming compen-
satory damages must establish that the employer had “actual knowledge” of
the discrimination and failed to respond adequately. Although Chandler ad-
mitted a failure to show that Adkinson himself was informed of the discrimi-
nation against him, we do not address or rely on this theory because Chandler
also sought equitable relief and because Adkinson prevails in this appeal on
other grounds.
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 17
that he was capable of performing the job of lieutenant. However,
the district court did not err in determining that Chandler did not
show that his reassignment, demotion, or termination were caus-
ally related to his disabilities, rather than the legitimate reasons
given for the employer’s actions Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1193. The
district court also correctly concluded that Chandler did not show
that the legitimate reasons for his transfer, demotion, and termina-
tion were pretextual because he did not demonstrate both that
these reasons were false and that the true reason was discrimina-
tory animus. See Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163.
Chandler did not show that his assignment to Station 4 was
discriminatory. See Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1193. Although Chandler
argues that his supervisors were on notice as to his disabilities as
early as his 2018 conversation with Turner, Chandler and Turner’s
general discussion of Chandler’s depression and PTSD—with no
specific mention that Chandler considered these common condi-
tions disabling and no request by Chandler for accommodations or
medical paperwork corroborating his claims3—did not put Turner
on notice as to Chandler’s disabled status prior to the decision to
transfer him to Station 4. Similarly, Chandler’s general statement
3 Indeed, Chandler’s conversation with Turner was very general, with Chan-
dler merely telling Turner that he had suffered from depression and PTSD for
several years (i.e. years during which Chandler had worked there and func-
tioned sufficiently well that he was promoted to lieutenant in June 2018 while
he was on leave due to an off duty injury to his hip and back). In the conver-
sation with Turner, Chandler did not claim to be disabled and made no request
for accommodation.
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
to Turner when requesting access to the Employee Assistance Pro-
gram (“EAP”) that he was experiencing stress did not put Turner
on notice that Chandler was legally disabled during the period that
he was requesting reassignment to a different station. See Owens,
52 F.4th at 1334-35 (stating that an ADA employee must “put her
employer on notice of the disability for which she seeks an accom-
modation and provide enough information to allow an employer
to understand how the accommodation would address the limita-
tions her disability presents . . . In most cases, to identify a disability,
an employee must provide at least some information about how a
physical or mental condition limits her functioning.”); Cordoba, 419
F.3d at 1175 (discussing previous holding that an employer can be
liable under ADA only if it had knowledge of the disability, and
constructive knowledge is insufficient); Gaston v. Bellingrath Gar-
dens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (“the duty
to provide a reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless a
specific demand for an accommodation has been made”). Thus,
and in light of the legitimate reasons for the transfer, Chandler can-
not show that either his transfer to Station 4 or the decision to keep
him there after he expressed generally that he was depressed were
motivated by discrimination on the basis of a disability. Cleveland,
369 F.3d at 1193. Furthermore, because Chandler did not claim a
statutory disability in his conversation with Turner, he did not trig-
ger a duty to accommodate his disabilities through reassignment to
a different station. See Owens, 52 F.4th at 1336. Therefore, the dis-
trict court properly determined that Chandler did not show that his
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 19
supervisors were on notice as to his disabilities or discriminating
against him on that account.
Nor did Chandler establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination regarding his demotion because, as the district court
reasoned, the demotion was neither an adverse outcome nor mo-
tivated by discriminatory animus. Chandler stated that he in-
formed Major Clark of his depression and PTSD prior to his demo-
tion when he requested a predetermination hearing, arguing that
Clark was aware that he considered himself disabled and expected
certain rights during the disciplinary process as a result of this sta-
tus. Even assuming arguendo that Chandler’s statements were suf-
ficiently specific to put Clark on notice as to Chandler’s disabilities,
Clark’s recommendation of a demotion was more lenient to Chan-
dler than the initial notice of proposed discipline, which announced
the intent to dismiss him, and therefore suggests that Clark treated
Chandler more favorably in recognition of his depression and
PTSD. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68. Furthermore, Ad-
kinson proffered two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
Chandler’s demotion—first, the insubordination stemming from
the September 21, 2018, dispute with Chief Newsome in which
Chandler lost his temper and used profanity; and second, his failure
to report for his overtime shift on August 27, 2018—and Chandler
did not show that either of these reasons was pretextual. See Cleve-
land, 369 F.3d at 1193.
In an effort to show that the allegation of insubordination
was pretextual, Chandler attempted to prove that his supervisors
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
did not typically sanction profanity in the workplace except when
used by disabled employees. He presented evidence that employ-
ees cussed, even to supervisors, routinely without discipline and
stated that Newsome laughed at the time of their confrontation
and did not plan on reporting Chandler until instructed to do so
weeks later by McMillian and Beaty, which Chandler argues sug-
gests that Chandler’s supervisors were searching for a reason to ter-
minate him after he expressed that he was disabled. See Furcron,
843 F.3d at 1313. He presented Thomas as another employee who
was known to be disabled and was terminated for using profanity
with a supervisor. Chandler submitted statements from Thomas
that Chandler was “set up” to provoke “an outburst to where they
could catch him” and the same thing happened to Thomas as a re-
sult of his disability, which could imply a practice of setting up dis-
abled employees for termination. See Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at
1274. Chandler set forth as a comparator an employee who was
not disabled, Gill, and was not disciplined for telling a supervisor
that a mandatory overtime shift was “bullshit.” But the context of
Gill’s comment was not that of a dispute with his superior, as was
Chandler’s. And he presented Hooper and Earley as two non-dis-
abled employees who were not disciplined, although they engaged
in substantially different conduct and have little relevance. See
Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1226-29, 1231.
Chandler also attempted to show that the second reason for
his demotion—failure to report for his August overtime shift—was
a pretext for discriminatory treatment. He tried to rebut the alle-
gation head on by stating that he did not fail to report for his shift
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 21
but was merely late. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. However, he
did not set forth a similarly-situated comparator who was not disa-
bled, late to a shift, and not disciplined or otherwise provide evi-
dence that discrimination was the true reason for this mark against
him. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220-21, 1226-29, 1231. Moreover, in
the proceedings with Major Clark, he took full ownership of his
failure to show up for the August shift. Furthermore, Chandler
would need to dispute the legitimacy of demoting him for both of-
fenses in order to resist summary judgment, which he failed to do.
See Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163.
Chandler’s failure to create a genuine issue of fact with re-
spect to the legitimacy of the reasons for his demotion is clear from
Chandler’s own admissions to Major Clark during the predetermi-
nation proceeding, over which Major Clark presided. The October
3, 2018, Notice of Proposed Termination proposed to terminate
Chandler for two reasons: the September 21, 2018, incident with
Chief Newsome which the Notice asserted constituted insubordi-
nation, and Chandler’s failure to report for duty on August 27,
2018. In response to the Notice, Chandler admitted to Major Clark
that he had “allowed his temper to get the best of him” in the Sep-
tember 21 incident, and admitted that he knew he was scheduled
for work on August 27, and admitted that his offenses were serious.
Chandler wrote to Major Clark, inter alia, as follows:
This is no excuse for my actions . . . I did not show up
to work as stated in the document and advised Chief
Turner that I knew, as the statement reads. This was
a very bad judgement call on my behalf and one I
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
deeply regret and I will take full responsibility for it. I
did report to work afterwards and was sent home by
Lieutenant Maestre, as he realized I was not able to
carry out my duties that day. He felt that I was not in
a good place mentally to serve the citizens of Walton
County. I like to keep my personal life private and
separate from work, but the evening prior to my shift
I had a very large argument with my wife which went
into the evening hours. Immediately realizing what I
had done by not showing up to work, I took it upon
myself to enroll in the EAP which is provided as a
benefit to employees. I have done this as an effort to
better myself personally and professionally.
Doc. 13-5 at 2.
Thus, the conduct of Chandler is too dissimilar to that of any
of his purported comparators. It is clear that there were legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for Chandler’s demotion; Chandler
failed to show that those reasons were a pretext for discrimination
on the basis of Chandler’s disabilities; there is no genuine issue of
fact in that regard.
Finally, the district court correctly determined that Chan-
dler did not present sufficient evidence to raise an inference of dis-
criminatory intent as to his termination. Chandler admitted that,
after his demotion, he repeatedly refused to return to work in a
demoted role or meet with Vause and McMillian, which Adkinson
cited as a reason for his termination.
Here again, Chandler did not show that this reason was pre-
textual because he conceded that he said he “wasn’t coming, that
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 23
[he] wouldn’t be returning to work, demoted, or what have you”
in conversations with Vause and McMillian after being notified of
his demotion. See Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163. He added that he also told
Vause and McMillian that he “felt like the demotion was wrong”
and stemmed in part from “just having disabilities in general.”
Vause, meanwhile, stated that Chandler announced, “I’m not com-
ing back to work as anything less than what I am.” While these
accounts differ in tone, the record was clear that Chandler told
Vause that he would not return to work after his demotion, which
is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. See
Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1193. Therefore, because Chandler did not
show that the reason proffered for his termination is false, he did
not meet his burden of showing it was pretext for discriminatory
animus. See Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163.
Because Chandler did not raise sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence to infer discriminatory intent in his reassignment, demotion,
or termination, he also did not establish a “convincing mosaic” of
disability discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment.
See Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. He cannot show pretext under the bur-
den-shifting framework as discussed above. See Cleveland, 369 F.3d
at 1193; Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163. Moreover, the demotion is not an
adverse event because it represented a comparatively favorable
outcome and both the demotion and the termination were sup-
ported by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. See Burlington
Northern, 548 U.S. at 68; Higdon, 393 F.3d at 1220; Cleveland, 369
F.3d at 1193; Jenkins, 26 F.4th at 1250. While the department may
have a “hostile” or “Alpha-driven” culture, the evidence on the
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24 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
record did not establish that Chandler was specifically targeted for
differential treatment based on his membership in a protected class.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1193. Accordingly,
Chandler did not show that his reassignment, demotion, or promo-
tion were causally related to his disabilities or motivated by dis-
criminatory animus and we affirm the district court’s order as to
this issue.
III. Chandler’s FCRA Retaliation Claims
The FCRA prohibits employers from discriminating against
any person because that person has opposed any practice which is
an unlawful employment practice under the law. Fla. Stat.
§ 760.10(7). As provided above, the FCRA is interpreted in con-
formity with the ADA. Ring, 4 F.4th at 1155. The ADA’s anti-re-
taliation provision, which corresponds to the FCRA antiretaliation
provision, provides that no person shall discriminate against any
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice
made unlawful by the ADA or because such individual made a
charge under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Stewart, 117 F.3d at
1287.
In evaluating claims of ADA retaliation based on circum-
stantial evidence, courts may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287. To establish a prima
facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff may show that (1) he engaged
in a statutorily protected expression, (2) he suffered a materially ad-
verse action, and (3) there was a causal link between the adverse
action and his protected expression. Id. The protected expression
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 25
may be informal and need not use words like “harassment” or “dis-
crimination” or any legal terminology but must show that the in-
dividual is expressing opposition or resistance to unlawful work-
place discrimination based on membership in a protected class. See
EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, No.
915.004, § (II)(A)(2)(a) (August 25, 2016); see also Furcron, 843 F.3d
at 1311 (noting, in the context of a sex discrimination claim, that
“Title VII’s protections are not limited to individuals who file for-
mal complaints, but extend to those who voice informal com-
plaints as well”). One way to infer that the adverse action is related
to protected expression rather than other factors is to set forth “me
too” evidence that others who engaged in similar expression also
suffered retaliation to show intent to discriminate and retaliate. See
Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator, Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1285-87 (11th Cir.
2008) (admitting “me too” evidence that four African-American
employees who complained of racial discrimination were termi-
nated as probative of the employer’s discriminatory and retaliatory
intent).
To prove a causal connection for a retaliation claim, a plain-
tiff need only demonstrate “that the protected activity and the ad-
verse action were not wholly unrelated.” Shotz v. City of Plantation,
Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1180 n.30 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and
emphasis omitted). This element is to be construed broadly. Pen-
nington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir.
2001). The plaintiff must generally establish that the employer was
actually aware of the protected expression at the time it took the
adverse employment action. Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc., 120
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26 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
F.3d 1192, 1197 (11th Cir. 1997). One way the plaintiff can establish
that the adverse action and protected activity were not “wholly un-
related” is by showing a close temporal proximity between the em-
ployer’s discovery of the protected activity and the adverse ac-
tion. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). We
have stated that temporal proximity must be “very close,” id. (quo-
tation marks omitted), and that a three-to-four-month delay is too
long, Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.
2007), while a one-month gap may satisfy the test, Donnellon v. Frue-
hauf Corp., 794 F.2d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 1986).
Yet, if the alleged retaliatory conduct occurred before the
employee engaged in protected activity, the two events cannot be
causally connected. See Cotton, 434 F.3d at 1233 (explaining that
there was no causal link between the alleged retaliatory conduct
and the plaintiff’s complaint of harassment where the decision to
decrease the plaintiff’s work hours had been made and conveyed
to the plaintiff when she was hired); Drago, 453 F.3d at 1308 (ex-
plaining that there was no causal link because the employer con-
templated demoting the plaintiff months before he complained
that the employer was interfering with his rights under the
FMLA).
Here, again, the district court did not err in concluding that
summary judgment was appropriate as to Chandler’s claim of re-
taliation under the FCRA because it correctly determined that
Chandler did not show that his reassignment, demotion, or termi-
nation were causally related to any protected expression
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22-13698 Opinion of the Court 27
concerning discrimination against himself and Cook. See Stewart,
117 F.3d at 1287.
As to Chandler’s reassignment, he did not show that the de-
cision to slate him for transfer to Station 4 was retaliation for his
disabilities or his reporting of Cook’s discrimination. See Raney, 120
F.3d at 1197. His general conversation with Turner about his men-
tal health in 2018 and prior complaint about “bullying and harass-
ment” targeting an “overweight female” did not convey a good
faith belief that his employers were engaging in an unlawful prac-
tice and, therefore, were not protected expression. See id. In addi-
tion, although Chandler stated that he requested a different assign-
ment and complained expressly that he felt his placement at Station
4 was in retaliation for using his FMLA leave, these statements
were also insufficient to convey a belief that he was being targeted
for illegal discrimination based on his membership in a protected
class of disabled employees, rather than his FMLA leave, and there-
fore was not protected expression under the FCRA. See EEOC En-
forcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues; Furcron, 843
F.3d at 1311.
As to Chandler’s demotion, Chandler argues that he in-
formed Clark that he felt he was the victim of disability discrimina-
tion, a protected expression, and was immediately demoted, sug-
gesting a causal connection between his protected expression and
the demotion. See Shotz, 344 F.3d at 1180 n.3; Pennington, 261 F.3d
at 1266; Higdon, 393 F.3d at 1197. However, the demotion does not
qualify as an adverse employment action in this context because
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28 Opinion of the Court 22-13698
Clark secured the demotion for Chandler as a lesser form of disci-
pline to the dismissal Chandler was initially facing prior to giving
notice to Clark of his depression, ostensibly in sympathy with
Chandler’s struggles. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68. Fur-
thermore, even if the demotion were considered an adverse em-
ployment action, Chandler did not show it was causally related to
his protected expression because, as discussed above, Adkinson’s
reasons for demoting Chandler were legitimate and nondiscrimi-
natory and Chandler did not show that they are pretextual. See su-
pra.
Finally, turning to Chandler’s termination, Chandler argues
that he engaged in protected expression when informing Vause and
McMillian that he considered his demotion to be a form of disabil-
ity discrimination. While termination is an adverse employment
action, he did not show that his termination was related to his pro-
tected expression. See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287. Chandler submit-
ted Halderson and Dickey as “me too” evidence that employees
that complained of discrimination were terminated, but Halderson
and Dickey complained of a different form of discrimination and
worked under a different supervisor, limiting the probative value
of evidence of their termination in inferring intent to discriminate
based on disability on the part of Chandler’s supervisors. See Gold-
smith, 513 F.3d at 1285-87. More significantly, as discussed above,
Adkinson presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for ter-
minating Chandler—his failure to return to work on top of the
original reasons in the Notice of discipline which resulted in his de-
motion—and he has not shown that these reasons were pretextual.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
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