USA v. Israel Calli Duenas

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14027
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ISRAEL CALLI DUENAS,
a.k.a. Israel Kelly,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:94-cr-03093-RV-3
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14027
Before NEWSOM , GRANT, and B LACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Israel Duenas appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
for a sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Duenas asserts the district
court had the authority to modify his life sentence when it was
based on a pre-Apprendi,1 judge-made drug quantity finding. After
review,2 we affirm the district court.
The First Step Act grants a court the discretion to “impose a
reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act
. . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.”
First Step Act § 404(b); see generally Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
Public Law 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (reducing sentencing dis-
parities between crack and powder cocaine). Under the Fair Sen-
tencing Act, a defendant who possesses with intent to distribute
280 grams of cocaine base and has two or more prior convictions
for a felony drug offense must be sentenced to life imprisonment.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2010) (amended 2018).
A district court has no authority to reduce a sentence under
the First Step Act “if the defendant received the lowest statutory
penalty that also would be available to him under the Fair
1 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2 “We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation and whether a dis-
trict court had the authority to modify a term of imprisonment.” United States
v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023).
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22-14027 Opinion of the Court 3
Sentencing Act.” United States v. Clowers, 62 F.4th 1377, 1380 (11th
Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). In determining what a mo-
vant’s statutory penalty would have been under the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act, the district court is bound by previous drug quantity find-
ings, including those made by a judge, that could have been used
to determine the movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentenc-
ing. United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2023).
The district court did not err when it denied Duenas’s mo-
tion. Based on the judge-found quantity of over 280 grams of co-
caine base and his prior convictions, Duenas would be subject to a
mandatory life sentence under the Fair Sentencing Act. 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2010). Because Duenas received the lowest stat-
utory penalty that would be available to him under the Fair Sen-
tencing Act, the First Step Act did not grant the district judge the
authority to reduce his sentence. See Clowers, 62 F.4th at 1380. In
determining whether it had the authority to reduce his sentence,
the district court was bound by the judge-made drug quantity find-
ing. See Jackson, 58 F.4th at 1337-38. While Duenas has preserved
his argument for possible future review, this Court is bound to fol-
low the precedent set forth in Jackson. See United States v. Gillis, 938
F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Under our prior panel precedent
rule, we are bound to follow a prior panel’s holding unless and until
it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by an opin-
ion of the Supreme Court or of this Court sitting en banc.”).
AFFIRMED.
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