USA v. Douglas Villegas

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14322
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DOUGLAS VILLEGAS,
a.k.a. Loko,
a.k.a. Loco,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14322
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00507-LMM-JEM-1
____________________
Before J ILL PRYOR , B RANCH and DUBINA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Douglas Villegas appeals his total sentence of 161
months following his conviction for conspiracy to possess with in-
tent to distribute heroin and at least 50 grams of methampheta-
mine. Villegas argues that the government breached his plea agree-
ment by recommending that his sentence be served consecutively
despite orally promising at the plea hearing that it would take no
position on the issue. Villegas also argues that the district court
erred in imposing a consecutive sentence because it did not con-
sider the mitigating factor of his personal growth during incarcer-
ation. Villegas further argues that his district court counsel ineffec-
tively assisted him, acting more as a prosecutor than as a zealous
advocate. Having read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record,
we affirm Villegas’s sentence.
I.
Villegas’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. An
appeal waiver does not bar a defendant’s claim that the government
breached the plea agreement. United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794
F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015). We ordinarily review de novo
whether the government breached a plea agreement. United States
v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022). However, when a
defendant did not raise an alleged breach of the plea agreement
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22-14322 Opinion of the Court 3
before the district court, we review for plain error. Id. We find
plain error only when (1) an error has occurred, (2) the error was
plain, (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and
(4) the error seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceed-
ings. Id. at 1319. If all factors are established, we may exercise our
discretion to correct the error. Id. at 1319-20.
A defendant’s substantial rights are affected if the error “af-
fected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 1319.
(quotation marks omitted). In challenging a sentence, this requires
the defendant to show that there is a “reasonable probability” that
his sentence would be different. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398
F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005); Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267,
1276 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that the party challenging the error
bears the burden of proof ). “[W]here the effect of an error on the
result in the district court is uncertain or indeterminate—where we
would have to speculate—the appellant has not met his burden.”
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1301.
The record indicates that Villegas fails to meet the burden of
plain error in establishing that the government breached his plea
agreement. We need not determine if the government’s recom-
mendation for a consecutive sentence, even though it was with-
drawn, constituted breach because the third element of plain error
review—that such a breach affected Villegas’s substantial rights—is
not met. See Malone, 51 F.4th at 1319. The district court’s clear
statements on the record strongly indicate that it would have im-
posed a consecutive sentence regardless of the government’s
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14322
opinion on the matter. The district court stated that it wanted to
ensure that Villegas be punished separately for his federal crimes,
and it acknowledged that might not happen with a concurrent sen-
tence. Furthermore, the Sentencing Guidelines, although not
mandatory, provide that a district court impose consecutive sen-
tences when the instant offense was committed during a defend-
ant’s term of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a). Thus, in the
absence of a reasonable probability that his sentence would have
been different, Villegas has failed to demonstrate plain error based
upon the government’s alleged breach of the plea agreement. See
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299; Malone, 51 F.4th at 1319.
II.
We review the imposition of a consecutive sentence for
abuse of discretion, and the resulting sentence must be reasonable.
United States v. Covington, 565 F.3d 1336, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2009).
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we must examine “the to-
tality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the
statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.”
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
A district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to af-
ford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The proper factors for
considering whether a sentence is unreasonable are set out in
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22-14322 Opinion of the Court 5
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and include the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(6).
“The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a
matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”
United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation
marks omitted). The district court may “attach great weight” to
any single factor or combination of factors. United States v. Over-
street, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
Further, when determining the defendant’s sentence, a district
court is “free to consider any information relevant to [the defend-
ant’s] background, character, and conduct.” United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
“[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered
the defendant’s arguments and the factors in [§] 3553(a) is suffi-
cient” to indicate that the district court properly considered the rel-
evant factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir.
2005), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
The record demonstrates that Villegas’s claim fails on the
merits because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-14322
imposing a consecutive sentence on Villegas.1 The district court
stated that it considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including
Villegas’s personal history, deterrence, and incapacitation. The dis-
trict court had the discretion to attach great weight to the need to
punish Villegas for the commission of the instant offense, particu-
larly because of the provision in the Sentencing Guidelines recom-
mending consecutive sentences for such offenses committed dur-
ing incarceration. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743; Overstreet, 713 F.3d at
638; U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a).
We “will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable
only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Woodson, 30 F.4th 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.) (quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,143 S. Ct. 412 (2022). Because
the district court considered all the proper factors and did not con-
sider any improper ones, and in the absence of a clear error of judg-
ment in weighing those factors, the district court did not abuse its
discretion. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
III.
1 Thus, because Villegas’s claim fails on the merits, we need not address
whether the claim is barred by his appeal waiver. See United States v. St. Hubert,
909 F.3d 335, 346 n.7 (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by United States
v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 859, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2025 (2022).
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22-14322 Opinion of the Court 7
The merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
present a mixed question of law and fact that we ordinarily review
de novo. Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir.
2005). For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was defi-
cient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984).
However, our precedent “require[s] the district court to have
the opportunity to examine ineffective-assistance claims before”
we review them. United States v. Padgett, 917 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th
Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we have held that, “except in the rare in-
stance when the record is sufficiently developed, we will not ad-
dress claims for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct ap-
peal.” United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008)
(alteration accepted) (quotation marks omitted). Rather, the
proper venue for a federal defendant presenting an ineffective-assis-
tance claim is a collateral attack presented in a § 2255 proceeding
where necessary evidence on the performance and prejudice
prongs of Strickland can be presented. Id.
We conclude that the record is not sufficiently developed for
us to adjudicate Villegas’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See id. Any such claim Villegas wishes to raise would best be raised
in a § 2255 motion, where he would have the opportunity to
properly request an evidentiary hearing on his claim. See id. Thus,
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-14322
we decline to consider Villegas’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
firm Villegas’s sentence of 161 months’ imprisonment.
AFFIRMED.
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