USA v. Nathan Cooper

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10224
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NATHAN COOPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20286-BB-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10224
Before J ORDAN , NEWSOM, and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nathan Cooper appeals his conviction for one count of pos-
session of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. Cooper
argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress because there was not reasonable suspicion that he com-
mitted a crime or that he was armed and dangerous. Cooper ar-
gues that because Officer Ramirez did not have reasonable suspi-
cion, the Officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights when she
stopped and frisked him. Cooper argues that because his rights
were violated, the firearm found should be suppressed.
We review the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress
under a mixed standard, assessing the lower court’s factual findings
for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo.
United States v. Vargas, 848 F.3d 971, 973 (11th Cir. 2017). When
considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, “all facts are con-
strued in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.”
United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). A fac-
tual finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing all the evidence,
we have a definite and firm conviction that the district court made
a mistake. United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir.
2010). We accept the district court’s credibility determination “un-
less it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or im-
probable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.”
United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
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23-10224 Opinion of the Court 3
marks omitted). Questions of probable cause and reasonable sus-
picion are reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
699 (1996).
Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right
“to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A court must examine the total-
ity of the circumstances to determine reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303
(11th Cir. 2012).
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence seized
during, or as a result of, an unlawful search. Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988). “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some cir-
cumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
Officers “may briefly detain a person as part of an investiga-
tory stop if they have a reasonable articulable suspicion based on
objective facts that the person has engaged in criminal activity.”
United States v. Bruce, 977 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing,
inter alia, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Although a mere hunch
that criminal activity is afoot is not enough to establish reasonable
suspicion, the standard is a less demanding one than probable
cause, and requires a showing less than preponderance of the evi-
dence. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
The Supreme Court has held that an officer may frisk a le-
gally stopped individual for weapons if he reasonably believes that
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10224
his or others’ safety is threatened. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. This belief
must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the individual is
armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 332 (2009).
Definitive evidence of a weapon or an absolute certainty that the
individual is armed is not required. United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d
1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2019). Instead, we evaluate the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether such suspicion was reasona-
ble. United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 998 (11th Cir. 2019) (en
banc). Circumstances considered include “the time of day, the lo-
cation of the scene, the lighting at the scene, the number of offic-
ers, and the nature of the alleged crime.” Id. A person’s nervous,
argumentative, or evasive behavior are relevant factors to be con-
sidered. Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1248-49. The reasonable suspicion in-
quiry “allows officers to draw on their own experience and special-
ized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cu-
mulative information available to them that might well elude an
untrained person.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
(quotation marks omitted).
Here, the court did not err when it denied Cooper’s motion
to suppress because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
and frisk Cooper. First, the court properly found that Officer
Ramirez, based on her training and experience inferred based on
the information presented to her that criminal activity was about
to or did occur. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. As the court properly ex-
plained, there was reasonable suspicion based on the dispatch call
and Jenema Phillips’ statements to Ramirez when Ramirez arrived
on scene. The dispatch call informed Ramirez that Phillips (the
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23-10224 Opinion of the Court 5
manager of the restaurant) had called 911 and said that her em-
ployee, Cooper, had threatened her, that she thought he had a gun,
and that she would be waiting for the officer outside the restaurant.
Ramirez arrived and talked to Phillips outside the restaurant. Phil-
lips explained the dispute with Cooper, that he was aggressive and
was slinging a metal poker around, and that he grabbed the book-
bag in which she thought he carried a gun. Based on this infor-
mation, the court did not err in its finding that there was reasonable
suspicion that Cooper had engaged in or was about to engage in
criminal activity. Taken as a whole, in light of the officers’ experi-
ence and knowledge, these circumstances were enough to create
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Bruce, 977
F.3d at 1116.
Second, the court properly found that Ramirez had reason-
able suspicion to stop and frisk Cooper as she had reasonable
grounds to believe that Cooper was armed and dangerous. Terry,
392 U.S. at 27-29. As the court properly found, Ramirez was in-
formed by the dispatch call and by Phillips when Ramirez arrived
on scene that Cooper and Phillips had a dispute which resulted in
Cooper cursing, behaving aggressively, and slinging a metal poker
around. Ramirez was also informed by Phillips, whom the court
found was reliable, that Cooper would carry a gun in his bookbag
and that he told her that he had previously sold a gun to another
employee. Phillips also conveyed to Ramirez that during the dis-
pute Cooper grabbed his bookbag in which she believed he kept a
gun. Ramirez had been informed by the dispatch call that Phillips
had reported that Cooper had threatened her, that he had a gun,
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10224
and that she would be waiting for the officers outside the restau-
rant. We agree with the district court that Ramirez’s own conver-
sation with Phillips outside the restaurant when Ramirez arrived
on the scene did not disabuse the Officer of her reasonable belief
that Phillips felt threatened and concerned for her safety and that
of her employees.1 Additionally, Ramirez testified that this call oc-
curred at night in a high crime area. Johnson, 921 F.3d at 998. Based
on the information presented to Ramirez and on her training and
experience, the court properly found that she had reasonable sus-
picion that Cooper was armed and dangerous.
Additionally, the court found that Phillips was reliable be-
cause of her relationship with Cooper and her actions on the day
of the incident. This finding is not inconsistent or improbable on
1 In his brief on appeal, Cooper asserts in conclusory fashion that when Phillips
spoke to Ramirez at the scene, she specifically denied that Cooper had threat-
ened her. Cooper argues that the Officer should have realized that the threat
mentioned in the dispatch call was in error and therefore that there was not a
reasonable suspicion that Cooper was armed and dangerous. On the basis of
our careful review of the colloquy between Ramirez and Phillips at the scene
(as recorded on the body cam video), we reject Cooper’s assertion and argu-
ment. Although Phillips did acknowledge that Cooper never threatened her
“directly,” in the same breath she clearly implied that she felt threatened when
he grabbed his bookbag in which she thought he carried a gun. And the to-
tality of the colloquy conveyed to Ramirez that Phillips felt threatened by
Cooper’s aggressive actions and her knowledge that he kept a gun in his book-
bag, and that Phillips was concerned for her safety. The fact that Phillips, the
manager of the restaurant, waited outside the restaurant for the officers and
did not reenter with them when they went to confront Cooper was also con-
firmation for Ramirez that Phillips was concerned for her safety.
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23-10224 Opinion of the Court 7
its face and is supported in the record. Holt, 777 F.3d at 1255. Based
on Phillips’s conversation with Ramirez when she arrived on scene
as well as her 911 call, there is evidence that a reasonable factfinder
could accept that demonstrates that Phillips was credible. Id.
Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
court did not err when it found that Ramirez had reasonable suspi-
cion that Cooper was armed and dangerous, and thus, properly
stopped and frisked him to search for weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at
27-29. As the court properly noted, it did not matter that Ramirez
was not absolutely certain that Cooper had a weapon but only that
she had reasonable suspicion. Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1250. Therefore,
it did not matter that neither Phillips nor Ramirez saw Cooper with
a gun on the day of the incident.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when
it denied Cooper’s motion to suppress.2
AFFIRMED.
2 We reject Cooper’s argument that Terry frisks are unconstitutional because
they are contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning. We are
bound by the Supreme Court’s decisions until they overrule them. United
States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001)( “[I]t is the Supreme Court’s preroga-
tive alone to overrule one of its precedents.”).
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