William Martin, et al v. Mauricio Duran, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10841
____________________
WILLIAM MARTIN,
MICHAEL MARTIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
MIAMI DADE COUNTY,
a Florida County and Political Subdivision
of the State of Florida,
Defendant,
MAURICIO DURAN,
Miami-Dade County Police Officer
in his individual and official capacity,
BRIDGET DOYLE,
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Miami-Dade County Police Officer
in her individual and official capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22107-PAS
____________________
Before J ORDAN, L AGOA, and H ULL , Circuit Judges.
H ULL , Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellees Michael and William Martin (the
“Martins”) filed an amended complaint alleging claims of false
arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution against
Defendants-Appellants Officers Mauricio Duran and Bridget Doyle
(the “Officers”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Officers moved to
dismiss based on qualified immunity, which the district court
denied. This is the Officers’ appeal.
After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we
(1) affirm the denial of qualified immunity as to the Martins’ false
arrest and excessive force claims; (2) reverse the denial of qualified
immunity as to the Martins’ malicious prosecution claims; and
(3) remand for further proceedings.
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I. AMENDED COMPLAINT
At this motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept the facts alleged
in the amended complaint as true and construe them in the light
most favorable to the Martins. See Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89
F.4th 852, 856 (11th Cir. 2023). The amended complaint also refers
to Officer Doyle’s body camera video of the incident. As to the
video, we construe ambiguities in favor of the Martins but accept
the video’s depiction to the extent it “is clear and obviously
contradicts the [Martins’] alleged facts.”1 See Baker v. City of
Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2023); see also Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (stating a court should view the
facts in the light depicted by the video where it “utterly discredit[s]”
a party’s version of events). Applying those standards, we recount
the facts in the light most favorable to the Martins.
A. Facts
Plaintiffs Michael and William Martin are brothers. Just
before 3:00 a.m. on January 10, 2018, the Martins were walking
from a gym through a parking lot headed to their car in a separate
parking lot. The incident took place in the first parking lot, which
we refer to as “the parking lot.”
The Martins were dressed in gym attire—hoodies and
basketball shorts—and carried backpacks, and Michael carried a
water bottle. In the parking lot, Officer Duran approached the
1 The parties agree this video was incorporated by reference into the amended
complaint.
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Martins as they were walking through the lot to their car. Shortly
thereafter, Officer Doyle arrived and activated her body camera
video (the “video”), which had audio too.
The video begins with Officer Doyle walking through an
alley and arriving in the parking lot where Officer Duran and the
Martins are. The video shows (1) no cars in the parking lot, save
Officer Duran’s police car with its emergency lights activated,
(2) the Martins are attempting to walk across the lot toward their
car and are engaged in no other activity, and (3) Officer Duran is
walking closely behind the Martins.2 The arrests occur in the next
38 seconds of the video.
The first 27 seconds of that 38 seconds of the video show
Officer Duran grabbing William’s arm twice and then taking
Michael down to the ground. Specifically, as the Martins walk,
Officer Duran grabs William’s arm, preventing him from walking
and crossing the lot. Michael then tells Officer Duran to “get your
hands off of him,” “this is assault,” and “do not touch him.”
William pulls away from Officer Duran’s grasp, and the Martins
continue walking toward their car.
Officer Duran then states that the Martins are “in the wrong
place.” Michael states, “What have I done besides walk to my car?”
Officer Duran asks, “Do you have a car here? Where’s your car at?”
2 At the time Officer Doyle arrives, there is some audio noise but she is not
close enough at first to the location of Officer Duran and the Martins for the
audio to clearly capture what was said at her arrival.
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Michael responds, “That’s my business,” and William responds,
“I’m walking to it.” Officer Doyle replies to Michael, “It’s not [your
business]; it’s ours.”
Officer Duran then grabs William’s arm a second time and
says, “I’m telling you to stop.” At this point, the body camera video
becomes obscured by Officer Duran, but Michael can be heard
saying, “Yo, if you touch him again, that’s assault.” After this
statement, Officer Duran performs a take-down maneuver on
Michael, sweeping out his legs and slamming him into the ground.
Before the takedown, Officer Duran had not said or even hinted
that Michael was under arrest.
The next 15 seconds of the video show the tasing of
William. As Officer Duran pins Michael to the ground, William
approaches and says, “Get off my brother,” “you’re assaulting
him,” and “he didn’t do anything wrong and you know it.” From
the ground, Officer Duran instructs Officer Doyle to tase William,
which she does.
As Officer Duran continues to pin Michael to the ground,
both brothers state that their car is nearby and they have the keys.
Officer Doyle says to Michael, “We asked you to stop walking and
did you fucking stop? No.” Michael responds, “We don’t have to
stop.”
Eventually, additional police officers respond and the
brothers are charged with loitering or prowling, battery on a law
enforcement officer, and resisting an officer with violence. At their
criminal trial, the jury acquitted the Martins.
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B. Police Report
After the Martins’ arrests, the Officers prepared a police
report about the incident. The Martins’ amended complaint
quotes several statements the Officers wrote in the police report.
That police report, as quoted in the amended complaint, states
Officer Duran (1) watched the Martins to “see their intent” “due to
the time of night,” (2) approached the Martins because he
“observed both black males walking slowly looking into the parked
county vehicle and officers’ personal cars inside the station parking
lot,” and (3) “due to their unorthodox behavior and the time of
night, [] requested additional units to assist in stopping both males
to question their intentions in the area.”
The Officers argue we must accept the statements in the
police report as true and that they established reasonable suspicion
for Officer Duran to stop the Martins by grabbing William’s arm
twice and then taking down Michael. We disagree. The amended
complaint did quote the police report’s statements but also alleged
that the police report was “materially false” and was contradicted
by Officer Doyle’s body camera video. Moreover, before Officer
Duran’s grabbing of William’s arm twice, the video shows no
conduct by the Martins other than their walking through the
parking lot and both saying they were walking to their car. The
amended complaint also alleged, and the video confirms, that
Officer Duran approached the Martins in an empty parking lot
devoid of cars. The video shows only Officer Duran’s police car.
And the amended complaint also contained statements that
contradict those in the police report, including that the Martins
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were walking casually through the parking lot without cars and
“were not engaged in any apparent criminal activity, as they were
walking to their vehicle.”
Given the amended complaint alleges the police report is
materially false and the video and amended complaint taken
together contradict the police report, we cannot consider the police
report as true for the purposes of this appeal of the motion to
dismiss. See Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014)
(stating, where a civil rights plaintiff alleges the contents of a police
report are false, “the contents of the report cannot be considered
as true for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss”).
Therefore, under the amended complaint’s allegations and
the video in the light most favorable to the Martins, Officer Duran
encountered the Martins, two Black males, at 3:00 a.m. while they
were walking from a gym across the parking lot to their car and
engaging in no other conduct. Officer Duran followed them and
forcibly grabbed William’s arm twice while William was walking.
Michael verbally objected twice when Officer Duran grabbed
William’s arm. Officer Duran then slammed Michael into the
ground. William then verbally objected and was tased by Officer
Doyle. With this version of events, we turn to qualified immunity.3
See Ounjian, 89 F.4th at 856; Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277-78.
3 The Officers’ brief relies heavily on the police report’s statement that Officer
Duran observed “both black males walking slowly looking into the parked
County vehicle and officer[s’] personal cars inside the station parking lot.” As
outlined above, the Martins’ amended complaint contradicts that statement,
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II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
legal questions.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 243 (2014) (quotation
marks omitted). If an official was acting within his discretionary
authority, the plaintiff must establish that the official is not entitled
to qualified immunity by showing the official’s conduct (1) violated
a constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of
the official’s conduct. Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 904 (11th
Cir. 2011). For a constitutional right to be clearly established,
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.”
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quotation marks
omitted).
It is undisputed that the Officers were acting within their
discretionary authority. So we evaluate whether the Martins have
shown the Officers’ conduct violated clearly established
constitutional rights.4
and the video, which starts at Officer Doyle’s arrival, does not show any cars
other than Officer Duran’s in the parking lot where the Martins and Officer
Duran are standing. So that disputed fact is a key issue in the case and for the
jury to determine.
4 We review de novo the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at the
motion-to-dismiss stage. Est. of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 939 (11th
Cir. 2018).
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III. FALSE ARREST
“Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to
be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Skop v. City of
Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). To conduct a brief
investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an
officer must have “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir.
2000) (quotation marks omitted). The question “is not whether
reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but whether the officer had
‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop.”
Id. at 1166.
In addition, “an arrest is a seizure of the person.” Skop, 485
F.3d at 1137. “Probable cause to arrest exists when law
enforcement officials have facts and circumstances within their
knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect
had committed or was committing a crime.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). In the qualified immunity context, an officer need not
have actual probable cause; arguable probable cause will suffice. Id.
At the time of the Officers’ conduct in 2018, it was clearly
established that a stop made without arguable reasonable suspicion
and an arrest made without arguable probable cause violate the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1143; Sauls, 206 F.3d at 1166. Under
the Martins’ version of events, the Officers lacked both arguable
reasonable suspicion to stop and arguable probable cause to arrest
the Martins. In 2018, any reasonable police officer would know
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that he or she could not stop and arrest the Martins for merely
walking through a parking lot at night.
That Michael verbally objected to Officer Duran’s grabbing
William’s arm twice, and that the two Martin brothers walked
away from Officer Duran, also do not show arguable reasonable
suspicion to stop or arguable probable cause to arrest. The
freedom of individuals to verbally object to police action without
thereby risking arrest was well established and well known in 2018.
See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1139. “[W]hen an officer, without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the
individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.
And any refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the
minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or
seizure.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). While police officers enjoy the liberty
to address questions to other persons in public spaces, the person
addressed ordinarily “has an equal right to ignore his interrogator
and walk away.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980)
(quotation marks omitted).
The Officers also argue they obtained probable cause for the
arrest due to the Martins’ resistance conduct after Officer Duran
swept out Michael’s legs and threw him to the ground. But the
Martins’ post-arrest conduct cannot supply the probable cause
necessary to initiate the arrest. See Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th
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1326, 1333 n.3 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Probable cause is measured at the
time of the arrest, not at some time before or after.”).5
The Officers further argue they had “at least arguable
probable cause to arrest Michael for assault” because a “reasonable
officer could have interpreted Michael saying ‘Yo, if you touch him
again—’ as a threat.” What Michael actually said—plain as day on
Officer Doyle’s body camera video—was “Yo, if you touch him
again, that’s assault.” Despite our typical deference to police
officers’ discretion in fast-paced situations, see Gates v. Khokhar, 884
F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018), we must, of course, credit the
5 The Officers suggest Officer Duran had reasonable suspicion to stop the
Martins merely because they were walking at night, in dark-colored clothing,
through the parking lot of a closed establishment. The Officers’ cited Eleventh
Circuit cases, however, involved additional factors not present here. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting
Hernandez was found speeding in her car at night in severe weather, gave an
implausible excuse for speeding, told conflicting accounts of her trip’s length
and purpose, did not know the trip’s destination, was traveling between two
main source cities for narcotics, and exhibited abnormal nervousness); United
States v. Hardy, 806 F. App’x 718, 721-22 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting Hardy wore
all black clothing at night, was found in a high-crime area near where a 911
call about a “prowler” had just been made, and gave the officer an “unlikely”
story for his presence in the area); United States v. Ligon, 2022 WL 2091598, at
*2-3 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting Ligon was found in black clothing, walking in a
roadway at night in a high-crime area near where a murder had recently
occurred, and matched a description of the murder suspect); United States v.
Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting Briggman was in a parked
car at 4:00 a.m. in a high-crime area where the nearby commercial
establishments were closed, wore “suspicious clothing,” and attempted to
evade police prior to the stop).
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Martins’ version of the statement, which is supported by the
footage, not the Officers’. No reasonable officer could construe “if
you touch him again, that’s assault,” as a threat to do bodily harm
to the Officers. Thus, this statement cannot provide arguable
probable cause to arrest Michael for assault. See Fla. Stat.
§ 784.011(1) (“An ‘assault’ is an intentional, unlawful threat by word
or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an
apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a
well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is
imminent.”).
As to William, the Officers argue they had arguable probable
cause to arrest him for battery because (1) after the takedown,
William moved toward Officer Duran and said, “Get off my
brother,” and (2) when Officer Doyle reached out to grab William,
William turned around and pushed her. But this push is not alleged
in the complaint, and it is not visible on the body camera video.
Given the amended complaint and the body camera video
together, the Officers did not have arguable probable cause to arrest
William for battery. See Fla Stat § 784.03(1)(a) (stating battery
occurs when one “[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes
another person against the will of the other”).
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity on
the Martins’ false arrest claims.
IV. EXCESSIVE FORCE
The Martins alleged two alternative theories for their
excessive force claims: (1) the Officers’ use of force was excessive
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because they lacked arguable probable suspicion/cause to detain or
arrest them, so any force at all was excessive; and
(2) “[a]lternatively,” even if the Officers’ detention and arrest of the
Martins was lawful, the force used in effectuating the arrest
remains excessive.6
A. Artificial Claim
The Martins’ first theory is an “artificial” excessive force
claim—a claim that any force used was excessive because the stop
and arrest were unlawful. See Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180
(11th Cir. 2022). It is true that “if a stop or arrest is illegal, then
there is no basis for any threat or any use of force[.]” Sauls, 206 F.3d
at 1171 (emphasis added). However, an “artificial” excessive force
claim is not a discrete claim and is subsumed within a false arrest
claim. Id.
While the Martins’ “artificial” excessive force claims fail to
state independent excessive force claims, they remain relevant to
any subsequent determination of damages on their false arrest
claims, as they may recover “damages suffered because of the use
of force in effecting the arrest.” See Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155,
6 It is well-settled that plaintiffs may assert alternative and contradictory
theories of liability. Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1175 (11th
Cir. 2014); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). At oral argument, the Officers suggested
that the Martins failed to plead alternative theories for their excessive force
claims. We disagree because the Martins’ pleading was sufficient to satisfy
Rule 8(d)(2).
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158 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055, 1060 (11th
Cir. 1987) (“It is obvious that if the jury finds the arrest
unconstitutional, the use of force and the search were
unconstitutional and they become elements of damages for the
§ 1983 violation.”).
B. Genuine Claim
The Martins’ second theory is a “genuine” excessive force
claim because it “relates to the manner in which an arrest was
carried out, independent of whether law enforcement had the
power to arrest.” See Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180 (quotation marks
omitted). When a false arrest claim and a “genuine” excessive force
claim stem from the same incident, the two claims “must be
analyzed independently.” Id. at 1181 (quotation marks omitted).
Taking the amended complaint’s allegations and the video
in the light most favorable to the Martins, we cannot say that the
Martins fail to state plausible “genuine” excessive force claims. The
Officers’ uses of force—slamming Michael into the ground and
tasing William—were not “reasonably proportionate to the need
for that force” given the totality of the circumstances facing the
Officers prior to that force. See Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1251
(11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). While the audio does
capture some verbal objection to Officer Duran’s conduct, there is
no clear or obvious physical aggression or resistance shown by
either Martin brother prior to the Officers’ use of force. At most,
the video becomes obscured and unclear at that point, and we must
construe any ambiguities in the Martins’ favor.
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Further, it was clearly established at the time of the Officers’
conduct that a gratuitous use of force is excessive when a suspect
is not resisting arrest. See Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1267 (characterizing
as gratuitous force an officer slamming a non-resisting suspect’s
head into the ground); see also Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272,
1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating it is clearly established that using a
taser “is excessive where the suspect is non-violent and has not
resisted arrest”).
Thus, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity on the
Martins’ “genuine” excessive force claims.
V. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
We first distinguish between false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims and the distinct seizures required for each
claim. Under the Fourth Amendment, a claim of false arrest
concerns a seizure without legal process, such as the warrantless
arrests here. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007) (stating
false arrest claims cover seizures without legal process); Williams v.
Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A claim of false arrest
or imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment concerns seizures
without legal process, such as warrantless arrests.”); Sylvester v.
Fulton Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024) (stating “[a]
‘false arrest’ claim challenges as constitutionally deficient an
officer’s on-the-spot determination of probable cause” without
legal process).
In contrast, a claim of malicious prosecution requires a
seizure pursuant to legal process. See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. ----,
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139 S. Ct. 2149, 2157 (2019) (“Looking first to the common law, . . .
malicious prosecution permits damages for confinement imposed
pursuant to legal process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Nieves v.
Bartlett, 587 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019) (“At common law,
false imprisonment arose from a detention without legal process,
whereas malicious prosecution was marked by wrongful institution
of legal process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Luke v. Gulley, 975
F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating malicious prosecution “is
shorthand for a claim of deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal
process” (quotation marks omitted)); Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158
(“Malicious prosecution . . . requires a seizure pursuant to legal
process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Kingsland v. City of Miami,
382 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating a malicious prosecution
claim must be based on an unlawful seizure “in relation to the
prosecution”), abrogated on other grounds by Williams, 965 F.3d at
1159. Seizures pursuant to legal process may include a
warrant-based arrest and arrests following arraignment,
indictment, or a probable cause hearing. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158;
see, e.g., Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1330 (“A ‘malicious prosecution’ claim
is that an officer used a constitutionally deficient legal process to
effectuate an arrest—here, an allegedly defective warrant.”).
Here, the Martins presented no allegation of an unlawful
seizure pursuant to legal process, nor are there facts from which
we can draw a reasonable inference of such a seizure. While the
Martins argue their warrantless arrests may support their malicious
prosecution claims, the precedent above shows otherwise. Simply
put, the Martins’ warrantless arrests were not seizures pursuant to
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legal process and cannot support their malicious prosecution
claims. See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158. And the Martins failed to
allege any subsequent unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process.
We recognize that the Martins argue, and the district court
concluded, that this Court’s Kingsland decision was abrogated by
the Supreme Court in Nieves and this Court in Williams. Nieves and
Williams, however, did not abrogate Kingsland’s holding about the
legal process requirement; if anything, they confirmed it, as
outlined above. Indeed, Williams expressly recognized that a
warrantless arrest constitutes a seizure without legal process and
will not support a malicious prosecution claim. Williams, 965 F.3d
at 1158.
Williams also carefully explained how Nieves undermined
Kingsland only to the extent Kingsland turned to modern Florida tort
law to determine the common law elements of malicious
prosecution. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1234 (stating that, in addition
to an unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process, a plaintiff alleging
malicious prosecution must establish the common law elements of
malicious prosecution, and turning to modern Florida tort law for
those common law elements); Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159
(addressing Kingsland and stating that Nieves “clarified that the
relevant common-law principles are those that were ‘well settled at
the time of [section 1983’s] enactment,’” not those developed by
modern state tort law (quoting Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726)).
For completeness, we note that the district court also relied
on three other decisions to conclude that the Martins’ warrantless
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arrests could support their malicious prosecution claims: Grider v.
City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d
872 (11th Cir. 2003); and Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959 (11th Cir.
2018). But tellingly, Grider and Wood both concerned malicious
prosecution claims stemming from warrant-based arrests—i.e.,
seizures pursuant to legal process. See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1249;
Wood, 323 F.3d at 876; Williams, 965 F.3d at 1164 (noting Wood
“considered only [a] seizure[] pursuant to a warrant”). They
cannot be read as holding that warrantless arrests, i.e. seizures
without legal process, can support a malicious prosecution claim.
See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158.
Additionally, although Manners analyzed a malicious
prosecution claim stemming from a warrantless arrest, this Court
ultimately concluded that the claim failed because the officer had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Manners, 891 F.3d at 969, 975.
In any event, the precedent in Wallace, McDonough, Nieves, and
Kingsland control, not Manners. See also Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159
(explaining how Manners relied on “the erroneous premise that a
seizure without legal process . . . could sustain a claim of malicious
prosecution”).
We conclude that the district court erred in denying the
Officers qualified immunity on the Martins’ malicious prosecution
claims because their warrantless arrests were on-the-spot seizures
and without legal process.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we (1) affirm the denial of qualified
immunity as to the Martins’ false arrest and excessive force claims,
(2) reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to the Martins’
malicious prosecution claims, and (3) remand for further
proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
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