USA v. Erotida Natasha Harden Ortiz

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11028
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EROTIDA NATASHA HARDEN ORTIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00057-RBD-DCI-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
Before J ORDAN, L UCK , and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Erotida Ortiz appeals her convictions and total sentence of
96 months’ imprisonment for one count of conspiracy to defraud
the United States and six counts of aiding in the preparation and
presentation of a false tax return. First, Ortiz argues that the gov-
ernment presented insufficient evidence for each count to establish
that she willfully agreed to submit and submitted false tax returns
that entitled her customers to higher refunds. Second, Ortiz argues
that the district court erred in allowing testimony about her alleged
Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan fraud under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. Third, Ortiz argues that the district court
erred in failing to instruct the jury on the good faith defense. And
lastly Ortiz argues that her below Guidelines sentence is substan-
tively unreasonable because her codefendant, Aida Cortes, re-
ceived a lesser sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
A federal grand jury charged Ortiz with one count of con-
spiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
(Count One), and six counts of aiding in the preparation and
presentation of a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)
(Counts Two to Seven). The indictment lists Cortes as a cocon-
spirator. The indictment alleged that Ortiz owned a tax prepara-
tion business, Certified Taxes, which Cortes managed. As to
Counts Two to Seven, it listed the specific tax returns that were
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 3
filed for the following individuals for tax years 2016 and 2017: C.Q.
as to Count 2; A.M. as to Count 3; M.M. as to Count 4; J.M. as to
Count 5; A.P. as to Count 6; and J.D. as to Count 7.
Ortiz moved to exclude, in relevant part, any mention at
trial to her uncharged, alleged PPP loan fraud, arguing that she had
a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. She contended
that the probative value of the evidence was substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury because the evidence was only indicative of
propensity, as PPP loans were not relevant or similar to the instant
offense conduct. The government responded by arguing that the
evidence was admissible, if Ortiz testified, for impeachment on
cross-examination and under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2).
The case proceeded to trial. During trial, the government
called several Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agents, who testi-
fied to the following. To submit taxes returns to the IRS, a com-
pany must have an electronic filer identification number (“EFIN”)
and a preparer tax identification number (“PTIN”). To obtain an
EFIN, the person must pass a suitability check, which includes a
criminal background check. Cortes obtained an EFIN, which Cer-
tified Taxes used to submit tax returns. The Schedule C form on a
tax return listed profits or losses from a business. If someone did
not have a business, they could not put any expenses on a Schedule
C form. Instead, they would deduct work-related expenses on a
Schedule A. Earned income tax credit was a credit that increased
as someone’s income increased, leveled off, and then decreased as
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
their income increased. A negative income on a Schedule C form
offset wages earned on a W-2 for purposes of calculating the earned
income tax credit.
Ricky Poole, a retired IRS agent who previously investigated
Certified Taxes, testified to the following. During his investigation,
he interviewed Ortiz, who said that she personally reviewed all of
the tax returns the company filed. Although Certified Taxes pre-
pared around 700 Schedule C forms, Ortiz told him that the com-
pany had prepared only twenty Schedule C forms. She told him
that she required documentation for any Schedule C expenses and
would investigate any claims of no income. According to another
IRS agent, throughout the scheme, Ortiz made approximately $1.1
million from processing returns.
The government also called Chris Nisbeth, who testified to
the following. Nisbeth worked for Drake Software, which offered
tax preparation software to tax professionals. Certified Taxes used
Drake Software with Ortiz and Cortes listed as contact individuals.
The preparer was responsible for inputting the data into the system
for each document and, to use the software properly, needed to
understand how to prepare taxes. A Schedule C form did not gen-
erate automatically, but rather, a preparer had to navigate to that
page of the software.
The government called several past customers of Certified
Taxes: Joseph Mojica, Carmen Quinones, Angela Williams, Anto-
nio Rivera, Alberto Medina, Maribel Medina, Alfred Pennant,
Jamark Salazar, and Jose Dominguez. These past customers
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 5
testified that, while their taxes indicated that they had a business
for which they incurred expenses but made no income, they never
told anyone at Certified Taxes any of those things and never pro-
vided documentation to that effect. On cross-examination, the cus-
tomers testified that they were charged a flat fee regardless of the
size of the return and did not receive any kickbacks.
The government then called two former employees of Cer-
tified Taxes, who testified to the following. They did not have any
prior experience filing taxes. For training, Ortiz and Cortes pro-
vided a packet about taxes, including information on tax returns
involving businesses. No one at Certified Taxes told them to make
up numbers to put on a tax form. They received a commission
based on how many returns they completed. One employee testi-
fied that Ortiz and Cortes reviewed every tax return she prepared.
The other employee testified that she did not fill out any Schedule
C forms without documentation. That same employee indicated
that, in December 2018, the employees at Certified Taxes found
out they were preparing taxes incorrectly after going to an IRS sem-
inar.
After the government rested, Ortiz moved for judgment of
acquittal on all counts. The district court denied her motion.
Then, Ortiz called Darryll Jones, an expert in taxation, who
testified to the following. There was no minimum level of educa-
tion needed to get a PTIN number. The expenses listed on a Sched-
ule C form were not automatically disqualified if a business name
was not listed. On cross-examination, Jones testified that the tax
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
preparer must have some substantiation of the expenses entered
on the Schedule C form. He testified that a person could get an
earned income tax credit for more than what they had withheld in
their taxes. And he testified that one way to get the maximum
earned income tax credit was to list deductions on a Schedule C
form.
Ortiz herself then testified to the following in her defense.
She primarily worked on marketing the company and did not re-
view most of the taxes it filed. Cortes and Michael Harden were
responsible for checking the returns before filing. Ortiz and Cortes
trained their employees with a study guide. She did not tell anyone
to make up numbers. She was previously convicted of three felo-
nies: dealing in stolen property, false verification to a pawn broker,
and food stamp fraud. She paid her employees a commission based
on the amount of tax returns they filed. As the administrator, she
was the default user in the Drake Software program. In 2018, she
attended an IRS seminar where she learned that Certified Taxes has
been incorrectly using Schedule C forms, as they had listed regular
W-2 expenses on the Schedule C form. Soon after that seminar,
she informed everyone at the office the correct way to complete
Schedule C forms. She did not prepare or assist in any of the tax
returns listed in the indictment. If her name was on a tax return, it
was because the person had logged into the system “under admin.”
She charged customers a flat fee and did not ask for kickbacks.
On cross-examination, Ortiz testified that, before opening
Certified Taxes, she worked for two other tax companies that the
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 7
IRS shut down. She denied the government’s assertion that all of
her customers except one received a refund, although when con-
fronted with evidence she stated that she was unsure. She denied
the government’s assertion that customers receiving a big refund
benefited her because it would incentivize customers to come
back.
The government asked whether she had received and ap-
plied for a PPP loan, to which she objected. Ortiz argued that, be-
cause she was being investigated for PPP loan fraud, she had a Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court explained
that her credibility was at issue because she had elected to testify.
After a recess, the court explained that, according to its research,
Ortiz waived her right to raise a Fifth Amendment privilege by tak-
ing the stand. Ortiz argued that the Rule 403 balancing test
weighed in her favor based on her constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The court explained that the alleged PPP loan was
relevant because it bore on the plausibility of her explanation that
the improper tax returns were the result of a mistake. Ortiz asked
whether the court found that the probative value of the alleged
PPP loan was not substantially outweighed by her right against self-
incrimination, to which it replied that it did. Ortiz asked for, and
the court granted, a standing objection.
Ortiz retook the stand for cross-examination. She testified
that she received a PPP loan in 2021. She testified that someone
else prepared her application for that PPP loan, in which they indi-
cated that she had another business that she did not have. She
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
testified that she received $20,000 from that PPP loan. On redirect
examination, she testified that, for the PPP loan, she found some-
one online to submit the application and sent that person her tax
return. She testified that she did not give that person the false in-
formation listed on the application about a separate business.
Then, Cortes herself, in her defense, testified to the follow-
ing. When filling out Schedule C forms, she asked customers how
far they drove to work, if they used their cell phone for work, and
if they bought food at work. She would input the information into
the Schedule C form regardless of whether the person had a busi-
ness. After Ortiz attended an IRS forum, she learned that the way
she had completed Schedule C forms was incorrect. Cortes man-
aged the company’s office.
Ortiz then renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal,
which the district court denied.
As to the jury instructions, Ortiz objected to the proposed
instruction on the good faith defense, arguing for the inclusion of
language stating that “evidence that establishes only that a person
made a mistake in judgment or error in management or was care-
less does not establish fraudulent intent.” The district court ex-
plained that Ortiz’s instruction was a modification of the pattern
jury instruction. The government argued against any modification
to the pattern instruction. The district court stated that it would
not modify the pattern instruction and overruled Ortiz’s objection.
In the jury instructions, the district court instructed that
“[e]vidence that a Defendant was previously convicted of a crime
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 9
is not evidence of guilt of the crime in this trial,” but rather could
be used to decide the credibility of the testimony. Further, it in-
structed on the good faith defense, specifically stating that:
Good-Faith is a complete defense to the charges in the
indictment since good-faith on the part of a Defend-
ant is inconsistent with willfulness, and willfulness is
an essential part of the charges. If that Defendant
acted in good faith, sincerely believing herself to be
exempt by the law, then that Defendant did not inten-
tionally violate a known legal duty – that is, that De-
fendant did not act “willfully.” The burden of proof
is not on that Defendant to prove good-faith intent
because that Defendant does not need to prove any-
thing. The government must establish beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that each Defendant acted willfully as
charged.
The jury ultimately found Ortiz guilty on all counts.
The U.S. Probation Office generated Ortiz’s presentence in-
vestigation report (“PSI”). The PSI grouped the counts together
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(J),
her base offense level was 24. Pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2T1.4(b)(1)(B), Ortiz received a two-level increase because she
professionally caused tax returns to be filed at Certified Taxes.
Next, pursuant to § 2T1.4(b)(2), Ortiz received a two-level increase
because she provided co-conspirators with the instructions and
training on how to file fraudulent tax returns. And, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, she received a two-level increase because she ob-
structed justice when she lied at trial that she had no knowledge of
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
tax preparation. The PSI thus calculated her total offense level as
30.
As to her criminal history, Ortiz had prior convictions, in-
cluding cultivation of marijuana, possession of 20 grams or less of
cannabis, food stamp fraud, dealing in stolen property, and receiv-
ing money from a pawnbroker by false verification of ownership.
She had three criminal history points, resulting in a criminal history
category of II.
For Count One, the statutory maximum term of imprison-
ment was five years. For Counts Two to Seven, the statutory max-
imum term of imprisonment was three years per count. Based on
a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of II, her
total guideline range was 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment.
Ortiz submitted objections to the PSI, which are not rele-
vant to this appeal. The government did not object to the PSI. In
her sentencing memorandum, Ortiz asked for a sentence of 60
months’ imprisonment. She argued that the government abused
its prosecutorial discretion in charging her with seven counts and
Cortes with only one because Cortes managed the business and as-
sisted in the preparation of false tax returns. She contended that
the difference in charging was the government’s attempt to “get
around” any future argument of a sentencing disparity.
At the consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court
noted that, with a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history
category of II, Ortiz’s guideline range was 108 to 135 months’ im-
prisonment. As to Cortes, it noted that, while her Guideline range
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 11
would have been 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment based on a total
offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I, Cortes’s
guideline range was 60 months’ imprisonment due to her statutory
maximum. The government argued for both Ortiz and Cortes to
be sentenced within their applicable guideline ranges. It contended
that Ortiz deserved a higher sentence than Cortes based on her
knowledge and role in the scheme, her criminal record, and her
fraudulent conduct regarding the PPP loan.
Ortiz asked the district court not to consider the alleged PPP
loan because she had not been charged with any PPP fraud. She
argued that there was no reason she should be treated any differ-
ently than Cortes because both were integral to the scheme. She
contended that the government abused its prosecutorial discretion
in charging her with extra counts with which it did not charge Cor-
tes. But she acknowledged that her criminal record allowed for her
to be “treated a little differently.”
The district court sentenced Cortes to 54 months’ imprison-
ment and sentenced Ortiz to a total sentence of 96 months’ impris-
onment, consisting of 60 months’ imprisonment as to Count One
and 6 months’ imprisonment as to Counts Two to Seven, all to run
consecutively. The district court imposed a total supervised release
of three years, imposed a total restitution of $3,796,000, and waived
the imposition of a fine. The district court noted that, based on the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the sentence reflected a balance be-
tween the nature of and her role in the offense, her criminal his-
tory, and the need to avoid sentencing disparities. It explained that
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
the 36-month difference between the sentences imposed on Ortiz
and Cortes was warranted by Ortiz’s criminal history and organi-
zational leadership, including the formation of the entity, origin of
the concept of the fraud, and implementation of the fraud.
This appeal ensued.
II.
We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal
de novo, viewing all facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the government. United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1250
(11th Cir. 2016). The district court’s denial of a motion for a judg-
ment of acquittal will be upheld “if a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 218
F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000)). It is not enough for a defendant
to put forth a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, as the issue is
not whether the jury reasonably could have acquitted, but whether
it reasonably could have found the defendant guilty. United States
v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009). “Although the evi-
dence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence,”
a conviction will not be affirmed if it is predicated on “conjecture.”
United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998).
When a defendant takes the stand and testifies in her own
defense, the jury may disbelieve her testimony, and the defendant’s
own statements “may be considered as substantive evidence of the
defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir.
1995) (emphasis in original). In other words, “when a defendant
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 13
chooses to testify, [s]he runs the risk that if disbelieved ‘the jury
might conclude the opposite of h[er] testimony is true.’” Id. (quot-
ing Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 961 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992)).
To sustain a conviction for conspiracy under § 371, the gov-
ernment must show: “(1) the existence of an agreement to achieve
an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowing and voluntary
participation in the conspiracy; and (3) the commission of an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Harmas, 974
F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Cure, 804
F.2d 625, 628-30 (11th Cir. 1986)). Because direct evidence of an
agreement is rare, an agreement “can be inferred from acts that
furthered the conspiracy’s purpose.” United States v. Miller, 693 F.2d
1051, 1053 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Middlebrooks,
618 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1980)).
To prove a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), the government
must show that the defendant (1) willfully and knowingly aided or
assisted (2) in the preparation or filing of a federal income tax re-
turn (3) that contained false material statements. See United States
v. Haynes, 573 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1978).1 The defendant does
not need to sign or prepare the return to be prosecuted under this
statute. See United States v. Wolfson, 573 F.2d 216, 225 (5th Cir.
1978). Willfulness is a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty” that does not require proof of evil motive or bad intent.
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down before October 1, 1981.
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 1194, 1199 (5th Cir. 1977). This is
generally shown through circumstantial evidence, such as making
false invoices or documents, concealing assets to hide the source of
income, and any other conduct that misleads or conceals. Id. at
1199 & n.14.
Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in deny-
ing Ortiz’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the govern-
ment presented sufficient evidence as to each count. As to Count
One, the government presented sufficient evidence as to the exist-
ence of an agreement to defraud the United States through submit-
ting false tax returns that claimed Schedule C expenses that re-
duced the earned income for the customer and inflated their re-
fund, encouraging the customer to return and refer others to the
business. The government presented evidence that: (1) Ortiz and
Cortes trained their employees, who ultimately filed the false tax
returns; (2) Cortes managed the office while Ortiz marketed the
business; and (3) Cortes acquired an EFIN to submit taxes, as Ortiz
was unable due to her prior felonies. Because the jury rejected
Ortiz’s testimony, her testimony that she did not review the tax
returns or instruct her employees to fabricate information was sub-
stantive evidence of her guilt, as corroborated by testimony that
the tax returns claimed false Schedule C expenses and that Ortiz
reviewed all of them. As to Counts Two to Seven, the government
presented sufficient evidence that Ortiz willfully and knowingly
aided or assisted in the false filings identified in the indictment.
Witnesses testified that Ortiz reviewed every tax return.
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 15
Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
III.
We review a district court’s ruling on admission of evidence
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jimenez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1249
(11th Cir. 2000). “An abuse of discretion arises when the district
court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an
errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.”
United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and
“the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R.
Evid. 401(a)-(b). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible at
trial unless provided otherwise by statute, the Constitution, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, or the Supreme Court. Fed. R. Evid.
402.
Relevant evidence “may” be excluded “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the fol-
lowing: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative ev-
idence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Exclusion under Rule 403 is an “ex-
traordinary remedy” that courts should employ “only sparingly
since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative ev-
idence.” Smith, 459 F.3d at 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly,
we view the disputed evidence “in a light most favorable to its
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its un-
due prejudicial impact.” Id. (quoting United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d
775, 784 (11th Cir. 1989)). A similarity between an extrinsic act and
the “charged offense will make the other offense highly probative
with regard to a defendant’s intent in the charged offense.” United
States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005). Unfair prej-
udice is defined as “relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into de-
claring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in ad-
mitting evidence of the alleged PPP loan fraud pursuant to Rule
403 because its probative value was not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, as both the instant offense con-
duct and the alleged fraud involved misrepresentations to the gov-
ernment on Schedule C forms. Further, there was no risk of con-
fusion of the issues because she executed the schemes in different
ways, i.e., the instant offense conduct involved her business filing
false tax returns and the alleged fraud involved her application for
a PPP loan regarding a separate business.
Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
IV.
We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury
instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Martinelli, 454
F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court abuses its discre-
tion in refusing such a request where: (1) the instruction correctly
stated the law; (2) the instruction’s subject matter was not
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 17
substantially covered by other instructions; and (3) the refusal seri-
ously impaired the defendant’s ability to defend herself. Id. If the
charge given “adequately addresses the substance of [her] request,”
a defendant is not entitled to an instruction using her precise lan-
guage. United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1210 (11th Cir. 2017)
(quoting United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir.
1984)).
Issues not briefed on appeal are deemed forfeited and will
not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances. United States
v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in failing
to instruct the jury on the good faith defense because it did give
that instruction. While the district court did not instruct the jury
with Ortiz’s precise language, she abandoned any argument that
not using her precise language was error by failing to raise it as an
issue in her brief.
Thus, we affirm as to this issue.
V.
We review a sentence’s reasonableness for abuse of discre-
tion, regardless of whether that sentence falls inside or outside of
the guideline range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
“Substantive reasonableness involves examining the totality of the
circumstances and whether the sentence is supported by the sen-
tencing factors outlined in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” United States v.
Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 2010). “The party
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18 Opinion of the Court 23-11028
challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the sentence
is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors,
and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United
States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). The
district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in
§ 3553(a), which includes, in relevant part, the need to avoid un-
warranted sentencing disparities. § 3553(a)(2).
A defendant may challenge her sentence as substantively un-
reasonable due to an “unwarranted” sentencing disparity under
§ 3553(a)(6). United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir.
2009). A difference in sentences is warranted if meaningful differ-
ences in the codefendants’ conduct and situations justified it.
United States v. Howard, 28 F.4th 180, 216 (11th Cir. 2022). “The
underlying facts of the crime and all of the individual characteristics
are relevant” to a court’s evaluation of alleged sentencing dispari-
ties and its assessment of whether two defendants are similarly sit-
uated. United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th Cir. 2015).
We have also stated that “[d]isparity between the sentences im-
posed on codefendants is generally not an appropriate basis for re-
lief on appeal.” United States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321, 1325–26
(11th Cir. 2001).
Here, we conclude that Ortiz’s sentence is not substantively
unreasonable because the 36-month sentencing disparity was war-
ranted based on Ortiz’s higher criminal history, including prior
fraudulent conduct, and leadership role in the instant offense
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23-11028 Opinion of the Court 19
conduct. Indeed, she reviewed all of the tax returns filed at the
company and worked at two prior tax companies closed by the IRS.
Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
VI.
For the reasons stated, we affirm Ortiz’s convictions and
sentences.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 23-11028 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2024 Page: 19 of 19

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