Lucrecia Marina Lucas Mazeriegos, et al v. U.S. Attorney General

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11846
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
LUCRECIA MARINA LUCAS MAZERIEGOS,
JOSE MANUEL CIFUENTES LUCAS,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A206-442-069
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11846
____________________
Before J ORDAN , G RANT, and L AGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lucrecia Marina Lucas Mazeriegos, a native and citizen of
Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s final order affirming the immigration judge’s denial of
her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.1 We
deny the petition.
I.
Lucas first argues that the Board failed to give reasoned
consideration to her application for asylum and withholding of
removal. Specifically, Lucas argues that the Board erred by
declining to remand her case for a new hearing after an intervening
change in the law governing her asylum claim. As a result, Lucas
contends that the Board’s order affirming her removal
mischaracterized the immigration judge’s factual findings and
impermissibly engaged in its own factfinding. We find no error.
When Lucas was first placed into removal proceedings in
2015, the governing precedent on asylum cases involving domestic
violence was Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
1 Lucas’s petition for review is filed on behalf of herself and Jose Manuel
Cifuentes Lucas, her son and derivate asylum applicant.
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23-11846 Opinion of the Court 3
This decision found that a particular social group composed of
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship” was cognizable for asylum purposes. Id. at 392–95.
Lucas initially planned to claim membership in this social group for
her asylum application. But in 2018, the Attorney General
overruled Matter of A-R-C-G- in Matter of A-B- (Matter of A-B- I), 27 I
& N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Thus, at Lucas’s removal hearing in
2019, her counsel conceded that she could no longer pursue her
asylum claim based on her original particular social group, which
relied on Matter of A-R-C-G-. She reframed her particular social
group as “women facing fear in Guatemala because of domestic
violence,” which the immigration judge ruled was not a cognizable
social group for asylum purposes.
Between her hearing and her appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General changed course. In
Matter of A-B- (Matter of A-B- III), 28 I & N Dec. 307, 307–09 (A.G.
2021), the Attorney General vacated Matter of A-B- I, thereby
restoring Matter of A-R-C-G- as governing law. Accordingly, Lucas
requested that the Board remand her case back to the immigration
judge for renewed factfinding under the appropriate legal standard.
The Board was not obligated to remand. In Lucas’s initial
hearing, the immigration judge had specifically found that Lucas
“was able to leave her husband.” The Board’s decision identified
that Matter of A-B- III had restored Matter of A-R-C-G- but stated that
Lucas could not show membership in even her original particular
social group because the immigration judge had found that Lucas
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11846
“was able to leave her abusive husband.” Therefore, remand was
not necessary because the immigration judge had made the
necessary factual findings to support denial of asylum, even after
the intervening change in the law. And the Board did not
mischaracterize the immigration judge’s factual findings, nor did it
engage in its own factfinding. Lucas’s reasoned consideration
challenge to the Board’s denial of her asylum and withholding of
removal claims fails.
Our dissenting colleague contends that we “cannot say
whether the legal error on the applicable standard affected the
immigration judge’s factual finding.” Dissent at 2. With respect,
we disagree. Agency guidance instructs immigration judges to
“make comprehensive findings of fact . . . rather than just those
findings pertinent to one issue that the Immigration Judge may
deem dispositive of the case” in order to avoid unnecessary
remands for additional factfinding after “unforeseen change[s] or
interpretation[s] of law.” In re S-H-, 23 I & N Dec. 462, 465 (B.I.A.
2002). The immigration judge here heeded that advice. She stated
on the record that she viewed Lucas’s newly proposed particular
social group as indistinguishable from the one advanced in Matter
of A-R-C-G- and rejected in Matter of A-B- I. That alone supported
her decision to deny relief under the then-prevailing legal standard.
But the judge then found, in the alternative, that Lucas was not a
member of her proposed, Matter of A-R-C-G- based social group
anyway because she could leave her husband. Remand was thus
unnecessary because the intervening change in the law did not
affect this alternative factual finding, adopted by the Board.
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23-11846 Opinion of the Court 5
II.
Next, Lucas argues that the Board’s determination that
Lucas was not a member of the particular social group of “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”
was unsupported by substantial evidence. In reviewing for
substantial evidence, we will affirm the Board’s decision if it is
“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022,
1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quotation omitted). A finding of
fact will be reversed only when the record “compels” it, not just
because the record “may support a contrary conclusion.” Id.
The record shows that, although Lucas remains legally
married to her husband, she left their shared home and lived
separately from him at her parents’ house for sixteen years prior to
seeking asylum in the United States. Although she had been
physically abused during her marriage, after their separation, her
husband never harmed her again. About annually, her husband
would show up at her parent’s house, armed, and demand her
return. But he never used the weapon and was always successfully
turned away without incident by Lucas’s mother. And Lucas never
sought police intervention, at any point. Based on this, the Board’s
conclusion that Lucas was able to leave her abusive relationship was
supported by more than enough evidence.
III.
Finally, Lucas argues that the Board failed to give her
Convention Against Torture claim reasoned consideration. We
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11846
disagree. On a reasoned consideration challenge, “the Board does
not need to do much.” Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327, 1333
(11th Cir. 2019). It “need not address specifically each piece of
evidence the petitioner presented.” Id. (alteration adopted)
(quotation omitted). We have held that the Board does not give
reasoned consideration in three types of circumstances: when it
“misstates the contents of the record, fails to adequately explain its
rejection of logical conclusions, or provides justifications for its
decision which are unreasonable and which do not respond to any
arguments in the record.” Id. at 1334 (quotation omitted).
Ultimately, for the Board’s decision to exhibit a lack of reasoned
consideration, it must “force[] us to doubt whether we and the
Board are, in substance, looking at the same case.” Id.
Here, the Board identified the correct legal standard,
explaining that Lucas failed to show that she was more likely than
not to be tortured if returned to Guatemala by or with the
acquiescence of a government official. It then explained that Lucas
was unable to show a probability of harm rising to the level of
torture because she could successfully relocate within Guatemala
away from her husband—as evidenced by the fact that she had
resided at her parent’s home for sixteen years prior to seeking
asylum in the United States.
That was enough to generate a decision reviewable by this
Court. Although Lucas faults the Board for not discussing evidence
relevant to the government acquiescence prong of the torture
standard, the Board was not required to discuss “each piece of
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23-11846 Opinion of the Court 7
evidence” in the record. Id. at 1333 (quotation omitted). And
because the Board found that Lucas did not establish that it was
more likely than not she would suffer harm rising to the level of
torture if returned to Guatemala, it was not also required to rule
specifically on the separate requirement of government
acquiescence. See Farah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2021).
* * *
PETITION DENIED.
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23-11846 JORDAN , J., Dissenting 1
JORDAN , Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
I would send this matter back to the BIA for further
proceedings. With respect, I dissent from the court’s denial of Ms.
Lucas’ petition for review.
When the immigration judge resolved the asylum claim, the
governing standard for cases involving domestic violence was the
one articulated in Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
As a result, Ms. Lucas’ original proposed group—married women
in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship—was not
then cognizable. In addressing asylum, the immigration judge
understandably followed Matter of A-B- and focused only on Ms.
Lucas’ alternative proposed group—women facing fear based upon
domestic violence. See App. 222-23. So when the immigration
judge made a factual finding that Ms. Lucas was able to leave her
husband, see App. 223, that finding was made under the asylum
standard articulated in Matter of A-B- and was not geared towards
the group that Ms. Lucas had initially proposed.
By the time the asylum claim got to the BIA, the asylum
standard had changed again and was back to the one set out in
Matter of A-R-C-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). See Matter of
A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021). As a result, Ms. Lucas’
original proposed group was again cognizable. In my view, the BIA
should not have relied on a factual finding made by the
immigration judge under a now-incorrect standard (and pursuant
only to an alternative proposed group) to reject Ms. Lucas’ asylum
claim. See Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The
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2 JORDAN , J., Dissenting 23-11846
BIA’s substitution of the proper [legal] standard at the intermediate
appellate level without considering how the error may have colored
the [immigration judge’s] factual findings of fact cannot plausibly
be read to support the conclusion . . . that ‘the [BIA] has considered
the issue[.]’”) (citation omitted). Because I cannot say whether the
legal error on the applicable standard affected the immigration
judge’s factual finding, i.e., whether the error was harmless, I
would vacate the BIA’s order and send the matter back for further
proceedings before the immigration judge under the correct
asylum standard and pursuant to Ms. Lucas’ original proposed
group. Cf. United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019)
(explaining that “[i]f a district court applies an incorrect legal
standard in reaching a factual conclusion, the resulting finding is
not insulated by the clear error standard,” and the appropriate
remedy is to remand if we “cannot say” whether the erroneous
legal standard affected the factual finding).
I recognize that the immigration judge also made an adverse
credibility finding against Ms. Lucas and concluded that this finding
was sufficient to foreclose all of the relief she requested. See App.
216-19. But the BIA did not adopt this portion of the immigration
judge’s order, see App. 2, and that means that the adverse credibility
finding is not properly before us. See, e.g., Lingeswaran v. U.S. Atty.
Gen., 969 F.3d 1278, 1287 n.12 (11th Cir. 2020). I would allow the
BIA to decide on remand whether to adopt the immigration judge’s
adverse credibility finding, and if does so to then address (a)
whether that finding is adequately supported by the record and (b)
whether it suffices to deny Ms. Lucas all forms of requested relief.
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