USA v. Nelson Cintron

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11958
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NELSON CINTRON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:07-cr-60049-WPD-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11958
Before J ILL PRYOR , BRANCH, and H ULL , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nelson Hurricane Cintron appeals the district court’s order
denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) motion for early termination of
supervised release. On appeal, Cintron argues that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to consider properly the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. After review, we find no abuse
of discretion and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Between July 2006 and early 2007, Cintron engaged in
sexually explicit online communications with undercover law
enforcement officers who were posing as 14-year-old girls. During
some of these conversations, Cintron sent images of child
pornography to an undercover officer.
A search of Cintron’s personal computer and laptops
revealed more images and videos of child pornography, some
depicting adults engaged in sexual activity with prepubescent
children. Cintron admitted his conduct. But Cintron explained
that at approximately age 18 he had a traumatic incident in which
he was chased by 20 men and feared for his life and afterwards he
developed an anxiety disorder and retreated into the virtual world
of the computer.
In 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, Cintron pled guilty
to one count of distribution of child pornography, in violation of
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23-11958 Opinion of the Court 3
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1). The district court sentenced
Cintron to 180 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of
supervised release. On July 24, 2020, Cintron was released from
prison and began serving his supervised release term. Cintron was
subject to numerous special conditions of supervised release for sex
offenders, including restrictions on his use of a computer and
access to the Internet.
In November 2020, after Cintron was offered employment
with Evexia Enterprises, the district court granted Cintron’s
request to modify his conditions of supervised release to permit
Cintron to use a computer “only as to employment at Evexia
Enterprises” and “subject to probation’s installing, at Defendant’s
expense, computer monitoring software.”
In May 2023, Cintron filed a pro se § 3583(e)(1) motion for
early termination of supervised release. Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1)
motion argued that he had exhibited “exceptional” conduct while
in prison, completed all requirements for psychotherapy
treatment, obtained employment after his release, was law-
abiding, and fully complied with his supervised release terms for
the last approximately three years.
Cintron’s motion stated that his employer at Evexia
Enterprises had offered him a partnership in the business, which
would require him to travel frequently and to have access at all
times to a smartphone, tablets, and other computer-related
equipment to interact with potential customers and hold virtual
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11958
meetings. Cintron asked the district court to grant his motion to
terminate supervised release so he could further his career.
The government filed a brief response opposing the motion
and noting that Cintron’s probation officer also objected to early
termination.
The district court denied Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The
district court stated it had considered the government’s response
and reviewed Cintron’s court file and presentence investigation
report. The court acknowledged that Cintron had “completed
much of his court ordered supervised release.” The court stated,
“Other than that, there are no reasons, certainly not exceptional
reasons, given for early termination.”
The district court acknowledged it could terminate
supervised release if warranted by the defendant’s conduct or in the
interests of justice. However, the district court declined to exercise
its discretion and do so in Cintron’s case, stating it had considered
the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Cintron filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. General Principles
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for early
termination of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017). A court abuses
its discretion when it fails to explain its sentencing decisions
adequately enough for meaningful appellate review. Id.
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Under § 3583(e)(1), and after the expiration of one year of
supervised release, the district court may terminate a defendant’s
supervised release term if, “after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6),
and (a)(7)” the court “is satisfied that such action is warranted by
the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); see Johnson, 877 F.3d at 996.
The relevant § 3553(a) factors referenced in § 3583(e)(1)
include: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the need for the
sentence imposed “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct,” “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant,” and “to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner”; (3) “the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”; and
(4) “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7).
A district court ruling on a § 3583(e)(1) motion “must
demonstrate that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors,” but it
“need not explain each factor’s applicability, nor always explicitly
articulate that it considered the factors.” Johnson, 877 F.3d at
997-98. Even so, the district court “must explain its sentencing
decisions adequately enough to allow for meaningful appellate
review.” Id. at 997. Meaningful appellate review “requires the
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11958
reasons for the district court’s decision to be sufficiently apparent,”
and thus, apart from the district court’s order, the record can also
provide a sufficient basis for meaningful appellate review. Id. at 998.
B. Denial of Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) Motion
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. Although the district court
did not explain each § 3553(a) factor’s applicability, it was not
required to do so. See id. at 997-98.
The district court’s explanation for its ruling indicates that
the court considered the pertinent § 3553(a) factors, Cintron’s
§ 3583(e)(1) motion, the government’s response, and the criminal
court file, including the presentence investigation report. The
district court further explained that Cintron’s justification—that he
had successfully completed a substantial portion of his five-year
supervised release term—was not sufficient to warrant early
termination of supervised release. In light of the seriousness of
Cintron’s child pornography offense, which involved online
distribution, and the need to protect the public while Cintron
works with computers as part of his employment, we cannot say
the district court abused its discretion.
We also find no merit to Cintron’s contention that the
district court required him to show “unusual or extraordinary
circumstances” rather than considering the § 3553(a) factors as
mandated by § 3583(e)(1). The district court merely noted that
Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion offered no other reasons apart from
the one the district court determined was insufficient. The district
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23-11958 Opinion of the Court 7
court explicitly stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors,
and Cintron has offered no reason why we should not take the
district court at its word.
Cintron also argues the district court committed legal error
because it “declined” to exercise its discretion. But Cintron
misreads the district court’s order. The district court understood
that it had the discretion to grant Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion and
concluded, after considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors, that an
exercise of discretion in Cintron’s favor was not warranted under
the circumstances. Such a determination is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion, and we find none here. See id. at 997.1
AFFIRMED.
1 To the extent Cintron’s reply brief raises new arguments attacking his
underlying criminal proceedings, including at sentencing, we decline to
address them. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871-73 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, ----U.S.----, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022) (explaining that generally
arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited and deemed
abandoned).
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