USA v. Kevin Lamar Ratliff

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12129
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEVIN LAMAR RATLIFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:08-cr-00038-RH-MAL-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12129
Before J ILL PRYOR , NEWSOM , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Ratliff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
the district court’s denial of his motion for a further sentence re-
duction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. The govern-
ment has moved for summary affirmance. We grant the govern-
ment’s motion.
I.
In 2008, a jury found Ratliff guilty of possessing with intent
to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine as well as conspir-
ing to distribute or possess with intent to distribute five grams or
more of crack cocaine. The district court imposed a sentence of 360
months’ imprisonment.
After Ratliff was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sen-
tencing Act of 2010 to address disparities in sentences between of-
fenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder co-
caine. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010); see also Kim-
brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–100 (2007) (providing back-
ground on disparity). The Fair Sentencing Act increased the quan-
tity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the highest statutory pen-
alties from 50 grams to 280 grams and the quantity of crack cocaine
necessary to trigger intermediate statutory penalties from 5 grams
to 28 grams. See Fair Sentencing Act § 2; 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). The Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced
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23-12129 Opinion of the Court 3
penalties applied only to defendants who were sentenced on or af-
ter its effective date. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012).
In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Among other things, the First Step Act
gave district courts the discretion to apply retroactively the re-
duced statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses in the Fair Sen-
tencing Act to movants sentenced before those penalties became
effective. See First Step Act § 404. Based on the First Step Act, the
district court reduced Ratliff’s sentence to 262 months’ imprison-
ment.
In July 2021, Ratliff filed a new motion requesting a further
sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act. The district
court denied Ratliff’s motion. Ratliff appealed that decision. In the
appeal, the government moved for summary affirmance, which we
granted. See United States v. Ratliff, No. 21-13949, 2022 WL 987424
(11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2022) (unpublished). We explained that because
the district court had already “reduced Ratliff’s sentence in accord-
ance with sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, it was not
authorized to entertain Ratliff’s later motion requesting a further
reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act.” Id. at *2.
In February 2023, Ratliff filed another motion seeking a fur-
ther sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act, urging
the district court to consider intervening changes in the law, which
he said showed that he no longer qualified as a career offender. The
district court denied Ratliff’s motion. Ratliff now appeals the denial
of his February 2023 motion.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12129
II.
Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
the essence, such as in “situations where important public policy
issues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights de-
nied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as
a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to
the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case,
the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d
1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).1
We review de novo whether a district court had the authority
to modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment under the First Step
Act. United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023).
III.
District courts generally lack the authority to modify a term
of imprisonment once it has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
But the First Step Act permits district courts to reduce some previ-
ously-imposed terms of imprisonment for offenses involving crack
cocaine. See First Step Act § 404. Section 404(c) imposes a limit on
successive motions for sentence reductions. It states that “[n]o
court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a
sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously re-
duced in accordance with . . . the Fair Sentencing Act . . . or if a
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
down prior to October 1, 1981.
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23-12129 Opinion of the Court 5
previous motion made under this section to reduce the sentence
was . . . denied.” Id. § 404(c). Under this provision, “[a] district court
may not consider a First Step Act motion if the movant’s sentence
was already reduced under the Fair Sentencing Act or if the court
considered and rejected a motion under the First Step Act.” Concep-
cion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 496 (2022); see United States v. Gon-
zalez, 71 F.4th 881, 886 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that § 404(c)
bars courts from “consider[ing] successive First Step Act motions”
(emphasis in original)).
Here, the district court previously reduced Ratliff’s sentence
in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010. Because the First Step Act plainly states that a movant may
receive only one such sentence reduction, the district court
properly denied Ratliff’s most recent § 404 motion, which sought a
further sentence reduction. See First Step Act § 404(c); Concepcion,
597 U.S. at 496. Because the government’s position is clearly correct
as a matter of law and there is not a substantial question as to the
outcome of the case, we conclude that summary affirmance is ap-
propriate. See Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. Accordingly, the
government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED.
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