USA v. Robert Williams

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12154
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT LEESEAN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 5:14-cr-00010-RH-MJF-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12154
Before WILSON, BRASHER , and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his second motion for compassionate release un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that the district court
abused its direction by failing to adequately address his arguments,
improperly relying on a juvenile adjudication, and erroneously
weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. We disagree. The district
court properly considered his arguments and did not commit a
clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. Accord-
ingly, we affirm.
I.
In October 2014, Williams was charged with distribution, re-
ception, and possession of child pornography, to which he pled
guilty and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. His sen-
tence is at the upper end of the guidance range because this was his
third sex crime against a child—at thirteen years old he pled guilty
to a lewd and lascivious act with a three-year-old, and at twenty-
one, he pled nolo contendere to sexual battery of a fifteen-year-old.
Williams has filed two motions to vacate this sentence and one
prior motion for compassionate release—none of which have been
successful.
Most recently, he filed a second motion for compassionate
release, arguing that (1) he has preexisting conditions that heighten
his COVID-19 risk; (2) he has demonstrated substantial rehabilita-
tion during his imprisonment; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors support
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23-12154 Opinion of the Court 3
his release. The district court denied this motion, but on review,
we held that it failed to provide sufficient explanation for its deci-
sion, and vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We now
review the district court’s new order denying Williams’s motion.
II.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d
1243, 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). Once eligibility is established, we
review a district court’s denial of the motion for an abuse of discre-
tion, requiring an adequate explanation of the sentencing decision
to allow for meaningful review. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343,
1345 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it ap-
plies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
making its determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual find-
ings.” Id. We will find an abuse of discretion regarding the reason-
ableness of a sentence if a district court “(1) fails to afford consider-
ation to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) com-
mits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(quotations omitted).
The First Step Act of 20181 codified “compassionate release,”
which provides a narrow exception to the general rule that a court
may not modify a sentence once it has been imposed. 18 U.S.C.
1 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391. 132 Stat. 5194.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12154
§ 3582(c); United States v. Puentes 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th Cir.
2015) (A district court may modify a defendant’s sentence “only
when authorized by a statute or rule.”). In order to grant a motion
for compassionate release, the district court must find “first, that
an extraordinary and compelling reason exists; second, that a sen-
tencing reduction would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and
third, that § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate re-
lease.” Giron, 15 F.4th at 1347. If the district court finds against the
defendant on one of these requirements, it need not analyze the
other requirements and cannot reduce the sentence. Id.
The district court here found against Williams on the
§ 3553(a) factors. There are numerous § 3553(a) factors,2 and to ad-
equately explain its decision, a district court “need not exhaustively
analyze” every factor in its order, but must note that each factor
was considered. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1241 (11th
Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). It need not give all factors equal
weight and has discretion to attach greater weight to one factor
over others, especially when weighing criminal history. See United
States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021). This is a low
burden that the district court has met here.
2 The factors include but are not limited to: (1) the offense’s nature and cir-
cumstances and the defendant’s history and characteristics; (2) the need to re-
flect the offense’s seriousness, promote respect for the law, and provide just
punishment; (3) the need to deter; (4) the need to protect the public; and (5)
the sentencing guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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23-12154 Opinion of the Court 5
The district court order provided a sufficient statement of its
reasons for denying Williams’s motion. It focused on the need to
protect the public by discussing Williams’s prior child sex crimes,
and maintaining that he is a danger to other persons in the com-
munity, particularly children.3 The order goes on to briefly note
that the court considered Williams’s arguments and all § 3553(a)
factors. This is all our case law compels the district court to do. See
Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241; Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254; Riley 995
F.3d at 1279. It afforded consideration to relevant factors without
clear error, and did not improperly weigh irrelevant factors.4 See
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Therefore, the district did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying Williams’s motion for compassionate release,
and we affirm its decision.
AFFIRMED.
3 Due to the high rate of recidivism for sex crimes against minors, we find this
brief interaction with the facts sufficient. Klaus-Peter Dahle et al., The Develop-
ment of the Crime Scene Behavior Risk Measure for Sexual Offense Recidivism, 38
Law & Hum. Behav. 569 (2014).
4 While Williams argues that the district court erred in considering his juvenile
adjudication (the lewd and lascivious act he pled guilty to at thirteen), there is
no limit on the information concerning the background, character, and con-
duct of the defendant that a court may consider in imposing an appropriate
sentence. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 3661. This includes evidence
of post-conviction rehabilitation. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 503–04
(2011).
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