David Webb v. Gwinnett County Government, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-13416
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
DAVID Q. WEBB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GWINNETT COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
GWINNETT COUNTY STATE COURT,
DIVISION S3, CHIEF JUDGE,
GWINNETT COUNTY GA DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
GWINNETT COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13416
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-03527-WMR
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM , BRASHER , and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2023, David Q. Webb filed a pro se complaint arising out
of his detention at the Gwinnett County Jail more than thirty years
ago, from September 1990 through February 1991. He claimed
that he was illegally detained without booking or any judicial pro-
cess based on his race, color, and national origin as an African-
American man. Seeking money damages, he raised claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 2000d, alleging violations of his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and under state law, O.C.G.A.
§ 51-2-2. The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2), and determined it was frivolous because it was plainly
barred by Georgia’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations.
We review a dismissal for frivolity for an abuse of discretion.
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). We “review
de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the stat-
ute of limitations.” United States v. Frediani, 790 F.3d 1196, 1199
(11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). “Pro se pleadings are
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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23-13416 Opinion of the Court 3
As the district court explained, all of Webb’s claims, which
are based on the same allegations of false arrest and imprisonment,
are subject to Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for per-
sonal-injury claims, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d
556, 560–61 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that claims brought under §§
1983, 1985, and 2000d are “measured by the personal injury limita-
tions period of the state”); McCullough v. Atl. Refining Co., 177 S.E.
601, 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934) (“Actions for malicious prosecution, for
malicious abuse of legal process, for false arrest or false imprison-
ment, or for malicious use of civil process are all actions for dam-
ages for injuries to the person of the party complainant.”). And
that two-year period began to run no later than the date of his re-
lease from jail in February 1991, when “the facts which would sup-
port a cause of action [were] apparent or should [have been] appar-
ent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”
Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987); see Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (“Limitations begin to run against
an action for false imprisonment when the alleged false imprison-
ment ends.”) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Webb’s
complaint, filed more than thirty years after his release, is barred
by the statute of limitations.
Recognizing that his claims are untimely, Webb invokes a
purported exception for “fraud upon the court” that, in Webb’s
view, was “inherent within the Official Court Record” for his state
criminal case. He claims that the “savings clause” of Rule 60(d)(1),
Fed. R. Civ. P., supersedes the statute of limitations and permits his
late claims. Webb is mistaken.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13416
Rule 60 provides for relief from a judgment obtained by
fraud, if the moving party seeks relief “no more than a year after
the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Nonetheless,
Rule 60(d)(1) preserves the court’s power to “entertain an inde-
pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). And “[a]n independent action
does not have to be brought within one year.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 273 (11th Cir. 1988).
Because Webb did not seek relief from a judgment or order,
though, he cannot rely on Rule 60 or establish the elements neces-
sary to maintain an independent action. See id. (stating that the first
element of an independent action is “a judgment which ought not,
in equity and good conscience, to be enforced”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.
The complaint’s allegations do not reference any judgment in the
state criminal case, and his briefing on appeal states that no judg-
ment was entered. Rather, as the district court stated, Webb’s com-
plaint sought only money damages for violations of his state and
federal rights arising from his alleged false arrest and imprison-
ment. Accordingly, neither Rule 60 nor an independent action per-
mit relief in this case or exempt Webb’s claims from the ordinary
limitations period.
For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Webb’s com-
plaint as barred by the statute of limitations.
AFFIRMED.
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