Albert Koster, et al v. Elena Grafova

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-14121
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
EUROBOOR BV, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants,
ALBERT KOSTER,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant
Appellant,
EUROBOOR FZC,
Counter Defendant
Appellant,
versus
ELENA GRAFOVA,
USCA11 Case: 23-14121 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/16/2024 Page: 1 of 4

-- 1 of 4 --

2 Opinion of the Court 23-14121
Defendant-Counter Claimant
Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-02157-KOB
____________________
Before W ILSON, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Albert Koster and Euroboor FZC appeal from the district
court’s amended final judgment, the order granting partial sum-
mary judgment, and the post-judgment order denying their motion
to enforce the settlement agreement and for sanctions. For the rea-
sons discussed below, we lack jurisdiction to review any of those
rulings.
Rule 41(a) permits a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an “ac-
tion” by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Here, the Rule 41(a)
stipulation was ineffective because it did not dismiss the entire ac-
tion. See Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir.
2018). It did not dismiss all claims or all counterclaims, and coun-
terclaim count 4 remained pending. See id. (noting that a plaintiff
cannot stipulate to dismissal of a portion of his lawsuit while leav-
ing a different part of the lawsuit pending before the trial court).
USCA11 Case: 23-14121 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/16/2024 Page: 2 of 4

-- 2 of 4 --

23-14121 Opinion of the Court 3
While Rule 41(a) also permits a plaintiff (or counter-plaintiff) to dis-
miss all of his claims against a particular defendant (or counter-de-
fendant), the stipulation did not do that either. See Rosell v. VMSB,
LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 n.2 (11th Cir. 2023); Klay v. United
Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004). It purported
to dismiss only some of the plaintiffs’ claims against Grafova and
only some of Grafova’s counterclaims against two plaintiffs. See
Klay, 376 F.3d at 1106 (noting that Rule 41 does not permit plaintiffs
to pick and choose, dismissing only particular claims within an ac-
tion); Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1143-44 (holding that there was no final
decision in the action because the parties’ attempt to dismiss a sin-
gle count under Rule 41(a) was ineffective). Therefore, the stipu-
lation was invalid, and the district court could not cure that failure
by entering an order under Rule 41(a)(2) that similarly purported
to dismiss fewer than all the claims against one or more parties. See
Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144 & n.2; Sanchez, 84 F.4th at 1292-93.
Additionally, the district court’s order denying Koster and
Euroboor FZC’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement is
not an immediately appealable collateral order. In order to fall un-
der the collateral order doctrine, the interlocutory order must (1)
conclusively determine a disputed question; (2) resolve an im-
portant issue completely separate from the merits of the action;
and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judg-
ment. See Plaintiff A v. Schair, 744 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (11th Cir.
2014). This doctrine is narrow in scope and allows for review for a
small category of interlocutory rulings. See id. at 1253; Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (stating that the
USCA11 Case: 23-14121 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/16/2024 Page: 3 of 4

-- 3 of 4 --

4 Opinion of the Court 23-14121
collateral order doctrine’s “reach is limited to trial court orders af-
fecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an im-
mediate appeal”); Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106
(2009) (noting that the appealability of an order under the collateral
order doctrine depends on whether delaying review of that cate-
gory of orders “would imperil a substantial public interest or some
particular value of a high order”). Importantly, we ask whether the
category of claim, not the individual claim, can be vindicated with-
out an immediate appeal. See Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 106.
Litigants are routinely required to “wait until after final judgment
to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our adver-
sarial system.” Id. at 108-109.
Here, Koster and Euroboor FZC seek fulfillment of a term
in the settlement related to a lawsuit pending in the United Arab
Emirates (“UAE”), which they argue is an important interest due
to the many consequences the UAE has imposed on Koster and the
Euroboor entities. However, this right can be adequately vindi-
cated on appeal from final judgment. See Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 869 (1992) (holding that rights un-
der private settlement agreements can be adequately vindicated on
appeal from final judgment); Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 106.
Thus, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. All
pending motions are denied as MOOT.
USCA11 Case: 23-14121 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/16/2024 Page: 4 of 4

-- 4 of 4 --