St Case1tech, LLC v. John A. Squires, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ST CASE1TECH, LLC,
Appellant
v.
JOHN A. SQUIRES, UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Intervenor
______________________
2023-2388
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2022-
00281.
______________________
Decided: February 18, 2026
______________________
ANDREW PETER DEMARCO, Devlin Law Firm LLC, Wil-
mington, DE, argued for appellant. Also represented by
TIMOTHY DEVLIN, ROBERT J. GAJARSA, JASON MITCHELL
SHAPIRO.
OMAR FAROOQ AMIN, Office of the Solicitor, United
States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA,
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ST CASE1TECH, LLC v. SQUIRES 2
argued for intervenor. Also represented by MAI-TRANG
DUC DANG, NICHOLAS THEODORE MATICH, IV, ROBERT J.
MCMANUS.
______________________
Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
STARK, Circuit Judge.
ST Case1Tech, LLC (“ST1”) appeals from a final writ-
ten decision (“FWD”) of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“Board”) in an inter partes review (“IPR”) of U.S. Patent
No. 9,270,244 (the “’244 patent”), which generally relates
to systems for and methods of automatically adjusting au-
dio levels in user-worn devices in order to improve the
user’s situational awareness. In its FWD, the Board found
claims 1-4, 6, 13, 14, 17-19, and 25-27 of the ’244 patent
invalid as obvious. In making that determination, the
Board adopted a claim construction ST1 challenges on ap-
peal. Because we agree with the Board’s construction, we
affirm.
I
The ’244 patent is directed to systems and methods
that allow a user listening to audio content through ear-
phones to hear nearby conversations without having to
manually adjust the volume of the audio content. This au-
tomation is achieved by way of a processor and an ambient
sound microphone that detects voice activity. When voice
activity is detected, the system adjusts the volume of the
audio content and employs a “voice timer” to maintain the
adjusted volume during conversational gaps in voice activ-
ity, so that the device does not rapidly alter volume levels
during short conversational pauses. The following limita-
tion from representative claim 1 is relevant to this appeal:
[A]djusting a mixing gain of an audio content sig-
nal delivered to the earphone with the ambient
sound pass-through during a voice timer pending
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ST CASE1TECH, LLC v. SQUIRES 3
voice activity; and wherein the audio content is one
of a voice signal, music content, or audible sound
delivered to the internal speaker for audible repro-
duction.
J.A. 57 at 13:50-55 (emphasis added).
Petitioner, who has since withdrawn from this appeal,1
petitioned for IPR of all 30 claims of the ’244 patent, argu-
ing that U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2007/0189544 (“Rosen-
berg”), alone or in combination with other references not
pertinent to this appeal, rendered all challenged claims ob-
vious. Rosenberg discloses an “Ambient Sound Responsive
Media Player” that detects certain “characteristic forms” in
an ambient audio signal – such as another person speaking
the user’s name, the user’s own voice, or an alarm – and
upon such detection automatically reduces the volume of
media content being output so that the user can better hear
the ambient sound. J.A. 518. In one embodiment, Rosen-
berg’s processor captures ambient audio, processes it to de-
tect a characteristic form, reduces media volume upon
detection, and then performs a “time delay” that maintains
the reduced volume for a selected period. J.A. 525 at ¶ 50.
The Board found that Rosenberg rendered claims 1-4,
6, 13, 14, 17-19, and 25-27 of the ’244 patent obvious. Its
determination was primarily based on a construction of
“adjusting a mixing gain of an audio content signal deliv-
ered to the earphone with the ambient sound pass-through
during a voice timer pending voice activity,” that does not
require the step of “adjusting” the mixing gain (i.e., vol-
ume) to occur after the activation of a voice timer. J.A. 5,
10. Specifically, the Board found that “the claims do not
require performing the ‘activating/activate’ step before the
1 The Director of the Patent and Trademark Office
intervened and filed a brief to defend the decision of the
Board. ECF Nos. 48, 53.
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ST CASE1TECH, LLC v. SQUIRES 4
‘adjusting/adjusts’ step, nor that a singular act of ‘adjust-
ing/adjusts’ must occur during a voice timer.” J.A. 10.
Applying that construction, the Board determined that
Rosenberg disclosed every step of the challenged claims:
(i) monitoring ambient audio via a microphone, (ii) auto-
matically initiating a voice timer upon detection or cessa-
tion of voice activity (wherein Rosenberg’s “time delay”
functions as the claimed “voice timer”), and (iii) adjusting
and maintaining the adjustment to the volume during the
timer.
ST1 timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 141(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
II
“Claim construction is a question of law with underly-
ing questions of fact.” Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto.
Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Where “the
intrinsic record fully governs the proper construction of a
term,” our review is de novo. Id.
III
The sole dispute we need to resolve in this appeal is
whether the challenged limitation in claim 1 – “adjusting a
mixing gain of an audio content signal delivered to the ear-
phone with the ambient sound pass-through during a voice
timer pending voice activity” – requires that the adjusting
of a mixing gain of audio content occur after the activation
of the system’s voice timer. See J.A. 57 at 13:50-55. ST1
insists that it must; in its view, the adjusting must take
place “during a voice timer,” which cannot happen if the
adjusting is done prior to the activation of the voice timer.
Id. (emphasis added). The Director, by contrast, defends
the Board’s conflicting view, which is that “the ‘adjust-
ing/adjusts’ includes maintaining and delivering relative
levels of adjusted gains ‘during a voice timer pending voice
activity,’ even if the actual moment the first adjustment is
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ST CASE1TECH, LLC v. SQUIRES 5
made occurs before activation of the voice timer.” J.A. 14.
We agree with the Board.
“Although the language of a method claim does not gen-
erally require that its steps be undertaken in the listed or-
der, sometimes either logic or grammar mandates a
particular order of steps.” Dionex Softron GmbH v. Agilent
Techs., Inc., 56 F.4th 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Such can
be the case “where the claim implicitly requires order, for
example, if the language of a claimed step refers to the com-
pleted results of the prior step.” Kaneka Corp. v. Xiamen
Kingdomway Grp. Co., 790 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015). When assessing whether claimed steps require an
order, we avoid constructions that would result in super-
fluous limitations. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21
F.4th 801, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“It is highly disfavored to
construe terms in a way that renders them void, meaning-
less, or superfluous.”) (citation omitted).
Neither grammar nor logic warrant reading ST1’s
claim as requiring an order of steps such that the adjusting
of the mixing gain occur only after the activating of the
voice timer. ST1’s only syntactical contention is to dispute
the Director’s reliance on the last antecedent rule,2 which
the Director argues means that the “during a voice timer
pending voice activity” term modifies only “deliver[y] [of
the audio content signal] to the earphone,” and does not
also modify the “adjusting” said mixing gain. Even assum-
ing, without deciding, that the Director is wrong about the
application of the last antecedent rule here, the result is
only that some adjusting must occur “during a voice timer.”
But nothing about such a view of the grammar limits
2 The last antecedent rule provides that “a limiting
clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying
only the noun or phrase it immediately follows.” Apple Inc.
v. United States, 964 F.3d 1087, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (in-
ternal citation and ellipsis omitted).
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ST CASE1TECH, LLC v. SQUIRES 6
adjusting to gain-altering actions occurring after the voice
timer starts, to the exclusion of the maintaining of (earlier
set) gain levels during the voice timer.
That over-time process of changing and maintaining is
an available meaning of “adjusting,” and as the Board
found, that meaning is the best one in the present context:
the claim term “adjusting a mixing gain” encompasses not
only the initial act of changing gain levels but also main-
taining those changed levels over time. For instance, Fig-
ure 2B, depicted below, shows that, after initial gain
adjustments are made (steps 253-254), the system may
loop back and “maintain” those gains at step 256 if front
voice activity continues to be detected. J.A. 43.
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Throughout this iterative process, the system is contin-
uously “adjusting” the mixing gain by either changing the
relative sound levels or maintaining previously adjusted
levels. See J.A. 53 at 6:4-13 (“If at step 255 front voice ac-
tivity from the second individual is detected, then the gain
of the incoming audio signal is maintained (or decreased)
and the ambient sound pass-through gain is maintained (or
decreased) at step 256. . . . The method then continues back
to step 252 to monitor for user voice activity.”). In some
instances, the specification even describes equivalency be-
tween “maintain[ing]” and “decreas[ing]” gain, showing
that maintenance of a previously adjusted gain is a form of
adjustment in the context of the ’244 patent. See id. at 6:5-
7 (“[T]he gain of the incoming audio signal is maintained
(or decreased) and the ambient sound pass-through gain is
maintained (or decreased) at step 256.”) (emphasis added).
Other specification passages further suggest inclusion of
maintaining within adjusting. See id. at 7:24-36, 8:6-10.
As such, even if grammar were to require that “adjusting”
only happen during the voice timer, such adjustments can
be achieved in the system through maintaining and deliv-
ering a previously adjusted volume level.
ST1’s reliance on logic fares no better. The Board cor-
rectly explained that the purpose of the voice timer is to
“bridge gaps” between voice activity to prevent the ear-
phone from constantly adjusting sound signals up and
down between individual spoken words in a conversation.
J.A. 13; see also J.A. 54 at 7:36-39; J.A. 58-59 at 16:66-17:3.
The timer serves this function equally well whether the
gain adjustment happens immediately before, simultane-
ously with, or after the voice timer’s activation, provided
the adjusted levels are maintained into some portion of the
timer’s duration. See J.A. 13 (“[N]othing in the specifica-
tion . . . suggests the order of activating the voice timer and
adjusting the relevant gains is important or even relevant
to the invention.”).
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ST CASE1TECH, LLC v. SQUIRES 8
The intrinsic evidence fully supports an unordered
reading of the claims. The specification contemplates em-
bodiments in which adjustments are made and thereafter
maintained and treats them as examples of adjustments
occurring during the voice timer. See J.A. 54 at 7:24-36
(“The method . . . includes decreasing the audio content sig-
nal and increasing the ambient sound pass-through . . .
starting a voice activity timer . . . and maintaining ambient
sound pass-through level and audio content signal level
during the combined voice activity.”). For example, the em-
bodiment depicted in Figure 2B (shown above) demon-
strates that adjustments can occur before timer activation.
See J.A. 43. Steps 253-254 show decreasing incoming audio
gain and increasing ambient sound pass-through gain upon
detection of user voice activity. Id. The specification then
states: “When user voice activity ceases, a user voice activ-
ity timer is started prior to step 255.” J.A. 53 at 5:58-60.
The specification does not, however, identify when, prior to
step 255, the timer is started. Thus, in this embodiment,
gain adjustments at steps 253-254 can occur before the
timer is activated. J.A. 43.
Nothing in the specification compels the rigid order of
steps ST1 advocates. See, e.g., J.A. 43 at Fig. 2B; J.A. 53
at 6:4-7 (describing embodiment wherein the activation of
the voice timer need not occur prior to adjusting). Neither
side claims to find support for its position in the prosecu-
tion history. And there is no need here to consult the ex-
trinsic evidence, which cannot change the construction
compelled by the intrinsic evidence. See Kara Tech. Inc. v.
Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“[E]xtrinsic evidence like expert testimony cannot over-
come more persuasive intrinsic evidence.”).
Contrary to ST1’s suggestion, the Board’s construction,
which we too have now adopted, does not render “activat-
ing a voice timer” impermissibly superfluous. J.A. 57 at
13:47; see also generally Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Rsch. in
Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting
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construction whereby “the separate sub-step for [‘]estab-
lishing a connection[’] would become ‘superfluous’”). With-
out the “activating a voice timer” requirement, the claims
could encompass an embodiment in which the adjusting be-
gins and ends without any voice timer at all. The claims’
requirement that adjustment occur “during a voice timer”
renders such an embodiment outside the scope of the
claims. When the adjusting occurs before the voice timer
is activated, the claims are only practiced if that adjusting
is maintained until at least some time after the voice timer
activates, which, of course, requires there to be an acti-
vated voice timer.
Finally, while it is true that a district court in parallel
litigation adopted a construction consistent with ST1’s pro-
posal here, requiring an order of steps including that the
adjusting occur before the activating of the voice timer,
that construction is not binding on the Board. The Board
considered the district court construction and did not find
it persuasive. See J.A. 10-11. That is all it was required to
do. See ParkerVision, Inc. v. Vidal, 88 F.4th 969, 977-78
(Fed. Cir. 2023); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim
construction determination concerning a term of the claim
. . . that is timely made of record in the inter partes review
proceeding will be considered.”).
ST1 does not dispute that the Board had substantial
evidence for the factual findings underpinning its determi-
nation of obviousness under the Director’s preferred con-
struction. Accordingly, we affirm.
IV
We have considered ST1’s remaining arguments and
deem them without merit. The decision of the Board is af-
firmed.
AFFIRMED
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