Us Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1520
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington in No. 2:23-cv-00592-JHC,
Judge John H. Chun.
______________________
Decided: January 22, 2026
______________________
D AVID P. BERTEN, Global IP Law Group, Chicago, IL,
argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by ALISON
AUBREY RICHARDS .
J OHN R. B OULE, III, Jones Day, Los Angeles, CA, ar-
gued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by T.
K AITLIN CROWDER, Cleveland, OH; MICHAEL C.
HENDERSHOT , Palo Alto, CA; I SRAEL SASHA MAYERGOYZ,
Chicago, IL; J ENNIFER L. SWIZE, Washington, DC; RITA J.
YOON, San Francisco, CA.
______________________
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 1 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 1 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 2
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, HUGHES and STOLL , Circuit
Judges.
MOORE, Chief Judge.
US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC appeals an order of the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington granting Google LLC’s (Google) motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant owns U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637, which re-
lates to web conferencing systems that include “time-shift-
ing capabilities” enabling participants “to observe [a]
session in real-time, delayed while the session is still in
progress, or after the session has completed.” ’637 patent
at abstract, 3:61–64; see also id. at 2:33–43. Participants
can also observe the session at different playback rates
while maintaining substantially consistent perceived audio
quality. Id. at 3:64–67. According to Appellant, and undis-
puted by Google on appeal, the claims allow data streams
(e.g., video, chat data, documents, web pages, and white-
boarding sessions) to be viewed asynchronously, for exam-
ple, to go back and review one aspect of a multimedia
presentation while another aspect is proceeding live. Ap-
pellant Br. 29–30; see also Google Br. 3–4.
Independent claims 2 and 7 of the ’637 patent are rep-
resentative. Claim 2 reads:
2. A web conferencing system comprising:
(a) a first client application allowing at least one
presenting participant to share computer screen
video,
(b) said first client application also being arranged
to allow said presenting participant to share at
least one data stream selected from the group
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 2 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 2 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 3
consisting of chat data, documents, web pages and
white-boarding session,
(c) storage means for recording said computer
screen video and said data stream, and
(d) a second client application allowing at least one
observing participant to sense said computer
screen video and said data stream live,
(e) said second client application also being ar-
ranged to allow said observing participant to selec-
tively sense a previously presented and recorded
part of said computer screen video and said data
stream while said presenting participant is sharing
a current part of said computer screen video and
said data stream,
(f) said second client application also being ar-
ranged to allow said observing participant to selec-
tively sense a previously presented and recorded
part of said computer screen video and said data
stream after said presenting participant has fin-
ished sharing a said computer screen video and,
said data stream
whereby said web conferencing system is able to
simultaneously record said computer screen video
and said data stream and allow said observing par-
ticipant to sense current and previously presented
parts of said computer screen video and said data
stream.
’637 patent at 12:32–61.
Claim 7 reads:
7. A web conferencing system comprising:
(a) a first client application that allows at least one
presenting participant to share data streams
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 3 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 3 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 4
comprised of audio data and computer screen video
data
(b) a second client application that allows at least
one observing participant to sense said data
streams
(c) a server application operatively connected to
said first client application and to said second cli-
ent application, said server application arranged
to:
i. receive said data streams from said first
client application and record it in a storage
device
ii. retrieve said data streams from said
storage device and send it to said second
client application
(d) a time-scale modification component opera-
tively connected to said second client application
which is able to maintain substantially consistent
perceived audio quality at a plurality of playback
rates
whereby said data streams from said first client ap-
plication can be simultaneously recorded by and re-
trieved from said storage device, and said second
client application allows said observing participant
to sense said data streams in real-time, and said
second client application also allows said observing
participant to selectively sense a previously pre-
sented and recorded part of said data streams at a
plurality of playback rates at the same time that
said presenting participant is sharing a current
part of said data streams and after said presenting
participant has stopped sharing, and said observ-
ing participant will perceive substantially con-
sistent audio quality.
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 4 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 4 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 5
Id. at 13:20–14:19.
Appellant sued Google for infringing claims 2–5 and
7–9 of the ’637 patent. J.A. 87–88. Google moved to dis-
miss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6), arguing the asserted claims are patent-
ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.1 J.A. 121–36. The district
court granted Google’s motion to dismiss and denied Appel-
lant leave to amend its complaint based on futility.
J.A. 1–25. US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC appeals. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
D ISCUSSION
We review a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal un-
der the law of the regional circuit, here the Ninth Circuit.
Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit reviews Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissals de novo, accepting all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and construing the pleadings in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Knievel
v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005)).
I. Patent Eligibility
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of
law that may contain underlying factual issues. Interval
Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2018). We review the district court’s ultimate conclusion
on patent eligibility de novo. Id. We assess patent eligibil-
ity using a two-part test. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014). First, “[w]e must . . . deter-
mine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
1 Google also argued Appellant failed to plausibly al-
lege that Google “benefits” from or “uses” the entire
claimed system. J.A. 136. The district court did not reach
this alternative argument, J.A. 2 n.1, and we do not reach
it on appeal.
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 5 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 5 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 6
ineligible concept,” such as an abstract idea (i.e., Alice Step
One). Id. at 218. If so, we must then “consider the ele-
ments of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible ap-
plication” (i.e., Alice Step Two). Id. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 78–79 (2012)). The Supreme Court has described Alice
Step Two as “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to en-
sure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.’” Id.
at 217–18 (citation modified) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 72–73).
Applying the Alice test, the district court determined
the asserted claims are patent-ineligible because they are
directed to an abstract idea and do not include an inventive
concept that makes the claims patent-eligible. J.A. 1–24.
We agree the asserted claims are not eligible.
A. Alice Step One
Regarding Alice Step One, Appellant argues the dis-
trict court erred in determining the asserted claims are di-
rected to the abstract idea of “playing back recorded
content.” Appellant Br. 21 (citing J.A. 18). According to
Appellant, this is an over-generalization of the claims,
which are directed to a “specific asserted improvement that
allows a presentation to be reviewed asynchronously . . . at
the same time.” Id. at 23–26. Even if we were to narrow
the district court’s characterization of the claims, however,
we would still conclude the claims are directed to the pa-
tent-ineligible abstract idea of allowing asynchronous re-
view of presentations, rather than any specific
technological improvement, because they do not “describe
how the alleged goal of [asynchronous review] is achieved.”
Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC, 60 F.4th 1349,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (emphasis added).
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 6 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 6 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 7
“In cases involving software innovations, [the step-one]
inquiry often turns on whether the claims focus on specific
asserted improvements in computer capabilities or instead
on a process or system that qualifies [as] an abstract
idea . . . .” Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc.,
50 F.4th 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (alterations in origi-
nal). “While the § 101 inquiry must focus on the language
of the asserted claims themselves,” ChargePoint, Inc. v.
SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (ci-
tation modified), the claim itself need not explicitly recite
the improvement. Rather, our precedent supports a vari-
ety of analytical approaches including, for example,
(1) looking to the written description to understand the
problem facing the inventor and what the patent describes
as the invention, id. at 767–68; (2) considering whether
any technological improvement is “embodied in the claims,”
Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1258
(Fed. Cir. 2017); and (3) analyzing whether the claims and
written description “describe how [the] improvement was
accomplished.” Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp.,
134 F.4th 1205, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (collecting cases),
cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2025 WL 3507020 (Dec. 8, 2025).
We start our analysis with the claim language. Here,
independent claim 2 recites that the first and second client
applications are “arranged to allow” certain results and
that the web conferencing system is “able to” achieve sim-
ultaneous recording and observing of current and previ-
ously presented parts of a computer screen video and data
stream. ’637 patent at 12:32–61 (claim 2). Similarly, inde-
pendent claim 7 recites that “a first client applica-
tion . . . allows at least one presenting participant to share
data streams comprised of audio data and computer screen
video data” and “a second client application . . . allows at
least one observing participant to sense said data streams”
in real time and asynchronously. Id. at 13:20–14:19
(claim 7) (emphases added). Neither these claims nor their
dependent claims, however, disclose how the claimed
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 7 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 7 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 8
results are achieved or embody any specific technological
improvement discernible to a skilled artisan from the pa-
tent or the prosecution history. Accordingly, we agree with
the district court that the asserted claims of the ’637 patent
are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. See Be-
teiro, LLC v. DraftKings Inc., 104 F.4th 1350, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2024) (“[C]laims . . . drafted using largely (if not
entirely) result-focused functional language, containing no
specificity about how the purported invention achieves
those results . . . are almost always found to be ineligible
for patenting under Section 101.”).
Appellant argues the asserted claims are not result-ori-
ented because they recite two client applications enabling
the manipulation (e.g., the sharing, recording, reviewing,
and sensing) of multiple data streams, and thus “expressly
explain how the systems need to be set up to accomplish
the improvement” of asynchronous presentation review.
Appellant Br. 29–30; see Oral Arg. at 5:07–7:32. We do not
agree. The claims are result-oriented because they do not
explain how the client applications achieve the recited ma-
nipulation of the data streams to enable asynchronous re-
view. ’637 patent at 12:32–61 (claim 2), 13:20–14:19
(claim 7). Moreover, the written description does not dis-
close any improvement to the underlying components to en-
able asynchronous review. See id. at 10:26–29 (disclosing
known client applications); id. at 5:37–38 (acknowledging
data streams were “commonly used in the audio visual
field”); id. at 8:33–39 (stating “the workings of [the stream
decompression and display] components resemble those of
similar components in existing web conferencing . . . appli-
cations”). The written description does not suggest the use
of two client applications and multiple data streams was a
technical solution to any problem facing the inventor. See
id. at 2:66–3:6, 3:61–64 (describing problem and inven-
tion). Instead, the written description suggests the inven-
tion is nothing more than the abstract idea of applying
known time-shifting functions to web-conferencing
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 8 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 8 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 9
systems to solve “great inefficiencies” resulting from par-
ticipants waiting for others to join a presentation or from
participants missing part of a presentation. Id. at 3:2–6.
For these reasons, this case is not like Contour IP Hold-
ing LLC v. GoPro, Inc., where the patent disclosed (and the
claims reflected) “improving POV camera technology
through specific means of generating high- and low-quality
video streams in parallel and transferring a low-quality
video stream to a remote device.” 113 F.4th 1373, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2024). Instead, this case is like Hawk Technol-
ogy Systems, where the claims at issue also involved the
manipulation of multiple data streams but “fail[ed] to re-
cite a specific solution to make the alleged improvement—
conserving bandwidth while preserving quality—‘con-
crete’” and were “recited at such a level of result-oriented
generality that those claims amount[ed] to a mere imple-
mentation of an abstract idea.” 60 F.4th at 1358 (quoting
Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d
1143, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
Appellant additionally argues that, even if the asserted
claims are result-oriented, Google similarly uses “func-
tional claiming” in its own video conferencing patents and
thus necessarily believes this approach to claim drafting
does not result in subject matter ineligible claims. Appel-
lant Br. 30–34. The subject matter eligibility of Google’s
patent claims is not before us and has no bearing on our
analysis of the ’637 patent. Moreover, we reject the notion
that the mere existence of factually distinguishable Google-
owned patents somehow amounts to a sweeping concession
by Google that all patents involving functional claiming ap-
proaches are necessarily patent-eligible.
Because we conclude the asserted claims of the ’637 pa-
tent are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we
proceed to Step Two of the Alice test.
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 9 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 9 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 10
B. Alice Step Two
Appellant argues the district court erred in its applica-
tion of Alice Step Two by overlooking two inventive con-
cepts recited in the asserted claims that allegedly make
them patent-eligible: (1) a two client application system
allowing for the manipulation of multiple data streams and
(2) a “time-scale modification component.” Appellant
Br. 37–40. We do not agree either “transforms the nature
of the claims into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217 (citation modified).
First, Appellant largely repeats its Alice Step One ar-
guments in pointing out the claims recite two client appli-
cations enabling the manipulation of distinct data streams.
Appellant Br. 38. As explained above, the claims use re-
sult-oriented language with no specific implementation il-
lustrating how to achieve the claimed results. “Merely
describing the functions of the abstract idea itself, without
particularity, . . . is simply not enough under step two.”
Int’l Bus. Machs., 50 F.4th at 1382 (citation modified).
Moreover, as the specification makes clear, the claimed cli-
ent applications are conventional, well-known components,
operating according to their ordinary functions to manipu-
late conventional data streams. See ’637 patent at 5:10–
20, 5:23–39, 8:33–39, 10:20–29. This cannot amount to an
inventive concept, which must “reflect[] something more
than the application of an abstract idea using ‘well-under-
stood, routine, and conventional activities previously
known to the industry.’” Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
927 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Aatrix Soft-
ware, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121,
1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also Accenture Glob. Servs.,
GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (no inventive concept in system claims that
“only contain generalized software components arranged to
implement an abstract concept on a computer”). Nor can
conclusory allegations to the contrary “alter what [the]
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 10 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 10 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 11
patent itself states.” Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc.,
65 F.4th 698, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Second, Appellant points to claims 4 and 7 of the
’637 patent as allegedly supplying an inventive concept be-
cause they require an audio “time-scale modification com-
ponent” able to maintain substantially consistent
perceived audio quality (or aspects of audio quality) at a
plurality of playback rates. Appellant Br. 39; ’637 patent
at 13:1–10 (claim 4), 13:20–14:19 (claim 7). Again, there is
no disclosed inventive concept used to accomplish the
claimed result, and the specification confirms the time-
scale modification component was a conventional compo-
nent implemented using off-the-shelf algorithms from re-
lated audio contexts including the “playback of recorded
content.” ’637 patent at 3:19–32, 9:4–13. Under these cir-
cumstances, the time-scale modification component can-
not, as a matter of law, constitute an inventive concept,
which “must be more than well-understood, routine, con-
ventional activity.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v.
DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (ci-
tation modified).
We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that
claims 2–5 and 7–9 of the ’637 patent are patent-ineligible
and affirm the dismissal.
II. Premature Dismissal
Appellant next argues that, as a procedural matter, the
district court erred by deciding patent-eligibility at the mo-
tion to dismiss stage and should have granted Appellant
leave to amend its complaint. Appellant Br. 40–44. We do
not agree.
“A patent may be determined ineligible at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage ‘when there are no factual allegations that,
taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as
a matter of law.’” Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods.,
Inc., 983 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Aatrix,
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 11 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 11 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 12
882 F.3d at 1125). And while “[t]he Ninth Circuit reviews
a district court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint for
abuse of discretion,” “[t]he question of futility of amend-
ment . . . is reviewed de novo.” Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blip-
par Ltd., 110 F.4th 1280, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted).
The Appellant has made no factual allegations that
would preclude dismissal in this case. The abstract idea
involves allowing asynchronous review of web conferencing
presentations, and an inventive concept “must be signifi-
cantly more than the abstract idea itself.” BASCOM Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). No amendment to the complaint can
alter what the ’637 patent itself states regarding the con-
ventionality of the client applications, data streams, and
time-scale modification components discussed in the eligi-
bility analysis detailed above. See supra Discussion § I;
Sanderling, 65 F.4th at 706. Accordingly, we see no error
in the district court’s conclusion that granting leave to
amend here would be futile. J.A. 25.
Appellant additionally argues the district court should
have (1) treated Google’s motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment because Google improperly relied on
facts outside the complaint to attempt to establish what
was known, routine, or conventional, and (2) conducted
claim construction before dismissal. Both arguments are
unavailing. The district court was not obligated to treat
Google’s motion as a summary judgment motion because
the court was clear it did not rely on any extra-pleading
materials. See J.A. 22 n.7; Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d
1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss supported by extraneous materials cannot be re-
garded as one for summary judgment until the district
court acts to convert the motion by indicating . . . that it
will not exclude those materials from its consideration.”
(emphases added)). Nor was claim construction necessary
because Appellant never proposed any constructions or
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 12 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 12 of 13 --

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 13
explained how a proposed construction would change the
patent-eligibility analysis. Mobile Acuity, 110 F.4th at
1293 (“To defeat a motion to dismiss based on the pur-
ported need for claim construction, a patentee must pro-
pose a specific claim construction . . . and explain why any
dispute . . . must be resolved before the scope of the claims
can be understood for § 101 purposes.” (citation modified)).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Because claims 2–5 and 7–9
of the ’637 patent are patent-ineligible and dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Costs to Google.
Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 13 Filed: 01/22/2026

-- 13 of 13 --