Ingevity Corporation, Ingevity South Carolina, LLC v. Basf Corporation

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
INGEVITY CORPORATION, INGEVITY SOUTH
CAROLINA, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
BASF CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1577
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware in No. 1:18-cv-01391-RGA, Judge
Richard G. Andrews.
______________________
Decided: February 11, 2026
______________________
WES EARNHARDT, Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, New
York, NY, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also repre-
sented by SHARONMOYEE GOSWAMI.
PAUL ALESSIO MEZZINA, King & Spalding LLP, Wash-
ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by ALEXANDER KAZAM, CHRISTOPHER YOOK; BRIAN
EUTERMOSER, Denver, CO; THOMAS FRIEL, Palo Alto, CA.
______________________
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 2
Before LOURIE, PROST, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
Ingevity Corporation and Ingevity South Carolina,
LLC (together, “Ingevity”) sued BASF Corporation
(“BASF”) in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware for infringement of U.S. Patent RE38,844
(“the ’844 patent”). The district court granted summary
judgment of invalidity of the asserted claims (1, 4, 11, 18,
19, 24, 43 and 48) of the ’844 patent. See Ingevity Corp. v.
BASF Corp., 501 F. Supp. 3d 274 (D. Del. 2020). It later
denied both parties’ motions for partial summary judgment
on BASF’s antitrust and tortious interference counter-
claims and then held a jury trial on those claims. J.A. 39–
43. At trial, the jury found, in relevant part, that Ingevity
had engaged in unlawful tying and awarded damages ac-
cordingly. J.A. 9087–90, 51–52. The district court subse-
quently denied Ingevity’s renewed motion for judgment as
a matter of law and motion for a new trial. See Ingevity
Corp. v. BASF Corp., No. 18-cv-1391-RGA, 2024 WL
579667 (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2024) (“JMOL Decision”). Ingevity
timely appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm In-
gevity’s antitrust liability and the corresponding damages
award and therefore need not reach the remaining issues
raised on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Ingevity and BASF both manufacture carbon honey-
combs, an activated carbon structure that can be used to
filter airborne pollutants in a variety of applications. Both
companies market carbon honeycombs for use in automo-
bile air-intake systems and fuel vapor canisters. Air-in-
take products control emissions by filtering incoming air
before it enters the engine, while fuel vapor canisters con-
trol emissions by capturing gasoline vapors released from
a vehicle’s gas tank before they escape into the atmosphere.
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 3
Ingevity owns the ’844 patent, which describes and
claims systems and methods for reducing emissions from a
car’s gas tank. ’844 patent col. 1 ll. 14–23. Specifically, the
’844 patent is directed to a dual-stage fuel-vapor canister
system that combines a higher-capacity gas-tank-side ad-
sorbent with a lower-capacity vent-side adsorbent. See,
e.g., id. at col. 10 ll. 36–44 (claim 1). Notably, carbon hon-
eycombs used in air-intake systems do not come within the
scope of the ’844 patent, but honeycombs used in fuel vapor
canisters do. See JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *2;
Ingevity Op. Br. 20.
In 2016, BASF began marketing its EvapTrap XC, a
carbon honeycomb with dimensions and cell density com-
parable to Ingevity’s honeycomb products but produced us-
ing different materials and manufacturing processes. In
2018, Ingevity sued BASF, asserting infringement of the
’844 patent by testing and marketing EvapTrap XC. BASF
responded by arguing that the patent was not infringed,
was invalid on multiple grounds, and was unenforceable
due to patent misuse.
BASF also brought counterclaims for unlawful tying
and exclusive dealing under the federal antitrust laws and
tortious interference under Delaware law. As relevant
here, regarding its unlawful tying claim, BASF alleged that
Ingevity conditioned licenses to the ’844 patent (the tying
product) on customers’ agreements to fulfill their honey-
comb product needs by exclusively purchasing Ingevity’s
unpatented honeycomb products (the tied products) in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 or 2 (1988). The
infringing or non-infringing use of Ingevity’s unpatented
honeycomb products is the key issue in this appeal, as will
be seen hereinbelow.
I
At summary judgment on patent validity, the district
court ruled that Ingevity’s ’844 patent is invalid based on
prior invention “by another” under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 4
§ 102(g).1 J.A. 37. Both parties then filed motions for par-
tial summary judgment on BASF’s counterclaims. J.A. 39.
Ingevity argued that its conduct alleged to be tying and ex-
clusive dealing did not violate the antitrust laws because
its honeycomb products were “nonstaple goods,” i.e., goods
lacking substantial non-infringing uses, and therefore pro-
tected from antitrust liability under the patent laws. The
district court explained that whether Ingevity’s honey-
combs had substantial non-infringing uses beyond the ’844
patent was “a jury issue.” J.A. 41. It observed that while
“Ingevity’s records . . . suggest that Ingevity has sold the
same articles to others for [non-infringing] uses[,]” Ingevity
“says the records are inconclusive, contain mistakes, etc.,”
which, to the court, created a “disputed issue of material
fact.” Id.
Ingevity also asserted immunity under the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine, which shields certain conduct from anti-
trust liability when it involves petitioning the government.
J.A. 4291. It argued that its tying conduct merely consisted
of “threat[s] to sue [customers] for patent infringement”
and nothing more. Id. The district court declined to resolve
the immunity issue on the existing record, explaining that
it could not decide the matter “more than tentatively” and
that a definitive ruling would have to await trial. J.A. 42–
43. The court nevertheless previewed its view, stating that
“Noerr-Pennington will [not] help Ingevity if BASF proves
the Ingevity product . . . is a staple” because “the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine [does not] eradicate[] the boundaries
that the Supreme Court has described in similar contexts.”
1 In a separate proceeding, the International Trade
Commission ruled that all claims of the ’844 patent as-
serted here were invalid on the same ground, and we af-
firmed that decision. Ingevity Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
No. 20-1800, 2021 WL 3440786, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 21,
2021).
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 5
J.A. 43 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969) (“[T]he patentee . . . may not con-
dition the right to use his patent on the licensee’s agree-
ment to purchase, use, or sell, or not to purchase, use, or
sell, another article of commerce not within the scope of his
patent monopoly.”)). The district court therefore denied
both parties’ summary judgment motions. J.A. 39.
II
BASF’s antitrust and tortious interference counter-
claims were then tried to a jury. See J.A. 51–52. The jury
heard evidence of unlawful tying, including testimony from
Ed Woodcock, president of Ingevity’s automotive-products
division, who admitted at trial that “in order to obtain a
license [to the ’844 patent,] Ingevity requires that custom-
ers buy the honeycombs only from Ingevity.” J.A. 9476.
The district court later instructed the jury that “[a] patent
owner has the right to control the market” for “nonstaple
goods” but “has no right to control the market for” staple
goods—those suitable for actual and substantial non-in-
fringing uses. J.A. 9032 (Jury Instruction 4.2). The in-
struction concluded that if the jury “determine[s] that
BASF has not met its burden to prove that the carbon hon-
eycombs at issue are staple goods, [the jury] must find for
Ingevity on the tying . . . claim[].” Id. The jury found that
BASF had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
Ingevity had engaged in the unlawful tying of its ’844 pa-
tent licenses to sales of its carbon honeycombs in violation
of Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.2 J.A. 9087. It then
2 The jury also found Ingevity liable on all other
counts, including claims of exclusive dealing and tortious
interference, and awarded damages accordingly.
J.A. 9088–89. The damages amount for unlawful tying,
$28,285,714, was larger than any other claim’s damages
amount, and the parties agreed that the damages for the
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 6
awarded BASF $28,285,714 in antitrust damages.
J.A. 9089.
III
After the jury entered its verdict but before the district
court entered its judgment, the district court directed
BASF to submit proposed findings and conclusions of law
on Ingevity’s immunity defenses with Ingevity’s responses
to follow. J.A. 127. In its response, Ingevity acknowledged
that “tying and bad-faith patent enforcement are separate
bases for liability,” J.A. 11241, but continued to deny that
it had created a tying arrangement. Specifically, Ingevity
asserted that it never “told customers they were required
to purchase Ingevity’s honeycombs to receive a ‘license’” to
the ’844 patent, J.A. 11234, but merely “communicated to
customers what does and does not infringe” the patent,
J.A. 11229. Because that conduct, Ingevity argued, was
limited to communications, it was entitled to immunity un-
der the patent laws and Noerr-Pennington. Id. The district
court rejected Ingevity’s immunity argument because “the
jury found otherwise.” J.A. 47. It explained that the jury
was “instructed that it could not find illegal tying if Ingev-
ity’s conduct was limited to ‘communications about its pa-
tent rights to customers,’” such that it was
“straightforward” that “the conduct upon which the jury
other claims were not cumulative. J.A. 9086. Therefore,
the total amount of damages was simply the unlawful tying
damages amount of $28,285,714 (later trebled to
$84,857,142 by the district court, J.A. 51–52). Because we
affirm the jury’s unlawful tying findings and the corre-
sponding damages, infra Discussion §§ I.A–C, we need not
address the other claims on appeal. See Oral Arg.
at 12:21–35, Appeal No. 24–1577, available at
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/24-1577_12
052025.mp3 (Ingevity’s counsel agreeing that the other
claims are mooted if we affirm on tying).
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 7
based its [unlawful tying] finding was not limited to pro-
tected communications about [Ingevity’s] patent rights.”3
Id. The court therefore concluded that “neither the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine nor the patent laws immunize Ingev-
ity’s conduct.” J.A. 46.
IV
Ingevity then moved for judgment as a matter of law or
a new trial. JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *1;
J.A. 10590–95 (Ingevity’s excerpted JMOL briefing). As
relevant here, Ingevity challenged the jury’s verdict as to
unlawful tying under federal antitrust law by asserting a
statutory patent misuse defense under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).4
D.I. 594 at 3. It argued that “a patent holder has a ‘statu-
tory right to control nonstaple goods that are capable only
of infringing use in a patented invention,’ even if it would
‘suppress competition in the market for an unpatented
commodity.’” Id. at 2 (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
3 Jury Instruction 4.1 provided that “Ingevity has
the right under the patent laws to enforce its patents, in-
cluding through licensing, through communications about
its patent rights to customers and competitors, and
through litigation,” as well as a First Amendment right “to
file a lawsuit, to threaten litigation, and to communicate
with customers about litigation.” J.A. 9031. The jury was
further instructed that “[e]vidence of the exercise of such
rights cannot form the basis for BASF’s antitrust claims or
BASF’s tortious interference claim.” Id. Notably, “Ingevity
did not make or renew any objections to Final Jury Instruc-
tion 4.1 when the instructions were being finalized.”
J.A. 46 n.2.
4 The Joint Appendix excerpts Ingevity’s opening
JMOL briefing such that it begins at page 8. For pages 1
to 7, we will directly cite the district court’s docket number,
D.I. 594, and the corresponding brief page, as the district
court did.
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 8
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 202, 213 (1980)). On that basis,
Ingevity argued that substantial evidence did not support
the jury’s staple good finding underlying the unlawful ty-
ing verdict. JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *2. It
specifically contended that there was no record “evidence
that: (1) Ingevity intended its honeycombs to be used out-
side of fuel vapor canisters . . . ; (2) anyone actually used
Ingevity’s honeycombs in air-intake systems; and (3) any
non-infringing uses were substantial.” Id. BASF re-
sponded that the jury was properly instructed on the fac-
tual question of staple goods and was free to reject
Ingevity’s position. J.A. 10611.
Alternatively, Ingevity reframed its tying conduct as
mere “[c]ommunications about patent rights” in an attempt
to obtain immunity under the patent laws and Noerr-Pen-
nington. Id. at 10597–98 (citations omitted). Specifically,
it argued that “[t]here is no evidence that Ingevity engaged
in any alleged tying . . . conduct besides the indisputably
immune express or implied statements that Ingevity would
enforce its patents against conduct Ingevity believed was
infringing.” Id. at 10598; see also id. (“The sum total of
what BASF cites as evidence of ‘tying’ consists of Ingevity
telling its customers that it did not consider use of Ingev-
ity’s adsorbents to be infringing the ’844 [p]atent, but use
of competitors’ adsorbents would be.”).
The district court rejected both of Ingevity’s argu-
ments. First, while “drawing all logical inferences in favor
of BASF,” the district court concluded that “there was sub-
stantial evidence in the record supporting the jury’s deter-
mination that Ingevity’s honeycombs are staple goods”
with actual and substantial non-infringing uses. JMOL
Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *6. The district court ex-
plained that the jury could reasonably have found that
there were (1) sales of Ingevity’s honeycombs for non-in-
fringing uses based on contemporaneous business records
reflecting repeated sales for air-intake applications over
multiple years, id. at *4; (2) actual non-infringing use
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 9
based on evidence of repeated purchases for those applica-
tions, id. at *5; and (3) substantial non-infringing use
based on the volume, practicality, and recurring nature of
those uses, without resort to rigid percentage thresholds,
id. at *5–6. Because, as the court reasoned, the jury’s “sta-
ple good” finding rested on permissible inferences and cred-
ibility determinations supported by substantial evidence,
it declined to disturb the jury’s verdict on antitrust tying
liability and accordingly denied judgment as a matter of
law. Id. at *6.
Second, the district court rejected Ingevity’s contention
that its conduct was immunized by the patent laws and
Noerr-Pennington. Id. at *8–9. The court held that “[t]he
jury could reasonably have found a classic tying arrange-
ment” based on conduct extending beyond protected patent
communications; specifically, it pointed to testimony from
Woodcock showing that Ingevity conditioned licenses to the
’844 patent on the purchase of its honeycombs. Id. at *9.
Thus, because the jury found that Ingevity’s honeycombs
were staple goods, the district court explained, they did not
have an implied license under the ’844 patent. Id. Moreo-
ver, the district court explained that such finding neces-
sarily precluded Ingevity’s argument that its conduct could
be recast as only patent enforcement activity. Id. The dis-
trict court therefore concluded that immunity did not apply
and accordingly denied judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Separately, Ingevity challenged the jury’s damages
award on two grounds. First, it argued that BASF failed to
disaggregate damages attributable to unlawful conduct
from those caused by lawful patent enforcement. Id. at *6.
Second, Ingevity argued that the damages model was spec-
ulative, asserting there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the expert’s assumption that BASF would have
captured a 50% market share and sold millions of honey-
combs despite lacking product certification or prior sales.
Id. The court rejected those contentions and explained that
BASF needed to show only that Ingevity’s unlawful
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 10
conduct was a material cause of its injury. Id. at *7 (cita-
tion omitted). The district court then determined that sub-
stantial evidence supported the jury’s damages award and
further concluded that the jury reasonably accepted
BASF’s expert testimony that disaggregation was imprac-
ticable and that the damages model was not speculative.
Id. at *7–8.
Ingevity timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
Ingevity argues that the district court erred in denying
it judgment as a matter of law and challenges the suffi-
ciency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of un-
lawful tying under federal antitrust law.5 It does so by
advancing a theory of defense to antitrust liability and,
separately, a theory of immunity from antitrust liability.
Ingevity also challenges the jury’s antitrust damages
award.
First, Ingevity asserts a statutory patent misuse de-
fense under § 271(d) of the Patent Act supported by the
5 Ingevity also challenges the district court’s sum-
mary judgment ruling on patent invalidity, but we need not
address that ruling on appeal. As discussed below, we af-
firm the jury’s finding of unlawful tying, see infra Discus-
sion §§ I.A–B, and the ’844 patent expired on March 18,
2022, J.A. 8023. Accordingly, Ingevity’s appeal of the inva-
lidity ruling is dismissed as moot. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (un-
lawful tying makes the underlying patent “unenforceable”);
Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“A determination of unenforceability . . . moots any
issue of invalidity.” (citation omitted)). Ingevity’s counsel
agreed. See Oral Arg. at 11:39–54.
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 11
related “staple article” doctrine. See Ingevity Op. Br. 34–
47. It argues that the jury’s verdict was not supported by
substantial evidence because BASF failed to show that In-
gevity’s honeycombs (the tied product) are staple goods,
and, as such, Ingevity has the statutory right under the pa-
tent laws to control those nonstaple goods. Id. at 34–35
(citing Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. at 213).
Second, Ingevity argues that its purported tying con-
duct is immune from antitrust liability under the patent
laws and Noerr-Pennington. Id. at 47–57. It contends that
whether or not the jury’s staple goods finding was correct,
“such enforcement activities are immune from antitrust li-
ability” “[b]ecause Ingevity has the right under the patent
laws and the First Amendment to enforce its patents in
good faith.” Id. at 48. It further contends that its immun-
ity argument holds true “even if Ingevity were mistaken
about the scope of its patent rights.” Id.
Third, Ingevity argues that the jury’s antitrust dam-
ages award should be vacated because BASF failed to dis-
aggregate the damages caused by Ingevity’s unlawful
conduct from those resulting from its lawful patent enforce-
ment and that such disaggregation was required and feasi-
ble. Id. at 61–67.
We discuss each argument in turn.
I
We apply our own law with respect to patent law is-
sues. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. Hikma Pharms. USA Inc.,
104 F.4th 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2024). For matters not
unique to patent law, we apply the law of the regional cir-
cuit, here, the Third Circuit. Versata Software, Inc. v.
Callidus Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134, 1136 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (applying Third Circuit law). The Third Circuit “re-
views a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, ap-
plying the same standard as the District Court.”
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 12
Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 603 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citation modified).
Likewise, the Third Circuit reviews grants and denials
of motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b)
de novo, Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d
1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), but that review remains highly
deferential to the jury’s verdict. “[A] jury verdict will not
be overturned unless the record is critically deficient of
that quantum of evidence from which a jury could have ra-
tionally reached its verdict,” Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc.,
834 F.3d 376, 386 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted), a standard akin to the familiar sub-
stantial evidence standard, Gomez v. Allegheny Health
Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995).
Finally, the Third Circuit reviews orders on motions
“for a new trial for abuse of discretion unless the court’s
denial is based on the application of a legal precept, in
which case the standard of review is plenary.” Lightning
Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1167 (3d Cir. 1993).
A
We first address Ingevity’s antitrust liability, which
was based on the jury’s finding that Ingevity unlawfully
tied licenses to its ’844 patent to its unpatented carbon hon-
eycomb products in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1 or 2. “Tying can support a Sherman Act claim either
under § 1, as an unlawful restraint on trade, or under § 2,
as an unlawful act of monopolization or attempted monop-
olization.” Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d
354, 397 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 17.01,
at 17–13 (4th ed. Supp. 2015); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2); see also
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34
(2006).
As the Supreme Court has explained in Illinois Tool
Works and elsewhere, “the essential characteristic of an
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 13
invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation
of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into
the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere
on different terms.” 547 U.S. at 34–35 (quoting Jefferson
Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984)). In-
deed, “[e]ven if a seller has obtained a monopoly in the ty-
ing product legitimately (as by obtaining a patent), courts
have seen the expansion of that power to other product
markets as illegitimate and competition-suppressing.”
Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
959 F.2d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 1992).
“Tying is defined as selling one good (the tying product)
on the condition that the buyer also purchase another, sep-
arate good (the tied product).” Id. Under Third Circuit
law, to prove an unlawful tying under the Sherman Act,
one must show that “(1) a defendant seller ties two distinct
products; (2) the seller possesses market power in the tying
product market; and (3) a substantial amount of interstate
commerce is affected.” Id. at 477.
Here, Ingevity’s position rests on a statutory patent
misuse defense grounded in 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which ex-
pressly shields conduct that would otherwise be character-
ized as tying or exclusionary when it is undertaken to
prevent contributory infringement as defined in § 271(c).6
Ingevity Op. Br. 36–38. Section 271(c) limits contributory
infringement to the sale of a “material or apparatus . . . es-
pecially made or especially adapted for use in an
6 Ingevity’s argument, at least on appeal, does not
appear to challenge the “two distinct products” element of
the antitrust tying analysis, Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 477,
which turns on “the character of the demand for the two
items,” and not any “functional relation between them,”
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19. Instead, Ingevity pro-
ceeds solely under § 271(d)’s patent misuse framework.
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 14
infringement . . . and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,” and
§ 271(d) correspondingly provides that a patent owner shall
not “be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right” by deriving revenue from, en-
forcing rights against, or refusing to license such contribu-
tory infringement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c), (d).
As the Supreme Court explained in Rohm & Haas,
those provisions of the Patent Act affirmatively authorize
a patentee “to control nonstaple goods that are capable only
of infringing use.” 448 U.S. at 213; see also id. at 201 (“A
patentee may sell a nonstaple article himself while enjoin-
ing others from marketing that same good without his au-
thorization.”). Thus, according to Ingevity, where, as here,
“a patent owner seeks to control a non-staple article
through its patent, there can be no antitrust liability aris-
ing from such acts during the patent’s term.” Ingevity Op.
Br. 37 (citing Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d
860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
To prove that Ingevity, as the patentee, was not enti-
tled to control the goods at issue—thus engaging in unlaw-
ful tying—BASF needed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the goods have actual and substantial non-
infringing uses, i.e., that they are staple goods. See Bio-
Rad Lab’ys, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 998 F.3d 1320,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining that the “substantial non-
infringing uses” inquiry “focuses on the real way in which
the accused product is made, used, and sold”). That is the
crux of this appeal controlling the § 271(d) misuse defense.
And to be “substantial,” the alleged non-infringing uses
may not be “unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, oc-
casional, aberrant, or experimental.” Vita-Mix Corp. v.
Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Ingevity contends that “BASF failed to adduce any ev-
idence meeting those criteria, and the district court’s con-
trary order denying Ingevity’s Rule 50(b) motion should be
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 15
reversed.” Ingevity Op. Br. 38 (emphasis omitted). Specif-
ically, Ingevity argues that (1) its records showing sales for
non-infringing uses are “typographical errors”; (2) the non-
infringing uses are “impossible”; (3) even if accurate, the
records are insufficient to prove “actual” non-infringing
uses; and (4) 18,000+ non-infringing uses is not a “substan-
tial” amount. Id. at 38–47 (citations omitted). We disa-
gree. As the district court aptly concluded, “there was
substantial evidence in the record supporting the jury’s de-
termination that Ingevity’s honeycombs are staple goods.”
JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *6. We now address
each of Ingevity’s challenges as described above.
As a threshold matter, each of Ingevity’s arguments
seeks to relitigate factual disputes the jury resolved in
BASF’s favor. But we may not second-guess the jury’s
“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts,”
and we must “disregard all evidence favorable to [Ingevity]
that the jury [was] not required to believe.” Avaya Inc.,
838 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, “judgment as a matter of law could only
have been appropriate in the extraordinary circumstance
that none of that evidence could lead a reasonable jury to
find” that Ingevity’s honeycomb products were staple
goods. Id.
The jury heard substantial evidence regarding Ingev-
ity’s honeycombs and their potential use in non-infringing
air intake systems. The parties do not dispute that honey-
comb use in air-intake systems is non-infringing under the
’844 patent. See JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *2;
Ingevity Op. Br. 20. And BASF introduced Ingevity’s own
sales records and spreadsheets showing repeated pur-
chases by customers Toledo Molding & Die (“Toledo”),
Stant, and SumiRiko for a non-infringing “end use” labeled
as “CC-AIR INDUCTION SYS” or “CC-AIS Honeycombs”
(“AIS” is short for “air induction system”) across multiple
months and years, totaling more than 18,000 units. See
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 16
JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *4. The record fur-
ther contained a 2010 Ingevity memo that indicated Toledo
purchased Ingevity honeycombs for its air-intake systems,
again non-infringing, corroborating the spreadsheet data.
Id. (citing J.A. 8170); see J.A. 8170 (“TMD manufactures
AIS assemblies. They currently purchase 41x150 honey-
combs for LEV2 Fords and two different Corvette parts.”);
see also J.A. 8484, 9458 (record evidence showing, per
Woodcock’s testimony, the “status of an air[-]intake system
project for Toledo”).
Ingevity, relying on Woodcock’s testimony, argues that
the spreadsheet entries were “typographical errors.” In-
gevity Op. Br. 40. Yet it provided no documents or other
evidence corroborating Woodcock’s testimony, such as tes-
timony from the listed Ingevity salespeople or any cus-
tomer witnesses stating any errors in the entries. Ingevity
also argues that it is “impossible” for its honeycombs “to be
used in an air[-]intake system,” id. at 38–39, but offered no
expert testimony on this issue, JMOL Decision, 2024 WL
579667, at *4. Instead, it relied again on testimony from
Woodcock and another Ingevity executive and inventor of
the ’844 patent, Roger Williams. J.A. 9543, 10131. Be-
cause credibility determinations are the jury’s province
and the record provided a basis for the jury’s findings, the
jury was entitled to discount or reject the conclusory and
unsubstantiated testimony, and we may not credit that tes-
timony in place of the jury’s judgment. Marra v. Phila.
Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007), as amended
(Aug. 28, 2007) (“[W]e must refrain from weighing the evi-
dence, determining the credibility of witnesses, or substi-
tuting our own version of the facts for that of the jury.”).
BASF, on the other hand, “relied on the Park patent
and the testimony of James Lyons, its technical expert, to
argue” that Ingevity’s honeycombs were suitable for use in
air-intake systems. JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at
*4 (citing J.A. 8582–83, 8585, 8772–83). The Park patent,
which covers Ingevity’s honeycomb manufacturing process,
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 17
J.A. 8577, 8585, discloses that its honeycomb “desirably”
has “about 540 cells per square inch” and that one “in-
tended application[]” is “in an automobile air[-]intake sys-
tem,” J.A. 8779. BASF also presented Akash Abraham’s
corroborating testimony where he explained that, as a for-
mer BASF employee, Toledo had contacted him to discuss
buying the BASF honeycombs at issue for use in air-intake
systems and raised no need for modifications or concerns
about cell density. J.A. 9307–08. That testimony regard-
ing honeycomb use in non-infringing air-intake systems,
together with the Park patent, gave the jury sufficient rea-
son to discount Ingevity executives’ testimony and favor
BASF’s evidence.
The jury also heard substantial evidence of actual use.
Ingevity argues that even if it did sell thousands of honey-
combs for non-infringing use in air-intake systems, “it
would not be evidence that any of those buyers actually
used FVC honeycombs in air[-]intake systems.” Ingevity
Op. Br. 39 (emphasis omitted). But, as we explained, the
jury reasonably relied on contemporaneous business rec-
ords reflecting repeated sales of Ingevity’s honeycombs for
air-intake applications over multiple years and was enti-
tled to treat those records as more persuasive than con-
trary testimony from interested witnesses. See JMOL
Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *5. From that evidence, the
jury could permissibly infer that Ingevity’s honeycomb
products were actually used for the non-infringing pur-
poses identified in Ingevity’s own records, even in the ab-
sence of direct proof identifying a specific vehicle or
installation. United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 738
(3d Cir. 1989) (“Statements admitted . . . to show the de-
clarant’s intent or plan may be used to show that the de-
clarant acted in accord with that plan.”); see also Moleculon
Rsch. Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (“It is hornbook law that direct evidence of a fact is
not necessary.”). In other words, large-volume purchases
for a stated end use support a reasonable inference that
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 18
customers acted in accordance with that use. See J.A. 9448
(Woodcock testimony agreeing that Ingevity’s end use “re-
fers to the anticipated customer application”).
Finally, the jury heard substantial evidence that those
non-infringing uses were substantial. Rather than apply a
rigid proportionality or percentage-of-sales test as Ingevity
argues, the jury was free to consider the absolute volume
of sales, their recurrence over time, and their practical fea-
sibility in light of the technical evidence. See, e.g., Vita-Mix
Corp., 581 F.3d at 1327 (“[T]he frequency of infringing
use . . . does not speak to the substantiality of the non-in-
fringing use in this case.”); In re Bill of Lading Transmis-
sion & Processing Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1337–39
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Moreover, the jury instructions did not
confine the jury to a comparative evaluation, see J.A. 9032,
and Ingevity did not argue that there were any errors in
that instruction, JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *2.
Accordingly, viewing the evidence under the proper legal
standard, the jury reasonably found that the accused prod-
ucts had substantial non-infringing uses, and that finding
was supported by sufficient evidence. That the products
had substantial non-infringing uses means that they are
staples.
In sum, because the jury’s verdict rested on permissible
inferences and credibility determinations supported by the
record, substantial evidence supports the finding that In-
gevity’s honeycombs are staple goods. Thus, Ingevity’s pa-
tent misuse-based defense fails.
B
Ingevity next argues that its conduct is immune from
antitrust liability. Ingevity Op. Br. 47–48. It contends that
“[e]ven if the jury’s implicit finding that Ingevity’s FVC
honeycombs are staple articles were correct (it is not), In-
gevity had a good-faith belief that the honeycombs are non-
staple articles” and thus “immunity applies.” Id. BASF
responds, arguing that Ingevity’s modified immunity
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 19
argument is forfeited and meritless. BASF Resp. Br. 46–
53. It argues that at summary judgment and later at trial,
Ingevity’s immunity argument was premised on equating
its alleged tying conduct to mere patent enforcement activ-
ity. Id. at 49–53. But now, on appeal, BASF further as-
serts that Ingevity’s immunity argument posits that actual
tying conduct—i.e., conditioning a license on the purchase
of a staple article—is itself immune activity regardless
whether it is mere patent enforcement activity or some-
thing more. Id. at 48 (citing Ingevity Op. Br. 47).
We agree with BASF that Ingevity’s immunity argu-
ment is materially different from what was argued below
and is therefore forfeited. Ingevity’s immunity argument
is no longer in the alternative; it now subsumes its patent-
misuse defense. That modification attempts to capture on
appeal what it had previously regarded as conduct not im-
mune from antitrust liability. We may not consider such
new and improperly preserved arguments. Simko v. U.S.
Steel Corp, 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[A]rguments
raised for the first time on appeal are not properly pre-
served for appellate review.”).
At summary judgment, Ingevity’s immunity argument
was based on the theory that what BASF had alleged as
tying conduct was actually mere patent enforcement activ-
ity and thus immune, and it further agreed that conduct
beyond mere enforcement activity was not immune. See
J.A. 7925–26 (summary judgment hearing); J.A. 9031
(agreed-to jury instruction); see also J.A. 47; JMOL Deci-
sion, 2024 WL 579667, at *8–9. That is evidenced by the
colloquy between Judge Andrews and Ingevity’s counsel at
the summary judgment hearing. There, Judge Andrews
clarified the distinction between unprotected tying conduct
and protected patent enforcement communications. He
stated, “I don’t think [Ingevity is] saying tying and exclu-
sive dealing are immunized. I think [Ingevity is] saying
some stuff that surrounds it is immunized.” J.A. 7925.
Judge Andrews then asked Ingevity’s counsel directly: “Are
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 20
you saying tying and exclusive dealing are immunized?”
Id. at 7925–26. Ingevity’s counsel, drawing a line between
actual tying conduct and mere patent enforcement, re-
sponded that “the basis upon which we are arguing” is that
“threats of litigation are immunized,” and because the al-
leged tying conduct here is mere patent enforcement activ-
ity, despite BASF’s labeling of it as tying, it is protected.
Id.
Given that agreed-upon categorical distinction be-
tween unprotected commercial tying conduct and patent
enforcement, and because the district court noted that
there was a factual dispute as to which of those categories
Ingevity’s conduct fell under, the district court cautioned
that its summary judgment denial reflected its “tenta-
tive[]” views and was not a “definitive” ruling. J.A. 42–43;
id. at 43 (explaining that “the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
will [not] help Ingevity if BASF proves the Ingevity prod-
uct . . . is a staple article of commerce”).
The distinction drawn at summary judgment was car-
ried through trial and Ingevity’s post-trial briefing. At
trial, Ingevity agreed to a jury instruction stating that im-
munity does not apply to “conduct, such as tying or exclu-
sive dealing, that unlawfully restricts competition beyond
the scope of the patent monopoly.” J.A. 9031; see J.A. 46
n.2 (the district court acknowledging that Ingevity did not
object to the instruction). Post-trial, in its proposed find-
ings and conclusions of law response, “Ingevity agree[d]
that tying and bad-faith patent enforcement are separate
bases for liability,” J.A. 11241, and continued to argue that
its conduct was immune because it did “nothing more
than . . . communicate[] to customers what does and does
not infringe,” J.A. 47 (citing J.A. 11229).
The district court rejected that argument because “the
conduct upon which the jury based its finding was not lim-
ited to protected communications.” J.A. 47. Stated differ-
ently, the jury was instructed that patent enforcement
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 21
communications alone could not support a tying violation,
so by finding unlawful tying, the properly-instructed jury
necessarily found that Ingevity’s conduct went beyond pro-
tected patent communications. See id. Ingevity subse-
quently made the same argument in its JMOL motion,
equating its tying conduct to mere “statements to convey
that it would enforce its patents.” JMOL Decision,
2024 WL 579667, at *8. The district court again rejected
that argument because the evidence supported a finding of
“a classic tying arrangement.” Id. at *9.
But now, for the first time on appeal, Ingevity erases
that distinction. See Ingevity Reply Br. 23 (“BASF’s Al-
leged Distinction Between ‘Communications’ and ‘Conduct’
Is Unsupported.”). It argues that even if the jury found
that its honeycomb products are staple goods, its tying con-
duct is still immune. Ingevity Op. Br. 47–48. Counsel for
Ingevity made this change clear at oral argument when he
stated that “there are two separate issues: Noerr-Penning-
ton, which is one basis for immunity, and Rohm & Haas,
which is another [basis for immunity], so all of the state-
ments about Noerr-Pennington and statements about com-
munications are not relevant to the ruling about Rohm &
Haas.” See Oral Arg. at 21:47–22:01. He went on to ex-
plain that Ingevity’s argument “today is about Rohm &
Haas, which is about conduct and [regardless of] whether
[] you are wrong about [the] staple versus non-staple com-
parison that right is important as all the other rights for
you to have immunity.” Id. at 22:11–21. In effect, Ingev-
ity’s counsel newly argued at oral argument that Rohm &
Haas supplies a freestanding immunity for tying conduct
independent of Noerr-Pennington and independent of
whether the honeycombs are staple goods, collapsing the
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 22
jury’s staple good finding into an immunity argument
never presented below.7
Ingevity’s reframing of its arguments underscores its
forfeiture. Throughout summary judgment, trial, post-
trial proceedings, and its opening brief on appeal, Ingevity
tied its immunity theory to patent enforcement communi-
cations and expressly disclaimed any contention that ac-
tual “tying and exclusive dealing are immunized.” See J.A.
7925–26; J.A. 9031; J.A. 47; JMOL Decision, 2024 WL
579667, at *8–9. The citations Ingevity provides suggest
the same. See, e.g., J.A. 4293 (Ingevity’s summary judg-
ment immunity arguments cabined to patent enforcement
activity, and do not extend to conduct beyond enforcement);
J.A. 7927–28 (same at trial); J.A. 10598 (same post-trial).
Having litigated and lost on that theory below, Ingevity
may not now advance a distinct argument that tying con-
duct itself is immune notwithstanding the jury’s staple
good finding.8
7 Notably, Ingevity cites Rohm & Haas only for im-
munity purposes in its reply brief and only for the uncon-
troversial proposition that “the right to control unpatented
non-staple goods is no different than the right to control
‘claimed’ aspects of the same patent.” Ingevity Reply Br.
26 (citing Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. at 201).
8 Even assuming that Ingevity raises the argument
that it presented below—i.e., its alleged tying conduct is it-
self only protected patent enforcement activity and nothing
more, see J.A. 11229—that argument fails. We agree with
the district court that the conduct at issue here goes beyond
any protected patent enforcement activity. See JMOL De-
cision, 2024 WL 579667, at *9. Substantial evidence shows
that the only way to get a license to the ’844 patent was to
purchase Ingevity’s staple honeycomb products. See
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 23
Ingevity challenges the immunity-based jury instruc-
tion on the same basis. Ingevity Op. Br. 54–57 (citing J.A.
9031). Because Ingevity forfeited its immunity argument,
its jury instruction challenge is reviewed only for plain er-
ror, which we “exercise[] sparingly” and “with extreme cau-
tion in the civil context.” Lesende v. Borrero, 752 F.3d 324,
336 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v.
N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 340 (3d Cir. 2005)); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2). An instructional error “is plain only
where the proper course is clear under current law,” Col-
lins v. Alco Parking Corp., 448 F.3d 652, 655–56 (3d Cir.
2006) (citation modified), and Ingevity’s theory that good-
faith tying and exclusive dealing are immune is anything
but clear. Ingevity cites no case that has ever extended
immunity—under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine or the pa-
tent laws—to anticompetitive commercial conduct like ty-
ing and exclusive dealing because there is none. In fact,
counsel for Ingevity, in response to the question whether
“there [is] any case law . . . where there is actual tying of
staple goods . . . and immunity applies,” admitted that
“[t]here is no case either way.” See Oral Arg. at 22:21–32.
Moreover, even Rohm & Haas, which Ingevity’s coun-
sel claims for the first time at oral argument supports this
new proposition, is distinct because that case, unlike here,
involved a nonstaple good finding and thus there was no
J.A. 9476; JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *3–6. That
is commercial conduct that goes beyond education about
Ingevity’s patent rights. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“[R]estrictions on protected ex-
pression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity”
like those in the “antitrust laws”); see also FTC v. Actavis,
Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 150 (2013) (“[T]he Court has struck
down overly restrictive patent licensing agreements—irre-
spective of whether those agreements produced supra-pa-
tent-permitted revenues.”).
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 24
issue of immunity left. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. at 199
(“[P]ropanil is a nonstaple commodity which has no use ex-
cept through practice of the patented method.”); id. at 201–
02 (“[T]he provisions of § 271(d) effectively confer upon the
patentee . . . a limited power to exclude others from compe-
tition in nonstaple goods,” and “Rohm & Haas’ conduct is
not dissimilar in either nature or effect from the conduct
that is thus clearly embraced within § 271(d).”). Ingevity
similarly overreads Brulotte v. Thys Co., which it contends
equates enforcing an expired patent with illegal tying for
immunity purposes. Ingevity Reply Br. 25 (citing Brulotte
v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964)). Brulotte instead uses
tying as an analogy to illustrate that both practices imper-
missibly extend patent power beyond its lawful scope.
Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33 (“[R]oyalty payments beyond the
life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the
monopoly of the patent by t[y]ing.”).
On the record before us, the district court’s instruc-
tion—which expressly excluded immunity for “conduct,
such as tying or exclusive dealing, that unlawfully restricts
competition beyond the scope of the patent monopoly,”
J.A. 9031—was reasonable and consistent with the parties’
agreed framing and the governing law. At minimum, the
absence of any clear authority supporting Ingevity’s newly
modified theory, including any potential dispute about the
scope of Rohm & Haas, confirms that the “proper course”
was not “clear under current law.” Collins, 448 F.3d
at 655–56. Any alleged error therefore falls far short of
plain error warranting relief. See id.
C
Upon finding Ingevity liable for antitrust conduct, the
jury awarded BASF antitrust damages in the amount of
$28,285,714. J.A. 9089. Ingevity argues that the “the an-
titrust damages judgment must be vacated because BASF
never disaggregated the damages that resulted from Ingev-
ity’s unlawful conduct from that caused by Ingevity’s
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 25
lawful assertion of its patent rights.” Ingevity Op. Br. 61.
We again disagree.
As the district court explained, “[t]o establish an anti-
trust injury, BASF was not required to show that the ac-
cused conduct was the sole cause of its injury; BASF needed
to show that Ingevity’s conduct was a material or substan-
tial cause of its injury.” JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667,
at *7; see Danny Kresky Enters. Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d
206, 210 (3d Cir. 1983) (“It is enough that the illegality is
shown to be a material cause of the injury; a plaintiff need
not exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury.”
(quoting Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 114 n.9)).
First, “[t]he jury instructions, to which Ingevity d[id]
not object, are consistent with this [materiality] require-
ment.” JMOL Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *7 (citing
J.A. 9065 (“BASF is entitled to recover damages for an in-
jury to its business or property if it can establish . . . that
the alleged illegal conduct was a material cause of BASF’s
injury.”)). Second, there was substantial evidence for the
jury to have reasonably found that Ingevity’s tying conduct
was a material cause of the injury. Dr. Divya Mathur,
BASF’s damages expert, testified that Ingevity’s conduct
prevented BASF from selling honeycombs to canister mak-
ers for use in five automakers’ vehicles, and that conclusion
was supported by evidence that BASF’s honeycombs were
cheaper and performed better than Ingevity’s products,
and that several automakers expressed interest in BASF’s
honeycombs and undertook validation testing. See JMOL
Decision, 2024 WL 579667, at *7 (citations omitted). The
jury also heard evidence that Ingevity internally viewed
BASF’s product as a competitive “threat” and responded by
selectively raising prices to coerce customers into exclusiv-
ity and by conditioning patent licenses on the purchase of
Ingevity honeycombs—conduct that directly foreclosed
BASF from making sales it otherwise could have made. See
id. Taken together, that is substantial evidence for the jury
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 26
to have found material causation. See Danny Kresky,
716 F.2d at 210.
Furthermore, the jury could reasonably credit Dr. Ma-
thur’s testimony that disaggregating damages caused by
lawful versus unlawful conduct was impossible, given that
the same exclusionary practices simultaneously affected
price, access, and customer choice and because Ingevity
“bear[s] the risk of the uncertainty which [its] own wrong
has created.” See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946); cf. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Mon-
santo Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1243 (7th Cir. 1982) (A court may
not “deprive [plaintiff] of [its] recovery merely because the
jury may have found that [defendant] combined lawful con-
duct with unlawful conduct[,] making it impossible to de-
termine which portion of the total damages was caused by
the unlawful conduct.”); see also Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962) (“[A]cts
which are in themselves legal lose that character when
they become constituent elements of an unlawful
scheme.”).
Ingevity’s expert argued that disaggregation was feasi-
ble, but the jury was entitled to reject Ingevity’s position
and conclude that disaggregation was impossible based on
Dr. Mathur’s opinion. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601,
624 (3d Cir. 1998) (denying motion for a new trial because
the jury was entitled to credit one expert’s damages evi-
dence). That is particularly appropriate here, where the
jury heard testimony from both parties’ experts that Ingev-
ity’s expert proposed an analysis that did not necessarily
account for the unlawful conduct at issue. JMOL Decision,
2024 WL 579667, at *7 (citation omitted); see J.A. 10057,
10281–10282, 9705 (trial testimony that Ingevity’s expert
lacked critical information regarding unlawful conduct at
the time of evaluation). In light of this evidence and Dr.
Mathur’s reliance on a broad set of record documents ra-
ther than speculative projections, the jury could reasonably
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INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION 27
have found both material causation and non-speculative
damages.9
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ingevity’s remaining arguments
but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL and uphold the
jury verdict of antitrust liability and damages.
AFFIRMED
9 Because Daubert rulings are reviewed only for
abuse of discretion, Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d
376, 391 (3d Cir. 2016), Ingevity’s Daubert argument fails
for the same reasons as its merits argument.
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