Abdul Mutakaber v. Secretary of State

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ABDUL MUTAKABER,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Appellee
______________________
2024-1644
______________________
Appeal from the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals in
No. 7576, Administrative Judge Marian Elizabeth Sulli-
van, Administrative Judge Allan H. Goodman, Administra-
tive Judge Joseph A. Vergilio.
------------------------------------------------
HAMIDULLAH, SON OF MOHAMMAD RAJAB,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Appellee
______________________
2024-1645
______________________
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 2
Appeal from the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals in
Nos. 7502, 7503, Administrative Judge Marian Elizabeth
Sullivan, Administrative Judge Allan H. Goodman, Admin-
istrative Judge Joseph A. Vergilio.
______________________
Decided: December 18, 2025
______________________
ENAYAT QASIMI, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, LLP,
Washington, DC, argued for appellants.
WILLIAM PORTER RAYEL, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also repre-
sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI,
PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; ERIN M. KRIYNOVICH, Office of the
Legal Adviser for Buildings and Acquisitions, United
States Department of State, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before CUNNINGHAM, LINN, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
STARK, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Abdul Mutakaber and Hamidullah, son of
Mohammad Rajab (together, “Appellants”), appeal from
companion decisions of the United States Civilian Board of
Contract Appeals (“Board”). See Mutakaber v. Dep’t of
State, CBCA 7576, 24-1 BCA ¶ 38,496 (2024); Hamidullah
v. Dep’t of State, CBCA 7502, 24-1 BCA ¶ 38,495 (2024). As
acknowledged by the parties, these cases involve the same
operative facts, materially identical contracts, substan-
tially similar legal arguments, and like treatment by the
Board. Hence, we address both cases together. We affirm.
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 3
I
A
In August 2021, the United States military withdrew
from Afghanistan as the Taliban was approaching the
country’s capital, Kabul. As part of that withdrawal, the
U.S. vacated its embassy and the surrounding buildings
and surface lots it had used as part of its diplomatic mis-
sion. Seven of these properties were leased by the U.S. gov-
ernment pursuant to a series of written agreements (the
“Leases”), including five residential buildings owned by Ap-
pellant Mutakaber (the “Villas”) and two military vehicle
storage lots owned by Appellant Hamidullah (the “Lots,”
and, together with the Villas, hereinafter the “Properties”).
These Leases form the basis of these appeals.
Each of the Leases was executed sometime between
2013 and 2020, a period during which Afghanistan was
governed by the democratically-elected and U.S.-recog-
nized Ghani administration. In 2020, however, faced with
a Taliban insurgency, the U.S. entered into an agreement
with the Taliban known as the “Doha Agreement.”
M.J.A. 274-76; H.J.A. 392.1 Pursuant to the Doha Agree-
ment, the U.S. agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan.
In August 2021, the U.S. evacuated its personnel from
Kabul, ceased diplomatic operations, and substantially left
Afghanistan. In the ensuing vacuum, the Taliban took con-
trol of Kabul and precipitated the collapse of the Ghani gov-
ernment. See Lessors of Abchakan Vill. v. Sec’y of Def., 137
F.4th 1301, 1306 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2025). As part of its occu-
pation of Kabul, the Taliban seized Appellants’ Properties.
1 “M.J.A.” refers to the Mutakaber record, M. ECF
No. 22, while “H.J.A.” refers to the Hamidullah record, H.
ECF No. 22.
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 4
B
In 2013 and 2014, respectively, the government exe-
cuted two leases with Hamidullah to rent what are called
the Qasemi and Polaski Lots (respectively, the “Qasemi
Lease” and the “Polaski Lease”). The Qasemi and Polaski
Leases were in effect in 2021 during the events at issue
here.
Similarly, between 2016 and 2020, the government
contracted with Mutakaber to rent the five Villas – known
as the Maryland, Guam, Champagne, Pennsylvania, and
Connecticut Houses – pursuant to four leases (collectively,
the “Mutakaber Leases”). Specifically, each of the Mary-
land, Guam, and Champagne Houses was the subject of an
individual lease, while the Pennsylvania and Connecticut
Houses were leased together under a single, joint agree-
ment.2 The Mutakaber Leases were all in effect during the
relevant period.
On September 23, 2021, several weeks after the Tali-
ban took control of Kabul, the government terminated the
Mutakaber Leases by sending Mutakaber notice by email.
Each termination notice invoked Article 12(A) of the Mu-
takaber Leases, which relates to force majeure, and pur-
ported to effect termination as of the next day, September
24, 2021. The government terminated the Qasemi and Po-
laski Leases in the same manner and on the same grounds
on November 9, 2021, and March 3, 2022, respectively.
The government also requested refunds from both
landlords for advance rental payments it had made under
the Leases. From Mutakaber, the government demanded
the return of $51,287.67, $86,991.78, and $276,657.53 un-
der the Guam, Champagne, and PA+CT Leases,
2 In keeping with the parties’ briefs, we refer herein
to these as the “Maryland Lease,” “Guam Lease,” “Cham-
pagne Lease,” and “PA+CT Lease,” respectively.
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 5
respectively. From Hamidullah, the government sought
$118,076 under the Polaski Lease.
After receiving the notices of termination, representa-
tives of Mutakaber and Hamidullah tried to access the
Properties. In October 2021, Mutakaber’s property man-
ager attempted to inspect the Villas. Upon arriving at the
security gate, he discovered that the Taliban had taken
possession of all five Villas. He was denied access by the
Taliban that day and again on at least one subsequent oc-
casion. In late 2022, Hamidullah had a similar experience.
After obtaining the phone numbers for two Taliban mili-
tary commanders he learned were in control of the Lots, he
was told during several phone calls that the Taliban Spe-
cial Forces and Ministry of Defense were using the Lots for
various military purposes. As far as the record reveals, to
date neither Appellant has been able to reclaim or occupy
his property.
C
In 2022, pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978,
41 U.S.C. § 7101, et seq., Mutakaber and Hamidullah sub-
mitted certified claims to the State Department. In them,
Appellants sought the alternative remedies of recovery of
unpaid rent, restoration of physical possession of the Prop-
erties, or a purchase of the Properties by the government.
After their claims were denied by the contracting of-
ficer, Appellants appealed to the Board. The government
counterclaimed for $384,306.84 against Mutakaber and for
$118,076 against Hamidullah, seeking refunds of pre-paid
rent. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment in both cases.
The Board denied Appellants’ motions for summary
judgment and granted the government’s motions in part.
In both cases, the Board found that, although the govern-
ment did not successfully terminate the Leases pursuant
to the force majeure clause contained in Article 12, it
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 6
nonetheless constructively terminated them for “conven-
ience” under Article 14’s “Termination” provision. M.J.A.
3, 6-8 (“[The government’s] [t]erminations [w]ere [p]roper .
. . [b]ecause [it] had the right to terminate the leases for
convenience under [A]rticle 14.”); H.J.A. 4, 6-8 (same). The
Board also rejected Appellants’ breach of contract claims
based on its determination that the government had no
duty to deliver physical possession of the Villas and Lots to
Appellants following termination.
After the parties submitted additional information con-
cerning the outstanding sums owed, the Board found that:
(1) the government owed Mutakaber unpaid rent of
$94,355.76 for the Maryland House, while (2) Mutakaber
owed the government refunds of (a) $27,616.40 for the
Guam House; (b) $73,182.93 for the Champagne House;
and (c) $108,986.28 for the PA+CT House. With respect to
Hamidullah, the Board found that: (1) the government
owed Hamidullah unpaid rent for the Qasemi Lot of
$254,669.80, and (2) Hamidullah owed the government a
refund for pre-paid rent on the Polaski Lot of $61,399.65.
In sum, the Board entered judgments against Mutakaber
in the amount of $115,429.85 (plus interest) and for Ha-
midullah in the amount of $193,270.15 (plus interest).
Appellants timely appealed. The Board had jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 7105(e)(1)(B). We have juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10).
II
“We review de novo the Board’s conclusions of law, in-
cluding grants of summary judgment, and the interpreta-
tion of a government contract.” Cooper/Ports Am., LLC v.
Sec’y of Def., 959 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “Contractual in-
terpretation is a pure legal issue.” P.K. Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v.
Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 987 F.3d 1030, 1032 (Fed. Cir.
2021).
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 7
III
Appellants argue that the Board erred in finding that
the government did not breach the Leases. They insist that
the Leases obligated the government to return physical
possession of the Villas and Lots upon termination. In sup-
port of their position, Appellants rely on: (1) the express
terms of the Leases; (2) the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; and (3) Afghan law. We address each
ground in turn.
A
“To recover for a breach of contract, a party must allege
and establish: (1) a valid contract between the parties,
(2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract,
(3) a breach of that duty, and (4) damages caused by the
breach.” Oliva v. United States, 961 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also San
Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877
F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The dispute here centers on
the second element, the existence of a contractual duty.
1
Appellants first argue that the government breached
Article 8(C), which, according to them, expressly imposes a
duty on the government to physically return the leased
Properties upon expiration or termination of the Leases.
The plain and unambiguous language of that provision con-
tains no such duty, however. See NOAA Maryland, LLC v.
Adm’r of Gen. Servs. Admin., 997 F.3d 1159, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (“In contract interpretation, the plain and unambig-
uous meaning of a written agreement controls.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 8
Article 8 provides, in full:3
ARTICLE EIGHT: TENANT RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The TENANT shall have the right, dur-
ing the existence of this Lease, to erect
new structures, additions, and annexes,
install utility infrastructure, post signs,
make alterations, and attach fixtures in
or upon the Premises. This includes the
right to affix a flagstaff, a U.S. flag, a
U.S. seal, and office signs and insignia
on the Premises leased.
B. Such fixtures, additions, annexes or
structures placed in or upon or attached
to the said Premises shall be and remain
the property of the TENANT and may be
removed before, at the time of, or within
a reasonable time after the Lease or any
extension thereof expires or is termi-
nated at TENANT’s discretion.
TENANT may choose to leave the
3 The language of Article 8 varies slightly across the
six Leases. At oral argument, Appellants’ counsel argued
that the version “most favorable” to Mutakaber’s position
is contained in the Champagne Lease. M. Oral Arg.
at 13:50-14:55 (available at https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
oral-arguments/24-1644_11072025.mp3); see also H. Oral
Arg. at 2:15-30 (available at https://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/oral-arguments/24-1645_11072025.mp3). That provi-
sion is materially identical to Article 8 in the Polaski Lease,
and therefore the strongest for Hamidullah as well. Com-
pare M.J.A. 64-65, with H.J.A 88. Hence, we principally
address Article 8 of the Champagne and Polaski Leases.
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 9
improvements for the LANDLORD and
there will be no requirement for the
LANDLORD to pay any compensation.
C. The TENANT will not be responsible for
restoring the Premises to any condition
or for any changes or damages to the
Premises. The Premises are leased in ‘as
is’ condition and may be returned in the
‘as is’ condition as of the date of lease ex-
piry or termination.
M.J.A. 64-65 (emphasis added); H.J.A. 88 (same).
Appellants focus on the word “returned” in Article 8(C),
asserting that it “necessarily connotes an obligation to ac-
tually return the Leased Premises at termination.”
M. Open. Br. at 14; see also H. Open. Br. at 15. Relying on
the well-settled principle that contracts are generally to be
construed to avoid rendering any provision mere “surplus-
age,” they reason that “[i]f the United States was free to
abandon the Leased Premises to a hostile force upon lease
termination, there would have been no need to address the
obligation to restore the Leased Premises, nor any need to
specify a condition in which the Leased Premises could be
returned.” M. Open. Br. at 13, 16; see also H. Open. Br. at
13-14; NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153,
1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“An interpretation that gives mean-
ing to all parts of the contract is to be preferred over one
that leaves a portion of the contract useless, inexplicable,
void, or superfluous.”).
“Contract interpretation begins with the language of
the written agreement.” NVT Techs., 370 F.3d at 1159; see
also C. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539,
1543 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“A contract is read in accordance
with its express terms and the plain meaning thereof.”).
Here, the plain language of Article 8 does not address
whether the government has an obligation to return phys-
ical possession of the Properties to Appellants upon
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 10
terminating the Leases for convenience. Instead, as is
clear from the last sentence of Article 8(C), the only refer-
ence to “return” in Article 8 pertains to the “condition” of
the property at the time of return. M.J.A. 65 (“The Prem-
ises are leased in ‘as is’ condition and may be returned in
the ‘as is’ condition as of the date of lease expiry or termi-
nation.”); H.J.A. 88 (same). Indeed, Article 8 is entitled
“Tenant Rights and Responsibilities” and governs the
rights of the government, as tenant, to alter the Properties,
such as by “erect[ing] new structures, additions, and an-
nexes, install[ing] utility infrastructure, post[ing] signs,
mak[ing] alterations, and attach[ing] fixtures in or upon
the Premises.” M.J.A. 64; H.J.A. 88. Notably, Article 8(C)
does not even mention the word “termination,” and its only
reference to “return” is silent as to when or even whether
the government must return the property.
No part of Article 8 imposes an obligation on the gov-
ernment to return the Properties upon termination, no
matter the circumstances or whatever actions third parties
might undertake. Nor does Article 8 obligate the govern-
ment to use any degree of effort to ensure Appellants’
reentry of the Properties. It does not, for instance, require
the U.S. to take diplomatic or military action to return the
Properties.4
Because Article 8 does not obligate the government to
restore physical possession of the Properties to Appellants
4 Because we find that Article 8(C) of the Cham-
pagne and Polaski Leases does not contain an express obli-
gation of physical return, we find that Appellants’ reliance
on the less favorable language of Article 8(A) of the Qasemi,
Maryland, Guam, and PA+CT Leases is similarly unper-
suasive. Article 8(A) does not mention the word “return,”
and, like Article 8(C), simply concerns the tenant’s right to
make alterations. See M.J.A. 36, 45-46, 54; H.J.A. 79.
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 11
under the Leases, we reject Appellants’ argument that the
government breached this provision.
2
Appellant Hamidullah also claims that Article 14(A) of
the Qasemi Lease expressly requires physical return. That
provision provides:
ARTICLE FOURTEEN: TERMINATION
A. The TENANT may, for its convenience,
terminate this Lease in whole or in part
at any time, if it determines that such
termination is in the best interests of
the TENANT, by giving written notice
to the LANDLORD 90 days in advance.
If the TENANT terminates this Lease in
accordance with this clause, the
TENANT shall not be liable for any
charges additional to those normally in-
curred up to the date the Lease is termi-
nated. The TENANT will return the
property [in the condition] in which it
was received minus normal wear and
tear. No unnecessary make-ready will
be accomplished unless the damage[] is
the result of negligence by the
TENANT.
H.J.A. 80 (emphasis added).
Hamidullah’s argument under Article 14 fails for the
same reasons we have already considered with respect to
Article 8. Namely, the provision’s mention of “return” only
addresses the condition of the premises upon return, not
any duty or obligation with respect to whether, or how,
physical possession might need to be restored. The lan-
guage of this provision does not impose any express duty to
return the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease.
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 12
See NOAA Maryland, 997 F.3d at 1166; see also NVT
Techs., 370 F.3d at 1159.
3
Several provisions of the Leases further undermine Ap-
pellants’ reading of the express language of Articles 8 and
14.
Article 8(B) of the Maryland, Guam, PA+CT, and
Qasemi Leases sets out that the government shall not be
responsible for “damage by the elements, or other circum-
stances not under the TENANT’s control,” including “[a]ny
damage arising from the intentional acts or negligence
of . . . third parties not under LANDLORD’s or TENANT’s
control.” M.J.A. 37, 46, 55; H.J.A. 79. Polaski Lease Article
7(E) similarly recites that “LANDLORD accepts full and
sole responsibility for damage or injury sustained by
TENANT or third parties.” H.J.A. 88.
Article 11 of the Maryland, Guam, Champagne,
PA+CT, and Polaski Leases, meanwhile, provides that
“LANDLORD shall bear responsibility for all risk of loss of
or damage to the Premises . . . arising from any causes
whatsoever, other than TENANT fault.” M.J.A. 37, 46, 55,
66; H.J.A. 89-90 (same).
Each of these provisions demonstrates that the parties
expressly agreed to allocate to Appellants the risk of dam-
age and injury to the Properties arising from third-party
actions or events beyond the government’s control or fault.
See generally Oman-Fischbach Int’l (JV) v. Pirie, 276 F.3d
1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Unless the parties in unmis-
takable terms agreed to shift the risk of [the contract] due
to acts by [a third-party] military, no liability on the part
of the [U.S.] attaches from such acts.”). The Taliban occu-
pation of the Villas and Lots was a third-party action be-
yond the control of the government. As such, any damage
caused by this event, including the inability of Appellants
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 13
to reoccupy the Properties, is to be borne by Appellants, not
the government.
Accordingly, the express language of the Leases im-
poses no obligation on the government to physically return
the Properties to Appellants.
B
In the alternative, Appellants contend that the Leases
include an implied obligation of physical return. They base
this argument on “the essential purpose of the Leases,” as
well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
M. Open. Br. at 18-19, 30; see also H. Open. Br. at 17-20,
27. We are not persuaded.
“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an im-
plied duty that each party to a contract owes to its contract-
ing partner.” Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “The duty applies to the government
just as it does to private parties,” and obligates the govern-
ment “not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expecta-
tions of the other party regarding the fruits of the contract.”
Id. However, the implied covenant “cannot expand a
party’s contractual duties beyond those in the express con-
tract or create duties inconsistent with the contract’s pro-
visions.” Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States,
596 F.3d 817, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also BGT Holdings
LLC v. United States, 984 F.3d 1003, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(“[A counterparty] cannot use the doctrine of good faith and
fair dealing to complain of the very conduct that the con-
tract expressly permits.”).
Here, as we have already explained, the express lan-
guage of the Leases relieves the government of responsibil-
ity for damage or loss to the Properties caused by third
parties, including the Taliban. Hence, to read into the
Leases an implied agreement by the government to physi-
cally return the Properties, regardless of the intervening
third-party occupation by the Taliban, would impose a
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 14
contractual duty on the government inconsistent with the
Leases’ provisions. This would be improper. See Metcalf
Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[A]n act will not be found to violate the duty [of good
faith and fair dealing] (which is implicit in the contract) if
such a finding would be at odds with the terms of the orig-
inal bargain, whether by altering the contract’s discernible
allocation of risks and benefits or by conflicting with a con-
tract provision.”).
Our holding does not, as Appellants contend, defeat the
“essential purpose” of the Leases or constructively trans-
form rental agreements into sale contracts. See, e.g.,
M. Open. Br. at 19; H. Open. Br. at 17. To be clear, our
decision does not authorize the government to retain phys-
ical possession of the Properties. As the government con-
cedes, it had a duty as a tenant to vacate the Properties
once it terminated the Leases. See Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“We conclude that, due to [the] definite term of the lease
and the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship, an im-
plied duty to vacate is an inherent part of every fixed term
lease agreement unless the parties explicitly express an in-
tention to the contrary.”). It is undisputed that the govern-
ment has done so.
Therefore, we agree with the Board that the Leases
contain no implied obligation for the government to physi-
cally return the Properties to Appellants upon termination.
C
Finally, Appellants contend that Afghan law entitles
them to the physical return of the Properties under the
“Choice of Law” provision contained in the Leases. Article
16 of each Lease states (with immaterial variation): “The
terms of this Lease shall be construed in accordance with
the local laws of Afghanistan.” M.J.A. 40, 49, 58, 70; H.J.A.
82, 94. According to Appellants, Articles 1375-77 of the
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MUTAKABER v. SECRETARY OF STATE 15
Afghan Civil Code mandate physical return. Once again,
we disagree with Appellants.
The sections of the Afghan Civil Code on which Appel-
lants rely do not expressly address the circumstances pre-
sented here, where the government terminated the Leases
and vacated the Properties, and a third party subsequently
occupied the Properties before the landlord attempted to
retake physical possession. Instead, Articles 1375 and
1377 pertain to situations in which the “lessee keeps [the
property] with himself” or “keeps the [leased] property
without legal cause.” M.J.A. 1951-52; H.J.A. 1523-24 (Ar-
ticle 1375: “If [lessee] keeps the mentioned property without
legal cause, he shall be bound to pay lessor.”) (emphasis
added), (Article 1377: “If lessee keeps [the property] with
himself despite claim of return, he shall be liable for its de-
struction.”) (emphasis added). As Article 1376 of the Af-
ghan Civil Code provides, the lessee’s “obligat[ion] to
return the leased property” is excused in cases of “destruc-
tion or defect in which lessee is not involved.” M.J.A. 1952;
H.J.A. 1524. That is essentially what occurred here.
Appellants’ argument that the government violated the
Afghan Civil Code, thus, is unavailing.5
IV
We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the
Board’s judgments.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
5 This is assuming, without deciding, that Appel-
lants’ claims under the Afghan Civil Code are enforceable
at the Board.
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