James K. Young v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JAMES K. YOUNG,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2024-1833
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 23-5136, Judge Joseph L. Toth.
______________________
Decided: January 13, 2026
______________________
K ENNETH D OJAQUEZ, Carpenter Chartered, Topeka,
KS, argued for claimant-appellant. Also represented by
K ENNETH M. C ARPENTER.
MEREDYTH C OHEN HAVASY , Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee.
Also represented by MARTIN F. H OCKEY , J R., P ATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY , YAAKOV ROTH ; MATTHEW ALBANESE, BRIAN D.
G RIFFIN, Office of General Counsel, United States Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 2
Before T ARANTO, BRYSON, and CUNNINGHAM , Circuit
Judges.
T ARANTO, Circuit Judge.
James Young served in the military in the mid-1980s.
In 1988, as a veteran, he applied to what soon became the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for service-connected-
disability benefits, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, based on
asserted head injuries suffered in a car accident during ser-
vice. In 1999, VA’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) de-
nied the claim. More than two decades later, Mr. Young
moved the Board to vacate its 1999 decision pursuant to 38
C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), alleging that he had been denied due
process. The Board denied the motion, and Mr. Young ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veter-
ans Court). The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal,
reasoning that (1) the appeal was untimely insofar as it
sought review of the 1999 Board decision, and (2) although
the appeal was timely as to the vacatur denial, that denial
was not an appealable decision. See Young v. McDonough,
No. 23-5136, 2024 WL 706809, at *1–2 (Vet. App. Feb. 21,
2024) (Decision).
Mr. Young appeals to this court, challenging the Veter-
ans Court’s second rationale. He argues that the Board’s
denial of a motion to vacate under section 20.1000(a) is ap-
pealable to the Veterans Court. We conclude otherwise and
therefore affirm the Veterans Court’s dismissal.
I
A
After Mr. Young filed his head-injuries claim in 1988,
the relevant regional office (RO) of VA denied the claim in
1991, and he appealed to the Board. Several years of Board
proceedings followed the RO’s 1991 claim denial. In 1997,
the Board ordered that Mr. Young undergo a medical ex-
amination by VA. See J.A. 12. On two occasions, according
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 3
to Mr. Young’s present allegations (which we may assume
to be true for our purposes here), the Board directed the RO
to search for certain records indicating that Mr. Young’s
injuries were incurred in the line of duty, but the RO did
not do so, and Mr. Young told the Board of that noncompli-
ance with its order in June 1999. See J.A. 14–15. In July
1999, the Board, without commenting on Mr. Young’s alle-
gation of RO noncompliance, issued a final decision that
denied Mr. Young’s claim because he had failed to appear
for two scheduled VA examinations ordered by the Board.
J.A. 10–13; see 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(b) (1998). Mr. Young did
not appeal that Board decision.
According to Mr. Young, he later filed a disability claim
for his head injuries (seemingly in 2012), necessary medi-
cal examination(s) occurred, and VA granted the claim in
2017, finding “service connection effective August 17,
2012.” J.A. 15.
B
In 2022, Mr. Young, hoping to secure an earlier effec-
tive date corresponding to his 1988 claim submission, filed
with the Board a motion to vacate its 1999 claim denial
pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a). J.A. 14–15. That pro-
vision states in relevant part:
An appellate decision may be vacated by the Board
of Veterans’ Appeals at any time upon request of
the appellant or his or her representative, or on the
Board’s own motion, on the following grounds:
(a) Denial of due process. Examples of circum-
stances in which denial of due process of law will
be conceded are:
(1) When the appellant was denied his or her right
to representation through action or inaction by De-
partment of Veterans Affairs or Board of Veterans’
Appeals personnel,
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 4
(2) When there was a prejudicial failure to afford
the appellant a personal hearing. (Where there
was a failure to honor a request for a hearing and
a hearing is subsequently scheduled, but the appel-
lant fails to appear, the decision will not be va-
cated.), and
(3) For a legacy appeal, as defined in § 19.2 of this
chapter, when a Statement of the Case or required
Supplemental Statement of the Case was not pro-
vided.
38 C.F.R. § 20.1000. Section 20.1000(b), not at issue here,
permits vacatur of the allowance of benefits for fraud on
the Board. See id.
Mr. Young invoked only the due-process basis of sec-
tion 20.1000(a) for his motion. He asserted that the Board
in 1999 had denied him due process by failing to ensure
that the RO complied with the Board’s orders to search for
records. J.A. 14. On May 1, 2023, the Board denied
Mr. Young’s motion because the asserted error was “a duty
to assist error rather than a due process error.” J.A. 16.1
C
Mr. Young filed a notice of appeal to the Veterans
Court 119 days later, on August 28, 2023. Decision, at *1;
J.A. 18. The Veterans Court’s jurisdictional statute, 38
1 The Veterans Court characterized the denial as the
Board Chairman’s action, e.g., Decision, at *1, even though
the denial is signed by a Veterans Law Judge who was not
the Chairman, J.A. 16–17, and section 20.1000 gives the
Board the specified authority. The parties before us char-
acterize the denial as the action of the Board, Young’s
Opening Br. at 2; Secretary’s Br. at 2–3, and neither party
suggests that the Board/Chairman distinction matters in
this appeal. We refer to the ruling as the Board’s.
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 5
U.S.C. § 7252, provides for “exclusive jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Board” subject to a 120-day time bar found
in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The Secretary moved to dismiss,
arguing that (1) Mr. Young’s appeal was untimely to the
extent he was appealing the 1999 Board decision and
(2) the Board’s denial of vacatur was not itself an appeala-
ble decision, citing for the latter proposition the Veterans
Court’s decision in Harms v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 238,
240 (2006) (en banc) (Harms CAVC), affirmed, 489 F.3d
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). J.A. 19–22. Mr. Young opposed dis-
missal, clarifying that he “did not and [was] not appealing
the . . . 1999 decision.” J.A. 37. Rather, he contended that
the Board’s denial of his section 20.1000(a) motion was an
appealable decision. J.A. 36–37.
The Veterans Court granted the Secretary’s motion to
dismiss. The appeal of the denial of the motion to vacate
was within the 120 days allowed by the appeal statute, so
the only issue was whether that denial was an appealable
decision. The Veterans Court held that it was not. It rea-
soned that “[a] ‘decision’ of the Board, for purposes of [the
Veterans Court’s] jurisdiction, is a decision with respect to
the benefit sought by the veteran”—and that a denial of a
(mere) motion to vacate makes no such decision about the
benefit sought and is therefore not an appealable decision.
Decision, at *2 (citation omitted). The Veterans Court fur-
ther observed that “to permit the appeal of a denial of a
motion to vacate—a procedural ruling—24 years after the
underlying Board decision . . . ‘would render meaningless
the 120-day statutory period for filing appeals.’” Id. (quot-
ing Harms CAVC, 20 Vet. App. at 243).
Mr. Young timely appealed the Veterans Court’s dis-
missal. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (c).
II
Mr. Young challenges a legal ruling by the Veterans
Court and therefore presents a question within our juris-
diction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). Mr. Young contends
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 6
that, contrary to the Veterans Court’s conclusion, the
Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under section
20.1000(a) is a “decision” of the Board reviewable by the
Veterans Court under 38 U.S.C § 7252. We answer such
legal questions de novo. Flores-Vazquez v. McDonough,
996 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Mr. Young’s argu-
ment, we conclude, is foreclosed by controlling precedent,
which Mr. Young has not persuasively shown to merit a
narrow reading so as to distinguish this case based on the
legal authorities he invokes.
A
In Harms v. Nicholson, 489 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Harms CAFC), this court affirmed the Veterans Court’s
dismissal of an appeal from the Board’s denial of a motion
to vacate filed under 38 C.F.R. § 20.904(a) (2005)—which
was later recodified without material change as section
20.1000(a). In Harms CAFC, the court reached that result
by applying the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Lo-
comotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987). Harms CAFC,
489 F.3d at 1379. Those decisions control the present case.
Locomotive Engineers involved an unsuccessful chal-
lenge by several labor unions to the Interstate Commerce
Commission’s approval of certain railroad mergers. 482
U.S. at 273–74. The unions moved for reconsideration of
that decision pursuant to a statutory provision that author-
ized the Commission “at any time” to “reopen and recon-
sider” a decision because of “material error, new evidence,
or substantially changed circumstances.” See id. at 276–
78; 49 U.S.C. § 10327(g)(1) (1978). In particular, the un-
ions invoked only the “material error” ground, alleging that
the Commission’s original decision was legally (and mate-
rially) erroneous. See Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at
276, 278–79. The Commission denied reconsideration, and
the unions appealed to the D.C. Circuit. Id. A statute im-
posed a 60-day deadline for bringing appeals from a “final
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 7
order” of the Commission; the unions’ appeal was brought
within 60 days of the Commission’s denial of reconsidera-
tion, but more than 60 days after the Commission’s original
decision. Id. at 276–77. The D.C. Circuit concluded that
the appeal could be heard. See id. at 276.
The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling (as relevant
here) that the Commission’s denial of the motion to reopen
and reconsider was unreviewable. Id. at 277–80. The
Court explained that “where no new data but only ‘material
error’ has been put forward as the basis for reopening, an
appeal places before the courts precisely the same sub-
stance that could have been brought there by appeal from
the original order” and “judicial review would serve only
the peculiar purpose of extending indefinitely the time
within which seriously mistaken agency orders can be judi-
cially overturned.” Id. at 279–280 (emphasis in original).
The Court distinguished the other reopening grounds spec-
ified in the reopening statute, concluding that where reo-
pening is sought “on the basis of new evidence or changed
circumstances[,] review is available.” Id. at 284.
The Veterans Court in Harms CAVC applied Locomo-
tive Engineers to what is now section 20.1000(a). 20 Vet.
App. at 243–44. Harms CAVC concerned a veteran’s mo-
tion to vacate made more than 120 days after an unfavora-
ble Board decision. Id. at 240–41. The motion alleged that
the Board had denied him due process and erroneously re-
quired certain evidence. See Harms CAFC, 489 F.3d at
1378. When the Board denied the motion to vacate, the
veteran appealed within about a month. Harms CAVC, 20
Vet. App. at 241. He sought review of both the denial and
the underlying merits decision, arguing that “a decision on
a motion to vacate is a final Board decision” reviewable un-
der 38 U.S.C. § 7252. Id. The Veterans Court disagreed,
and dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the appeal from
the underlying Board decision was untimely and that the
Board’s denial of the motion to vacate was not appealable,
as it was “not substantively distinguishable” from the
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 8
unappealable denial of reconsideration in Locomotive En-
gineers. Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
The veteran appealed, and we affirmed. Harms CAFC,
489 F.3d at 1377. We held that a mere denial of a motion
to vacate under what is now section 20.1000(a)—which
does not even purport to delay the finality of the underlying
decision—does not constitute “a new Board decision on the
merits of the original claims” and therefore is not itself ap-
pealable. See id. at 1378–79. And we agreed with the Vet-
erans Court’s application of Locomotive Engineers to such
a denial, lest an essentially procedural mechanism “open
an avenue to perpetual review of Board decisions.” Id. at
1379; see id. (citing Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 280–
81).
This case comes within the rule of Harms CAFC that
the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under section
20.1000(a) is not itself reviewable. Mr. Young’s motion to
vacate was predicated entirely on an allegation known to
the Board in 1999 (the RO’s purported failure to search for
certain records). There is no plausible argument here—if
there ever could be under section 20.1000(a)—that the mo-
tion rests on “new evidence” or “changed circumstances” so
as to put the case outside the reach of Locomotive Engi-
neers and, by extension, Harms CAFC. See Locomotive En-
gineers, 482 U.S. at 284. Moreover, the veteran in Harms
CAFC waited only about a year to move the Board to vacate
its merits decision, while Mr. Young waited 23 years. Com-
pare 489 F.3d at 1377–78 with J.A. 14–15. This case thus
highlights the concern about “perpetual review” underlying
Harm CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1379, and Locomotive Engineers,
as a belated request like Mr. Young’s would likely involve
different counsel from the original case, faded memories, or
incomplete records, all increasing the risk of waste and er-
ror. Finally, a holding of reviewability here would effec-
tively subject the 120-day time bar of 38 U.S.C. § 7266 to a
“proviso” that, as to an allegation of due process error,
reads: “judicial review may be sought at any time.”
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 9
Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 279–80. If that result
was unwarranted in Locomotive Engineers, where two dif-
ferent statutes provided, respectively, for the appeal dead-
line and for reopening at any time, id. at 277–78, the same
conclusion seems to follow a fortiori where, as here, the va-
catur authority exists only by a regulation—one that does
not delay the finality of the underlying decision.
Mr. Young urges us to ignore Harms CAFC because,
there, the veteran was openly seeking review of both the
Board’s denial of vacatur and the underlying merits deci-
sion whereas Mr. Young is not appealing the Board’s 1999
decision. Young’s Opening Br. at 12. That difference is
immaterial. In Harms CAFC, we squarely held that a va-
catur denial is not an appealable decision, rejecting the
same argument Mr. Young makes here that a “decision to
deny the request to vacate is a new final decision.” Harms
CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1378. That holding is independent of
whether an appeal of the underlying decision would still be
timely or whether the veteran has chosen to appeal the un-
derlying decision (in a timely or untimely manner) as well
as the vacatur denial. It makes no sense that the rule of
Harms CAFC and Locomotive Engineers, which precludes
indefinite reviewability of challenges available at the time
of the underlying decision, Harms CAFC, 489 F.3d at
1378–79; Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 278–80, would
be subject to evasion by the appellant’s simple choice to re-
frain from pressing an out-of-time appeal of the underlying
decision.
B
Mr. Young contends that this case presents a question
of first impression because he asks us to interpret the Vet-
erans Court’s jurisdictional statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7252, in
light of several other statutory and regulatory provisions
assertedly not brought to this court’s attention in Harms
CAFC. Young’s Reply Br. at 2–5. But Mr. Young cites
nothing to support the notion that such new arguments are
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 10
a basis for a panel to depart from directly on-point prece-
dent—where the precedent is firmly founded on a Supreme
Court decision and there has been no intervening change
in law. See Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 517
F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (permitting departure
from precedent only after a sufficient intervening change
in governing law); see also Deckers Corp. v. United States,
752 F.3d 949, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In Harms CAFC, we
squarely concluded that the Veterans Court had not “mis-
interpreted its jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and
7266(a),” and we affirmed a Veterans Court decision that
rejected some of the same arguments about regulatory pro-
visions as those Mr. Young makes to us. 489 F.3d at 1378;
see Harms CAVC, 20 Vet. App. at 244–45. And even if a
panel may properly give a precedent an available narrow
reading in light of persuasive new arguments, Mr. Young
has not shown that this is a case for such action. The new
arguments presented by Mr. Young do not undermine the
straightforward application of Harms CAFC to this case.
1
Mr. Young primarily relies on 38 U.S.C. § 511(a),
which uses the word “decide” to describe actions of the Sec-
retary “affect[ing]” benefits and so, according to Mr. Young,
defines the scope of a reviewable “decision” of the Board
under the Veterans Court’s jurisdictional statute, 38
U.S.C. § 7252(a). Young’s Opening Br. at 6–10. The stat-
ute itself refutes Mr. Young’s argument.
Section 511(a) states:
The Secretary shall decide all questions of law and
fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under
a law that affects the provision of benefits by the
Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survi-
vors of veterans. Subject to subsection (b), the deci-
sion of the Secretary as to any such question shall
be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 11
any other official or by any court, whether by an
action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (emphases added). The second sentence
of that provision states a general rule of unreviewability.
Section 511(b) then states exceptions, of which only one is
relevant here: “The second sentence of subsection (a) does
not apply to— . . . (4) matters covered by chapter 72 of this
title,” which is the chapter that defines the appellate juris-
diction of the Veterans Court. Id. § 511(b)(4).2
As a straightforward textual matter, section 511(a)
does not affirmatively make a decision reviewable. It sets
a default bar on reviewability. Section 511(b) then creates
an exception to that bar for, as relevant here, what is made
reviewable in chapter 72. Thus, contrary to Mr. Young’s
assertion, any affirmative grant of reviewability, and its
definition, must come from chapter 72, not section 511.
The mere fact that a Board action is a “decision” under sec-
tion 511(a) does not make it reviewable by the Veterans
Court. Indeed, Mr. Young’s contrary conclusion makes
nonsense of the structure of section 511 and makes subsec-
tion (b)(4) surplusage.
Mr. Young gets no more help from 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a).
See Young’s Opening Br. at 8–10. Section 7104(a) states
that the “[f]inal decisions” in matters “which under section
511(a) . . . [are] subject to decision by the Secretary” shall
be made by the Board. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a). That language
says no more than that, for any “decision” (by the Secre-
tary) covered by section 511(a), it is the Board that makes
2 Chapter 72 of title 38, called “United States Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims,” prescribes the jurisdiction
and procedures of the Veterans Court, among other things.
See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251–7299; Pub. L. No. 105-368, title V,
§ 512(a)(4)(A), 112 Stat. 3315, 3341 (1998) (enacting chap-
ter heading into law).
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 12
the “final decision” (for the Secretary). It does not say that
every decision of the Board is a “final decision” for purposes
of Veterans Court review. By its reference to section 511,
it leaves the latter issue to chapter 72.
As to what chapter 72 means, our precedents point to
a narrower understanding of what is required for a “deci-
sion” to be reviewable by the Veterans Court than
Mr. Young urges. We have repeatedly said that “[a] ‘deci-
sion’ of the Board, for purposes of the Veterans Court’s ju-
risdiction under [38 U.S.C. § 7252], is the decision with
respect to the benefit sought by the veteran [where] bene-
fits are either granted . . . or they are denied.” Maggitt
v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000); accord Mote
v. Wilkie, 976 F.3d 1337, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (collect-
ing cases); see May v. McDonough, 61 F.4th 963, 965–66
(Fed. Cir. 2023). The Veterans Court has consistently ap-
plied that gloss to § 7252. See Dojaquez v. McDonough, 35
Vet. App. 423, 428–431 (2022) (discussing doctrinal devel-
opments and collecting cases). Even were we free to do so,
Mr. Young offers no compelling reason that we ought to de-
part from that longstanding interpretation.
2
Mr. Young further argues that the unreviewability of
vacatur denials under section 20.1000(a) is inconsistent
with the reviewability of the Board’s decisions on claims of
clear and unmistakable error (CUE) and claims for reopen-
ing. See Young’s Opening Br. at 5–6, 12; Young’s Reply Br.
at 6–7. We see no such inconsistency—or tension that
would justify excluding this case from the reach of Harms
CAFC.
First, we see no such disharmony with the reviewabil-
ity of CUE claims. The law authorizing revision of benefits
decisions for clear and unmistakable error says, “chapter
72 of title 38 . . . shall apply with respect to any decision of
the [Board] on a [CUE] claim.” Pub. L. No. 105-111
§ 1(c)(2), 111 Stat. 2271, 2272 (1997) (emphases added); 38
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 13
U.S.C. § 7251 (note). That clear, targeted expression of
Congress’s will to make judicial review available for “any”
decision on a CUE claim has no counterpart for decisions
on a motion to vacate under the regulation at issue here,
section 20.1000.
CUE claims also differ relevantly in their substance
from the claim at issue here. Under the long-established
standard, a CUE challenge is a contention that the bottom-
line result of the challenged benefits decision was wrong
because it must be shown that correction of the asserted
error “would have manifestly changed the outcome.” Smith
v. McDonough, 101 F.4th 1375, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2024)
(quoting 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(c)); see, e.g., Russell v. Prin-
cipi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313 (1992) (en banc). Relatedly, the
provisions governing CUE use mandatory language that
require the outcome to be changed when CUE is estab-
lished; the provisions are not mere authorizations, and
they do not use the language of “may.” See 38 U.S.C.
§§ 5109A, 7111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (as quoted in Russell,
3 Vet. App. at 313). CUE claims thus fit the Maggitt for-
mulation regarding “decisions” in a way that motions to va-
cate under section 20.1000(a) do not.
Second, the long-recognized reviewability of denials of
reopening under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156, see Elkins v. West, 12
Vet. App. 209, 215–18 (1999) (en banc) (affording clear er-
ror review), is similarly consistent with the unreviewabil-
ity of denials of motions to vacate under section 20.1000(a).
Like the CUE provisions, the statutes governing claims for
reopening and supplemental claims use mandatory (not
“may”) language, thus requiring the requested action when
the standards are met. See 38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 U.S.C.
§ 5108 (2016). Additionally, the reopening regulation, 38
C.F.R. § 3.156, like the supplemental claim procedure of 38
C.F.R. § 3.2501 that has largely succeeded it, necessarily
involves “new” evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (requiring
“new and material” evidence); id. § 3.2501(a) (for supple-
mental claims, “new and relevant” evidence). In that way,
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YOUNG v. COLLINS 14
reopening and supplemental claims are unlike the present
motion to vacate and the reconsideration motion in Loco-
motive Engineers, both of which involved an allegation of
material error that could have been asserted at the time of
the original decision. That difference mattered in Locomo-
tive Engineers, which, as discussed above, recognized the
reviewability of a reopening motion premised on new evi-
dence. 482 U.S. at 284; see id. at 279 (“If review of denial
to reopen for new evidence . . . is unavailable, the petitioner
will have been deprived of all opportunity for judicial con-
sideration . . . of facts which, through no fault of his own,
the original proceeding did not contain.”). And because of
the requirement of “new and material” (or “new and rele-
vant”) evidence, reopening decisions directly call into ques-
tion the substance of the Board’s original benefits grant or
denial, providing a closer fit with the Maggitt standard for
“decision” than do claims under section 20.1000(a), with
their focus on process defects.
In view of these differences between the vacatur proce-
dure at issue here and the other reconsideration mecha-
nisms invoked by Mr. Young, reviewability of decisions
made through those mechanisms does not readily imply re-
viewability of a denial of a motion to vacate under section
20.1000(a). We thus see no reason to depart from the nat-
ural understanding of Harms CAFC as governing the pre-
sent case.
III
We have considered Mr. Young’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the Veterans Court.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
AFFIRMED
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