Synqor, Inc. v. Vicor Corporation

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SYNQOR, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
VICOR CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant
______________________
2024-1879
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:14-cv-00287-RWS-JBB,
Judge Robert Schroeder, III.
______________________
Decided: February 13, 2026
______________________
STEVEN J. HOROWITZ, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL,
argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by
STEPHANIE P. KOH, EMMA GRACE SILBERSTEIN; MICHAEL D.
HATCHER, Dallas, TX; JILLIAN STONECIPHER, Washington,
DC.
JOHN BASH, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, Austin, TX, argued for defendant-appellant. Also rep-
resented by NICHOLAS JOHN CALUDA, Houston, TX; SEAN S.
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 1 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 1 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 2
PAK, San Francisco, CA; PATRICK T. SCHMIDT, Los Angeles,
CA.
______________________
Before REYNA and CHEN, Circuit Judges, and FREEMAN,
District Judge.1
FREEMAN, District Judge.
SynQor, Inc. (“SynQor”) filed suit against Vicor Corp.
(“Vicor”) for infringement of several patents, including U.S.
Patent No. 7,564,702 (“’702 patent”), in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. A jury
found that Vicor indirectly and willfully infringed two
claims of the ’702 patent by selling its direct-current–direct
current (“DC-DC”) converters to customers and awarded
$6.5 million in damages.
The district court denied Vicor’s post-trial motion for
judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) of noninfringement,
holding that the jury’s verdict was supported by substan-
tial evidence. The district court also granted SynQor’s
post-trial motions for enhanced damages and attorneys’
fees, increasing SynQor’s award to $25 million. We affirm
the district court’s judgment, finding that the jury’s in-
fringement verdict and willfulness finding were supported
by substantial evidence and that the district court’s orders
awarding enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees were not
an abuse of discretion.
BACKGROUND
I
The technology at issue in this appeal involves DC-DC
converters, which are computer components configured to
1 Honorable Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge,
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, sitting by designation.
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 2 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 2 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 3
receive a direct current at a given voltage and convert it to
a lower voltage output. ’702 patent col. 1, ll. 23–25. Many
DC-DC converters use metal-oxide-semiconductor field-ef-
fect transistors (“MOSFETs”), including “synchronous” or
“controlled” rectifiers, to turn the flow of current across the
device “on” or “off” to avoid core saturation. See ’702 patent
col. 5 ll. 14–36, col. 6 ll. 21–28, 41–48. The conduction
state (“on” or “off”) depends on whether the voltage applied
at the gate exceeds a specified threshold value: The tran-
sistor will turn “on” when the voltage applied at the gate
exceeds the threshold. See ’702 patent col. 16 ll. 10–17.
Two important functions of DC-DC converters include
(1) isolation, whereby the device insulates direct current by
not directly connecting the input and output to avoid shock-
ing the user, and (2) regulation, which enables the con-
verter to produce the specific output voltage required. The
’702 patent is entitled “High Efficiency Power Converter”
and is directed to DC-DC converters with an “intermediate
bus architecture,” where the direct current input is first
isolated and then flows into one of several regulators de-
pending on the desired output. See, e.g., ’702 patent fig. 5.
The ’702 patent’s claims are directed to a DC-DC con-
verter in which the isolating MOSFETs are “cross-coupled”
to opposite transformers, leading to a highly dissipative
overlap interval. ’702 patent col. 6 ll. 41–48, col. 7 ll. 37–
42. To improve efficiency, the ’702 patent’s specification
teaches that it is “desirable to keep the overlap interval
short compared to the period of the cycle.” ’702 patent
col. 7 ll. 42–44. The claims at issue in this appeal (inde-
pendent claim 55 and dependent claim 67) require that the
transistors be “turned on for an on-state time and off for an
off-state time in synchronization with a voltage waveform”
(“In-Synch Limitation”), ’702 patent col. 22 ll. 42–44, with
“transition times which are short relative to the on-state
and the off-state times” (“Short Transitions Limitation”),
’702 patent col. 22 ll. 48–50.
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 3 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 3 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 4
II
Prior to filing this suit, SynQor sued several other DC-
DC power converter companies for patent infringement
(the “Artesyn Suit”). SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
No. 07-cv-00497-RWS (E.D. Tex. filed Nov. 13, 2007). This
Court ultimately affirmed the jury’s verdict that the Ar-
tesyn Suit defendants induced infringement of SynQor’s
asserted patents (including the ’702 patent) by selling com-
ponents to customers that incorporated those products into
systems with intermediate bus architecture. See SynQor,
Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1372–73, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
As relevant to this appeal, the Artesyn Suit defendants
asserted that damages for lost profits should not be
awarded because Vicor’s unregulated bus converters (i.e.,
the accused products here) were an available noninfringing
alternative. In connection with the damages phase, Vicor’s
Chief Executive Officer Dr. Patrizio Vinciarelli was de-
posed. J.A. 52257 ¶ 19. At the Artesyn trial, SynQor pre-
sented expert testimony that Vicor’s unregulated bus
converters were not a noninfringing alternative because
they also infringed the asserted patents. The jury in the
Artesyn Suit ultimately awarded lost-profits damages. See
SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 07-cv-00497-TJW-
CE, 2011 WL 238645, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2011). The
district court in that case also issued an injunction against
the sale of the accused products. See id. at *9.
Around the conclusion of proceedings in the Artesyn
Suit, certain defendants and other customers approached
Vicor with requests to supply them with noninfringing con-
verters. Vicor responded by designing its own unregulated
bus converters as replacements for the enjoined products
for use in intermediate bus architecture power supply sys-
tems. J.A. 52257 ¶ 22. Notably, Cisco Systems, Inc.
(“Cisco”) asked Vicor to provide “sufficient legal evi-
dence/proof that Vicor is not impacted” by the disposition
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 4 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 4 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 5
of the Artesyn Suit. J.A. 76858. Vicor responded that its
products were “fundamentally different in most obvious re-
spects” from the products at issue in the Artesyn Suit (and
found to infringe SynQor’s patents). Instead of providing
an opinion of counsel, Vicor agreed to indemnify Cisco.
J.A. 85713 (ll. 1–3), 85737 (ll. 1–5). Vicor also designed
some converters with transition times above 25%, since the
district court in the Artesyn Suit construed the Short Tran-
sitions Limitation as requiring transition times less than
20%.
III
Vicor filed a complaint for declaratory judgment of non-
infringement and invalidity in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts on January 26,
2011. See Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., No. 11-cv-10146
(D. Mass. filed Jan. 26, 2011). Shortly thereafter, SynQor
filed the complaint giving rise to this appeal in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
against Vicor,2 asserting infringement of the same patents
as the Artesyn Suit, including the ’702 patent and U.S. Pa-
tent Nos. 7,072,190 (“’190 patent”), 7,272,021 (“’021 pa-
tent”), and 8,023,290 (“’290 patent”).3 See SynQor Inc.
2 SynQor’s original complaint in the underlying ac-
tion named Cisco, Vicor, and Ericsson, Inc. (“Ericsson”) as
defendants. SynQor later voluntarily dismissed Ericsson,
and the claims against Cisco and Vicor were severed.
3 Vicor sought inter partes reexamination of
SynQor’s patents and obtained a stay of litigation in 2016.
The reexaminations resulted in the cancellation of all
claims of the ’021 and ’290 patents, see Vicor Corp.
v. SynQor, Inc., 869 F.3d 1309, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
SynQor, Inc. v. Vicor Corp., No. 21-2211, 2023 WL 234186,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 18, 2023), as well as claims of the
’190 patent lacking the Short Transitions Limitation, see
Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 603 F. App’x 969, 975
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 5 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 5 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 6
v. Ericsson, Inc., No. 11-cv-00054-TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. filed
Jan. 28, 2011). In its answer, Vicor asserted affirmative
equitable defenses of waiver and estoppel as well as coun-
terclaims for unfair competition and tortious interference
under Massachusetts law. See J.A. 63757, 63783–89.
In the course of the litigation, the district court con-
strued the In-Synch Limitation as requiring that each
transistor be “turned from on to off and from off to on at
some point in the course of the change of the voltage wave-
form.” J.A. 620. Despite the court’s construction, addi-
tional disputes arose throughout the litigation, with
SynQor seeking to argue that “being turned from on to off
and from off to on” is an action that may take place over a
period of time and Vicor responding that the claims require
that the transistors actually switch states during the tran-
sition. The district court eventually ordered supplemental
briefing regarding the claim-construction dispute and ulti-
mately concluded that “[t]he claim is broad enough to allow
turn on and off to be shown by either a process or an in-
stant,” and that “Vicor may not argue to the jury that the
claimed turn on or off must be identified by a specific in-
stant in time, and SynQor may not argue to the jury that
the claimed turn on or off must be identified by a process.”
J.A. 47359.
SynQor proceeded to trial on claim 2 of the ’190 patent
and claims 55 and 67 of the ’702 patent, arguing that Vicor
indirectly infringed the patents under the doctrine of will-
ful blindness. J.A. 84575–77. For the accused products
that did not literally meet the Short Transition Time Lim-
itation, SynQor argued infringement under a doctrine-of-
equivalents theory. At the close of evidence, the district
(Fed. Cir. 2015). This Court affirmed the Board’s conclu-
sion that the ’702 patent’s claims were not shown to be un-
patentable, see Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 706 F. App’x
673, 677–78 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 6 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 6 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 7
court deferred ruling on Vicor’s motion for JMOL of nonin-
fringement and granted SynQor’s motion for JMOL as to
Vicor’s state-law counterclaims. J.A. 49512 ¶¶ 9–10. The
jury found that Vicor did not infringe claim 2 of the ’190 pa-
tent but indirectly and willfully infringed claims 55 and 67
of the ’702 patent, awarding $6.5 million in damages. See
J.A. 49498–502.
IV
After trial, Vicor renewed its JMOL motion for nonin-
fringement of the ’702 patent. J.A. 51237. Vicor argued
that no reasonable jury could find that it indirectly in-
fringed the ’702 patent’s claims, urging that there was not
sufficient evidence to show that (1) Vicor subjectively be-
lieved that there was a high probability of infringement or
that (2) Vicor took affirmative, deliberate actions to avoid
confirming that belief. Vicor further argued that, even if
the evidence supported the jury’s verdict of indirect in-
fringement, it did not support the jury’s verdict of willful
infringement, which imposes a different scienter standard
than indirect infringement.
The district court denied Vicor’s JMOL motion, stating
that “[b]oth parties presented substantial evidence as to
whether Vicor indirectly infringed the ’702 patent.”
J.A. 31. The district court reasoned that a reasonable jury
could have found indirect infringement based on the “total-
ity of circumstances,” namely, “Vicor’s work on drop-in re-
placements, Vicor’s knowledge of the relatively recently
issued ’702 patent, Vicor’s knowledge of and participation
in the [Artesyn Suit], Vicor’s failure to obtain opinion of
counsel, and Vicor’s failure to read the ’702 patent until it
filed its declaratory action.” J.A. 31 (footnote omitted).
The district court concluded that “a reasonable jury could
consider this same evidence to find that Vicor’s indirect in-
fringement was willful.” J.A. 31.
SynQor filed motions for attorneys’ fees, see J.A. 49541,
and for enhanced damages, see J.A. 51091. As to attorneys’
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 7 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 7 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 8
fees, SynQor argued that the case before the district court
was exceptional because Vicor’s infringement merits de-
fenses, infringement equitable defenses, and counterclaims
were exceptionally weak. SynQor further argued that Vi-
cor litigated the case in an exceptional manner by filing a
series of ex parte reexamination petitions after its inter
partes review petition had been denied and using its coun-
terclaims to introduce inflammatory and prejudicial alle-
gations (including SynQor’s so-called “Kill Vicor”
campaign). J.A. 49556–57. As to enhanced damages,
SynQor argued that the case was exceptional because Vicor
had no good-faith belief of noninfringement or invalidity
and litigated the case in bad faith. The district court
granted both motions. J.A. 71, 92.
As to attorneys’ fees, the district court agreed with
SynQor that Vicor’s litigation positions—particularly its
equitable defenses and counterclaims, were exceptionally
weak—concluding that “Vicor unnecessarily multiplied
these proceedings by its continued adoption of unreasona-
ble and untenable positions.” J.A. 78. The district court
also faulted Vicor for repeatedly attempting to relitigate
the In-Synch Limitation to argue to the jury that the limi-
tation could only be satisfied if the transistors turned “on”
or “off” at a discrete moment in time, finding that “[t]his
behavior is especially egregious with respect to the accused
products with transition times of less than 20 percent,
where Vicor’s only true defense to induced infringement
was an alleged lack of intent or knowledge.” J.A. 78. After
the district court awarded attorneys’ fees, the parties stip-
ulated to an amount of $9.5 million, with Vicor reserving
its right to appeal. J.A. 52314–18.
As to enhanced damages, the district court “ulti-
mately . . . focused on ‘egregious’ behavior concerning the
’702 [p]atent” but also performed its analysis based on the
factors we set forth in Read Corporation v. Portec Inc.,
970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992), based on the parties’ argu-
ments. J.A. 83. The district court determined that the
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 8 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 8 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 9
Read factors favored enhancing damages because Vicor
acted in bad faith, concluding that “[u]ltimately, alt-
hough . . . Vicor’s conduct does not merit a full trebling of
damages, . . . enhancement is appropriate.” J.A. 89. The
court enhanced damages by $4.5 million. J.A. 92.
Vicor filed this timely appeal. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
I
We begin with Vicor’s arguments as to infringement.
Vicor urges that there was insufficient evidence before the
jury for it to find either that Vicor induced infringement of
the ’702 patent or that such infringement was willful. In
reviewing issues tried to a jury, we review the district
court’s denial of post-trial JMOL motions and new trial mo-
tions under the law of the regional circuit. Packet Intel.
LLC v. NetScout Sys., Inc., 965 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2020). The Fifth Circuit reviews the denial of a JMOL mo-
tion de novo under the same standard as the trial court,
i.e., substantial evidence. Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co.,
118 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1997).
As to indirect infringement, Vicor’s arguments amount
to no more than an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence
before the jury and make various inferences in Vicor’s fa-
vor. This we decline to do. As to willful infringement, the
district court correctly found that the jury’s verdict was
supported by substantial evidence. While we agree with
Vicor that the standards for willful infringement and will-
ful blindness are different, we hold that the evidence in the
record, taken in the light most favorable to the jury’s ver-
dict, was sufficient to prove both indirect infringement and
willfulness.
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 9 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 9 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 10
A
Section 271 of the Patent Act creates liability for both
direct and indirect infringement, providing that “[w]hoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Active inducement “re-
quires knowledge of the underlying direct infringement—
not merely the knowledge of the existence of the patent.”
Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., 829 F.3d 1353, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Knowledge is a high standard—this
Court has repeatedly explained that it requires more than
proof of mere negligence or recklessness. See, e.g., Roche
Diagnostics Corp. v. Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC, 30 F.4th
1109, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
The Supreme Court has explained that section 271(b)’s
knowledge requirement can be satisfied by showing that
the defendant possessed actual knowledge of the underly-
ing infringement or, in certain cases, under the doctrine of
willful blindness. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). To establish willful-blind-
ness liability, a patentee must show that the defendant
(1) “subjectively believe[d] that there [was] a high probabil-
ity” of infringement and (2) took “deliberate actions to
avoid learning of that fact.” Id. at 769.
Here, Vicor argues that the district court erred by
denying JMOL of noninfringement because the evidence
before the jury was insufficient to establish either element
of willful blindness. Appellant’s Br. 32. We address each
element in turn, concluding that the evidence was suffi-
cient for a reasonable jury to find both requirements were
met by Vicor’s conduct.
As to belief of likelihood of infringement, Vicor argues
that there was no evidence that it subjectively believed it
was infringing the ’702 patent during the relevant period,
urging that its “good-faith belief that it did not infringe . . .
negate[d] the requisite knowledge of infringement.” Appel-
lant’s Br. 40. Emphasizing the highly fact-intensive
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 10 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 10 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 11
nature of the issue of intent, SynQor responds that, draw-
ing all inferences in its favor, the evidence in the record
was sufficient for a jury to find that Vicor subjectively be-
lieved there was a high likelihood of infringement. Appel-
lee’s Br. 34. We agree.4
The problem with Vicor’s argument at bottom is that it
relies on drawing inferences from the evidence that the
jury was simply not required to make. See Warsaw Ortho-
pedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 824 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (sustaining indirect infringement verdict where
there was “substantial evidence that [the defendant’s] in-
fringement position was objectively unreasonable” and jury
“could reasonably have concluded” that defendant “had
knowledge” or “was willfully blind” to the fact of infringe-
ment). The jury heard extensive evidence that Vicor mon-
itored and reverse engineered SynQor’s patent-marked
products, see J.A. 85108 (ll. 15–25), 85109 (ll. 12–20),
85433 (ll. 13–17); was made aware of SynQor’s position
that Vicor’s products were not a noninfringing alternative,
see J.A. 78118, 84755 (ll. 13–22), 84756 (ll. 1–4); and chose
to indemnify Cisco rather than provide a legal opinion that
its products did not infringe, see J.A. 85736–37. On this
record, the “requisite intent to induce infringement may be
inferred from all the circumstances.” Broadcom Corp.
4 SynQor argues that the evidence before the jury
was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Vicor
not only was willfully blind but also possessed actual
knowledge of infringement. See Appellee’s Br. 34–35. Be-
cause we agree with SynQor that a reasonable jury could
infer based on the evidence in the record that Vicor subjec-
tively believed there was a high chance of infringement and
deliberately avoided confirming this belief, we need not de-
cide whether the evidence was sufficient to prove actual
knowledge.
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 11 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 11 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 12
v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quot-
ing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 669
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, the jury was entitled to rely on evidence that
Vicor sought to capitalize on the “window of opportunity,”
J.A. 78136, 85126 (ll. 8–21), that opened once the court in
the Artesyn Suit enjoined the sale of competitors’ convert-
ers. To the extent that Vicor argues that the jury could not
find that Vicor was on notice of SynQor’s position until it
was brought into the Artesyn Suit, see Appellant’s Br. 42,
we disagree. Given the evidence that Vicor and SynQor
competed in the same market and monitored one another,
the jury was not required to suspend disbelief and credit
Vicor’s account that it was unaware of the Artesyn Suit un-
til Dr. Vinciarelli was deposed during the damages phase.
As to the deliberate-action requirement, Vicor urges
that the evidence “focus[ed] on failures to act to learn of
infringement, whereas Global-Tech requires deliberately
acting to shield oneself from learning of infringement.” Ap-
pellant’s Br. 33 (emphasis added). This argument is ulti-
mately semantic. True, willful blindness requires proof of
deliberate acts to avoid confirming one’s subjective belief of
a high probability of infringement, but the inquiry is not as
rigid as Vicor’s argument would appear to suggest.
The jury heard from Dr. Vinciarelli himself that he did
not read SynQor’s patents, despite his admission that, as
the owner of many patents, he understood that one needed
to compare products to assess infringement. J.A. 85729–
31, 85751. Such evidence supports the deliberate-action
requirement. See Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, 783 F.3d
1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Smith & Nephew, Inc.
v. Arthrex, Inc., 502 F. App’x 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(nonprecedential) (explaining that testimony that a de-
fendant “made no attempt to compare its [products] to the
claims of the [asserted] patent” supported jury’s indirect-
infringement verdict). Even if a reasonable jury could have
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 12 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 12 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 13
interpreted Dr. Vinciarelli’s apparent confidence in Vicor’s
technology as being the sole explanation for why Vicor did
not seek to confirm whether its products infringed after of-
fering drop-in replacements in the wake of the Artesyn
Suit, the jury was not required to do so, especially after
hearing of Vicor’s choice to provide indemnification instead
of a formal opinion-of-counsel letter in response to Cisco’s
request for legal assurances of noninfringement. See Co-
mark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1192
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that court are “not required to
assume that the jury believed all or indeed any . . . excul-
patory evidence” in deciding JMOL motions).
Vicor’s position is particularly difficult to square with
the jury having heard of Vicor’s extensive monitoring and
familiarity with SynQor’s products, along with Vicor’s mar-
ket expansion, which may permissibly support a finding of
willful blindness. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 770–71 (noting
that the defendant performed “market research” and
“gather[ed] information as much as possible” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL
of noninfringement as to indirect infringement of the
’702 patent.
B
Section 284 of the Patent Act allows for enhancement
of damages in cases of willful infringement. 35 U.S.C.
§ 284. “The subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, in-
tentional or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages,
without regard to whether his infringement was objectively
reckless.” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S.
93, 105 (2016). We have explained that knowledge of the
asserted patent and evidence of infringement is necessary,
but not sufficient, for a finding of willfulness: “Rather, will-
fulness requires deliberate or intentional infringement.”
Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Provisur Techs., Inc. v. Weber,
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 13 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 13 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 14
Inc., 119 F.4th 948, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2024), cert. denied,
145 S. Ct. 1181 (2025).
Willfulness is ultimately a question for the factfinder,
taking into consideration the totality of circumstances.
Exmark Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods. Grp.,
LLC, 879 F.3d 1332, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “[T]he con-
cept of ‘willfulness’ requires a jury to find no more than de-
liberate or intentional infringement.” Eko Brands, LLC
v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 946 F.3d 1367, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Halo, 579 U.S. at 105). We do not
“second-guess the jury or substitute [our] judgment for its
judgment” when reviewing a finding of willfulness. Arctic
Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d
1350, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Vicor’s primary argument on appeal is that the district
court erred as a matter of law in denying Vicor’s motion for
JMOL as to willfulness because it “relied exclusively on the
same willful-blindness theory” as proffered for indirect in-
fringement. Appellant’s Br. 46–47. SynQor responds that
it recognizes that the standards are different but that there
is nothing problematic about the “evidence supporting the
jury’s finding of indirect infringement . . . likewise sup-
port[ing] its finding of willful infringement.” Appellee’s
Br. 50.
As a threshold matter, we agree with Vicor that the
standards for indirect infringement under the willful blind-
ness doctrine and willful infringement are distinct. The in-
quiry for willful blindness is to determine whether the
defendant took deliberate steps to avoid confirming in-
fringement despite its subjective belief of a high likelihood
of infringement. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 769. The touch-
stone of willful infringement, on the other hand, is whether
infringement was “deliberate” or “intentional.” Eko
Brands, 946 F.3d at 1378.
We have previously explained that “a finding of in-
duced infringement does not compel a finding of
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 14 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 14 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 15
willfulness,” and “the standard required for willful in-
fringement is different than that required for induced in-
fringement.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 14 F.4th
1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2021). That does not mean, however,
that the two inquiries are completely unrelated—we have
also acknowledged that “[i]n some respects, the intent
standard for inducement is akin to the one for willfulness,
as both rest on the subjective intent of the accused in-
fringer.” Roche Diagnostics, 30 F.4th at 1119. Here, a rea-
sonable jury could have concluded that the same evidence
supporting indirect infringement independently met the
different threshold required for willful infringement.
Vicor dedicates much of its argument to urging that the
district court improperly conflated the legal standards for
indirect infringement and willfulness. But our task on ap-
peal is to review the jury’s verdict, not the district court’s
order. Bellows, 118 F.3d at 273; see also Braun Inc. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992). As
Vicor itself concedes, see Appellant’s Br. 48, the jury was
properly instructed that it could only find willful infringe-
ment if SynQor demonstrated by a preponderance of evi-
dence “that Vicor knew of the SynQor patent and that the
infringement by Vicor was intentional,” and that it was not
enough that “Vicor was aware of the patent and infringed
it,” J.A. 49466–67. We accordingly must affirm if a reason-
able jury could have found that the evidence was sufficient
to prove willfulness under this concededly proper instruc-
tion. Warsaw Orthopedic, 824 F.3d at 1348.
While it is true that willful infringement requires a dif-
ferent intent than willful blindness, evidence of indirect in-
fringement may be probative of willfulness, especially
when combined with a lack of reasonable noninfringement
and invalidity positions. In SRI International, for example,
we affirmed a jury’s finding of willfulness because the
jury’s “findings on induced infringement, when combined
with [the defendant’s] lack of reasonable bases for its in-
fringement and invalidity defenses, provide[d] sufficient
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 15 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 15 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 16
support for the jury’s finding of willful infringement.”
14 F.4th at 1329. The jury was free to credit the relevant
evidence of record, which included evidence suggesting
that Vicor deliberately infringed the patent without a rea-
sonable belief of invalidity or noninfringement as to at least
certain accused products.
In view of the unchallenged jury instructions and the
evidence in the record, we conclude that the district court
did not err in denying Vicor’s motion to set aside the jury’s
willfulness finding. As discussed above, the jury heard
that Vicor monitored and reverse engineered SynQor’s
products, knew of SynQor’s patents, seized the opportunity
to offer drop-in replacements for Artesyn Suit defendants,
and sold at least some converters with transition times less
than 20%. Vicor did not provide competing expert testi-
mony on literal infringement for many of the converters at
issue and did not present an invalidity defense for the
’702 patent at all. Based on the totality of the circum-
stances, a reasonable jury could have determined that Vi-
cor willfully infringed the ’702 patent.
II
Having concluded that the jury’s infringement verdict
and willfulness finding were supported by substantial evi-
dence, we next turn to the district court’s awards of attor-
neys’ fees and enhanced damages. We review such
determinations for abuse of discretion. WBIP, LLC
v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We
hold that the district court acted within its discretion in
awarding attorneys’ fees and enhanced damages to
SynQor.
A
District courts “in exceptional cases may award reason-
able attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285.
“The statute imposes ‘one and only one constraint on dis-
trict courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees in patent
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 16 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 16 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 17
litigation: [t]he power is reserved for “exceptional” cases.’”
Lumen View Tech. LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 811 F.3d
479, 482 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
572 U.S. 545, 553 (2014)). “[A]n ‘exceptional’ case is simply
one that stands out from others with respect to the sub-
stantive strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Oc-
tane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554. “District courts may deter-
mine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case
exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the
circumstances.” Id.
In a reasoned order discussing SynQor’s motions for at-
torneys’ fees and enhanced damages, the district court con-
cluded that attorneys’ fees were warranted because
SynQor was a prevailing party and the case was excep-
tional. J.A. 71. In accepting SynQor’s argument that “Vi-
cor’s litigating position was exceptionally weak and Vicor’s
litigation tactics were in bad faith,” J.A. 76, the district
court pointed to Vicor’s relitigation of its claim construc-
tion, weak equitable claims, and gamesmanship at trial to
support its exceptional-case finding. See, e.g., J.A. 78 (“Vi-
cor unnecessarily multiplied these proceedings by its con-
tinued adoption of unreasonable and untenable
positions . . . . Vicor’s insistence that [its equitable] de-
fenses be presented to the jury[] [and] last-minute decision
to rescind its request for an advisory verdict[] demonstrate
not only the weakness of these defenses but an exceptional
degree of gamesmanship.”).
Vicor argues three separate errors in the district
court’s exceptional-case finding and award of attorneys’
fees. Specifically, Vicor argues that the case was not ex-
ceptional and that the district court “(1) failed to consider
all relevant circumstances, (2) improperly punished Vicor
for pursuing colorable state-law counterclaims and equita-
ble defenses that survived summary judgment, and
(3) wrongly condemned Vicor for rearguing a rejected
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 17 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 17 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 18
claim-construction position.” Appellant’s Br. 50. SynQor
responds that the district court was well within its discre-
tion to find that Vicor had engaged in litigation misconduct
warranting an award of attorneys’ fees.
A district court abuses its discretion when it “base[s]
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Rothschild Con-
nected Devices Innovations, LLC v. Guardian Prot. Servs.,
Inc., 858 F.3d 1383, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (alteration in
original) (quoting Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt.
Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014)). None of Vicor’s
arguments on appeal suggests such errors on the part of
the district court.
As to the totality of circumstances, Vicor apparently
complains that the district court erred in failing to credit
instances of its good behavior, charging that “the district
court failed to account for the fact that over a decade of lit-
igation, there was no allegation that Vicor committed dis-
covery misconduct, violated any court order, or
transgressed any evidentiary ruling at trial.” Appellant’s
Br. 50. We are aware of no rule or prior case holding that
exceptional cases are limited to examples of attorney mis-
conduct. Cf. Energy Heating, LLC v. Heat On-The-Fly,
LLC, 15 F.4th 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining that
district courts are “not required to affirmatively weigh [a
party’s] purported lack of litigation misconduct” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
As to the district court’s discussion of Vicor’s equitable
claims and claim construction position, we are mindful that
the district court “live[d] with the case over a prolonged pe-
riod of time” and is thus “‘better positioned’” to determine
whether it was exceptional. Highmark, 572 U.S. at 563–64
(quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988)).
To the extent that Vicor suggests that its equitable claims
could not support an exceptional-case finding because they
survived summary judgment, it is mistaken. The fact that
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 18 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 18 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 19
the district court found that genuine factual disputes pre-
cluded summary judgment prior to trial does not mean that
such factual disputes were actually borne out in the evi-
dence or that Vicor’s positions were not weak. See Eko
Brands, 946 F.3d at 1375. Moreover, Vicor’s mere disa-
greement with the district court’s considered view of its lit-
igation conduct is not sufficient to support an abuse of
discretion.
B
District courts have discretion to “increase the dam-
ages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” 35
U.S.C. § 284. We have explained that, among the relevant
factors in determining whether to enhance damages, dis-
trict courts may consider (1) whether the defendant delib-
erately copied the ideas or design of another, (2) whether
the defendant investigated the scope of the patent and
formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was
not infringed, (3) the defendant’s behavior in the litigation,
(4) the defendant’s size and financial condition, (5) the
closeness of the case, (6) the duration of defendant’s mis-
conduct, (7) the defendant’s remedial action, (8) the de-
fendant’s motivation for harm, and (9) whether the
defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct. Read,
970 F.2d at 827. A district court is not required, however,
to discuss the Read factors, which are nonexhaustive: “The
Halo test merely requires the district court to consider the
particular circumstances of the case to determine whether
it is egregious.” Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ce-
ramics Corp., 875 F.3d 1369, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Vicor argues that the district court committed legal er-
ror by punishing Vicor for litigation misconduct rather
than “egregious infringement behavior.” Appellant’s
Br. 57–59 (quoting Halo Elecs., 579 U.S. at 103). While we
agree with Vicor that “[a]cts of litigation misconduct stand-
ing alone ‘are not sufficient for an increased damages
award,’” Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals L.P. v. U.S.
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 19 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 19 of 20 --

SYNQOR, INC. v. VICOR CORPORATION 20
Venture, Inc., 32 F.4th 1161, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting
Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996)),
that is not what happened here.
The district court walked through the Read factors and
awarded enhanced damages well within the statutory tre-
ble damages permitted by statute. J.A. 89 (“Ultimately,
although the Court finds that Vicor’s conduct does not
merit a full trebling of damages, . . . . [h]aving reviewed the
Read factors and having considered the totality of the cir-
cumstances in this case, . . . the Court finds an enhance-
ment [of $4.5 million] is appropriate.”). While Vicor makes
much of the district court’s references to its litigation mis-
conduct, this was not the only basis for its decision. For
example, the district court found that Vicor’s infringement
was longstanding and that, for certain accused products,
Vicor lacked a good-faith belief of non-infringement and
failed to take appropriate remedial action. See J.A. 84–89.
Moreover, we note that the jury reviewed the evidence
in the record and found willfulness. While “an award of
enhanced damages does not necessarily flow from a willful-
ness finding,” we have recognized that such a finding “is a
component of enhancement.” SRI Int’l, 14 F.4th at 1330
(quoting Presidio Components, 875 F.3d at 1382). Under
these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in enhancing damages.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Vicor’s remaining arguments and
find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
firm the jury’s verdict of indirect and willful infringement
of the ’702 patent and the district court’s enhanced dam-
ages and attorneys’ fees orders.
AFFIRMED
Case: 24-1879 Document: 57 Page: 20 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 20 of 20 --